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ABSTRACT
In the last four decades, most of Africa's indigenous non-colonial governments have been
confronted by internal wars of liberation either in the form of revolutions or of military
uprisings and coup de'tats. Since independence, these regimes have faced the most lucid and
trenchant criticism from intellectuals, from writers, playwrights and poets such as Chinua
Achebe, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Wole Soyinka, and, especially in the 1990s, from renowned
academics such as All A. Mazrui, A.M. Babu, Peter Anyang Nyong'o, Issa Shivji, Korwa G.
Adar, Samuel Decalo, Julius Nyang'oro and many others. In the view of these critics, the past
years of Africa's independence appear as the lost decades. Such criticism helped to reveal the
reality of the changing political situation in post-colonial Africa.
Discourses on Liberation and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is a theoretical, historical
and political analysis of liberation movements in post-colonial countries in the sub-continental
region of Africa. It examines the confrontation between liberation movements and indigenous,
that is non-colonial, non-white-minority-rule governments in the region. It attempts to clarify
the role played by liberation movements in the shaping of post-colonial African political order.
The main aim of the study is threefold: (i) to contribute to the theories of liberation by looking
at the specific problems faced by liberation from indigenous post-colonial non-white-minority-
regimes in Africa; (ii) to link the theories to empirical cases by looking at the self-views of the
actors involved in the liberation struggle itself; and fmally, (iii) to assess current problems
faced in African societies during the process of democratisation.
The study looks at the two cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia in order to ifiuminate and inform the
theoretical discussion. The two cases are particularly interesting because they are clearly
linked and still provide two different narratives on liberation. As will be shown in the course
of the investigation, Eritrean self-views centre more around self-determinationlsecession
andlor independence, while Ethiopian self-views refer more to democratic principles. The
investigation of the liberation movements in Eritrea and Ethiopia allows us to study the
relationship between two different narratives on liberation (self-determination and democracy)
in one concrete historical setting. Eritrea and Ethiopia are a unique experience because their
fighters of liberation have defeated a powerful army of a status quo regime backed, at one
moment, by both world powers. They form a challenge to much received thought and suggest
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GLOSSARY OF LOCAL TERMS
aklie: term for patience
al-tahrir: liberation
Ato: is word for 'Mr.' mainly in Ethiopia and not very commonly used in Eritrea
awet neh'fash: victory to the masses
awraja: administrative division (in Eritrea an awraja is a province)
baito: Tigrigna term for parliament or some kind of legislature/assembly
baito adi: village assembly (in Eritrea)
baria: despised ethnic group (associated in Eritrea with dark skin people such as
the Nara and the Kunama)
beta israel: Ethiopian jews often considered a different ethnic group
bin: Ethiopian currency, ten of its equivalent per a sterling pound (or five per U.S. dollar)
buda: the evil eye also used for persons believed to posses the buda
dergue: Amhara term for council or committee after the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia
desa (diessa): village based land distribution system in Eritrea (also shehena)
deyanus/dagna: judges/judge
ehadeg: Amharic acronym for EPRDF
enda: familiy based land distribution system (also tselmi)
eslah: reform
felasha: pejoratibe for the Ethiopian jews (also beta israel)
gelafo: a committe responsible for those who do not have the right to own land (because of age or
in the case of immigrants)
gim gema: tigrigna term for debate or assembly (mainly among the Tigrayans, TPLF)
girmawi: greatest of the great
gult: land granted as fief
harakat al-tahrir Ertrya: arabic term for 'front for the liberation of Eritrea'
hdreb: serfs (members of the Beni-Amer confederation of tribes)
highi-endaba: laws of the natives
hisbawi ginbar harnet Ertra: Tigrigna's name for the EPLF
hiyadat al ama: military headquarters
jabhat atahrir al Ertrya qiyada al ama: arabic name for the ELF
kebelles: urban-dwellers association (in Amharic the term means neighbourhood)
Kidamawai: first amongst the first
mahber showate: Tigrigna for 'group of five'
makelai aliet: outsiders or immigrants from Ethiopia to the highlands of Eritrea who were mainly
Tigrigna speaking Coptic Christians
mareb mellash: land beyond the river
medri geez: the land of the free
medri bahri: the land of the sea
menkae: Tigrigna's dual term for a bat or left-handed
meret le arrashu: land to the tiller (a political slogan used by students under Haile Selassies
final days in power
metaro: land dividers
mitias: a Tigrigna term for 'to help community members start a new life'
nabtab: aristocrats (a member of the Beni-Amer confederation of tribes)
negus negussie (neguste negast): king of kings, a title used for the Ethiopian emperors
ras: from Ras Teferi Mekonnen crown negus of Ethiopia by Empress Zawditu, and later became widely
known as Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia
Restinya: a secret right over land (rest hereditary powers)
rist: private property with a right of inheritance (often used in land distribution)
ix
sha'abia: arabic name for the EPLF
shehena: village based land tenure system in Eritrea (also diesa)
sheria: arabid term for 'islamic law'
shifta: Amharic term for bandit (used to describe the EPLF and other fronts in Ethiopia during
both the imperial and military rule)
tahrir: arabic term for liberation
tegadelti: fighters, heroes (title used to describe the EPLF liberation fighters). Singular: tegadelei,
feminine: tegadalti




tselmi: family based land distribution system (also enda)
wedati: advocates
Woizero: is word for 'Mrs.' In both Ethiopia and Eritrea
woreda: district
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyses the influence liberation movements have exerted in shaping African
societies. It argues that liberation movements and democratisation processes were linked in the
history of some post-colonial African countries. The precise nature of this link is elucidated by
the two selected cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia where post-liberation restructuring has provided
a fertile ground for the emergence of public debate. For the first time democracy has become a
common terminology in Ethiopia's political history. This chapter introduces the theme, scope,
and methodology of this study.
1.1. Sub--Saharan Africa: a general background
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is that sub-continental region of Africa lying within the Equator
south of the Sahara Desert. It extends from 15° north to 35° south latitude. It is almost as
large as the size of western Europe, the United States and Canada combined. The region is
dominantly African in culture and history as opposed to its northern counterpart-the Maghreb
region-which is mainly Caucasian and Arab in race. With the exception of Ethiopia, Liberia,
and a few big countries occupied by Belgium, Germany and Portugal, the whole region fell
under British and the French colonial rule'. That in turn explains why the region has largely,
politically and socially, remained both Anglophone and Francophone in influence. This
external connection has also played a role in the on-going transition to democracy. For
example, in Francophone Africa, the changes mainly took place in the form of the 'National
Conferences'2 , and in Anglophone countries the transition followed the line of either mass
'For a history of the 'Scramble for Africa' see Chapter 3.
2See the phenomenon of the national conference in Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and
Constraints of Democratization in Africa", African Affairs (1992), pp. 7-35; Julius E. Nyang'oro,
"Reform Politics and the Democratization Process in Africa", African Studies Review, vol. 37, no. 1
(April 1994), pp. 133-149; Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge', World Policy Journal,
vol. ix, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 279-307; Catherine Newbury, "Introduction: Paradoxes of
Democratization in Africa", African Studies Review, vol. 37, no. 1 (April 1994), pp. 1-8; Kathryn
Nwajiaku, "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited", The Journal of Modern African
Studies, vol. 32, no. 3(1994), pp. 411-427.
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demonstrations such as in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia 3 , or through liberation struggles such as
in Uganda, Namibia and South Africa4.
This thesis examines liberation and democratisation processes in all these settings. It offers an
analysis of African conceptions of liberation within the parameters of the discipline of
International Relations. Historically, our analysis will begin with the emergence of the African
State-System at the close of the 18th century. For the two case studies, the thesis also traces
the genesis of the liberation struggles in both Eritrea and Ethiopia in view of establishing the
link between their political activities since the beginning of this century to the contemporary
situation. The empirical work done is meant to enable the reader to draw similarities and
dissimilarities of views on liberation and democratisation from both countries, and to appraise
theories of liberation.
Furthermore, the thesis provides us with substantial lessons to enable us realise that the
current discourse on democracy in particular is not just something that has taken place because
of similar incidents elsewhere, therefore giving the impression that the African people rarely
initiate political changes of their own. Such an analysis has been a boon to the most repressive
regimes in Africa, because it supports their defence that changes are being imposed on them
from outside, for example from Western donors and the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) such as the IMF andlor World Bank. But as one commentator rightly remarked: "The
African people, however, know that there has never been any time since independence when
3For a comparative analysis on the effects of the events of democratic change in most countries in
Africa, see Naomi Chazan, op. cit., pp.279-307; Samuel Decalo, op. cit., pp. 7-35; and two books by
Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1987)
and 30 Years of Independence: the lost decades? (Nairobi: Academy Science Publishers, 1992).
he liberation struggle has always been the phenomenon of those countries for years. See Alex de
Waal, "Ethiopia: Transition to What?" World Policy Journal, vol. ix, no. 4(FalllWinter 1992), pp.
7 19-737; Joshua B. Forrest, "A Promising Start: the Inauguration and Consolidation of Democracy in
Namibia", World Policy Journal, vol. ix, no. 4(FallfWinter 1992), pp. 739-753; David Pool, "Eritrean
Independence: The Legacy of the Dergue and the Politics of Reconstruction", African Affairs,
92(1993), pp. 389-402; and Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern Africa Responses to Eastern European
Developments", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 28, no. 3(1990), pp. 43 1-455.
3
there was no pressure for democracy from below' 5 . Academics have only been involved in
exerting this pressure since the early 1980s6.
Thus, the struggle to democratise Africa has been there since independence; the only
difference now is that the world attention has changed, favouring the struggle of the people
against repressive regimes in Africa and the rest of the world. However, in the case of
liberation movements, unlike democracy, only minimal theoretical work has been done.
Therefore it is the intention of this thesis to update the debate and provide an analysis of the
link between liberation and democracy in the continent.
1.2. The Relevance of the Discourse for Africa
The democratic project or the process of redemocratising African politics is becoming the
central focus in African studies. This is not only because of the anti-authoritarian climate in
the West, but also because there are clear indications that peasants, workers, and intellectuals
in Africa are no longer prepared to accept being victims of despotic regimes 7 . Revolutionary
thought in Africa today encourages the view that democratic politics wifi be made possible
only after all authoritarian regimes have been replaced by progressive, open and pluralistic
systems of governance. This has been backed by the belief that any attempts to resolve these
predicaments wifi not only succeed in bringing about political legitimacy, but wifi also lead to
the restructuring of the economy to meet the needs of the people at the grassroots level.
However, the demand for radical change has also generated its own dilemmas. For example,
what type of democratic governance is acceptable to the African situation? Is political
liberalism the answer? If not, what democracy?
In Western liberal terms, democratisation entails the establishment of political rights that are
mainly encompassed in Dahl's three principles of polyarchy: competition for government
5A better defence of that view is given in the edition of African scholars, see Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, 30
Years of Independence in Africa: The Lost Decades?, op. cit., p. 6; also article by Hussein M. Adam
explains how the democratic fight is as old as the history of independence in Africa, see his, 'Frantz
Fanon as a Democratic Theorist", African Affairs, 92(1993), pp. 499-5 18.
6See for example the proceedings of the 1985 Naivasha Conference on democracy in Africa edited by
Afrifa Gitonga and Walter Oyugi (eds.), De,nocratic Theory and Practice in Africa (Nairobi:
Heinemann, 1988); and also the democratization literature of SAPES works and CODES RIA have
been so radical even prior to the clear demise of the former east-west divide.
7See Robert Fatton, "Liberal Democracy in Africa", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 105, no. 3(1990),
pp. 455-473;cited in Julius E. Nyang'oro, op. cit., pp. 134-135
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power, political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and fmally civil and
political liberties 8 . These three principal elements are also associated with bourgeois
liberalism, portraying a high-level of "real democracy" 9 . In the current discourse on
democracy in Africa, Larry Diamond takes Robert Dahi's literature as a basis for assessing the
nature of African political systems in the post-Cold War era. For him, democracy is indeed a
system of government that meets three conditions similar to Dahi's principles. As he observed,
what is necessary is:
[m]eaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups
(especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular
intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political
participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair
elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and fmally a level of civil
and political liberties - freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form
and join organisations - sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and
participation'0
It is the absence of most of these principles of civil government since independence that
provided the ground for the rise of public discontent and liberation movements. In fact, the
on-going discourse on democratisation is concerned not only with the introduction of these
democratic rights, but that indigenous institutions must be crafted which support the working
of democracy. With this new focus, the current political discourse has revived hopes for
democratic governance in the continent.
Comparatively, most of the post-colonial literature on African studies from the 1960s to the
1980s engaged very much with the development agenda'. For example, issues dealing with
ideology, policy choice or "democracy" and so on, were all subsumed under the general post-
independence development project. Worse still, the choice was limited: what would deliver
quickly the objective of development -- liberal or socialist methods? In a way, the era of
8See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1971).
9Within a bourgeois framework, 'real democracy" emanates from the three principals of polyarchy, see
Georg Sorensen, Democracy and the Developmental State (Aarhus, Den.: Institute of Political Science,
1991).
his Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 2: Africa (Boulder, CoL: Lynne Reinner, 1988), p.
47.
"See e.g.: Crawford Young, Ideology and Develop,nent in Africa (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1982); Richard Skiar, "Developmental Democracy", Comparative Studies in Society and
History, vol. 29, no. 4(October 1987), pp. 686-7 14.
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African independence in the late 1950s through the 1960s was not a fortunate historical
moment because the world was preoccupied with ideological competition and African
countries were bound to fall into the muddles of Cold War politics. Perhaps if African
independence were to take place today, there would not have been any dilemma(s) as to which
way to go in terms of ideology and models of development. Today, the whole continent
seems under pressure to replace one-party rule by multi-partyism. We wifi discuss later to
what extent the link between multi-partyism and democracy is appropriate for Sub-Saharan
Africa.
The shift from the development debate to that of pluralistic governance became unavoidable
especially when the continent started facing economic problems, and structural adjustment
programmes (policies) became a central focus, and therefore, a prerequisite for any relations
with international finance. Hence, developmentalism began to pave the way to adjustment at
the level of economy, and at the political level, bourgeois democracy and its tenets began to
gain respect at the close of the 1980s. Even those who posed as socialist or neo-Marxist the
world over began to revise their political and ideological standpoints at the close of this
century' 2 . However, the shift did not go unchallenged. Some African scholars have already
cautioned that the shift from the developmental paradigm to democratic change must be done
with care. According to Julius Nyangro, there is a danger of faffing into the trap of shifting
to, and embracing, a new paradigm without taking stock of what was good about the old
school of development'3.
From the late 1980s, a much cautious, but rather operational and pragmatic approach, has
been taken by a few scholars who attempt to place the debate on democracy in Africa in the
' 2For example, Julius Nyerere's Tanzania in an interview with the Kenyan press, prior to Kenya's multi-
party elections in 1992 became apologetic and began to embrace the symptoms of democratic change.
Not only that, there has been an enormous literature advocating, not explicitly for democracy, but in
particular for issues of human rights. See SAPES and CODESRIA works by people like Issa Shivji,
The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (London: CODESRIA Books, 1989); in idem (ed.), State and
Constitutionalis,n: An African Debate on Democracy (Harare: SAPES, 1991); Claude E. Welch and
Ronald I. Meltzer (eds.), Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1984); Rhoda Howard, Human Rights in Commnonwealth Africa (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1986); and Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the
Li,nits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
' 3For earlier warnings on this, see Julius E. Nyang'oro, The State and Capitalist Development in
Africa: Declining Political Economics (New York: Praeger, 1989); Julius E. Nyang'oro and Timothy
M. Shaw (eds.), Corporatismn in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice (Boulder, Cot.: Westview,
1989); and Manfred Bienfeld, 'Dependency Theory and the Political Economy of Africa's Crisis",
Review of African Political Economy, vol. 43(1988), pp. 67-87.
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context of a changing global economy' 4 . These scholars contend that democratisation in
Africa must be viewed more as a process rather than a mere sharp or radical turn from
authoritarianism to a more open political rule, and that democratisation in Africa must be
discussed within the context of political economy' 5 . Even though it is evident that liberal-
democracy has since been justified on its own merit even by writers who considered
themselves socialists, there is a danger of construing others like Arnin, Shivji and Shaw as
having an ideological reservation about bourgeois liberal democracy, since the trio posed
themselves in the 1970s and 1980s as socialists. However, as Richard Sandbrook has argued:
From a democratic-socialist perspective, liberal democracy is a defensible goal as a
political system characterised by regular and free elections in which politicians
organised into parties compete to form the government, by the right of virtually all
adult citizens to vote, and by guarantees of a range of familiar political and civil rights
The other salient issue of greater relevance in the debate is the nature of the African state and
its fragmented civil society. It has been argued that the current debate in Africa about
governance and the one-party state is a manifestation of the crises of the state vis-a-vis
democracy and development. So to understand both the nature of the African condition, and
the current debate about it, the argument goes, it is necessary that we focus on the analysis of
the post-colonial state in Africa and its relationship to civil society' 7 . As Ibbo Mandaza has
observed, 'African scholars are nearer now to the consensus that the African condition is an
outcome of both internal and external factors" I8 Therefore, there is a growing need for
' 4Proponents of this school include: Samir Amin, 'The Issue of Democracy in the Contemporary Third
World", Socialis,n and Democracy, vol. 12(January 1991), pp. 83-104; Issa G. Shivji, "Contradicting
Class Perspectives in the Debate on Democracy", In Issa G. Shivji (ed.), op cit., pp. 253-260; and
Timothy M. Shaw, 'Revisionism in African Political Economy in 1990s", In Julius E. Nyang'oro and
Timothy M. Shaw (ed.), Beyond Structural Adjust,nent in Africa: The Political Economy of
Sustainable and Democratic Development (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 49-70.
' 5A plausible remark about this is made by Julius E. Nyang'oro, "Reform Politics and the
Democratisation Process in Africa", op. cit., pp. 144-146.
' 6See his "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist Revisionist Perspective", Canadian Journal of
African Studies, vol. 22, no. 2(1988), pp. 240-267:241; also cited by Julius Nyang'oro, op. cit., p. 136.
' 7See Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Con.:
Yale University Press, 1994); and Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly
(London: Longman, 1989).
' 8See his "The State and Democracy in Southern Africa", in Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), 30 Years of
Independence in Africa: The Lost Decades?, op. cit., pp. 62-85:64.
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studies of the relationship between the post-colonial state and civil society; and the contextual
nature of democracy. Within the Sub-S aharan African situation, for example, the issue of
governance and democracy could not be understood outside the context of revolutionary
thought. Here it is necessary to go beyond the simple characterisation of the present changes
in the continent as mere resonances of events elsewhere, in particular as major echoes of the
collapse of former Soviet Union and the redemocratisation of its European buffers. It must be
noted that post-colonial restructuring in Africa (SSA) has been the product of collective
rebellious effort by revolutionary intellectuals such as in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda
and/or now the Congo (former Zaire). The effects of this restructuring have sent shock waves
to other neighbouring regimes that are now perceived as islands of dictatorship.
Post-colonial liberation struggles have in specific terms affected the bulk of African societies,
changed the nature of the state and the extent (and extant) of civil society in general. Like
other post-colonial states elsewhere in the world, the African state is caught between the
continuities and demands of old structures, as reflected in the economic power of the first
generation leaders and their affies and international capital. We can observe such trends also in
other countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya and Malawi. A comprehensive study of the
African situation would have to provide insights into the political and economic conditions
that almost inexorably propelled the post-colonial state towards becoming a one-party-state
(de facto or de jure). It would further have to explore the conditions and means whereby civil
society can create the space to overcome those negative aspects and factors through
democratisation. This thesis contributes to such a study. The case studies selected for the
discourse on liberation and democracy in SSA gives us a deeper insight into the problematic of
the state and democracy in the post-colonial situation. Given the relevance of external and
internal factors in the evolution of African societies, we are compelled to trace the historical
emergence of the African state system before we analyse the changes post-colonial liberation
has caused.
When the metropolitan governments withdrew from their colonies in Africa, most indigenous
regimes succeeding them began to face severe opposition from their discontented citizens,
mainly because the decolonisation slogans had falsely promised a heaven for their followers.
Prior to independence, most national liberation movements in SSA cried for freedom from
colonial regimes. During the colonial era the political mobilisation of the African masses by
the nationalist leadership rested simply on the antipathy towards colonial domination.
Nationalist movements, therefore promoted not only the politicisation of the masses but also
the radicalisation of their consciousness. On the part of the masses, the assumption was that
the freedom yearned for at independence was inclusive - for all peoples. But in retrospect, it
appeared later that these hopes were never realised. And as a result, the majority of the
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African populace started to witness a deteriorating situation in which the gap between the
rulers in their mansions and the masses in their slums widened. In addition, most of the newly
independent African countries emerged under the aegis of dominant ethnic and tribal groups
who formed the leadership of the new nations. That in turn led to the concentration of power
in the centre and the people began to witness the unfair distribution of the "national wealth" in
terms of development. Consequently, the "marginalised" groups and classes of people in the
periphery became the main centre of revolutionary movements.
The important aspect to emphasise when examining the political crises in Africa is what has
already been pointed out, the nature of the African state, itself a product of colonialism. Many
analyses of African politics today tend to attribute most problems in Africa to the nature of the
African stat& 9 . However, the oppressive character of the post-colonial structure was mainly
augmented by lack of a democratic order or institutions, and that has often triggered peasant
mobilisation and nationalist sentiments from within. As a result, liberation movements in the
post-colonial era have often become one channel or another for getting equal rights and
perhaps even for democratising some parts of the continent. Thus, there is a link between
liberation and democracy in the history of some African countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, andlor now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
However, although the issues of liberation and democratisation cannot be separated entirely,
this thesis will focus on the influence of the liberation movements on these developments. The
process of "democratisation" will not be studied on its own, but only to the extent that it is
linked to the process of "liberation".
1.3. Methodological Considerations
This study is a work in political theory whose primary intention is to explore the specific
nature of African discourses on liberation in the post-colonial era. We will examine issues
theoretically, and use the empirical data collected from Eritrea and Ethiopia to appraise and
illuminate theoretical considerations. Moreover, the empirical work uncovers new narratives
on liberation. Thus, the main aim of conducting this empirical research is threefold. First, it
will contribute to the theories of liberation by looking at the specific problems faced by
liberation from indigenous, that is, non-white-minority-regimes. Second, by looking at the
self-views of the actors involved in the liberation struggle, the empirical findings illuminate
19 See in particular Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the
Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Zolberg Ergas, The African State in
Transition; Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, op. cit.; and Crawford
Young, The.African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, op. cit.
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theoretical underpinnings. Finally, by bringing in untapped sources, the thesis informs its
readers about current problems in African societies.
(a) Sources and Source Material (the use of interviews and texts in this study)
The thesis incorporates an analysis of material obtained from the fieldwork in Eritrea and
Ethiopia. The fieldwork involved the conduction of interviews, collection of archival materials
and published and unpublished texts from key actors of the liberation struggles in Eritrea and
Ethiopia. In setting up these interviews, I drew a lot from personal contacts in the Eritrean
diplomatic service. In addition, I collected opinions from the local population. I was also able
to talk to foreign diplomats in Asmara and Addis Ababa so as to be able to oppose Eritrean
and Ethiopian self-views to the assessments from outsiders.
(b) Organisation of Interviews
The fieldwork was conducted between January and July 1996 in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The
interviews concentrated mainly on people's beliefs, ideas and experiences both during the
thirty and seventeen years of war in Eritrea and Ethiopia respectively and their aftermaths. The
respondents to interviews were mainly drawn from occupational categories that represented
some of the most important constituencies in the post-liberation sectors of the Eritrean and
Ethiopian states. I spoke to the ordinary citizens, fighters, and demobiised fighters, to both
senior and junior ranks of the civil service in different governmental departments and
ministries. I had long conversations with key actors in both domestic and foreign affairs. I
spent time with the leaders of the EPLF (now the People's Front for Democracy and Justice,
PFDJ) and a regional Governor in Eritrea. I did the same in Ethiopia where I had ample time
with leading members at the EPRDF Headquarters in Addis Ababa, the Ministry of National
Defence and other governmental departments and ministries. I had long interviews with key
actors in the Constitutional Commission, members of parliament, women leaders, and others
involved in research and voluntary organisations in the two countries.
Most respondents were aged between thirty and fifty, and a few elderly people. A sizeable
group of young people drawn from my political science class in the University of Asmara also
gave me their own views of the whole situation. The educational background of my
respondents ranged from a handful who had completed only primary schooling to a number
with advanced or professional university degrees. The interviews usually lasted between one
and three hours. During each interview, the following themes were pursued: (a) the struggle
for liberation-practical definitions and conceptions, (b) democracy and democratisation,
secession and self-determination-practices and understandings, (c) transition from a liberation
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to a government structure, (d) the future prospects of a post-liberation society (with examples
from the Eritrean and Ethiopian cases), (e) general social issues: education, health, and the
role of women, and the youth, and land reform, and finally (1) the relationship between Eritrea
and Ethiopia and other neighbours in the region. In order to compare and verify the
information acquired from Eritrean and Ethiopian nationals, I also had conversations with
diplomats, journalists, administrators from other countries stationed in Eritrea and Ethiopia,
social scientists, academics and students in public institutions.
(c) Research Findings
The findings of our study concern (i) the suitability of existing theories of liberation for the
specific cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia, and (ii) for the entire continental politics of Africa.
Moreover, they concern (iii) the linkage between liberation and post-liberation governmental
problems, (iv) the relationship between liberation and democratisation, (v) the impact of the
end of the Cold War on the struggles for liberation, and (vi) more generally, contemporary
problems of African societies stemming from the cluster of issues discussed in this thesis.
1.4. Overview
The thesis begins, in Chapter Two, with a review of the literature on African conceptions of
liberation. Because concepts of liberation cannot be reviewed without referring to concepts of
democracy, I have also examined parts of the literature on democracy. Because of their great
influence on African thinkers and politicians, Marxist theories are examined in some detail.
For example, pragmatic adaptations of Marxism are treated in particular via African
revolutionary thinkers like Fanon and Cabral, and African statesmen like Nkrumah, Senghor,
Neto, Toure and Machel. In the same vein, the Christian Socialisms of Kaunda and Nyerere,
and the Stalinism of Mengistu are also examined. In this chapter, the relationship between
liberation and democracy is also discussed in theoretical terms.
Chapter Three traces the historical emergence of the African state system and discusses the
subsequent struggles for liberation there. It presents a brief history of the scramble for Africa,
its partition and independence from European colonialism. It further discusses the notions of
hation', 'state', and 'bivil society'. This chapter then situates this historical narrative within the
context of African international relations where the role of the United Nations (UN) as an
international body and that of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as a regional
organisation are also briefly outlined. As we shall see, the charters of the two organisations
had unfavourable (if not contradictory) implications on post-colonial liberation movements.
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Chapters Four and Five are case studies of the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia. Chapter Four presents the genesis of the Eritrean struggle for
independence through liberation, drawing on individual experiences of Eritreans during the
war. Chapter Five is structured in a parallel way as chapter Four but presents the case of the
liberation struggle for democracy ii Ethiopia. In both chapters, the role of the elites during
the mobilisation process and the rise of peasant consciousness in response to the liberation
struggles in Eritrea and Ethiopia are examined.
Chapter Six offers a concluding assessment of competing theories of liberation in the context
of the two cases studied previously as well as in the African context in general.
12
CHAPTER TWO: NOTIONS OF LIBERATION AND DEMOCRACY
Introduction
In African politics, liberation is a mass engagement in an enterprise where certain specific
goals and objectives are thought to be attainable through it. This connotation is very much
identical to its original meaning of the term developed from the American civil war in 1776
and the French revolution in 1789 and strengthened by the political writings of Karl Marx.
The African concept of liberation first emerged when the need for independence became acute
and was highly influenced by Marxist theories in the 1950s. In a theoretical discussion of
liberation it is difficult to avoid the mainstream theories of the social sciences, including
Marxist ones, with their roots in the Enlightenment project. The Enlightenment took the issues
of justice and human rights across borders and has therefore heavily influenced the interaction
of Western and non-Western societies. Thus, we are compelled to trace and explain the
history of how the African continental state-system came into being. Such an approach cannot
be skipped because it prevents us from being trapped into an irrelevant comparison of the
'free' Western World to Africa without knowing how the so-called "free" world emerged,
what ideas and conditions necessitated its emergence as a liberal society.
To be sure, liberal democracy took a long evolutionary process to emerge in the history of the
Anglo-American tradition and the rest of the Western society 20. The devices we are quite
familiar with come from two major sources. The first source is the long, slow, haphazard
growth of the English Constitution from the Parliament of Simon de Montfort in 1265 through
innumerable struggles for rights won a few at a time, as for example, in the Magna Carta. It
was the experience of the English Constitution which came to influence the making of the
American Constitution some years later2t . The other second source dates back to antiquity -
Greece and Rome, whose practices and writings on government inspired thinkers to design
plans for ideas and ideals such as democracy, equality, freedom and rights. That long tradition
in turn produced its often very different progenies - Rousseau, Locke, Hobbes, Burke and
much later the Jeffersons and the Madisons in the framing of the U.S Constitution.
20 For a study of the roots of democracy in Western society, see the collection of essays in John Dunn,
(ed.), Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992); and David Held, Models of Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
21 See for example, Jack J. Harvey, The British Constitution, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), and
Wilbourn E. Benton, 1787: Drafting the U.S. Constitution (College Station: Texas A & M University
Press, 1986).
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Thus the "democracy thesis", embraced today in other parts of the world since the collapse of
the Berlin wall in 1989, is an old idea that rests, however, on the nineteenth century
proponents and interpreters of the idea. For example, the conservative French Alexis de
Tocquivile could agree with the liberal German Philosopher, Immanuel Kant that democracy
was indeed the wave of the political future 22 . For Kant, liberal democracy was not only the
political embodiment of freedom, itself the driving force of history, but also the basis for a
peaceful world order23 . World peace, Kant thought, would follow from an expanded
community of democratic nations. The idea of a world organisation, supported earlier by
people such as Pierre Dubois in 1306, George Podebrad in 1460 and Emeric Cruce in 1623,
appealed to the intellectual imagination of many peace lovers. Many twentieth century leaders
led the movement for some similar form of international order that later resulted in the
founding of the League of Nations in 1919 and culminated in 1945 to a United Nations
Organisation that has continued to survive to date 24 . In fact, liberal internationalists like
Woodrow Wilson emphasised the salience of international law and institutions, and an active
role for government as well as for commerce, in creating the conditions for democracy and
peace25 . This has remained a concrete requisite especially in the third world where the call for
national constitutional conferences, issues of human rights, freeing market economies and so
on have become, in the eyes of many, major signals of democratisation 26 . This African
22 See the article by Jerry Sanders, "The Prospects for 'Democratic Engagement"', p. 369.
23 See for example Walter Bryce Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx,
Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Ronald Beiner and William
James Booth (ed.), Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (New Haven; London:
Yale University Press, 1993); and Andrew Hurrel, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International
Relations", Review of International Studies, 16(1990), pp. 183-205.
24 See Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During WW II
(New York: Aitheneum, 1967); and F. Warren Kuehl, Seeking World Order (Nashvile: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1969).
25 See the influence and contribution of liberal internationalism in the development of International
Relations as a discipline in A.J.R Groom, "Approaches to Conflict and Cooperation in International
Relations: Lessons from Theory for Practice", Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations,
2(1993), pp. 9-15.
26 See e.g. Abdullahi Ahmed An-naim and Frances Deng (ed.), Human Rights in Africa: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1990); Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights in
the New World Order," World Policy Journal, vol. ix, no. 2(Spring 1992), pp. 249-277; Dicker
Richard, "Monitoring Human Rights in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 29, no.
3(1991), pp. 505-510; Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden and Winston P. Nagon (eds.), Human Rights and
Governance in Africa (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994); Mahmood Mamdani, "The
Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 28, no.
(1990), pp. 359-374; Ben Turok, (ed.), Alternative Development Strategies for African. Volume
Three: Debt and Democracy (London: Institute for African Alternatives, 1991); J. Barry Riddel,
"Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa", The Journal of
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transition from an old order to the new will put both the classical and modern claims for
democracy to their most significant test, where a clear distinction has to be made between
democracy as a model and democracy as a process undertaken under previously unconducive
conditions in developing polities that are not, particularly in rural areas, well Westernised.
But a discourse on liberation and democracy in Africa and as elsewhere in the world, such as
in Latin America and the breakaway republics of the former Soviet Union and its former
European buffers, could not have arisen without prior influence from the preceding history of
Western political thinking. Western political history has had a great impact, both positive and
negative, on almost all aspects of the world's political systems. It is such a legacy that has led
mainstream Western international relations scholars to comment:
From the point of view of what might be termed the "linear" development of ideas
about international relations, however, it is Europe that really matters m terms of how
"world" politics as we conceptualise today emerged. The legacy of the European
nation-state system, despite many variations, has essentially been adopted as the world
system in our time27.
In fact, the African state-system emerged within the phenomenon of an established
international system that was dominated by the triumph of Western liberal-democracy. Surely
the West had a monopoly of 'civilisation' and world political leadership. Most of the
backward' countries were in colonial tuteledge to 'advanced' and very often liberal democratic
states such as Great Britain and France, and it was assumed that before being granted
independence, they were to be brought along to the point where they would run themselves on
liberal democratic lines 28 . Perhaps that would have happened had one substantial part of the
world not rejected the liberal way as early as 1917, with the Russian revolution and the
formation of the Soviet Union. Though the West, until the second world war, regarded the
Soviet bloc as something outside the mainstream of world development, it achieved influence
Modern African Studies, vol. 30, no. 1(1992), pp. 53-68; and finally Julius E. Nyangor'o and Timothy
M. Shaw (eds.), Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Political Economy of Sustainable and
Democratic Development (New York: Praeger, 1992). The page numbers for all subsequent citations
of these references will be given within the text.
27 See in particular William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Theory: Then and
Now, op. cit., p.4.
28 See among others, Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1961); P.J. Rooke, The Wind of Change in Africa (London: Allen, 1967); Gideon S. Were,
History, Public Morality and Nation-Building: A Survey of Africa Since Independence (Nairobi:
Gideon S. Were Press, 1992); I.K. Sundiata, "The Roots of African Despotism: The Question of
Political Culture", African Studies Review, vol. 31, no. 1(1988), pp. 9-32); and C.B. Macpherson, The
Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 2.
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over many of the Third World systems of government. The protracted Cold War occurred
and its end has been celebrated at the close of this century as marking the triumph of liberal-
democracy29 . Before this, most of the underdeveloped areas of Africa, Asia and Latin
America did achieve their independence, and a majority of them became one form or another
of one-party state. They rejected both the ethos and the actual institutions of the Western
individualist liberal-democracy but tended to defme themselves as democracies of their own
variant and not necessarily similar to those in Westminster, the French Parliament, or the
Congress and Senate of the United States of America. When the United Nations and many
other governmental and non-governmental organisations formed, all newly independent
African states enrolled as members of such organisations, where their styles of government
became tacitly legitimised.
Therefore, apart from the recent attempts at promoting democracy in the world -- Samuel
Huntington's "third Wave of democratisation in the modern era" 3 ° -- the concept 'democracy'
and for that matter liberation, developed as humanity strove for civilisation. However, in
order to analyse the discussion and for Africa to benefit from its relevance, we need to trace
separately the origins of the terms liberation and democracy.
2.1. Notions of Democracy
Etymologically, the term 'democracy' was first conceived and popularised in ancient Greek
City-States and was derived from two common Greek words: demos meaning the 'people', and
kratos, meaning 'to rule'43 '. Yet, while the historical origin of the term is uncontested, its
meaning remained elusive. In his introductory chapter, David Held writes "The history of
democracy is curious; the history of democracies is puzzling" 32 . In fact, nearly everyone today
says they are democrats no matter whether their views are on the left, centre or right. Political
29 See the provocative debate in the following: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the last
Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992); Timothy Bums (ed.), After History?: Fukuyama and His
Critics (Lanham, Md.: Littlefield, 1994); and Christopher Bertram and Andrew Chitty (ed.), Has
History Ended? Fukuyama, Marx, Modernity (Aldershot: Hants, 1994).
30 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 109-163; and by the same author "How
Countries Democratize", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 106, no. 4(1991-1992), p. 579.
31 See the etymological derivation and definition of the term in David Held, op. cit., pp. 2-3; Robert
Dahi, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956); Robert
Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 3-5.
32 See David Held (ed.), Models of Democracy, op. cit., p. 1.
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regimes of all kinds in, for instance, Western Europe, even the former Eastern bloc, Latin
America and one-party systems in Africa, all claimed to be democracies. Worse still military
leaders who lack distinctive legitimacy have often seized power with the pretext that they are
cleansing the state in order to restore a rightful democracy. Yet, when one examines what
each of these practised, there are radical differences. The whole attraction rests on the
conception that democracy seems to bestow what David Held describes as 'an aura of
legitimacy' on modern political life: rules, laws, policies and decisions appear justified and
appropriate when they are 'democratic3.
Democracy is and has been a remarkably difficult form of government to create and sustain.
For instance, in Western societies it evolved through intensive social struggles and is
frequently sacrificed in such struggles. Indeed the historical development of democracy took
many forms and used many devices to reach especially its elusive goal, human freedom. And
as we know of its origins, liberal democracy has often had a wayward historical development.
So while we try to conceptualise the term in this study, it is much safer that we do not attempt
to define democracy rigorously but rather outline some of the generally received defmitions of
it, and base our discourse on them.
Democracy as conceived in ancient Greece contained some of the ingredients of modern
democratic ideals which include: maintenance of law and order; promotion of justice for all;
and maximisation of freedom and equality for all citizens 34 . Therefore, the institutional
arrangements set up to ensure the survival of Greek democracy included: short office tenure
for public officials, direct participation of all adult citizens in the legislative process, majority
33 Ibid., p. 1.
Among notable introductions to democratic theory and practice in all their varieties, see especially
Robert A. Dahl, op cit.; C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1973); David Held, op. cit.; Jack Lively, Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975);
Carol C. Gould, offers a normative argument for the right of participation in decision-making in all
aspects of political life including economic and social life as well, see his Rethinking Democracy:
Freedom and social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), pp.31-90; James S. Fishkin, Democracy and deliberation: New Directions for
Democratic Reform (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp.29-4!; Geraint Parry and
George Moyser, 'More Participation, More Democracy?" in David Beetham (ed.), Defining and
Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1984), pp.44-62; John Dunn, op. cit.; and most recently the
translated works of Christian Meier: The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. by David McLintock
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) and The Political Art of Greek Tragedy, trans.
by Andrew Webber (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).
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rule decision-making, prohibition of re-election to certain key offices, popular control of
officials (including military ones), lot system of election for certain government positions35.
While 'modern' democracies have extensively borrowed from the ancient Greek democratic
conception, the latter, has however, been also conceived as defective in certain crucial ways.
For example it was strongly anti-feminist, since women, even wives of male citizens, had no
political rights. Moreover, though it endowed citizens with political and legal equality, it did
not extend the equality concept to other fields such as education, economics and social arenas.
Children, resident foreigners and slaves were all excluded from Greek democratic rights.
Worse still, the Greek democratic arrangement rested on the economic institution of human
slavery, where slaves and other non-citizen groups produced and reproduced all the city
wealth, while the 'citizen class' such as all men engaged in political activities 36 . In this context
for example, Justin Rosenberg proposes that there is a structural relationship between the
emergence of democracy and slavery37.
Though the Greek version of democracy is interpreted by some as primitive and exclusive of
the majority of the populace, others tend to think that the Greek democracy was a full
democracy, open to all its citizens while admitting at the same time that the notion of
citizenship was different. None the less the justffications given by the ancient Greek oligarchy
for their type of 'democratic' arrangement are in some ways remarkably similar to the
justifications used to legitimise oppressive regimes in former Eastern bloc, Latin America and
Africa that claimed to be democracies. Operating within the context of a slave political
economy, the ancient Greek rulers argued that the hierarchical division of labour and socio-
political organisation that existed was just and hence, democratic, in as far as each person was
seen to be performing the task(s) one was naturally fitted to do. Similarly, equality in this
context was interpreted to mean equal within one's own class, gender, race and age group.
See the enumeration of these in Wanjiku M. Kabira, Jacqueline A. Oduol and Maria Nzomo (ed.),
De,nocratic Change in Africa: Women 's Perspectives (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1993), p. 5; Other
necessary conditions of democracy are provided by Michael Saward, 'Democratic Theory and Indices
of Democratization", in David Beetham, op. cit., pp. 16-17; and for a detailed analysis see Jack Lively,
op. cit., pp. 53-1 10.
36 For the exemplary democratic practices of classical Athens, see especially A.H.M. Jones, Athenian
Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957); William G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy
(London: Methuen, 1966); C. Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989); and M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
See his article "Secret Origins of the States", Review of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2(April
1992), pp. 131-159.
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We shall also see that many 'modern democracies', though based on a capitalist rather than
slave mode of production, display significant similarities with the ancient Greek democratic
practice38.
When assessing Greek democracy, however, we must remember that, for the Greeks,
democracy was more or something else than equal rights for the citizen. The rise of democracy
signified a new era for mankind. The polis and democracy meant that aspects of social order
were now in the hands of man to design. Order became, arguably for the first time in man's
self-understanding, disposable, contingent, subject to human design, though still within certain
limitations39 . The advent of democracy in Greece meant, then, a fundamental change in man's
self-understanding, in his ontology, that is, in the way he related himself to his environment, to
the cosmos. There are, in other words, ontological preconditions for the emergence of
democracy.
As indicated earlier, it is often prudent not to attempt to defme democracy precisely as there
are numerous defmition. So the best alternative to this, would be to outline and contextualise
the various definitions at our disposal. For Dahl, democratic theory is concerned with
processes by which ordinary citizens exert a high degree of influence and control over leaders.
However, this is a minimal definition that could be translated easily to mean a variety of
things40. In the 'Nature of Democracy', Barry Holden defmes it as a political system of which
it can be said that the whole people, positively or negatively, make or are entitled to make, the
basic determining decisions on important matters of public policy41 . He also writes of various
sorts of democracy: direct, indirect or representative42 . However, his definitions presuppose
the presence of a constitution, or other declared system of basic norms, which authorises the
making of decisions by the people. In short, it requires the presence of institutions such as the
executive, judiciary and the legislature. This is precisely what Africa needs, a democracy
institutionally distinguished from other systems in which groups of people -- through civil
disobedience, riot, general disorders, insurrection or the threat of it -- influence political
38 See for example the publication by Keith Graham, The Battle of Democracy: Conflict, Consensus
and the Individual (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986).
See for details Christian Meier, op. cit.
° Robert Dahi talks of Madisonian democracy, Populistic democracy and Polyarchical democracy. See
his A Preface to democracy, op. cit.; and his Polyarchy, op. cit.
41 See Barry Holden, The Nature of Democracy (London: Thomas Nelson, 1974), p. 8.
42 Barry Holden op. cit. p. 28.
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decision-making to such an extent that they are, in effect, making the basic decisions on
important matters of public policy.
It was Abraham Lincoln who developed the famous phrase, "government of the people, by the
people, for the people" 43 . Lincoln refers to the control of the state or states' actions by the
people. But who are "the people"? The Athenian city-state of ancient Greece only included a
minority of the society among the decision-makers. It mainly included the farmers, those
involved in commerce, education and so on. However, in an early meaning of 'democracy' the
sense in which the word is used by Aristotle, 'the people' meant precisely the poor who were
not slaves. For Aristotle, a democracy is a polis in which the poor rule44 . 'The people' were
always equated with the 'mob'. The other concept of 'the people' by capitalist societies in their
18th and 19th century development covered the middle classes rather than the poor45.
Sometimes the meaning was not so much the 'middle classes' but something like 'responsible
people'46 . One of the crucial factors was the linking of the ownership of property with full
membership of society and the consequent right to participate in political decision-making.
Hence, the poor had no stake in society, and were therefore in one sense not of that society.
However over the years, the whole thrust of democratic theory and democratic thought has
been towards "inclusive citizenship", or the enlargement of the proportion of society involved
in politics47.
In the 1950s, John Plamenatz asked yet another question: "what are the necessary conditions
without which democracy could not existT' 48 . The debate identified different categories for a
sustainable democracy: cultural, political, economic, and general social conditions such as
participation, consensus, freedom of activities such as of speech, association, press, freedom
from arbitrary arrests, free and fair election procedures and so forth.
See Don E. Fehrenbacher, Lincoln in Text and Context. Collected Essays (Standford, Cal.:
Standford University Press, 1988); and James M. Macpherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second
American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
Aristotle, The politics, IV, p. viii.
See D. Spearman, Democracy in England (London: Rockliff, 1967), P. 87.
46 See for example, Voltaire's definition quoted by J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), p. 244.
See a satisfactory discussion of this by Jack Lively, op. cit. pp. 7-9.
48 See John Plamenatz, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successful Functioning Democracy", American
Political Science Review, vol. 50, (1956), pp. 101-137
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Some scholars have suggested that one way of understanding the concept democracy would
be by looking at those countries that have proclaimed themselves as being democratic49.
However, such a pragmatic approach was attacked as illogical and one author refers to it as a
major example of a "definitional fallacy"50. Others like Schumpeter sought the development of
an empirically based 'realistic' model of democracy51 . Deliberately avoiding normative
discussions of the meaning of democracy, he concerned himself with the task of accounting for
how actual democracies work. For Schumpeter, democracy was a political method, that is an
institutional arrangement for arriving at political-legislative and administrative-decisions by
vesting in certain individuals the power to decide on all matters as a consequence of their
successful pursuit of the people's vote52 . This is what David Held explains as the result of
democratic life which has almost become an axiomatic struggle between rival political leaders,
arrayed for example, in parties, for the mandate and legitimacy to rule53.
Others have also suggested the identification of certain principles that are not necessarily
embedded in specific governments or countries. For example David Beetham's "Auditing
Democracy in Britain", seeks to isolate 'the core ideas or principles embodied in the historical
conception of democracy as "rule of the people". He takes these to be 'popular control' and
'political equality'54 . Hadenius arrives at a conception of 'Political democracy' which holds that
public policy 'is to be governed by the freely expressed wifi of the people whereby all
individuals are to be treated as equals' 55 . Lively emphasises inclusive citizenship and political
' Already variants on this approach had surfaced. For example Arendt Lijphart, Democracies:
Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1984), p. 2; however much earlier than that the approach had already been
indicated in the fifth edition of J.A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269.
° See Barry Holden, op. cit., p. 6.
' J. Schumpeter, op. cit.
52 Ibid., p. 269.
David Held, Models of Democracy, op. cit., p. 165.
See David Beetham's manuscript, "Auditing Democracy in Britain", Democratic Audit Paper NO. 1.
Hu,nan Rights Center University of Essex (London: Coichester/Charter 88 Trust, 1993), p. 6.
See A. Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
pp. 7-9.
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equality56 . Sartori suggests that democracy not only entails majority rule and participation, but
also equality, freedom, consensus, coercion, competition, pluralism, and constitutional rule57.
With such a variety of definitions on offer, we can either simply retreat into essential
contestability58 , which seems to amount to a "giving up" 59, or we can continue searching for
reasons that could satisfactorily justify the adoption of certain specific principles of democracy
as basic60. Modern Western liberal democracy is often mentioned in this context as a basic
model of democracy. We will discuss some of its principles in the following.
(a) The Liberal-Democratic Paradigm
Liberal democracy is a system of rule based on elected 'officers' who undertake to 'represent'
the interests or views of citizens within the framework of the 'rule of law' 6t . It is basically a
liberalised or liberally constituted democracy defmed and structured within the limits set by
liberalism62 . But what is liberalism? Its meaning could be summarised in three main tenets:
(1) Liberalism upholds the values of freedom of choice, reason, and toleration in the face of
tyranny and any absolutist system 63 ; (2) liberalism sought to restrict the powers of the state
and defme a uniquely private sphere independent of state action. At the centre of this project
was the goal of freeing civil society (particularly personal, family and business life) from
political interference by the state 64 . And (3) liberal democracy became generally associated
56 See Jack Lively, op. cit., pp. 49-51.
See Giovani Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987), p.
184.
58 A discussion of such alternative was raised by A. Arblaster, Democracy (Milton Keynes: Open
University Press, 1987), pp. 5-8.
See David Beetham, op. cit., p. 1.
60 Saward, "Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization" in David Beetham, OP. cit., p. 7.
61 David Held, "Democracy: From the City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order" in David Held (ed.),
Prospects for Democracy, op. cit., p. 15.
62 See Bhiku Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy" in David Held, op. cit, p. 157.
63 See for example, C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, op. cit.; and John Dunn,
Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
David Held, Models of De,nocracy, op. cit., p. 41.
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with the doctrine that individuals should be free to pursue their own preferences in religious,
economic and political affairs, in fact, in everything that affected daily life65.
According to Macpherson, in Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed
until after the liberal state was firmly established 66. Democracy then fitted itself in the already
prepared soil of the liberal state. This was mainly necessitated by the operation of the
competitive , individualist, market society, and by the operation of the liberal state, which
served the Western societies through a system of freely competing, though not always
democratic political parties. Hence, it was the liberal state that was democratised, and in the
process, democracy was liberalised. And not the other way round!
Di Palma further points to three qualities of society and political economy which have
historically been conducive to the development of liberal democracy: (i) economic prosperity
and equality; (ii) a modern and diversified social structure in which non dependent middle
classes occupy centre-stage; and (lii) a national culture that, by tolerating diversity and
preferring accommodation, is implicitly democratic 67 . Therefore, liberal democracy is an
historically specific form of democracy that arrived on the scene of international politics nearly
two millennia after the disappearance of its archetypal Athenian form. Although in Western
political history democracy preceded liberalism, in the modern era liberalism preceded
democracy by nearly two centuries where it created a world to which the latter had to adjust.
Such antecedents are completely lacking in the building of democracy in most of the Third
World, particularly Africa. Instead, democracy in most of Africa, as in other parts of both
developing and underdeveloped new societies, came as a revolution against the liberal
capitalist society and state situated far away. For example the political movements for national
liberation for independence that came to power in those countries thought of themselves as
democratic; since democracy was able to take a different connotation after 1917, to mean
government by or for the hitherto oppressed classes subjected under capitalist or colonial rule
for so long.
None the less, in the West the normal order in democratisation was that democracy was
preceded by the emergence of first, the politics of choice, then the politics of competition, and
65 Ibid., p.42.
66 C.B. Macpherson, op. cit., p.5.
67 See Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Barkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), p. 3.
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finally the politics of the market68 . It is sometimes argued that, because Africa has never had a
chance to undergo such processes of liberalism and democratisation as witnessed in the
Western societies, it cannot be democratised at all. Such a trend of thought mainly emerged
immediately after independence from the corridors of African socialist leaders such as Arnilcar
Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, or Kenneth Kaunda. It is the legacy of this trend of
thought that has been openly challenged in most of Africa since the turn of this decade.
Furthermore, liberalism began to gain intellectual and political ascendancy in different parts of
Europe from the seventeenth century onward. It took the individual as the ultimate irreducible
unit of society and explains the latter in terms of it. The conception is not of the community as
a corporate entity; rather all that is seen to exist is a collection of autonomous individuals or
groups69 . In this view, society onsists' or is 'made up' of individuals and forms nothing but
the totality of its members and their relationships. This idea is opposed by Hegelian works on
community or society, a huge body of concepts with which we have no room to deal here70.
To be specific, the liberal democratic paradigm dates from the debate engendered by Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and these
largely set the pace for modern liberal democratic thought 71 . These three are largely regarded
as the first exponents of the liberal tradition. In particular, Thomas Hobbes marks the
transition between a commitment to the absolutist state and the struggle of liberalism against
tyranny. While John Locke signals the clear beginnings of the liberal constitutionalist
tradition; and J.S. Mill was influenced by the intense discussion about the reform of the British
institutions during his time, where he sought to defend a conception of political life marked by
enhanced individual liberty, more accountable government and an efficient governmental
administration unhindered by corrupt politics and excessively complex regulations72.
68 Ibid., p.6.
69 See another elaborate explanation of the tenets of liberal democracy by Barry Holden, The Nature of
Democracy, op. cit., pp. 34-40.
70 Although in some respect close to liberalism, Hegel's thought as interpreted by among others Chris
Brown rims clearly counter to the internationalist leanings of most of twentieth century liberal thought.
See his Hegel and International Ethics, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 5(1991), pp. 73-86); and
in idem, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1992).
David Held, Models of Democracy, op. cit., p. 41.
72 Ibid., p. 85..
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Mill was a clear advocate of democracy who preoccupied himself with the extent of individual
liberty in all spheres of human endeavour. A liberal democratic government was important for
Mill, not just because it established boundaries for the pursuit of individual satisfaction, but
also because it contributed to the free development of individuality. For example, he
maintained that participation in political life through voting, involvement in local
administration and jury service was vital in creating a direct interest in government and,
consequently, a basis for an informed and developing citizenry, male or female. That explains
why Mill is often referred to as a man who conceived liberal democratic politics as a prime
mechanism of moral self-development 73 . In all, though Mifi advocated individual liberty, he
also recognised that some regulation and interference in individual lives was necessary74.
In fact, the central problem faced by liberal political theory was how to reconcile the concept
of the state as an impersonal, legally circumscribed structure of power, with a new view of the
rights, obligations and duties of subjects. In other words, how was the 'sovereign state' to be
related to the 'sovereign people' who were recognised as the legitimate source of the state's
powers. Thus most liberal and modern liberal democratic theories have tried to justify the
sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits on that power 75 . And
since Thomas Hobbes, the struggle has been balancing might and right, power and law, duties
and rights. In fact, the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy concern the centrality in
principle, of an 'impersonal' structure of public power, of a constitution to help guarantee and
protect rights, of a diversity of power centres within and outside the state, and of mechanisms
to promote competition and debate between alternative political platforms76.
These problems have led to the fundamental liberal notion that the 'separation' of the state
from civil society must be a central feature of any democratic political order. And on the other
side of the coin, it is held that any models of democracy that depend on the assumption that
'state' could ever replace thvil society' must be treated with the utmost caution. Of course
within the history of Western liberalism, the concept of ivil society' has been interpreted in a
variety of different ways which are also briefly examined under the category of African civil
society later. Yet, there is a profound sense in which civil society can never be 'separate' from
C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Tunes of Liberal Democracy, op. cit, ch. 3; and John Dunn,
Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, op. cit., pp. 5 1-53.
On Mill see A. Ryan, J.S. Mill (London: Routledge, 1974).
A good elaboration on this would be S. Hall and B. Gieben (ed.), Formations of Modernity
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
76 David Held, op. cit., p. 281.
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the state; given that it is the state that provides the overall legal framework of society, and to a
significant degree constitutes civil society.
2.2. Notions of Liberation
In his declaration on the question of the use of violence in defence of rights, Mahatma Gandhi
thought:
Where the choice is set between cowardice and violence I would advise violence. I
praise and extol the serene courage of dying without killing. Yet I desire that those
who have not this courage should rather cultivate the art of killing and being killed,
than basely to avoid the danger. This is because he who runs away commits mental
violence; he has not the courage of facing death by killing. I would a thousand times
prefer violence ... I prefer to use arms in defence of honour rather than remain the vile
witness of dishonour77.
This trend of thought has obviously had great influence upon most liberation struggles in
Africa where violence has for long been an inevitable course of evicting repressive regimes.
Satyagraha (Gandhi's spirit which has a particular Indian meaning)78 , at one time admired by
most liberators has proved unrealistic in almost all of Africa, especially when governments
meet peaceful demands with force. For example, Kenneth Kaunda's long admiration of
Gandhi in the 1950s vanished when he became sympathetic to the use of violence in the
liberation struggle in South Africa79.
Thus, for de Braganca and Wallerstein 80, liberation movements do not just emerge one fme
day out of the mind of some superman or at the instigation of some foreign power. They are
Quoted by Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Liberation Reader: The National
Liberation Movements, vol. 2 (London: Zed Press, 1982), P. 43.
78 While Mahatma Gandhi greatly influenced Africa's political struggles before independence,
Jawaharlal Nehru did influence Africa's diplomatic strategies after independence. See Michael Tidy and
Ali A. Mazrui, Nationalism and new States in Africa: from about 1935 to the Present (Nairobi &
London: Heinmann, 1884), p. 355.
Kaunda insisted that, like Gandhi, if he had to choose between slavery and fighting for independence,
he would choose the latter. And he posed "Violently, yes, I'd rather do this, though it may seem a
contradiction". See Marjorie Hope and James Young, The Struggle for Humanity, op. cit., pp. 223-
257; Kaunda On Violence, edited by Cohn M. Morris (London: Sphere Books, 1982); Fergus
Macpherson, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (Lusuka: Oxford University Press, 1974); Stephen Chan,
Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London: British Academic Press,
1992); and in idem, The Decline of Kaunda: Essays of Praise and Complaint (Canterbury, UKC:
Board of Politics and International Relations, Series 1:1992; no.3).
80 See Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., p. iii.
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born out of popular discontent. They emerge over long periods to combat oppressive
conditions and express aspirations for a different kind of society. In short, they are agents of
class and national struggles. Classes and nations, as we shall see, are creations of the modern
world and, in the case of Africa, they were born in the crucible of the colonial experience. To
understand the role of national liberation movements, we must first grasp the social forces they
represent and the ways in which these social forces were shaped by their historical
circumstances81.
In the context of colonialism, genuine liberation implied the fact of regaining not only one's
historical personality as a free people but also one's own initiative as a maker of history. The
argument is that such initiative cannot be regained as long as the people's productive forces,
namely, the ability to produce and reproduce social existence, are subjugated to foreign
domination, thereby negating the people's historical process. This specific type of foreign
domination in the modern historical epoch is imperialism.
Cabral's defmition of national liberation is "the phenomenon in which a given socio-economic
whole rejects the negation of its historical process" 82 . In other words, the national liberation
of a people is the regaining of the historical personality of that people, its return to history
through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which it was subjected. From such
conception, it is therefore clear that, liberation movements are defmed as revolutionary
political organisations that mobilise the oppressed peoples for purposes of overthrowing the
regime, or imperialist domination in the case of colonialism. All liberation movements oppose
the colonial status quo and all its aspects.
In the post-colonial era, liberation movements do not only strive for high positions in the state
apparatus, as argued by their leaders. They are, as Nzongola-Ntalaja pointed out,
organisations of workers, peasants, and other exploited classes and strata under the leadership
of revolutionary intellectuals such as Afeworki, Sanawi, Museveni, Garang, Kagame, or
Kabilla, who are committed to radical social change 83 . In fact, such alliance between the
popular classes with progressive revolutionary intellectuals is required for the success of the
national liberation struggle especially in the post-colonial context.
81 These are discussed in part (d) of this chapter under class theories. It is clear that workers, peasants,
students or underprivileged groups in society make up 'liberators'. A better example is de Braganca and
Wallerstein, The Liberation Reader, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 86-101.
82 See Amilcar Lopes Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 102.
83 See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays in
Contemporary Politics (London: Zed Books, 1987), p. 36. (emphasis added).
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In liberation, there is an extraordinary confluence of individual and co-operative exhilaration,
personal and communal zest. The Third World wars of liberation were waged with a specific
purpose of achieving or defending a goal 84 . Liberation remains one agent that reveals the
historical bonds between peoples in society. It seeks to transform unjust relations among
peoples in the world, generally relations of political and economic subordination. It seeks to
ensure that the internal socio-economic forces, that is, those that evolve within each country,
are restructured in the direction of progress. In Africa, internal forms of subjugation were
caused by fragmentation into small ethnic or linguistic groupings, by the development of
privileged classes endowed with their own dynamism. These in turn did yield to a form of
oppression linked with neo-colonialism. Though such phenomena are also typical of other
post-colonial societies in the world, at the present they are acute and tangible in Africa85.
As a result, African revolutionary democratic theorists, from Fanon and Cabral to the present,
seem to believe that the development of democratic institutions may put the continent back on
the right footing of progress. The belief that democratic political systems tend to cater and
meet people's demands and, therefore, are less prone to revolutions is very common to both
social science researchers and practitioners 86 . Ernesto Che Guevara, perhaps the
quintessential exponent of voluntaristic revolutionary action, conceded that, "where a
government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and
maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be
promoted, since the possibilities of a peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted" 87 . This
observation appears to be correct, because it seems true that no revolutionary movement has
succeeded in overthrowing a democratically elected government. That is why Samuel
Huntington plausibly argued that, "perhaps the most important and obvious but also most
neglected fact about successful great revolutions is that they do not occur in democratically
elected systems"88.
The main goal was obviously independence. See Au A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, op. cit., p. 10.
85 discuss this in details some time later in the chapter under elite class formation.
86 See Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crises, Breakdown and Reequilibrarion
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978).
87 See Guevara's La Guerra de Guerrillas, translated by Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies,
Guerrilla Wa,fare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 48.
88 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1968), p. 275.
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Liberation has also been understood as release from restraint or bondage or, simply to be set
free89 . This definition of liberation implies that there are certain impediments, not necessarily
external or physical, that stand in the way of one's realising one's potentialities as a morally
autonomous agent. Therefore, if one is to be free, these impediments must be removed. But
as Sir Isaiah Berlin once commented: "It may be the case either that one is unaware of those
impediments or that one internalises them" 90. However, Fanon's conception of liberation is
much more concretely and socially based than spiritual freedom or the Stoic internalisation of
impediments. For example, it includes the removal of a whole arsenal of socio-economic,
cultural and political restrictions, because such restrictions limit the area of choices and
opportunities that are available to a person. Fanon's position is that the extent of one's
freedom is a function of socio-political institutions and practices91.
While Fanon's analysis was to define liberation in terms of decolonisation, ours is to examine it
in terms of a struggle against a regime that is indigenous. In the 1950s and 1960s, liberation
and independence were often synonymous with political independence or freedom from alien
rule. Today, liberation means more than political independence. Prior to independence, the
political mobiisation of the African masses by the nationalist leadership rested simply on the
antipathy against colonial domination. Where the nationalist movement created an effect, by
promoting not merely the politicisation of the masses but also by radicalising their
consciousness. On the part of the masses, the assumption was that the promises made by
liberation leaders would be honoured. But in retrospect, it appeared that the contrary became
true. The leaders responded to the people's demands either with more empty promises or with
repression. Right after decolonisation, the popular affiance formed during the independence
struggle began to disintegrate.
For Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, what followed independence is the fact that the post-colonial
state became principally concerned with serving the interests of those who control it as well as
those of their external affies and patrons92 . Thus, power became more and more concentrated
in the centre, and people began to witness the clear unfair distribution of the "national wealth".
That resulted in the subsequent emergence of the struggle to reliberate the continent from the
89 See L. Adele Jinadu, Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution (London: Kegan Paul International,
1986), p. 66.
° See Isaiah Berlin, Four essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. xxxviii.
L. Adele Jinadu, op. cit., p. 66.
92 See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, op. cit.,, p. 121.
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control of demagogues who still seem to exemplify a form of colonial domination from
within93 . What has taken place then is an effort of transforming the post-colonial state to meet
the interests of African deprived urban dwellers and peasants.
In a way, the liberation struggles are a continuous process of the 'second independence'
movement. The prime examples of these movements included the second independence
movement in Congo-Kinshasa (formerly Zaire) 94, Chad, Uganda, the heroic liberation
struggles in Namibia and South Africa, the struggles for national self-determination/secession
in north-east, and west Africa - Western Sahara, Biafra, Ogaden, Southern Sudan and now
independent Eritrea95 . In all these, the marginalised groups and classes of people in the
periphery became the recruitment and ideological centre of revolutionary struggles.
Another notion of liberation exemplified in Fanon's writings points to an interaction between
liberation and the concept of revolution96 . In this sense, liberation is inextricably bound up
with social and political revolution. It is part of a continuing process in which, philosophically,
human potentialities are forever enlarged. Liberation is thus constituted by a perpetual search
for a way of life where "truth", 'justice" and "equality" reign. Once such a way of life has
been discovered, conditions of alienation wifi no longer exist. This is what is usually referred
to as the utopian, romantic, or chiliastic aspect of Fanon's thought 97 . This pejorative
connotation of "romantic", however, should not be allowed to detract from the merit of
Fanon's position. Because by focusing on liberation as a continuous process, one is able to
examine the shortcomings of one's society and demonstrate how that society is incompatible
with freedom as self-fulfilment. It therefore matters less that Fanon's conception of liberation
is romantic or utopian than that it provides one possible yardstick for assessing social reality.
The conception of liberation is also implied in Fanon's call for the creation of a new man98.
Such domination has been interpreted from certain academic circles to imply class domination. See
for example, Richard L. Sklar "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa", The Journal of Modern
African Studies, vol. 17, no. 4(1979), pp. 531-552.
See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The Continuing Struggle for National Liberation in Zaire", The
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 17, no. 4(1979), pp. 595-6 14.
A good number of these are covered by Alexis Heraclides, op. cit., for example, Biafra, Eritrea,
Katanga, and Southern Sudan.
96 L. Adele Jinadu, op. cit., p. 68.
See Aristide Zolberg, "Frantz Fanon: A Gospel for the Damned", Encounter, vol. 27(November
1966), p. 58.
98 See FrantzFanon, Wretched of the Earth, op. cit., p. 316.
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Most scholars who have written on Fanon think that the concern with the creation of the new
man gives Fanon's notion of liberation and all his writings a universalist perspective 99 . In other
words, there is an HegelianfMarxist flavour to Fanon's notion of liberation and revolution as
involving the creation of a new man. Like Hegel and Marx, what Fanon offers us is a
theodicy, that man is pictured as reaching out and progressing towards higher and higher
horizons that, perhaps when the highest horizon is attained, must eventually consumate itself.
It is then and only then that harmony will be established, that man wifi become truly human
and wifi be able to purchase his interests unencumbered by prejudice and hate. This is Fanon's
ultimate goal, based on his firm belief that "no attempt must be made to encase man, for it is
his destiny to be set free"°°.
Generally speaking, it is worth-noting that since independence, the general history of liberation
movements in Africa reveals the emergence of three categories. The first category is that of
the national liberation movements that began since the 1950s, and terminated with the
struggles in the Portuguese colonies and the former Rhodesia in the 1970s and 1980. There is
a vast literature on this which I need not rehearse here'°'. The national liberation movements
were directed against colonial-white-minority regimes all over the continent. Their main
objective was clear - independence. Nationalism was the agent for harmony and a driving
spirit during the national liberation struggle.
The second category of liberation movements were those that demanded secession at
independence or after independence'°2 . They were the creation of ethnic discontent from
Jinadu, op. cit., p. 8; also Aristide Zolberg, op. cit.
'°° See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Mask, op. cit., p. 230.
101 See for example, George C. Grants, The Africans' Predicament in Rhodesia (London: Minority
Rights Group, 1972); J. Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (London: Westview
Press, 1980); Stephen Chan (ed.), Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-
1988 (London: Macmillan, 1990); Michael Chariton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the
Independence of Rhodesia (Oxford: Blackwel, 1990); David Birmingham, Frontline Nationalism in
Angola and Mozamnbique (London: James Currey, 1992); Stephen Chan and Vivian Jabri (ed.),
Mediation in Southern Africa (London: Macmillan, 1993); and Moises Venancio and Stephen Chan,
Portuguese Foreign Policy in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International
Affairs, 1995).
102 Various studies have been carried out on these and a useful survey is Alexis Heraclides's work The
Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Kegan Paul International, 1991);
others include Harold S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations (Leyden: A.W.
Sijthoff, 1967); Chris Brown, Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives (London and
New York: Routledge, 1994); and Kamal S. Shehadi, Ethnic Self-Determination the Break-up of
States (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1993).
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within. For example, Southern Sudan (1955-1972); Katanga (1960-1963); Eritrea (1961-
1992); and, perhaps, Ogaden (1970s)'°3 . Most of them are analysed as the consequence of
colonial policies of divide and rule that had to be replaced after independence in the more
difficult task of building new nations out of ethnically and diverse communities. Civil wars
became the most serious of challenges that several new African States had to face. Within
this, we have to distinguish between two types of civil wars: those waged directly for
secessionist purposes and those waged out of regional ethnic rivahy within the state. Other
civil wars were a result of the unwillingness of a region or an ethnic group to submit to a
central authority dominated by a rival (though not necessarily) ethnic group. The best
examples are Chad (since 1965) and Angola (1975-1976, then continued).
Generally, the foregoing categories of national liberation movements for independence and the
secessionist struggles are quite distinct from the third category which is the centre of this
project. The first category had independence as its primary objective, which was achieved all
over the continent. The second category is often caused by problems of disunity and
discontent from particular ethnic groups or regions. The third category, the post-colonial
liberation movements are not necessarily ethnic or regionally based. They are, if one uses
Harry Eckstein's title, 'internal wars', defmed as any attempt to alter state policy, rulers, or
institutions by the use of violence, in societies where violent competition is not the norm and
where well-defined institutional patterns exist or strive to exist'° 4 . Their primary objectives do
not include independence and secession. They are basically directed against a particular
regime in power, especially regimes that have alienated and marginalised the bulk of their
populations. Most, if not all, liberation struggles of this category do command a nation-wide
support and their leadership is often a mixture of diverse ethnic elites. The main and strong
objective in this category includes instant overthrow of the regime in power; establishment of
democratic order and institutions (rewriting constitutions) that will address national issues
irrespective of ethnic or regional diversities. These movements often have 'democracy' in their
manifestos as the major objective. What they aspire to, within such terms, is the establishment
of efficient, legitimate and domestically stable regime'°5.
2.3. Marxist Discourses on African Liberation
103 See Au A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, op. cit., pp. 194-225.
'°' See Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: Praeger, 1964), also Lawrence Stone, op. cit.,
p. 160.
105 They aspire, in a way, to a correction of the 'Quasi-State' image labeled by critiques of third world
states. See for example, Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States, op. cit.
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In the writings of most African scholars, it has been established that both Marx and Engels
knew very little, if anything, about Africa' 06. Save for the few, and often very rare isolated
remarks on Africa in their writings, Marx and Engels paid little attention to one of the world's
vast continents. That is partly why historical materialism was unable to challenge the image of
Africa portrayed in Europe by the representatives of European colonial interests. However,
Marxist literature has had great impact on African liberation and the subsequent establishment
of its most social systems'°7. For example, Marxist writings on political as well as guerrifia
warfare have had a fuelling impact on the formation of liberation struggles in most of Africa,
and the establishment of most post-colonial economies. Therefore, we will now briefly outline
some aspects of African rIarxism.
(a) Marxist Influence on African Liberation
In order to comprehend the Marxist impact, we need to fmd out precisely what generally is in
Marx's writings that has for years successfully influenced the thinking of both academics and
practitioners, and for that matter most African leaders. Marx's analysis of the social systems
was less sophisticated than portrayed in the works of most of his twentieth century followers.
He looked at the society of his time in Europe and discovered two different kinds of people,
namely, the factory owners on the one hand, and the workers on the other. In his analysis, it is
the workers ho often suffer, and he identified the main reasons for their sufferings. As a
result, he aimed all his efforts to the elimination of the causes of misery in his particular
Society. There is not enough space here to review the concepts he introduced in analysis:
"class-struggle', 'oppression , 'exploitation", "proletariat", "bourgeoisie', or "alienation".
In his plan for action, Marx proposed the complete overthrow of the capitalistic system, or as
he noted, "a iolent overthrow of the farmer conditions of production". For effective
purposes, he preached revolution', a complete overhaul of the system. He wanted a situation
where no person v.ould exploit another in order to make profit. All should become equals in
the process of work and in society. In order for this to be achieved, he offered a whole
concrete plan of action, under the umbrella of what he called "scientific socialism". He,
however, held that leaders of the revolution had to wait until the time was ripe. That is, the
106 For a lucid analysis of Marxism and the study of African social reality, see Georges Nzongola-
Ntalaja. Revolution and Counter-Ret olution in Africa, op. cit., pp. 1-21: 7.
For a er simple analysis and application of Marxist theories in African social systems, see Oswald
Hirma. Tue Gospel and the Social Systems: An introduction into Capitalism, Marxjs,n and African
Socialism (Nairobi and Kampala: St. Paul Publications, 198 I).
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time when tension erupts between factory owners and workers; when the workers became
conscious of their role in the struggle; when the workers of the whole world joined in the
revolution. However, Marx also foresaw that the revolution would occur in stages. The first
stage should be socialism", where the means of production should become "socialised", that
means they had to become property of the workers. Once the "mode of production" had
changed, a new society would make its logical appearance, and this would be the "Communist
Society", the classless and community-minded society. This is the second and fmal stage of the
revolution.
Generally, Marx's thinking had a global perspective. It never mattered whether the revolution
took place in one part of the world or another. He precisely saw the whole world involved in
his socialist/communist revolution. That is why he did proclaim the World Communist
Revolution, when in February 1848, together with Engels, they composed the Manifesto of the
Communist Party on the occasion of the First International "League of Communists". In the
Manifesto, they wrote:
The Communists scorn to conceal their views and their intentions. They openly
proclaim that their aims can only be attained by the overthrowing by force of all
existing order of society. Let the ruling class tremble before the communist revolution!
The proletariat have nothing to loose but their chains. They have the world to gain.
Workers of the World, Unite!'°8.
One major distinguishing element between Marx and his followers is that the communist
revolution was not just a violent overthrow of the regime, but rather a radical change of mind
and society. Given that there are so many varieties of Marxism, it is often difficult to establish
a "Marxist" perspective on certain issues'° 9 . The issue of democracy is no exception. For
Lenin, for example, the rule of a class can take a wide range of political forms. In his account,
capitalist rule in the first half of this century manifested itself in a wide range of political forms
including monarchical (Britain), fascist (Germany and Italy), and parliamentary (France and
U.S.) democratic ms'° So for Lenin, when talking of democracy, it must be asked
"democracy for what class?". His implication is that the specific historical forms of democracy
See D. Ryazanoff, The Co,nmunist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Frederick En gels (New York:
Russel & Russel, 1963), p. 68..
109 See Shiomo Avineri (eds.), Varieties of Marxism (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,
1977).
110 Ibid., p. 8.
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constitute democracy for a specific class or classes and the denial of it for other classes'.
Hence, democracy, as conceived within certain Marxist/Leninist thinkers, does not qualify as a
better or ideal means of running society. That is why in most parts of the world, especially
Third World countries, during the Cold War period, there emerged a muddled conception of
democracy. A communist variant of democracy was advanced widely and it was not meant to
be similar to the western liberal-democracy.
Therefore, during the Cold War, African countries had to search for their own way in the
conflict of ideologies. Which way to go: West or East?' The anticipated expectation prior to
independence, that Africa was to follow the west, did not materialise. In theory, the vast
majority of African leaders rejected both Marxism and Capitalism. They sought to go their
own way and declared: "African Socialism-a Third Way!" 2 . And in December 1962, at the
"Dakar Colloquium", the leaders of the newly independent African countries vocally rejected
both Marxism and Liberal Capitalism and decided to follow an African adoption of socialism
as a "third way". That led historians like Basil Davidson to declare in the 1960s that the
leaders of Africa "are all socialists now"3.
Reflections of Marxist influence in Africa include works of African theoreticians and
revolutionaries like Fanon, Cabral and Machel as well as those of African statesmen like
Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kaunda, Toure and/or Shengor. We do not, however, wish to give a
detailed account of these works due to lack of space. While Amilcar Lopes Cabral was the
leading theoretician of the liberation movements of Lusophone Africa, Frantz Fanon
influenced the liberation of Francophone Africa. Cabral founded the PAIGC which he led until
his assassination in 1973 in Conakry, and Fanon was instrumental in the making of the
Algerian war, the bitterest of all French Africa wars of independence" 4. Similarly, Julius
See V.1. Lenin, Collected Works, (find full title?) op. cit., p. 235; and in idem, State and Revolution
(New York: International Ouyblishers, 1932).
l2 See the collection of articles by Carl G. Roseberg and Thomas M. Callaghy (eds.), Socialism in
Su b-Saha ran Africa: A New Assessment (Institute of International Studies, Berkeley: University of
California Berkeley Press, 1979).
" See Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa?: The Search for a New Society (Baltimore: Penguin,
1967), p. 116; for a short description of African Socialism, see Dorothy Dodge, African Politics in
Perspective (Princeton, N.J., and London: D. Van Nostrand Company, INC., 1966), pp. 97-102; and
finally, see Julius K. Nyerere, Ujainaa: Essays on Socialis,n (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968),
especially pp. 96ff.
See Amilcar Lopes Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, op. cit.; Strike Mkandla, "The Thought of
Aniilcar Lopes Cabral of Guinea-Bissau (University of Kent, Ph.D. Thesis: 1983); and Adele Jinadu,
Fanon, op. cit.
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Nyerere took Marxist orthodoxy seriously when he introduced his famous Ujamaa; and
Kenneth Kaunda's fashion was displayed in his ideology of humanism' '. And some of the
most articulate Marxist works are those by Kwame Nkrumah, described by Mazrui and Tidy
as "Africa's Lenin and Ghana's Czar" 6 For Nkrumah, Ghana's independence meant nothing
if the rest of Africa was still under colonial control.
(b) Pragmatic Adaptation of Marxism in Africa
Certain aspects of Marxism were embraced by a section of African leaders. Nkrumah's efforts
at theorising, the revolutionary thoughts of Fanon and Cabral, the Christian socialisms of
Kaunda and Nyerere and the Stalinism of Mengistu, were all influenced by Marxist orthodoxy.
For instance, the African struggle against colonial powers was regarded as a "class-struggle'
in the Marxist sense. Lenin's theory of "imperialism" as the international form of capitalism
was also accepted within this section of leaders. Despite that, both Marxism and Capitalism
were disguisingly declared as foreign to the African way of life in the Dakar Colloquium. For
example, capitalist "individualism" which makes people think only of themselves and obsessed
by the spirit of profit-making, was absolutely rejected as a contradiction of African
communalism and spirit of sharing. They also rejected the Marxist teaching of "classes" and
"class-struggles", arguing that in traditional African society there were no classes" 7 . For
example, Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya argued for a philosophy of democratic
African Socialism based on a traditional African way of life 118 Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda
declared that "let the West have its Technology and Asia its Mysticism! Africa's gift to the
World culture must be in the realm of Human Relationships. I suppose I could be called a
humanist ... . Senegal's Leopold Sedar Senghor argued that in Africa there were no classes,
everyone was a worker and prestige was not based on wealth but on wisdom and age. For
115 See Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa, op. cit.; Ujamaa: Essays in Socialism; and A
Humanist in Africa, op. cit.
116 See Au A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, op. cit.; and refer to the bibliography for Nkrumah's works.
" For the declaration of each individual leader on this, see Oswald Hirma, op. cit., pp. 102-112.
118 See Alfred Lithuli, Kenneth Kaunda, D.K. Chisiza, Tom Mboya and Julius Nyerere, Africa's
Freedom (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964); Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without Bitterness: The
Founding of the Kenya Nation (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); Jeremy Murray-
Brown, Kenyatta (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1972); Tom Mboya, Freedo,n and After (London:
Deutsch, 1972) and by the same author, The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and
Writings (London: Deutsch, 1972); and for a comprehensive analysis of all, see John Iliffe, The
Emergence of African Capita lis,n (London: Macmillan, 1983).
See Oswald Hirma, op. cit., p. 103; and also Kenneth David Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, op. cit.
36
him, "communalism' or the 'communal basis" of African society gave its members a single
soul - a high ideal of solidarity in which all participated 120 . Hence, Senghor's ideas and ideals
of Negritude strengthened his efforts of trying to establish a political system based on African
tradition and values. Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah concurred with Senghor on this aspect of
communalism, and so did Tanzania's Julius Nyerere who professed Ujamaa-"familihood"21.
In the whole of Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were the three main countries
where aspects of the socialism of Marx and Lenin were implemented' 22 . For example, when he
took over power in Mozambique in 1975, Samora Mache! nationalised all businesses, factories
and accommodation and became very radical on the Church. This was in line with the Marxist
idea of wiping out the profit-making bourgeoisie (middle-class, capitalist) who "grew rich on
the backs of the poor" as he declared. As a result, little stores became "peoples shops" run on
non-profit lines for the benefit of the masses; land-owners were stripped of their property
which henceforth was to be run by the state. Though Machel's Marxist principles became
bogged down in practice, he, with considerable courage, met the crisis head-on. However,
like most of his African counterparts, Machel later changed his Marxist/Leninist way of
economy into a "mixed economy" where private enterprise goes together with state-controlled
businesses. He claimed it did not mean a deviation from the principles of Marxism/Leninism.
He allowed multi-national corporations to operate in Mozambique, "provided they do not take
the national's riches 'and leave us with holes in the ground". Robert Mugabe too
implemented his own specific Marxist/Leninist principles in Zimbabwe' 23 . When he took,
power for example, he wished to "distribute the wealth of Zimbabwe among all the people of
the country". He was determined to expropriate farms which were not worked properly for
the common good but exploited for persona! profit only by so-called cheque-book farmers.
What also deserves attention in this section is the Stalinism of Mengistu Haile Mariam of
Ethiopia. According to various writings, "Ethiopia's Socialism" is counted as one amongst
120 See Leopold Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, trans. and with an intro, by Mercer Cook
(London: Poll Mall, 1964).
121 See Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and
Development wit/i Particular reference to the African Revolution (London: Heinmann, 1964); and two
books by Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op. cit., and Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, op. cit.
122 See Oswald Hirma, op. cit., pp. 110-112.
23 See for example, Zimbabwe: The First Decade, 1980-1990 (Harare: Roblaw, 1990).
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the few radical applications of Marxism/Leninism in Africa' 24 . As a concept, socialism in
Ethiopia is a hybrid of socialism and nationalism which became more popularised in the
Amharic term of Hibrettesebawinet (a compound word of Hibrette-social, and Sebawinet-
humane), close in meaning to Nyerere's Swahili concept of Ujamaa, and both convey social
norms of togetherness. Even though these concepts were not strictly corresponding with
Marxian scientific socialism, they were a very important ideological vehicle in the mobilisation
of the masses. "Ethiopia's Socialism" was basically carried from the urban center to the
countryside where propaganda and agitation against the nobility was conducted among the
masses and mass literacy became a prerequisite. In order to become effective, "Ethiopia's
Socialism" was implemented through the help of the revolution.
One of most instrumental elements in the implementation programme of "Ethiopia's
Socialism" were the students, and to that effect, the Dergue officially proclaimed the zemecha
in 1975, a programme whose effects later on backfired against the regime' 25 . The real
implementation of socialism in Ethiopia began on the 1st January 1975, when the PMAC
declared all banks and insurances as public property; and in the first week of February the
same year, the government nationalised 22 industrial and commercial firms, mostly owned by
foreign capitalists, without compensation. Most radical in such implementations was the
declaration of the nationalisation of all rural lands, thus ending the feudal land tenure system
for ever.
On the other hand, the implementation of socialism in Ethiopia was also accompanied by a
turbulent, bloody and agonising period for the country. For example, Mengistu Haile Mariam
consolidated his leadership by eliminating the bulk of the makers of the revolution. He began
to amass more power and authority than he was able to cope with, and as a result, dug the
grave of his own downfall. Apart from the fact that he lacked the charisma of a Lenin or
Stalin and a personal aura of a Haile Selassie, Mengistu trusted very few and delegated little
of real significance. As Kinfe Abraham has summarised, "while his patrimonial hegemonic
regime had all the trappings of the previous regime, he lacked the human face, conventional
wisdom and diplomatic suave of his predecessor" 26 . However, a conversion to the socialist
credo that time was an automatic guarantee of prestige and a host of fringe benefits. In fact,
124 See Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit.; John Markakis, op. cit.; Addis Hiwet, op. cit.; Christopher
Clapham, op. cit.; Kinfe Abraham, op. cit.; and Jonathan Abraham, Ethiopia 's Road to Perestrojka
(Uppsala: SIAS, 1990).
125 ee chapter five for more details.
126 See Kinfe Abiaham, op. cit., p. 5.
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Mengistu and his followers had made a mockery of socialism by turning it into a fountain of
wealth, power and influence for a very few and of grinding poverty for millions. Therefore,
after seventeen years of muddling in the field of ideology, few Ethiopians really understood the
meaning of socialism and fewer still had benefited from the loud rhetoric of the socialist utopia
promised to them.
Even though the influence of Marxism upon revolutionary struggles of this century is quite
apparent, it raises a number of paradoxes when it comes to the analysis of revolutionary
struggles in Africa. Whereas the bulk of the work of Karl Marx was primarily concerned with
workings of the capitalist system and the self-generated preconditions of its overthrow by
socialism, the twentieth-century revolutions that have derived some form of inspiration from
his ideas have generally taken place in countries where capitalism had not yet been as
developed as in Marx's prototype of the pre-Revolutionary capitalist state' 27 . Stifi, Marxist
followers in the Third World contemplated the possibility of a seizure of power by the
proletariat, basing their argument on the fact that developed capitalist states had established a
crude form of capitalism in colonial countries. There was also a widespread hope that
capitalism had a role in creating the preconditions of socialism in the colonies -- a conception
that led, after independence, to a misguided programme of development.
In practice, not only has Marxist rhetoric been translated in varying degrees into the
programmes in the struggle against colonialism, but such rhetoric has also been reported to
have influenced post-colonial liberation movements. For example, though unconfirmed,
Clapham writes that "the EPLF in Eritrea and the EPRDF in Ethiopia had perhaps the most
deeply rooted Marxist formation of any African insurgency, and as late as 1989, the EPRDF
leader Meles Zenawi was looking to Albania as a model of autonomous socialist
128
In most cases, Marxist studies developed as a critique of the Western-dominated field of
research on Africa, that either ignored or distorted Marxism as a scientific method of
inquiry' 29 . Hence, most studies of African social reality tried to demonstrate that Marxism or
historical materialism is/was a living science, and not the ideas of some dead thinker or
thinkers. It was argued that Marxism was a revolutionary world outlook developed for
purposes of providing adequate solutions to the concrete problems facing the working and
127 Again, Strike Mkandla's perceptive thesis on Guinea-Bissau, op. cit., is a better example here.
128 See Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity, op. cit., p. 243.
29 See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, op. cit., p. 1.
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exploited classes in their struggle for emancipation. Thus, in Africa, one can say that Marxism
has been understood as 'the concrete analysis of concrete conditions' guided by a revolutionary
theory which seeks to understand the world in order to change it.
(c) The Spirit of Nationalism and Liberation
Nationalism, defined in the African context, is the championing of the case for independence
of a people (generally within a given tenitory). It can have a social-revolutionary content or
simply a 'political' one concentrated on the organs of state power but not postulating major
changes to the basic socio-economic organisation of the given national unit. Amilcar Cabral,
for example, addressed himself directly to this question of the forms which struggles for
national liberation can take' 30 . African nationalism was essentially concerned with the specific
process of ridding Africa of alien rule. Its earliest stage focused on nationalist efforts to forge
an effective anticolonial coalition. Thus, leaders of African liberation were virtually all drawn
to it by intense sympathy for its aims, operating in an 'intimate symbiosis' with the nationalist
struggle on the ground' 31 . It was widely held amongst African nationalist that European
colonialism would resist tenaciously in line with the 1944 Brazzaville Conference declaration
of French colonial officials that self-government was ruled out 'now or in the future' and
British official expectations that independence for Kenya and Tanganyika (today Tanzania) lay
some fifteen or thirty years ahead, worsen the expectations.
Amongst scholarly works on African nationalism, Thomas Hodgkin provided the classic
synthesis, adopting an inclusive definition of nationalism as all forms of anticolonial protest
and any organisational or group assertion of 'the rights', claims, and aspirations of a given
society (from the level of the language group to that of "Pan-Africa") in opposition to
European authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives. Hodgkin's book is suffused
with the excitement of nationalism in action and delights in the variety and ingenuity of African
protest'32.
However, there are other scholarly materials that also contend that nationalist politics
developed as an appropriate way to negotiate with the modern colonial state at both central
° See Strike Mkandla, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
131 Crawford Young, "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Class in Africa", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, vol.
XXXVI (1986), P. 423; also quoted by Henry S. Wilson, African Decolonisation (London: Edward
Arnold Ltd., 1994), p. 3.
132 See Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, op. cit.
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and local levels. On the strength of its claims to have developed forms of politics suitable for a
modern state, nationalism based its title to supersede colonialism. Thus, African nationalists
condemned the colonial state as an essentially transitory phenomenon unable to make the
transition to full modernisation. But nationalist organisations claimed to be more than just
modern political machines intent on wresting control of state power. The politics of
nationalism, infused with traditional symbolism and idioms, fiercely defended indigenous
society against alien encroachment. John Breuffly neatly sums up this capacity to embrace
both local tradition and modernity when he wrote: "Nationalism thus always combines
incompatible concerns with modernity (in the form of statehood) and tradition (in the form of
expressing the unspecialised culture of indigenous society)"33.
Mazrui and Tidy identified two kinds of political nationalism in Africa during the struggle for
political independence in the middle of the twentieth century. These were: (1) The ethnic sub-
nationalism of a community speaking one language and (2) the multi-ethnic nationalism, where
men and women of different ethnic sub-nations have striven together to develop a feeling of
patriotism, or love for their political country, and build one political nation out of numerous
ethnic groups (as is the case in most of Africa)' 34 . They further claim that "nationalism was a
strong feature of African civilisation in the pre-colonial period. Colonial rule in general had
the twin effects of weakening nationalism" 35 . For them, it is inappropriate to attribute the
creation of nations in Africa to colonialists. Instead, they argue that colonialism destroyed
many African political nations in the process of establishing their own political pattern in
Africa. For example, large empires like those of the Tokolor, Mandinka and Fulani were split
up between several colonial territories. Independent smaller nations like Zulu or Baganda were
submerged within a single colonial territory. They also argue that several African states which
fell victim to colonialism managed to re-emerge in the post-colonial era with substantially their
pre-colonial boundaries, hardly affected by the redrawing of the political map of Africa by
Europeans. These states include Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Dahomey, Madagascar,
and the kingdoms of Swaziland and Lesotho. The majority of the new African nations are
commonly supposed to be conglomerations of mainly state1ess' societies and small states,
lumped together fortuitously by European chancelleries or delineate colonial territories during
the scramble for Africa.
See his Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 193.
'See Au A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, op. cit., p. 84.
' Ibid.
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Scholars have pointed out that nationalist historiography is part of an effort to create what
Benedict Anderson terms 'imagined communities" 36 . In this case, events of the past are often
emphasised in order to support a specific claim of the future. This is how the spirit of
nationalism and liberation worked to fight European colonialism until the states' control was
handed to indigenous African leaders. In fact, the yearning for decolonisation emphasised the
need of self-government though nobody was critical enough to question the precise nature
such self-government should have.
(d) Class Theories, Class Formations and Class Fractions in Africa
Marx and Engels devoted much attention to the explanation of the behaviour of different
social classes in revolutionary conflicts, a task found in future struggles to be of critical
importance in the formulation of the most relevant strategy for consolidating different sources
of revolutionary activity. However, the analysis of the position of social classes and strata vis-
a-vis revolutionary struggles does not normally yield success as a guarantee; the fmal outcome
may be determined by a cluster of other factors, including the degree of cohesion of the
incumbent state apparatus. But even with such qualifications, the analysis of classes and class
behaviour rightly remains a central concern for revolutionaries and students of revolution.
However, the orthodox thinking during independence was that traditional African society is
"classless". It was on this basis that most African leaders maintained that the process of
building the nation-state rests on communalism and co-operation. As history showed, this idea
could easily be instrumentalised. Kenneth Grundy suggested, with great relevance for Africa,
that "where there is an element of disintegration in the social structure ... the tendency wifi be
for the leaders to minimise its importance" 37 . And Karl Mannheim observed that elites often
use ideologies in order to encourage national integration' 38 . Thus, it was upon the ostensible
lasslessness' of indigenous society that a potent emotional defence of the one-party state and
of African Socialism flourished.
136 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
Kenneth W. Grundy, "The 'Class Struggle' in Africa: an examination of conflicting theories", The
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. ii (1964), P. 392.
138 See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: an introductio,z to the sociologi' of knowledge (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936); and Walter Carlsnaes, The Concept of Ideology and
Political Analysis: a critical examination of Marx, Lenin, and Mannhei,n (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 198 1).
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Some African leaders, however, argued that there are classes in African societies but class
differentiation did not imply a diversification of interests and still less an opposition of
interests' 39 . According to this view, class consciousness is not sufficiently developed to create
conflict between African peoples. Hence, it is often argued that classes, and the conflict they
create are characteristic of Western industrial society and with some vigilance never need be
experienced in Africa' 40 . Such vigilance derived support from an ideology of African socialism
which stresses co-operative rather than conflicted models of development' 41 . Nyerere's major
use of the concept of a classless society was to defend the one-party systems on the grounds
that multi-party democracy makes sense only where there are antagonistic classes' 42 . Thus,
Nyerere introduced what he hoped would become an institutionalised system of internal party
competition in order to ensure that the temptations of the single party would not become too
great.
From other perspectives, the concept of 'social class' implies some degree of consciousness of
kind, some feeling of common cause with others in the same position vis-a-vis those either
below or above oneself in the prestige scaleu. This defmition of a social class does not imply
any relationship between class and economic position; therefore, it is non-Marxian. In a
similar line, James Meisel argued that a ruling class exists where there is 'group consciousness,
coherence and conspiracy'. For him, class is not necessarily determined by economic
condjtjofls' 44 . Yet others like Wright Mills contend that the term lass' is an economic one.
So that the phrase a 'ruling class' entails the theory that an economic class rules politically'45.
' Some African leaders agreed with the arguments of Modibo Keita, 'The Single Party in Africa",
Presence Africaine (Paris), vol. ii, no. 30(1960), p. 34.
140 Peter C. Lloyd, Classes, Crises, Coups: Themes in the Sociology of Developing Countries
(London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1971), p. 153.
141 See Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism, op. cit., p. 153.
142 See his article, "Democracy and the Party-System", in Paul E. Sigmund (eds.), The Ideologies of
Developing Nations (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 305-3 13.
' See J. Clyde Mitchell and A.L. Epstein, "Occupational Prestige and Social Status among Urban
Africans in Northern Rhodesia", in Pirre L. van den Berghe (ed.), Africa, Social Problems of Change
and Conflict (San Francisco, Cal.: Chandler,1965), p. 215.
"' See James Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite" (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p.4.
Charles Wright Mills chose the term Power Elite' as a title of his book rather than 'Ruling Class',
because for him, the latter is a 'badly loaded phrase'. See his The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1956), p. 277.
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However, for "class" to become a useful construct in the studies of African politics and
society, several confusions of the concept must first be removed. For example much of the
work on class begins with the notion of inequality, and with the (often unstated) presumption
that inequality, for both moral and developmental reasons, is undesirable' 46 . Unfortunately, all
societies today do exhibit inequalities and that is likely to remain so. Focusing on inequality
raises questions such as who is disadvantaged, why, and with what consequences? However,
as Marx pointed out, class is not just a tool for the study of inequality, but it is a tool for the
study of sources of change in society' 47 . It is in that use, in the search for structural sources of
change, that class will contribute to the study of the political restructuring and
democratisation in Africa.
In the African context, a clear distinction has been made between class and economic factors.
Max Weber argued that, as the basis of political power, possession of the means of
administration may be an alternative to the possession of the means of economic production".
This is significant in Africa since most countries do not possess a sizeable private economic
sector. As a consequence of this, employment opportunities are often dominated by the
government or, more precisely, by the civil service' 49 . Indeed, in Black Africa, there is no
section of the intellectual classes that is independent of the government. Thus, we see the rise
of a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' in Africa, whose political power derives from administrative
rather than economic sources even though a high ranking in the bureaucratic hierarchy is still
coupled with economic rewards' 50. Africa's bureaucrats and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
"s See for example, Joel Samoff, op. cit., p. 111.
"v For Karl Marx, 'class' was not primarily a category for describing how a particular capitalist society
looked at any given point in time, but rather above all an analytic tool for elucidating the sources of
structural change within the capitalist system. See Isaac Balbus, "Ruling Elite Theory vs. Marxian
&jialysis", Monthly Review, vol. 1, no. 2(1971), pp. 37-38; in idem "The Negation of the Negation",
politics and Society, vol. 3, no. 3(1972), pp. 49-63.
148 Cited by Thomas Burton Bottomore, Elites and Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p. 42.
"v This was satisfactorily discussed in an article by Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political
Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", The American Political Science Review, vol. lxii, no. 1
(March 1968), pp. 70-87:74-75.
'° Rene Dumont, in False Start in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1966), especially p. 81, argued that
power in Africa is derived from administrative positions rather than wealth. Dumont's argument
however, falls short because he does not add the fact that the African bureaucrats do earn a
disproportionate share of the economic rewards. For example, it is evident from Ruth First's argument
about Nigeria that in the late I 960s and I 970s, university graduates commenced their careers in the
civil service with salaries of over , 700 and, indeed, could eventually rise to , 3,900, even in countries
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politicians, are marked by the levels of education they attained. Therefore, education still
remains the sole pathway to elite status, which in turn is usually followed by employment in
government. Education plays a large role in determining whether the elite will solidify their
position by becoming a ruling class or not.
In a predominantly illiterate society, education tends to set an individual apart. Thus, if
education is taken as one way of identifying the development of classes in African societies,
then there are so far two major classes: the educated (formal) class, which are a minority, but
rank at the top of the class continuum, and the illiterate class, which form the bulk of the
population below' 5t . However, in the 1960s, Archibald Callaway argued that manual workers,
teachers, and unemployed school-leavers who drift to the urban centres, may constitute
another class in African societies 152 . Though class consciousness is already developing, their
consciousness is not yet organised on a class basis in most of Sub-Saharan African Cities.
This may imply that classes may develop in cities but not countrywide such as affecting the
rural areas. The latter do not simply fit for the development of classes, because the pattern of
sub-dividing and fragmenting land holdings, had a leveffing effect. For example, there is no
employment of labourers in the rural areas. Above all, it has already been pointed out quite
clearly that landownership in most of Africa is not regarded as landlordship or exploitation'53,
and members of the extended family and friends are often engaged for labour work in fields,
and not hired workers.
Thus, unless the rural agricultural sector is commercialised fully, there is no room where rural
classes will form. Even then, declining world prices and corrupt marketing structures may
discourage cultivators and drive them to withdraw from the commercialisation of production.
There is a wide range of evidence that this has happened in some areas of Africa. In Senegal,
for example, it is documented that peasants responded to low prices by simply abandoning the
cultivation of groundnuts and reverted their efforts to the cultivation of the local food crop,
where the average income per capita was estimated to be only , 29 per annum. See her The Barrel of a
Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup D'etat (London: Allen Lane, 1970), p. 106.
151 The World Bank surveys, are often correct to state in their findings that most African countries have
a very low percentage of literacy compared to the illiteracy one. This could be found in the recent
World Bank Reports.
152 See his "Unemployment among African School-Leavers", in Laing Gray Cowan, James O'Connell
and David G. Scanlon (eds.), Education and Nation-Building in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1965),
pp. 235-237.
153 See Szymon Chodak, "The Birth of an African Peasantry", Canadian Journal of African Studies,
vol.3(l97I), p.338.
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such as millet' 54 . Furthermore, it is often difficult to speak of class consciousness among
African peasants so long as they also attribute their deprivation to some impersonal Fate or
God rather than to the machination of other social classes' 55 . Thus, conflicts in African
societies arise due to friction within the elites and not between the elite and the rest of the
society. Thus, Robert Jackson was correct when he observed about two decades ago that,
"political conflict in contemporary Africa is not a type of conflict born of class antagonisms so
much as one that reflects the mutual hostilities of communal groups in the larger society or the
struggle among elites or factions"56.
Therefore, studies in African politics have attempted to defme 'class' in terms of the
relationship to the sources of authority, economic status in terms of both occupation and
wealth, educational levels, style of life, and to a limited extent, the existence of a
consciousness of a corporate class identity' 57 . A good example is Merran Fraenkel's Tribe and
Class in Monrovia, which distinguished between an 'upper class' and a 'middle class', where
the latter consists of 'white collar workers, teachers, nurses and so on, who had subordinate
positions in the government-based hierarchy' 58 . And according to Peter Marris in his study of
rehousing in Lagos, a class division results from a divergence between the patterns of life of
rich and poor' 59 . So class may as well be used to refer to a simple income category.
Others still use the term class to denote a stratum of positions whose members enjoy common
attitudes and ideologies towards self and society, consciousness of kind, and a sense of
'' See Donald B. Cruise O'Brien, "Cooperatives and Bureaucrats: class formation in a Senegalese
peasant society", Africa, vol. xli, no. 4 (October 1971), p. 275.
In fact, Kenneth Post's "Peasantization' and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa", in
Archives EuropJennes de Sociologie (Paris), concludes that there are grounds for doubting that this
has occurred in modern Western Africa. Quoted by Robert A. Miller, op. cit., p. 533.
156 Robert H. Jackson, "Political Stratification in Tropical Africa", Canadian Journal of African
Studies, vol. vii, no. 3 (1973), p. 397.
157 See an extended discussion of these by V.L. Allen, "The Meaning of the Working Class in Africa",
The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 10, no. 2 (1972), pp. 169-189.
158 See Merran Fraenkel, Tribe and Class in Monrovia (London, 1964), p. 196 and 201. Though his
distinction seem arbitrarily so, he definitely set a good example of class identification in African
socities.
See his Family Life and Social Change in an African City (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1962), p. 140.
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fundamental antagonism to other strata 160 . A fitting example would be Clyde Mitchell who
identified the African middle class in British Central Africa as those people who used
Europeans as a reference group for their behaviour. In this analysis, class is determined by
ivilising' factors and the prestige that comes with them. In the 1960s, it was observed that in
many parts of Tropical Africa, a "modern class has only began to form", where modem
referred to "values and self-styles", and the authors pointed to the adoptation of a "Western
style of life", a "growing Westernised elite", and a "middle-class European style of life"61.
This in turn explains why revolutionaries such as Cabral contended that a ubiquitous legacy of
colonial rule was the creation of new classes (colonial strata) in African Cities. In Guinea-
Bissau, for example, the urbanised African population comprised members of the liberal
professions, dockworkers and other blue-collar workers, and some 'déclassés' comprising a
lumpenproletariat and marginalised youth' 62 . Therefore, in most African countries, the social
classes absorbed varying degrees of English, French and Portuguese cultures. Especially the
better off like the professional officials (in Cabral's term, 'the petty-bourgeoisie') become
deeply immersed into foreign culture. Generally, most of the foregoing literature preoccupied
itself with observable life-style features, and consequently lack defmitional clarity. Others such
as Samir Amin, Giovanni Arighi and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja attempted to examine class
positions but, in causal terms.'63.
In all, scholars from the Marxists, neo-Marxists and structural dependency schools argued that
both colonialism and the incorporation of African societies into a world capitalist system (and
the class divisions this entailed) contributed to the formation of modern classes based on their
relationship with to the means of production and their conflicts with other classes on issues of
See Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (London:
Tavistock, 1964), P. 649.
61 See the conference papers on Methods and Objectives of Urban Research in Africa that were
published, edited by Horace Miner as The Cily in Modern Africa (London: Pall Mall, 1967).
162 See Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
63 See Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary
Forms", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol., 10, no. 4(1972); Accu,nulation on a World
Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974);
Unequal Development: an essay on the Social for,nation of peripheral capitalism (Hossacks:
Harvester Press, 1976); Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1977); Technological Change, Industrial Restructuring and Regional Development (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1986); and Eurocentrism (London: Zed, 1989).
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private and public policy' 64 . Today, the African bourgeoisie is generally thought to include the
political elite, and leading bureaucratic and parastatal officials, the local auxiliaries of
multinational companies, business people, landlords (in Imperial Ethiopia), large plantation and
cash-crop farmers, and high-ranking personnel (i.e. corporate lawyers and accountants).
(e) Theories of Revolution
The early use of the term revolution referred to the 'turning around' of political power and was
applied to the restoration of monarchies as well as to their overthrow' 65 . However, in one
sense, revolution is also often used allegorically to refer to any wide-ranging change in society,
one instituted, perhaps, by scientific or technological changes such as the Copernican and
industrial ones' 66 . Political revolution occur in all kinds of forms and political orientations,
from conservative Calvinism to the anti-ecclesiastical, chiliastic sectarian movements of
religious puritanism. These revolutionary assaults were directed against the Royal, Episcopal,
established Church; against the monarchy itself; against compulsory religious institutions; and
finally, against every sort of political discrimination (i.e. against the less powerful in society).
The common objective of these endeavour was to secure the personal rights of individuals -
rights which were derived from the divinely-ordained right to freedom of conscience and from
the natural right to life, liberty, and property'67.
Thus, in political science, the primary meaning of revolution is a deliberate, intentional, and
most probably violent overthrow of one ruling class by another, often fought out as a conflict
between the mobilised masses and the existing system. For example, as used by the French,
the term revolution implied not only a change in the top echelons of a political system, but a
change in the society as a whole. Above all, it meant both the altering of the power
distribution and a complete overhaul of the social structure. The revolution in France led to
the creation of a middle-class controlled republic instead of an aristocratically-controlled
monarchy.
' In analysing African class cleavages and social conflicts, Naomi and colleagues explain this point
more in details. See Naomi Chazan, et al., op. cit., pp.1l6-l24.
65 See David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionaiy of Politics, op. cit., p. 419.
66 See Karl Griewank, "Emergence of the Concept of Revolution", in Bruce Mazlish, Arthur D.
Kaledin and David B. Kaiston (ed.), Revolution: A Reader (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 13-18.
' 67 Ibid., p. 15.
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In another view, revolution serves as a means of personal liberation. It is a vehicle for
satisfying inner drives on the part of leaders and followers. In other words, revolution and
liberation are inextricably bound. According to this view, revolution is not merely a political
act aimed at transforming the colonial situation. Both notions of liberation and revolution give
expression to a continuing process through which man's potentialities are continuously
enlarged. It is a process that spans time, giving direction to social and political life. Thus,
over the years, the term revolution has come to be associated with fundamental changes in the
political, social, economic and psychological dimensions of human organisation' 68 . But, the
contemporary literature on revolution seems profuse, and concentrates around issues such as
the causes and consequences of revolution, revolutionary leadership, comparative studies, and
definition of revolution' 69 . For example, popular opinion often identifies or associates
revolution with violence' 70 . Revolution raises in one's mind a spectre of destruction, brutality
and carnage, a reaction which, as John Dunn pointed out, is partly fed by the pronouncements
of revolutionaries' 71 . The major lesson of revolutions is that they have often wreaked massive
damage on the existing power structure. Thus, an examination of a sample of the relevant
social science literature shows that the notion of violence is often built into the meaning of
revolution' 72 . The very notion of a non violent revolution is, according to this view, a
contradiction.
168 See Stanley A. Kochanek, "Perspectives on the Study of Revolution and Social Change',
comparative Politics, vo. 5, no. 3(April 1973), p. 314.
69 for useful views of these, see Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution", World Politics, vol. 18,
no. 2(January 1966), pp. 159-176; Isaac Kramnic, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and
Explanation in Recent Scholarship", History and Theory, vol. 2, no. 2(1972), pp. 22-63; Michael
Freeman, "Review Article: Theories of Revolution", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 2, part
3(July 1972), pp. 339-359; Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography",
political Science Quarterly, vol. 88, no. 1(March 1973), pp. 23-53; and most reviewing, is Jack A.
Gladstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation", World Politics, vol xxxii, no. 3(April
1980), pp. 423-453.
170 Revolution is described as a rapid, violent and irreversible change in the political organisation of a
society. See for example Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: an introduction (London: Croom
Helm, 1985), p. 160.
171 See John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomena
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 12; and also Stephen Chan and Andrew Williams, op.
cit., p. 6.
72 See Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, Col.: Hoover Institution,
1964); Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars", History and Theory, vol. 4, no. 2(1965);
and Robert T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (Princeton, N.J.: Princetom University Press, 1970).
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Similarly, Marxism/Leninism regards violence as an accompanying characteristics of
revolution' 73 . For this view, violence plays an essentially instrumental role in the revolutionary
process. Violence is viewed as an evil necessity called for by the violence of the bourgeoisie
state apparatus. Lenin himself expressed, 'the replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian
state is impossible without a violent revolution" 74 . Marx and Engels had expressed similar
views about the inevitability of a violent revolution in their famous Communist Manifesto.
However, Marx sometimes gave the impression that a peaceful non-violent revolution was
feasible in the two countries of England and the United States of America' 75 . It is such
ambivalence in Marx that led to the separation of his followers, some years later, into
"moderates" on the one hand, and "extremist" on the other' 76 . The former advocated for a
peaceful transformation of society, while the latter became the sole harbinger of violent change
in society. For example, according to Fanon, a violent revolution is likely to be more
"authentic" than a non-violent one. In the context of Africa, Fanon proposed that violent
revolutions can be regenerative, in that they can create "new" individuals and a "new" social
consciousness' 77 . This conception is also implied in Engel's reference to the "immense moral
and spiritual impetus which results from every victorious revolution"78.
However, most African liberation leaders regard revolution as involving more than the violent
or non-violent overthrow of a political regime. They view revolution as a process of
fundamental social, economic, political and institutional change. From the African point of
view, liberation movements are often waged in terms of revolution, where established quasi-
constitutional processes are often undermined as inept. Thus, liberation movements are often
destined for absolute change and the complete overhaul of the system. In other words, change
comes through a revolution, not evolution. What precipitates revolution is the widespread
belief that the existing system of power, the existing system of power relations between the
people, is somehow thwarting their humanity. And this was true of the great liberal
revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries in England and France, as well as the non-liberal
revolutions of this century. The common view which underpins every revolution is that the
'° See for example, L. Adele Jinadu, op. cit., p. 119.
174 See V.1. Lenin, State and Revolution, op. cit., p. 20.
'7 See M.G. Stekioff, History of the First International (New York: Lawrence, 1928), passi,n.
176 For the ambivalence and disintegration of Marxism, see Alfred G. Meyer, The Unity of Theory and
pyactice (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 103-121: 115-116.
' See L. Adele Jinadu, op. cit., p. 120.
'7 See Friedrich Engels, Anti-Duhring, quoted in V.1. Lenin, op. cit., p. 19.
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very structure of society, the dominant power relations in it, have made people less than fully
human, have warped them into inability to realise or even to see their full human potentiality.
It is on this basis that the turmoil of post-independence or post-colonial era generated a wide
variety of revolutions. Even though falling short of being truly "great" revolutions such as the
great revolutions in England, France, Russia and the United States' 79 . In Africa, most
revolutions have helped in the establishment of, if one uses Andrew Williams words, "ideal
types' of political organisation, that includes different models of democracy, governance,
political culture, that are at the heart of our current international society"80.
2.4. On the Relationship Between Liberation and Self-Determination
The principle of 'equal rights and self-determination of all peoples' was enshrined in the
purposes of the United Nations in Article I of the Charter' 8 '. This became accepted as the
basic principle of international law from 1948 when it was further endorsed with greater
rhetorical force in the Declaration of Human Rights. The UN not only endorsed such a
declaration but it also asserted the principle of self-determination as the central legitiniising
principle of international society' 82 . From that time, the principle came to enjoy international
consensus with no single state making explicit official objections to the Charter.
However, as with so many other international norms, the consensus depended in practice on a
considerable degree of ambiguity, which every member-state strove to resolve to their own
advantage. For example, architects of African and Arab nationalism, or Pan-Africanism and
Pan-Arabism, all sought to resolve the ambiguity of the Charter to benefit their struggle for
independence. Various European imperial powers also strove to revamp structures of their
colonies to take account of post-war international norms. Europe itself had since the French
Revolution sought to address crucial political issues such as "what constituted a 'people", and
"what could be construed as 'self-determination'?" The new internationalism too, meant that
such political questions were bound to contaminate Europe's African empires as well. And
evidently, at the end of the Second World War African nationalism picked up a severe attack
' See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1938).
180 See Stephen Chan and Andrew Williams, op. cit., p. 38.
181 See Herbert G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, 2nd edn. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1962), p. 197.
82 See H. Wiberg, "Self-Determination as an International Issue", in I.M. Lewis (ed.), Nationalism and
Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p. 43.
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on European colonialism branding it as outdated, oppressive, inefficient as well as artificial'83
From thence on, the principle was indeed used as a major defence for the nationalist struggles
throughout the Third World.
Because it seemed obvious that Eritreans were denied their right to benefit from the principle
of self-determination in the face of international legal principles, the fundamental historical and
legal peculiarity of the Eritrean national liberation movement were best defined in terms of
contemporary international law. According to Bereket's seminal work , Eritrea and the United
Nations, the Eritrean people possess the characteristic of a people according to international
law and their claim to self-determination is legally founded. Convinced that their case was
similar to that of other peoples of the world who were also fighting for the right of self-
determination, Eritreans wrote numerous appeals to the international bodies seeking legal
assistance. The Eritrean case was referred to the UN, and in 1952 the UN Resolution 390(V)
federated Eritrea and Ethiopia instead'84.
The resolution tacitly recognised the existence of an "Eritrean people", which was clear,
according to the UN view, that federation cannot annihilate it. The international recognition
of the Eritrean people meant, therefore, that under the 1952 settlement, the UN made the
Eritrean people beneficiaries of certain rights without being a legal entity' 85 . That is why,
when in 1962, the federal arrangement was abrogated by Emperor HaiJe Selassie, Eritrean
nationalists took up the option of armed struggle to achieve their right of independence.
Eritrea's ultimate goal throughout the liberation struggle was to gain independence, much like
other African countries which had suffered the yoke of colonial domination. Accordingly, as
we shall see in Chapter Four, Eritreans defme their liberation struggle very much in terms of
self-determination and independence.
Ethiopians too became fed up, first with the history of monarchical or dynastic rule and,
second with nearly two decades of a military autocracy. As a multi-ethnic society, the present
leaders argue, Ethiopia's diverse ethnic groups and regions deserve the right of determining
their own future but within the larger Ethiopian polity. But for such views to prevail, Ethiopia
183 See Henry S. Wilson, African Decolonisation (London: E. Arnold, 1994), P. 92.
184 For details on this UN resolution, see chapter four.
185 Alain Fenet provides a short but very useful study on the right of the Eritrean people to self-
determination form the perspective of an international lawyer. See his "The Right of the Eritrean People
to Self-Determination", in Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson (ed.), The Long Struggle of Eritrea for
Independence and Constructive Peace (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1990), pp. 33-45. [detail title
reference]
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required a severe liberation struggle to root out the previous establishment and reconstruct a
new order that would meet the needs of every Ethiopian citizen. The EPRDF-led government
in Ethiopia has proved and is still proving that only liberation could deliver democracy and the
right of every Ethiopian nationality to self-determination. This gesture is widely perceived as
the least common denominator that would resolve the historical political differences that have
threatened the survival of the Ethiopian state.
Therefore, it will be noted that Eritrean and Ethiopian self-views are all constituted by issues
of liberation, self-determination and the project of democratisation. These three concepts
form an 'intimate symbiosis' between them and are often regarded as major points of reference
throughout the transition in both societies. Moreover both liberation struggles strove for the
achievement of self-determination and democracy. Nonetheless, Eritreans view the process of
their liberation struggle not as a provider but a designer of their way of life, and unlike the
Ethiopians whose liberation struggle is viewed as a hope of preserving the unity of the state
threatened by disintegration.
2.5. On the Relationship between Liberation and Democratisation
The foregoing points to the argument that throughout the liberation struggles in Eritrea and
Ethiopia, an 'intimate symbiosis' has existed between the concepts of liberation, self-
determination and democracy. The right to self-determination is a democratic right which, as
a universal principle, was sought by the first generation of African leaders as a war aim for
decolonisation. Post-colonial liberation movements too, have proclaimed among other things
that their people must be given the opportunity to discuss what matters in their life and how
their way of life must be conducted. As wifi be argued in the cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia,
such aspirations can only be delivered in a democratically ordered society. For years, the
mobilisation of the Eritrean and Ethiopian liberation fighters was guided by such aspirations.
Therefore, as will be shown in later Chapters, all documents of the liberation fronts in Eritrea
and Ethiopia contained democratic principles as one primary objective of the struggle.
Historical records also show that liberation movements or revolutions from the French and the
American onwards invoked democracy and democratic principles as crucial objects.
Throughout the struggle, Eritreans were often critical of democracy as a "dogma" and
preferred to consider it as a practice. What the EPLF (now PFDJ) purports to do is to
provide content and meaning to democracy within the country's own unique history and
conditions. The experiences of the Eritrean society provide a ground upon which an
indigenous autochthonous democracy can be nurtured. According to Bereket Habte Selassie,
such home-grown order can come only through independent and innovative thinking, rather
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than wholesale adoptation of policies from external sources. And such an approach bodes
well with the Eritrean experience during the process of liberation where independent thinking
and self-sufficiency were alleged to be its distinguishing aspects. Thus, the liberation struggle
in Eritrea encouraged as its democratic gesture, independent thinking and self-sufficiency.
It has also been admitted that the liberation struggle in Eritrea exerted tremendous influence
on the liberalisation and the democratisation programme in Ethiopia' 86 . The EPLF (PFDJ) has
had enormous influence on the liberation fronts in Ethiopia, especially on the EPRDF. As we
shall see, pioneers of the TPLF (some of whom now constitute the leadership of the EPRDF)
were trained and brought up by the EPLF. It was common perception among the EPLF that
Eritrean independence requires the overthrow of the hardline regime in Addis Ababa, which
could be quickly achieved via the strengthening of the various fronts in Ethiopia. This was
proved in 1991 after the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa when Eritrea became de facto
independent.
Similarly, the concepts of liberation, self-determination and democracy in Ethiopia became
almost synonymous and that is why after the overthrow of the Dergue the EPRDF convened a
national conference to discuss the future of the country' 87 . This was a gesture of the EPRDF's
commitment to democratisation, putting its war aim into practice. Ethiopian experiences, as
we shall see, lean more towards the yearning for democracy and democratisation whose full
realisation is only defined in the context of the self-determination of ethnic nationalities in the
country. Unlike in Eritrea where democracy and democratisation are viewed as home-grown
values and a way of life, in Ethiopia democratisation (defined in terms of self-determination) is
projected as the least common denominator and preserver of the unity of a threatened mutli-
ethnic state. And as a result, Ethiopians take democracy as a universal legal framework
required for keeping together a highly, though stifi uniquely constituted, fragmented society.
186 See Assefaw Bariagaber, "Liberalisation and Democratisation in Ethiopia: Domestic Consequences
of the Conflict in Eritrea", Eritrean Studies Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 69-89.
187 See Sarah Vaughan, Thç Addis Ababa July Conference of 1991, op. cit.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF THE AFRICAN STATE-SYSTEM
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION
Introduction
The current democratisation process that came to the surface at the close of the 1980s in most
of Africa has been seen as a panacea for all the continent's ills of the past because it is
expected to inject accountability into politics and improve management of the economy.
However, this continuous yearning for accountability and transparency, to be realised through
multi-party democracy, has equally been confronted by a number of obstacles some of which
are historically traceable to the era of colonialism and others of which are indigenous. This
chapter examines the historical obstacles which grew during the formative years of the African
state, and are mainly regarded as consequences of colonialism. Unlike the European state-
system which had ample time for its evolution and whose fashion has generally been adopted
as a model for ordering the rest of the world, the African state was built in a short time. As a
result, many of the normative and analytical problems about the relations between the state
and society in Africa, especially South of the Sahara Desert, have been mainly exacerbated by
the hurried nature of the formation of the African state.
Thus, in order for us to understand such factors and fully comprehend the salience of the
whole discourse on liberation and the emergence of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, tracing
the origins of nationhood in the African continent becomes a very important element.
We noted earlier that the state is a construct of Western culture. There is a wide range of
evidence backing this claim, that the "modern world", in all its aspects including its States-
System, has its roots in the culture of Western Christendom. Thus, as Schuman noted:
All the peoples of the globe have in varying measure been "Europeanised" in
the process. The contemporary State System which covers the planet is, in
most of its essentials, European as its origins, practices, and motivations. But
its point of departure was early Western Christendom, in whose development
the "Dark" and "Middle" Ages were but the sunrise and morning of a day
which is now past noon'88.
Therefore, while tracing the history of the emergence of African State System, a very
important point to keep in mind is that the Western States-System has essentially been adopted
188 Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community
(New York, Toronto & London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, INC., 1958), pp. 55-56.
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as a model for framing the entire world system in our time. As is often pointed out, the
historical precursors to the Western-State System were not nation-states, but the City-States
of ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy' 89 . It is from these two major ancient traditions that
the West derived its principles of internal government and that of diplomatic representation.
From thence, basic characteristics of nationhood developed, that qualified states to engage in
international affairs. States' involvement in international relations, therefore, depends on a host
of conditions including the ability to pursue national interest, national security, and economic
strategy'9°
The Western State System came to rest upon the three cornerstones of the concept of
sovereignty; the principles of international law; and the politics of the balance of power. The
concept of sovereignty has been elevated to the dignity of a political theory and later to that of
a juridical idea underlying the whole structure of modern international jurisprudence. The
principles of international law have evolved into a system of public law in the community of
nations. And the politics of the balance of power has become an avowed principle of foreign
policy, accepted and acted upon so consistently by all the great states that it may well be
viewed as the central theme about which the web of diplomacy is woven' 91 . Such is the way
the European State system became established and was later simply adopted as a formula to
carve up African States. According to various sources, the emergence of African State-
System took place nearly after four centuries of contacts with Europe. The first and largest
period in the history of African Studies began c. 1500, with the establishment of trade relations
between the African continent and the then emerging, and European-based capitalist world
economy of the Middle Ages' 92 . The four hundred years of Afro-European relations were
189 For details on this, refer to the following literature on the origins of states: J.H. Shennan, The
Origins of the Modern European State, 1450-1725 (London: Hutchinson, 1974); Elman Rogers
Service, Origins of the State and Civilization: the process of cultural evolution (New York: Norton,
1975); Ronald Cohen and Elman R. Service (eds), Origins of the State: the anthropology of political
evolution (Philadelphia: Institute of the Study of Human Issues, 1978); Ralph Pettman, State and
Class: A Sociology of International Affairs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 108-112; and
Stephen Chan, Issues in International Relations: A View from Africa, op. cit., p. 3.
'° Stephen Chan lists eight of these conditions, see Issues in International Relations, op. cit., p. 4; see
also K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. sixth edition (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992), pp. 82-1 14, especially on "The purposes of states: foreign policy goals and
strategies".
'' See Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, op. cit., pp. 66-72.
92 The records hold that by about 1500, Portugal alone had taken some 700 tons of gold out of Africa.
See Hosea Jaffe, A History of Africa (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1985), especially pp. 43-64; also
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter- Revolution in Africa, op. cit., p. 5; and Paul
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dominated entirely by the two events of colonialism: first the slave trade, which constituted the
primary means of primitive accumulation, and second, the trade in the raw materials needed
for industrial production in Europe' 93 . These two were the primary concerns connecting
Africa and Europe. However, the first detailed descriptions of African social formations and
states were written by learned historians in the African countries bordering the Mediterranean.
Writing in Arabic, they described the civilisations of the Sudan and the regions along the
course of the Niger. Such scholars include El Bekri, El Idrisi, El Masudi, Ibn Hawkal, Ibn
Khaldun, Ibn Battuta, Yakut, Makrisi, Al Hassan Ibn Mohammed (also Leo Africanus), and Es
Sadi. Their writings revealed the existence of a series of societies, which were subsequently
'discovered' by European travellers and writers such as Dapper, Lopez, Cresque, Mungo Park,
Barth and Frobenius. However, the scientific interest in the scramble for Africa won official
sanctions in Europe only in the nineteenth century with the 1884-85 Conference in Berlin.
The deliberations at the Berlin African Conference superseded any prior European
involvement in the continent.
In this chapter, we shall take the period of the 'Scramble for Africa', as it is always labelled, as
the decisive period in the development of the African States System. This wifi include both
the formal partition on paper at the Berlin Conference and its subsequent historical reality on
the ground. Thereafter, I wifi discuss the formation of nations and the concept of the 'state' in
African politics. Our attention will also be drawn to the analyses of the category of African
civil society. Finally, I will summarise the emergence of African states-system and its
subsequent engagement in international affairs since independence. I wifi also present the
major events that dominated post-independence Africas international relations.
3.1. The Scramble for Africa, its Partition and Independence
The 'Scramble for Africa' and its subsequent partition are two major events that have created
contention amongst both historians and scholars of post-independence African politics'94.
Cammack, David Pool and William Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 13ff.
' See Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History (London & New York:
Longman, 1994), p. 4.
's" The circumstances that led to the Scramble for Africa and its partition have been discussed at length
in numerous published works. See for example, A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism
(London: James Currey, 1987), pp. 26-57; in idem (ed.), General History of Africa, vol. vii (London:
Longman, 1985); J. Schumpeter, Imperialis,n and Social Classes (Cleveland: World Publishing
Company, 1955); R.E. Robinson and J. Gallaghar, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan,
1961); J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1965);
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Worse still, historiography has added a pack of jostling theories such as the rise of, on the one
hand, Eurocentric explanations that are often sympathetic towards the imperial powers, and on
the other, an Afrocentric interpretation of colonial history, which takes into account the values
and concerns of the African people. Still, many scholars have sought to provide
comprehensive interpretations of the Scramble and partition of Africa. Two major series of
publications include the UNESCO General History of Africa and the Cambridge History of
Africa' 95 . However, the explanations given by these sources have been met by considerable
criticisms from some African scholars as having not proven adequate in attempts to explain the
events of this particular period' 96 . Indeed, the complexities of the Scramble appear to
continue to defy any general comprehensive interpretation, because the great diversity of
Africa and its peoples, and the inextricable interests and motives of the European powers,
preclude any single sweeping theory to explain the partition in every region of the continent'97.
Nevertheless, a more meaningful and accurate understanding of the partition can yet be best
achieved by regarding the Scramble as a series of interconnected events, which were also
conditioned by different patterns of human motivation and behaviour in each of the disparate
regions of Africa. I am not, in any case, intending to discuss these in detail here for reasons of
both space and relevanc&98.
Generally, a survey of the literature on the Scramble for Africa shows that there were hesitant
beginnings to the partition of Africa long prior to the Conference of Berlin in 1884-85. For
V.1. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983); J.S.
Keltie, The Partition of Africa (London: E. Stanford, 1983); G.N. Uzoigwe, Britain and the Conquest
of Africa (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1974); B. Sutcliffe and R. Owen (eds.),
Studies in the Theory of I,nperialis,n (London: Longman, 1972); Walter Rodney, How Europe
Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972); and Claude Ake, A
political Econo,ny of Africa, op. cit., pp. 26-29.
In these two useful major publications of the History of Africa, various scholars have contributed
massive accounts of events. See The Cambridge History of Africa, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976); and UNESCO General History of Africa, 8 vols. (Paris: UNESCO, 1985).
196 See Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism op. cit., pp. 1-26.
' See Robert 0. Collins, Europeans in Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 71-77.
198 These are well dealt with in a number of scholarly sources, such as by Raymond F. Betts (ed.), The
Scra,nble for Africa: Causes and Dimnensions of Empire (London: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972);
G.N. Sanderson, "The European Partition of Africa: origins and dynamics", in J.D. Fage and R. Oliver
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 96-158; in idem "The European Partition of Africa: Coincidence or Conjuncture?",
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Histo,y, vol. 3, no. 1(October 1974); and a number of articles
in both the Cambi idge and the UNESCO history of Africa series cited above.
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example, the discovery of diamonds in South Africa in 1869, is alleged to have provided the
incentive and capital for a large influx of Europeans, who ultimately spilled across the
Limpopo River into Central Africa' 99 . Another recounted event has been the opening of the
Suez Canal in the same year. The Canal, made possible by the development of the steamship,
not only made the East African coast more accessible, but also soon became the great pivotal
point in the British imperial strategy. Thus, British interest shifted to Cairo with repercussions
as far south as the Great Lakes of Equatorial Africa and as far west as Wadai and Lake
Chad200 . Besides that, some historians still regard the Scramble for Africa as having started a
bit earlier with Leopold's crusade in Brussels from 7 January to 15th September 1876, that
culminated to the raising of three flags across Africa from 14th September to June 1878201.
Also the period when the African Association was formed (strictly the 'Association for
promoting the Discovery of the Interior parts of Africa') in 1788, largely under the inspiration
of Joseph Banks, the then President of the Royal Society, who had accompanied Captain
Cook's voyage to the Pacific in 1868, is also regarded as marking the beginning of the
European Scramble for Africa202.
Furthermore, some historians still regard the greatest triumph of the African Association as
having began with the dispatch of Mungo Park's first expedition of 1795-97, which fmally
established the general direction of the River Niger which had long mystified Europeans 203 . A
similar development took place nearly a century later in 1881, when the French extended their
control over Tunis. Like the British in Egypt, Zanzibar and Turkey, the French had hoped to
maintain their influence by supporting the government of the Bey, the Tunisian ruler and to
avoid annexation204 . However, these occupations by the French and the British are regarded,
in the interpretations of Eurocentric historians, as non-signals or non-precipitators of the
Scramble for Africa. For Eurocentrics, the partition of Africa required greater stimuli than the
See Robert 0. Collins, op. cit., p. 71.
200 Ibid.
201 According to Claude Ake, op. cit., p. 29; within a few years after King Leopold II had triggered off
the Scramble for Africa in 1876, the continent became divided among the European powers and
subsequently colonised. See also the chapter on "Central Africa and Europe" by Thomas Pakenham,
The Scrainbiefor Africa: 1876-1912 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)), pp. 11-23.
202 See M.E. Chamberlain, The Scramble forAfrica (London: Longman, 1974), pp. 19-20.
203 See Robin Hallet (ed.), Records of the African Association, 1788-1831 (London: Nelson, 1964).
204 In "Saving the Bey' and Saving the Khedive', see Thomas Pakenham, op. cit., pp. 109-122, 123-
140.
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discovery of diamonds in South Africa or the political intrigue on the Mediterranean littoral205.
This view posits that the pre-partition era was foreshadowed by a process of the partition
carried out by Africans themselves, though under the command of European officers 206 . The
examples cited in support of the foregoing arguments, include the consolidation of Shaka
Zulu's empire and the Mfecane migrations, the creation of the Trekker republics by the South
African Boers and the West African Jihads inter a1ia207.
Such views, however, have never been left unchallenged 208. A number of sources have
indicated that Africa, at the eve of the colonial conquest and occupation, had its own system
of governance, international relations and means of how to resolve its own conflicts. For
example, many different forms of sociopolitical organisations existed in pre-colonial Africa,
ranging from centralised Kingdoms such as Ashanti (Asante) and Benin in West Africa and the
Buganda in East Africa; and stateless-societies such as in Western Sudan, where Gao, Jenne,
Kano, Timbuktu, and Walata had been established many centuries before the advent of
colonial rule209 . Till by as late as 1800, with very few exceptions, Africans were enjoying their
sovereignty and were very much in control of their own affairs and destinies. But within the
incredibly short period between 1880 and 1935, all of Africa, save Liberia and Ethiopia, was
seized by the European imperial powers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and
Spain210 . As Thomas Pakenham has rightly put it, "Africa was sliced like a cake, the pieces
swallowed by five rival nations	 From thence, Africans were converted from sovereign
205 See Robert 0. Collins, op. cit., p. 72.
206 Ibid., pp. 99-137.
207 See H.S. Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870 (Minneapolis, Minn.:
University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 24-30; and A. Nutting, The Scramble for Africa: the Great
Trek to the Boer War Contestable, op. cit.
208 A counter-argument has been advanced that although African-based imperialism took place, that
process was already concluded by the time the European partition commenced: and to ignore that fact
would be to discount "significant elements of European purposiveness, premeditation and aggression".
See H.S. Wilson, op. cit., p. 50; and Makumi Mwagiru, The International Management of Internal
Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation (Ph.D. Thesis, UKC, 1994), pp. 99-100.
209 See A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism, op. cit., pp. 1-26; Dorothy Dodge, op.
cit., pp. 15ff; and Paul Cammack, David Pool and William Tordoff, op cit., pp. 12-20.
210 See Albert Adu Boahen, "Africa and the Colonial Challenge", in A. Adu Boahen (eds.), UNESCO
General 1-lisroty of Africa, vol. vii, Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935 (London: James
Currey, 1990), p. 1.
211 See Thomas Pakenham, op. cit., p. xv.
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and royal citizens of their own continent into colonial and dependent subjects. So much that,
by the 1900s, in place of the numerous traditional African societies and polities, a completely
new and numerically smaller set of some forty artificially created colonies had emerged. These
colonies were administered by governors and officials who were appointed by their
metropolitan governments and were in no way responsible to their African subjects. Until the
1950s, the colonial system had been firmly imposed on virtually the whole of Africa, and
varied explanations on these have since proliferated.
For example, the earliest writers, such as Hobson and Lenin, saw one explanation in the rise of
the new imperialism in Europe, due primarily to the economic forces operating there during
the last three decades of the nineteenth century and, more especially, to the need to look for
areas where the surplus capital being generated by these forces could be invested. 212 . Some of
the explanations that have hitherto been advanced on the European struggle for Africa range
from those who see the event as more or less an accidental by-product of the diplomatic
confrontations among the major European powers, particularly France and Britain. Others
have often attributed the Scramble to a combination of internal African conditions and external
European factors. For instance, Hopkins has argued that in areas where the transition from
slave trade had been successfully made, where incomes had been maintained, and where peace
had been established, "an explanation of partition will need to emphasise external pressures,
such as mercantile demands and Anglo-French rivalries". Hopkins similarly argued that in
areas, "where the indigenous rulers adopted reactionary attitudes, where attempts were made
to maintain incomes by predatory means, and where internal conflicts were pronounced", more
weight should be placed "on disintegrative forces on the African side of the frontier, though
without neglecting the external factors"213.
For Professor Anthony Asiwaju, "The establishment of formal colonial rule must be seen
against a background of a major change in what came to be referred to as 'balance of power'
in Europe following the rise of Germany, and increasing political instability occasioned by
African wars of the nineteenth century which came to threaten peace in the African interior,
and consequently European trade in the coast". Asiwaju, therefore, contends that the partition
2!'	 .- See J.A. Hobson, imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1965);
V.1. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983); G.N.
Uzoigwe, "European Partition and the Conquest of Africa: an overview", in UNESCO General History
of Africa, op. cit., pp. 10-24; and also Claude Ake, op. cit., pp. 20-26.
213 See A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 165-166.
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of Africa "cannot become fully intelligible except in terms of the convergence between the new
situation in Europe and the prevailing political conditions in particular parts of Africa"214.
Other African scholars have attempted to diffuse the long controversy in various works.
Boahen, for example, finds Hobson and Lenin's particular explanations utterly unconvincing
and inadequate, given that it was not economic conditions or the need to invest surplus capital
alone that gave rise to the new imperialist spirit in Europe. Besides the strong economic
forces, Boahen adds political and social forces as major precipitators of the Scramble that have
long been ignored in the analysis of the African state 215 . The most important of these political
factors was an exaggerated spirit of nationalism in Europe following the unification of both
Germany and Italy and especially after Germany's defeat of France in 1871. With the
emergence of a strong national consciousness, nations began to think not only of their power
and progress but also of their prestige, greatness and security. Boahen concludes that the
main social condition that contributed to the rise of the new imperialism was the need to
acquire colonies where the surplus labour produced by the industrial capitalist system as well
as the large numbers of the unemployed could be settled without loosing their mother country.
Besides that, another point to note is that the European Scramble was not confmed to Africa
alone, given the proliferation of similar involvements elsewhere such as those in the whole of
southeastern Asia - Burma, Indochina, Malaya, Java, Sumatra and the Philippines 216 . Thus, it
was the conjunction of all these factors or forces in Europe in the 1880s, and not any
conditions in either Africa or Asia alone, that accounts for the Scramble for colonialism during
the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
Despite the foregoing somewhat conflicting explanations about the Scramble, there was also a
prevailing certain "ideology" on the "inner momentum" that brought Europe to carry out what
was regarded as Europe's "civilising mission". This European arrogance which allocated itself
the mission to "civilise" the world justifies the link that existed between the early expansion of
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the imperialism of the nineteenth century. In all, the
partition did not have long to wait, but took place on paper when Bismarck convened the
African Berlin Conference in 1884-85. The real importance of the Berlin Conference is the
214 See AT. Asiwaju, Paper presented at the Nigerian National Open University. Quoted by A. Adu
Boahen, African Perspectives of Colonialism, op. cit., p. 28.
215 See A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialis,n, op. cit., pp. 3 1-57.
216 
Among other valuable readings on this would be W.D. McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the
Tropics, 1865-1875 (London: Macmillan, 1967).
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actual realisation that partition was now practicable. By the time the Berlin Conference ended
in February 1885, the Scramble for Africa could have been in full swing.
(a) The Berlin Conference, 1884-85 and the Partition of Africa
First and foremost, one major issue that has caused Africa a number of problems today in their
social organisation is that of the nation-state, which is Europe's most enduring legacy, not only
in Africa but also the rest of the World. This particular mode of political organisation is alien
to Africa and that is partly why attempts to establish a coherent theory of the state in Africa
have often failed217 . The state originated in European diplomatic history and statecraft, and
developed with major sociological changes within European societies. The international
states-system as it exists today is often traced to the peace treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which
ended the internecine Thirty Years War in Europe. As we have been reminded repeatedly by
historians and students of diplomacy, it was upon the foundations of Westphalia that the entire
superstructure of world diplomacy and international relations came to be constructed 218 . Over
two centuries later, a similar event took place when descendants of Westphalia convened the
Berlin Conference to settle their disputes over territories in Africa. For a long time during the
nineteenth century, European powers quarrelled among themselves over the shares of Africa
that each wanted to get. But in 1884-85, in Berlin (then capital of a German empire), they
agreed to invade and take Africa without fighting each other. They marked out 'spheres of
interest', where each invaded the continent within its own 'spheres' 219 . Like the Westphalia
peace treaty that brought an end to the mutually destructive Thirty Years War in Europe, and
most recently, in the way the Yalta Peace Treaty mitigated the frontiers of Eastern Europe
after the Second World War, the Berlin Conference succeeded in settling the disputes arising
from European activities in Africa. Thus, it established the undisputed sway of colonialism in
Africa for nearly a century.
217 See Z. Ergas (ed.), op. cit.; and Adrian Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The Third World
State in Theoretical Perspective", Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 6, no. 1(1993), pp. 55-74:63-70.
218 I have no intention, whatsoever, of discussing Westphalia here, but the impact of its legacy has been
mentioned by a number of scholars in the manner used here. See in particular Au A. Mazrui and
Michael Tidy, op. cit., pp. 373-375; Frederick L. Schuman, op. cit., and William C. Olson and A.J.R.
Groom, op. cit.; also Kal J. Holsti, op cit., pp. 15-44.
219 See Basil Davidson, Modern Africa, op. cit, p. 5.
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As a matter of fact, the Berlin Conference, convened by Prince Otto von Bismarck, between
2015th November and 26th February 1885 = , did mcrease the intensity of the 'Scramble for
Africa' in Europe. During the conference, European leaders set out the ground rules for the
partition of Africa based upon what was termed 'effective occupation" - whenever a European
power occupied a parcel of land it could legitimately integrate that territory into its empire.
Professor Boahen summarises the main rules agreed upon at the conference as follows:
The first was that before any power claimed an area, it should inform the other
signatory powers so that any who deemed it necessary could make a counterclaim. The
second was that all such claims should be followed by annexation and effective
occupation before they could be accepted as valid. The third was that treaties signed
with African rulers were to be considered as legitimate titles to sovereignty. The fourth
rule was that each power could extend its coastal possessions inland to some extent
and claim spheres of influence. Finally, it was agreed that there was to be freedom of
navigation on the Congo and the Niger rivers221.
Furthermore, the interested powers settled their individual claims in the lobbies and divided the
territories concerned among themselves. For example in the treaty, they decreed an
international free trade regime, and in the bilateral settlements they partitioned the area
politically into exclusive spheres of influence which implied economic monopoly.
However, some contemporary African historians and observers alike, contend that the
negotiations or proceedings of the conference are open to different meanings: for example,
"They were about Zolivereine in Africa, they were about power politics in Europe; they were
intended to avert a partition, they deliberately carved up Africa; they were designed to bring
African people freely into the 'commercial republic of the world', they aimed at colonial
expropriation; the philanthropy was well meant, it was humbug; the treaty signified little in
Africa, the conference changed the course of events drastically..."222.
According to Samuel Geis:
220 See G.N. Uzoigwe, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Ronald Robinson, "The Conference in Berlin and the Future
in Africa, 1884-85", in Stig Forster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Ronald Robinson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-
32; Thomas Pakenham, op. cit., p. 217; A. Adu Boahen, op. cit., pp. 31-33; and S.E. Crowe, The
Berlin West African Conference, 1884-85 (London, 1942).
22! All these rules were embodied in the Berlin Act, ratified on 26th February 1885. See Boahen,
African perspectives on Colonialism, op. cit., p. 33; in idem, UNESCO General History of Africa, op.
cit., pp. 29-3 1; and General Act of the Berlin Conference, 26th February, 1885; Protocols and
General Act of the Berlin Conference, C. 4361, 1885, Prince Bismarck's opening address.
222 See Ronald Robinson, op. ci!., pp. 1-2.
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Africa's colonial partition was not planned or executed in Berlin in 1884-85,
but it was largely effected, though in a more complicated process, by decisions
taken at the conference. The historical evaluation of the Berlin Conference is,
therefore, faced with a paradoxical situation: its formal decisions remained
largely on paper; the historical facts (partition of Africa) ascribed to it can only
be linked to it as (direct or indirect) effects, but hardly as the clear-cut intention
that is suggested by loose wording. The powers as a whole did not 'want' to
carve up Africa into formalised colonies, but the Berlin Conference is, of
course, more than a mere symbolic or allegorical footnote to the 'Scramble for
Africa'223.
And Sybil E. Crowe argued inter alia, that the Conference did not partition Africa; that as a
legal document the Berlin Act was noteworthy; it brought about an era of strict trade
monopolies in Africa which negated its desire to ensure free trade in the basins of the Niger
and the Congo rivers; and that the Conference's "effective occupation" resolutions were 'as
empty as Pandora's box' 224 . In a way, Crowe regarded the Berlin Conference a failure.
However, such diverse political interpretations no longer conceive the Berlin Conference as a
riddle of alternative half-truths. The conference has been mainly regarded both as an event of
European diplomatic history, and a part of imperialist expansion in the late nineteenth century
that was responsible for the carving up of an innocent continent 225 . According to John
Hargreaves, the Berlin Conference did advance the process of partition by precipitating,
particularly a series of bilateral boundary agreements-some concluded as extra-mural activities
by delegates to Berlin - which had the effect of changing the speed, and perhaps the course, of
European penetration226.
At this point, we can ask, why is all the foregoing narrative of importance to us? The
"Scramble for Africa", was prompted by a mix of economic and political motivations among
competing European powers and was facilitated by the Berlin Conference. The Acts of the
Conference, taken without any African input, proved disastrous for Africa because it led to the
arbitrary carving up of the continent without consideration of indigenous factors, and
consequently helped to produce a post-colonial continent of unstable, artificial, and relatively
223 See Forster, Mommsen and Robinson, op. cit., p. 264.
224 See Sybil E. Crowe, op. cit., pp. 3-4, 103, 152-175; and G.N. Uzoigwe, "The Result of the Berlin
West Africa Conference: An Assessment", in Forster, Mornmsen and Robinson, op cit., pp. 54 1-552.
225 One book and most simple to read but details everything, is again Hosea Jaffe, A Histoy of Africa,
op. cit. Is quite convincing especially in its analyses of the tragic impact colonialism (achieved through
partition) has had on the general political life of Africa.
226 See John D. Hargreaves, The Berlin Conference, West African Boundaries, and the Eventual
Partition", in Forster, Mommsen and Robinson, op. cit., pp. 3 13-314.
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meaningless state entities 227 . At Berlin, the European powers disregarded everything else
except their own acquisitions and the need for a balance in Europe. So, at their independence,
most African states inherited the borders as left by colonial powers. Thus, all state boundaries
in Africa are of recent colonial creation 228 , and do not, therefore, coincide with nations such as
is the case in Europe.
Europe's transfer of its own state-system to Africa was not accompanied by any prior
calculation to make statehood coincide with nationhood. Neither was there any quest for
cultural congruence between the unit of the state and the national unit, nor even cultural
similarities among the different units being ruled by the same colonial government. The wisest
thing the OAU founders did, when they gathered in Cairo in 1964, was to pass a resolution
that demanded African states to respect the colonial borders, a simple way of averting
potential border disputes 229 , thus, conferring legitimacy upon the arbitrarily drawn colonial
frontiers advanced at Berlin. To date, very few, if any, of the new territorial units in Africa,
could be described as nations in the classical European sense. One major point to note from
the emergence of the African State-System in contrast to the European system is that African
states have significant time constraints on state-building process for which Europe had
approximately four centuries. African states, like their Third World counterparts, are also
subject to international human rights and democracy norms which did not apply to European
states during their formative years. Above all, colonialism distorted the process of state-
making by stifling economic transformation and perpetuating traditional sources of
authority230.
Despite the time constraints experienced by African countries in their formation, these very
fragmented "Quasi-States", to use Robert Jackson's terminology, were embraced into the
227 See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States, op. cit.; and Stephen Wright, "The Foreign Policy of Africa",
in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1992), pp. 330-356:332.
228	 See I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1987), pp. 105-119; and Cammack, Pool and Tordoff, op. cit., p.49.
229 See Y. E1-Ayouti and I. William Zartman, The OA U after Twenty Years (New York: Praeger,
1984); C.O.C. Amate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986);
and Norman Kiondo, "Review of Conflict areas in Africa", in Disarmament: Programme of Training
on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Management and Confidence-Building among African
States. Key Address in the Workshop for Senior African Military and Civil Officials (New York:
United Nations, 1991), pp. 43-46.
230 See for example, Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making,
Regional Conflict, and the System International (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
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community of nations, with its own rules, its own conventions and codes. International law
itself is a child of European diplomatic history and has been adopted to bind the new members
of the club of nation-states, Africa included. And one real cause of problems in most of Africa
today began with the creation of the nation-state that has remained fractured, and whose major
consequences have been the crisis of identity on the one hand, and that of authority and
control on the other. African countries assumed equal representation in the international
system without having consolidated enough required institutions for governing society. Thus,
creating problems which Professor All Mazrui has rightly pointed out, "... the crisis of identity
in Africa is a crisis whose main theatre is the nation, while that of authority and control is a
crisis whose main theatre is the state" 231 . From here, we can now turn to examine the
concepts of the nation and the state in African politics.
3.2. 'Nation', 'State' and 'Civil Society' in Africa: a brief discussion
(a) The Analysis of the Concepts of Nation and State in Africa
What is 'the nation'? What is 'the state'? Are the kind of questions one would hope to
address before any analysis of how they function in African politics. Unfortunately, 'state' and
'nation' are the type of concepts that have continued to defy any attempts for technical
definition in the social sciences. According to The Penguin Dictionary of Politics, "the
'state', though a very commonly-used word in the political vocabulary, is surprisingly opaque.
Even the derivation of the term is obscure, and in many cultures (including early medieval
European society, to take one example) it would be hard to specify what word should be
translated as 'state"212 . Defming the concept of the 'nation' is no less difficult.
Still, working definitions of such concepts have been devised in the social sciences. For
example, there is a substantial agreement on referring to the state essentially, as the whole
fixed political system, the set-up of authoritative and legitimately powerful roles by which
people are finally controlled, ordered, and organised233 . In other words, the state is the
organised aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance. Thus, the police, the
army and the civil service are aspects of the state, as is parliament and perhaps local
authorities.
231 See Au A. Mazrui, "Africa: The Political Culture of Nationhood and the Political Economy of the
State", Millennium, vol. 12, no. 3(Autumn 1983), PP. 201-210.
232 David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics, op. cit., p. 444.
233 See Raymond Duvall and John R. Freeman, "The State and Dependent Capitalism", International
Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1(1981), p. 106; and David Robertson, op. cit., p. 444.
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However, in International Relations, the state is given one specific definition: the national-
territorial totality. For example, Hedley Bull defined the state as a political community234.
Kenneth Waltz said it is in practice coextensive with the nation235 . F.S. Northedge used it to
refer to a territorial association of people recognised for purposes of law and diplomacy as a
legally equal member of the system of states 236 . Allan James straightforwardly uses state to
comprise 'territory, people, and a government'237.
Unlike the international relations literature, sociological writings on the state do not take into
account the social-territorial totality, but a specific set of coercive and administrative
institutions, distinct from the broader political, social and national context in which it finds
itself. For instance, Skocpol defmes the state as a set of administrative, policing, and military
organisations headed, and more or less well co-ordinated, by an authority 238 . Within the
sociological approach alone, one finds many alternative defmitions of the state. The history of
the state, as Weber, Barrington-Moore, Mann, Tffly and others have shown, is of the
imposition of administration and coercion on territories and population by competing groups
of rulers, doing this for their own purposes, in appropriate myths of justifications. Thus,
Weber's precise definition of state embodies four major elements: "(1) a differentiated set of
institutions and personnel, embodying (2) centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate
outwards from a centre to cover a (3) territoriality demarcated area, over which it exercises
(4) a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed by a monopoly of the means of
physical violence"29.
234 See The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 8.
235 See Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), pp. 172-178.
236 See The International Political System (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), P. 15.
237 See Sovereign Statehood (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 13.
238 See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
p. 29; and Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organised Crime", in Bringing the State
back In, op. cit., and in idem (ed.), The Formation of National States in Europe (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1975).
239 See Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 64; this
definition can also be found in R.N. Maclver, The Modern State (Oxford: Clarendon, 1926), p. 22; 5.
Eisenstadt, The Political S)'sre,ns of E,npires (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 5; Charles Tilly,
"Reflections on the History of European State-Making", in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National
States in Western Europe, op. cit., p. 27; and Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its
Origins, Mechanisms and Results", in John A. Hall (ed.), States in History, op. cit., p. 112.
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From a communitarian perspective of Hegel, the state can be defined as a sphere of common
life for the concern of general or universal interest with the sense of community of its members
that transcends individual's self-interest on the basis of solidarity and union, substantial unity,
not a formal aggregation. As Hegel argued: "the state ... by itself is the ethical whole, the
actualisation of freedom; and it is an absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual.
The state is mind on earth and consciously realising itself there ."'°. This particular
communitarian position contends that the individual is embedded in existing social practices
contained within defined political communities. In other words, it is the ethical community
which is conferred ontological priority rather than the individual.
Of course there are other interpretations of Hegelian ethics which emphasise a project of
reconciliation that allows the theoretical possibility of being both an individual and a social
member of a community241 . The communitarian understanding of the concept of the state
seems useful and relevant in any analysis of the African society because, in most of them, the
individual is subordinate to society so that the state as a superior entity should also carry the
moral burden of caring for every individual within society.
As far as traditional thinking in political philosophy is concerned, the 'state' is often regarded
as an essential element of democracy. For a long time under European conditions, democracy
only applies to a state. The social contract theory -- as proposed by Grotius, Purfendorf,
Barbeyrac, Burlamqui, Hobbes and Locke, and even Rousseau -- believes that the state was
the outcome of a covenant or agreement among men. The purpose of the state became the
protection of those people to which it owed its being, and the same theorists also agreed that
the sovereign must have enough power to provide such protection. A state, or 'civitas', is a
civil partnership - 'civilis societas'. This most pregnant term naturally translates to mean 'civil
society'. In Roman law, societas is a partnership, implying free contractual agreement of the
partners. This concept as applied to the state, connotes a civil partnership constituted by the
free contract of citizens, and the terms of their contract are the laws of the state without which
the state cannot exist242.
° See paragraphs 257 & 258 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. by T.M. Knox (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 155-159.
241 See MO. Hardimon, Hegel 's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
242 See M. Salamonio, De Principatu (Milan: Giuffre Editore, 1955); quoted by Michael Lesnoff,
Social Contract: Issues in Political Theory (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 26-27.
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Unlike the state, defining and conceptualising the 'nation' is much more difficult because the
essence of a nation is intangible. According to Walker Connor, this essence is a psychological
bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members,
form all other people in a most vital way243 . The nature of that bond and its well-spring
remain shadowy and elusive, and the consequent difficulty of defming the nation is usually
acknowledged by those who attempt this task.
The term "nation" often refers to a single inclusive group whose members-or the majority of
them - share common traditions, history and ethnic identity2 . When broadly defined, a nation
encompasses both subjective and objective indicators. Objective indicators include: language,
history, territory, culture, political organisation; subjective indicators include: a common sense
of identity and commitment or loyalty to the group 245 . For example, a nation in its original
connotation refers to Igbo or Yoruba in Nigeria; Kikuyu or Luo in Kenya, Baganda or Acholi
in Uganda; Lotuko or Zande in South Sudan; the Shona and Ndebele in Zimbabwe; or Hutu
and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda. Unlike in many European societies where the
crystallisation of the structures of authority followed the sense of national identity, colonial
arrangements brought the very opposite to most of Africa. Newly independent countries in
Africa reversed the European sequence and instead, conflated the use of the term nation to
mean "the people of a territory united under a single government, country or state". Thus,
authority and sovereignty evolved ahead of self-conscious national identity and cultural
integration. In fact, some countries even purported to the introduction of one language such
as in former British East Africa, where Kishwahili became a lingua franca246. To this extent,
243 See Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", World Politics, vol. xxiv (April
1972), pp. 3 19-355; and in idem "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ...", Ethnic
and Racial Studies, vol. 1, no. 4(October 1978), PP. 377-400.
244 See M.G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism", in L. Kuper and M.G. Smith
(eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 32.
245 See J. Isawa Elaigwu, "Nation-Building and Changing Political Structures", in Au A. Mazrui and
C. Wondji (ed.), UNESCO General History of Africa, vol. III: Africa Since 1935 (Oxford: Heinmann,
1993), pp. 437-437.
246 See the celebrated works of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, op. cit.; and Mzee Jomo Kenyatta,
Harambee: The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches, 1963-1964, also published by Oxford University
Press, are a better illustration of post-colonial Nation-Building in Aft ica.
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Rejai and Enloe were right to point out that whereas Europe produced nation-states, Africa
and Asia produced state-nations247 . As a result, the concept nation came to mean Kenya,
Tanzania or Uganda, and not Kikuyu, Baganda or Chaga in East Africa.
In common parlance, the words country, state, and nation are often used synonymously, but
they do not mean the same thing. For example, a country has geographical connotations, state
expresses the local organisation of a society, and the term nation involves a socio-cultural
perception of the group248 . So that the hyphenated term nation-state aptly describes a socially
and culturally homogenous group possessing the legal organisation to participate in
international politics. Unfortunately, nation-state has come to be applied indiscriminately to all
states, as one authority has noted that "a prime fact about the world is that it is largely
composed of nation-states" 249 . Thus, the state is often perceived as the political extension of
the nation250.
In African politics, the concept of the State has been dealt with at length in plentiful published
sources251 . And the major task in this has been the desire to establish a coherent theory of the
247 See Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations", International Studies
Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2(June 1969), P. 140.
248 See Piano and Olton, op. cit., p. 33.
249 Louis J. Halle, Civi1iation and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), p. 10; for
another example of this practice of referring to states as nation-states, see Dankwart Rustow, A World
of Nations (Washington: Brookings, 1967), p. 30.
250 Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ...", op. cit., P . 382.
251 A wide range of literature associates the concept of the State with the political analysis of Africa.
See Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit., pp. 68-81; Naomi Chazan, et al., op. cit., pp. 38-46;
Jean-Francois Bayart, L 'Etat en Afrique (Paris: Fayard, 1989); J. Lonsdale, "States and Social
Processes in Africa", African Studies Review, vol. 24, nos. 2-3(1981); these two offer most useful
discussions of state in Africa. And for a review of the concept of the State, see J.P. Nettl, "The State as
a Conceptual Variable", World Politic.s, vol. 20, no. 4(1968), pp. 559-592; Stephen D. Krasner,
"Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics", Comparative Politics,
vol. 16, no. 2(1984), pp. 223-245; Peter Anyang' Gnawing', "The Economic Foundations of the State in
Contemporary Africa", Presence Africaine, no. 127/128(1983), p. 195; Claude Ake, A Political
Economy of Africa (London: Longman, 1981), passim; Peter Evans et al. (eds.), Bringing the State
Back in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Theda Skocpol, The State and Social
Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and more.
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state in Sub-Saharan Africa, but with less successful effect 252 . The obvious failure in every
effort has been the proliferation of terms which have been devised to characterise African
states. Over the years, terms used to describe the African State include: 'patrimonial' and
'neopatrimonial' 253 ; 'underdeveloped' states254 ; 'prebendal' states255 ; 'patrimonial
administrative' states 256 ; 'fictitious' states257 ; 'juridical' and 'Quasi-States'258.
The examination of the concept of the state is often a starting point in the analysis of post-
colonial African politics 259 . Yet, in order for us to fully understand the post-colonial state in
Africa, it is imperative that we briefly examine how the colonial state itself looked like.
Patrick Chabal describes the colonial state as follows:
The colonial state was [...] the legal and political superstructure invented to control
and manage the colonial territories acquired through conquest; derived essentially from
the nature of the imperial state and from the nature of its objectives in Africa. All
meant to establish imperial sovereignty on the conquered territories; legitimate their
rule and to ensure their subjects' allegiance; set up the administration and
infiastructure needed to rule colonies at minimal (fmancial and coercive) cost to the
empire. All were charged with exploiting the resources of the colonies; all attempted to
'civilise' their colonial subjects in their own image. As a conquest state, it embodied
the tensions of being both an outpost of the empire and an autonomous state
252 See Z. Ergas (ed.), op. cit.
253 See Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1966); G. Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism and Empire-Building in the New
States", World Politics, vol. 20, no. (1968), pp. 195-206; and R. Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's
Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1985).
254 See J-F. Medard, "The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientism or
Neopatrimonialism", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power (London:
Pinter, 1982).
255 See R.A. Joseph, "Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria", Journal of Comnonwealth and
Comparative Politics, vol. xxi, no. (1983), pp. 2 1-38; in idem, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in
Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
256 See T.M. Callaghy, "The State as a Tame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in
Africa", in Z. Ergas (ed.), The African State in Transition, op. cit., pp. 87-116.
257 See again R. Sandbrook, op. cit., pp. 3 19-332.
258 See Robert H. Jackson and C.G. Roseberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist", in A. Kohli (ed.),
The State and develop,nent in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.
259-282; and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States, op cit.
259 It should be noted from now onward that in African politics, the term 'nation' is often synonymously
used to mean 'state'.
260 See Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa, op cit., pp. 74-76.
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In other words, the colonial state needed local collaborators in order to rule - collaboration is
always cheaper and infinitely preferable to force261 . Because it attempted to invent a new
political community to suit its imperial designs, the colonial state rested on force, however
much it appeared to rule by consent 262 . The colonial state was also the architect of the
political community. Thus, it defined the boundaries of the community, created its political
infrastructure and invented the rules of the game, rules which could always arbitrarily be
changed to suit the situation at hand. The colonial state dominated the economic sector and it
created a currency, levied taxes, developed markets, codified the uses of labour, introduced
new crops, controlled all sources of production and internal trade and export, and brought in
foreign labourers or encouraged settlers. Above all, the colonial state sought to integrate the
economies of the colonies into the imperial economy and in so doing it was at once the arbiter
and the main agent of economic activity 263 . The colonial state was also a bureaucratic state, in
the sense defmed by Weber264.
So to say, the colonial state was in tow a construct of the Metropolitan society, not the
colonial one. Thus, the colonial state and its immediate successor, the post-colonial state, did
not grow organically from the class structure, internal politics or functional economic
imperatives of the indigenous society, as both Marxist and Weberian theories suggest. The
post-colonial state was not the product of the developmental history of its own society. On
the contrary, it had been imposed from the outside. Its institutions were devised and deployed
by the metropolitan power in pursuit of its own purposes which included facilitating the
activities of metropolitan commercial interests. It followed, as Hamza Alavi argued in the case
of Pakistan and Bangladesh, that "... the 'superstructure' in the metropole is therefore
overdeveloped in relation to the 'structure' in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan
structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of independence" 265 . At the core of
261 See also Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism", in R. Owen and
B. Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theories of J,nperialis,n (London: Longman, 1972).
262 Theories of collaboration were adopted at disguising. One example is J. Gallagher et al., Locality,
Province and Nation: Essays o,z Indian Politics, 1870 to 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973).
263 Quoted from G. Kitching, Class and Econo,nic Ghange in Kenya (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1980).
264 See Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968); and Anthony
Giddens, Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber (London: Macmillan, 1972).
265 
For an argument on the overdevelopment of the colony, see Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-
Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, vol 74 (1972), p. 61.
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this overdeveloped state in the colonial period was a bureaucratic military apparatus which
controlled and subordinated the indigenous social classes. And it was this military
bureaucratic apparatus which the post-colonial society inherited at the heart of its newly
independent state.
In short, the colonial state left a mixed legacy to the African people and their leaders. The
most destructive legacies are those of centralised and coercive governance that was inherited
by post-colonial African leaders. The legitimacy of centralised governance depended solely on
its ability to control and manage the political community it had created rather than on enabling
representations of its constituent parts. However, that does not mean a centralised state lacks
local structures of government but one in which local government is accountable to central
government rather than to the citizens of the locality. The state was never defmed in terms or
in relation to its constituent, parts; rather the constituent parts were defmed in relation to the
state. Local government was the transmission belt of central government, however
sophisticated consultative or 'representative' councils appeared to be or however 'indirect'
colonial rule was claimed to be 266 . The colonial state used the external political power to
coerce the political community, as the colonial secretary was not accountable to his subjects
but to the imperial government. Thus, the colonial state derived its power from legally
sanctioned coercion unaccountable to the subjects of the state.
Finally, the rule of law and the use of force were, in the end, legitimated only by the colonial
'civilising' mission267 . Generally, the concept of the post-colonial state, is at heart relational
rather than structural. It contains the notion of the new dialectical relationship between state
and civil society which was brought about by the rupture in political accountability caused by
independence. According to Chabal, the state in Africa cannot simply be understood as a
political 'entity', but rather that it must be seen as the focal point of the drive for political and
economic hegemony268 . It is the drive for hegemony, the political contest for supremacy
between state and civil society, which is the hallmark of contemporary African politics. As to
whether the state has managed to fulfil its hegemonic ambitions, has largely been determined
by the politics of civil society, a concept which we now have to examine.
(b) The Category of African "Civil Society"
266 For a better example, see J. Iliffe, op. cit.
267 See Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), p. 146.
268 See Patrick Chabal, op cit., part IV, pp. 200-2 16.
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The idea of civil society, like that of the state, has been at the fore of political thinking for
centuries. However, growing emphasis among political scientists on the importance of civil
society, as the focus of public life rather than the state, is relatively recent. According to the
prevailing theory of democracy in political science, particularly in its liberal-western form,
democracy requires a developed economy with a substantial middle class. In its modern
format as a separation from other spheres of social formation such as the family and the state,
civil society is in turn a sphere of economic and legal activities of each individual's collective
relationship with others, or with society as a whole. Since the beginning of capitalism, civil
society has followed the state in its formation, and its emergence in Western societies marked
the achievement of modernity269.
Civil society is constituted mainly by the middle class, and as Robert Dahi emphasised,
members of this class possess the know-how, wealth and time to organise groups which in
turn successfully influence government decisions regarding interests of civil society in
general270 . But as Patrick Molutsi has argued on the Botswana experience, Africa's political
tradition offers minimal support for organised group activity, and its economic sluggishness
cannot spawn such groups271 . Thus in lieu of a pluralist structure to civil society, organised
citizen influence has often taken the form of a series of village , clan or ethnic based
participatory institutions. In the case of Botswana, village-based participatory institutions
have succeeded in maintaining democracy and Botswana provides an alternative path to
democratic politics in Africa272 . It is often argued that in cases like Botswana, a traditional
political culture existed which could sustain the necessary multiple group linkages between
civil society and government required for a democracy to persist overtime.
Thus, civil society denotes a social sphere in which men and women interact with each other in
a series of overlapping relationships and self-conscious associations and institutions
representing private interest groups - local, class, communal, civil, religious, economic, social
269 See Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op. cit., pp. 122-155. I am not however, intending to detail
Hegel's analysis of civil society here for reasons of precision.
270 See Robert A. DahI, Polyarchy, op. cit.
271 See Patrick Molutsi and John D. Hoim, "Developing Democracy When Civil Society is Weak: The
Case of Botswana", African Affairs, vol. 89, no. 356(July 1990), pp. 323-340.
272 However, a problem arises in the use of Botswana experience for the simple reason that Botswana is
a relatively homogenous society, a characteristic which is not common to all other countries in the
African continent.
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and cultural 'publics' which tend to emerge with the rise of a market economy 273 . It is 'the
independent self-organisation' of society, the constituent parts of which voluntarily engage in
public activity to pursue individual, group, or national interests within the context of a legally
defined state-society relationship 274 . Such definition views the institutional and associational
forms as mediating between the state and individuals qua economic actors, and thus having
political significance.
The institutional and associational mediation role raises conceptual and practical questions
with regard to how we view the political relations between the state and society in Africa.
According to Julius Nyango'ro, if we view the problem of disengagement by peasants from the
state through a network of relationships (which Goran Hyden has called the "economy of
affection" 275 ), then we actually cannot talk about political relations between the state and
whatever institutional form to which the disengaged population belong; for indeed they are
strictly not part of civil society if we were to follow Crook's formulation above in which
overlapping relationships between associations and institutions that represent private interest
groups exist276 . This distinction is important because it will defmitely affect the way one
examines the potential and action of various organisations in African society in the present
period of demands for political participation.
In the same vein, Cohen and Arato influentially argue that "only a concept of civil society that
is properly differentiated from the economy (and therefore bourgeois society) could become
the centre of a critical political and social theory where the market economy has already
developed, or is in the process of developing, its own autonomous logic" 277 . The point they
are making is obvious, because when one closely examines most of the world's societies, we
can see that they either have a market economy or are actually developing one. Therefore,
273 Quoted from Richard Crook, "State, Society and Political Institutions in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana",
see Julius E. Nyango'ro, "Reform Politics and Democratization Process in Africa", op. cit., pp. 133-
149: 13 1.
274 See Yehuda Mirsky, "Democratic Politics, Democratic Culture", Orbis, vol. 37, no. 4(Fall 1993), p.
571; Mercia A. Weigle and Jim Butterfield, "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The
Logic of Emergence", Comparative Politics, vol. 23, no. 4(1992), pp. 1-23.
275 See Goran Hyden, Political Development in Rural Tanzania: TANU yajenga nchi (Dar es Salaam:
East African Publishing House, 1983).
276 Julius E. Nyango'ro, op. cit., p. 139.
277 See Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theo'y (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1992), p. viii.
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Cohen and Arato define civil society as a sphere of social interaction between economy and
state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of
associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public
communication. The argument is that modern civil society is created through forms of self-
constitution and seif-mobilisation. In a way civil society is institutionalised and generalised
through laws, and especially subjective rights, that stabilise social differentiation. While the
self-creative and institutionalised dimensions can exist separately, in the long term both
independent action and institutionalisation are necessary for the reproduction of civil
society278 . What is important here is the recognition of the dialectical relationship between
economic and political organisation.
On the other hand, the concept of civil society also acquired special salience for the
democratisation purposes during the 1980s when it was taken up by dissident intellectuals
from behind the iron curtain, such as Adam Michnik and Leszek Kolakowski, as a social
model to be pitted against the totalitarian state. Under communism, Kolakowski had written
that "... the division between civil society and the state is done away with, leaving the
individual wholly absorbed into the state" 279 . But under capitalism, there is a clear distinction
between civil society and the state. In a similar development, Samir Amin explains that the
very concept of civil society is peculiar to capitalism, for the simple reason that the very
existence of civil society implies an autonomy of economic relations vis-a-vis the political.
Bourgeois democracy - with all the historical limitations that it involves - is based on this
separation of civil society and the state 280 . However, the separation between the two should
not be that of total divorce, but it should allow mutual relations where ideas and views are
exchanged on how society must be governed in a state. But in Africa, the state has not
allowed for the separation between itself and civil society. Instead it often opts to structure
the relationship under what Nyang'oro terms the 'formula of state corporatism', where the
civil society has often remained subordinate. In reality, the state is unable to separate itself
from civil society because of the relatively undifferentiated social structure resulting from an
undifferentiated political economy281 . And such is what makes Samir Amin to think that the
278 Ibid p. ix.
279 See Leszek Kolakowski, "Marxism and Human Rights", Daedalus (Fall 1983), p. 85; also Zbigniew
Rau (ed.), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Boulder, Col.:
Westview Press, 1991).
280 See Samir Amin, "Preface: The State and the Question of Development", in Peter Anyang Nyong'o
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-13:2.
281 See Julius E. Nyangoro, "Reform Politics and Democratization Process in Africa", op. cit. p. 146.
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absence of autonomous economic life in relation to state power renders any discourse on
democracy meaningless 282 . It could be discerned from Amin's expression that in such
conditions, democracy becomes truly impossible. Because of such practical reality, the
political economy of Africa will somehow continue to militate against the possibilities of
introducing liberal democracy continentally.
Furthermore, civil society is composed of individuals who are independent persons. It is a
contract of autonomous individuals who have freedom and right of property as an essential
condition for that individual freedom. As Hegel pointed out correctly, in civil society, there is
"free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where
waves of every passion gush forth"283 . Hence, civil society creates a breathing room for the
individual to join, or to be left alone, or both; it thus fosters human dignity. For example,
outside European societies, civil society has played a significant role in bringing about and
sustaining democracy284 . However, as John Lucas has also correctly pointed out, while the
democratic potential of Africa's civil societies has been frequently acknowledged, the
relationship of these societies to class remains largely unexplored285.
As we noted earlier, in the post-colonial African context, where the state preceded the nation,
civil society is necessarily determined first and foremost in its relation to the construction of
the state. Studying interactions between the state apparatus and civil society is very
enlightening and instructive when it comes to both short term issues on the pace of political
liberalisation and longer term concerns about the durability of democracy. Political
accountability is an essential condition for democracy, but the degree of accountability in turn
depends upon the capacity of a robust, autonomous civil society to curb the hegemony of the
state. At a time when most African countries were characterised in the I 970s and 1 980s as
"strong societies and weak states" 286, the tendency to afford the state 'ontological primacy' in
explaining the nature of African political economy was being challenged. One manifestation of
'8'
- - See Samir Amin (1987), p. 3.
283 See Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op. cit., p. 124.
284 This has been argued by among others, Larry Diamond (ed.), The Democratic Revolution: Struggle
for Freedom and Pluralism in Developing World (New York: Freedom House, 1992).
285 See John Lucas, "The State, Civil Society and Regional Elites: A Study of Three Associations in
Kano, Nigeria", African Affairs, vo. 93, no. 370(January 1994), pp. 21-38: 21.
286 See for example, Atul Kohli (ed.), The State and Development in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.:
Perinceton University Press, 1988); and also Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujainaa in Tanzania:
Underdevelop,nent and an Uncaptured Peasantiy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
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this has been a shift in scholarly attention to those intermediary and autonomous organisations
which function and sometimes flourish in the space that exists between the state and the
household-namely, the various groups which comprise civil society287.
A host of private and voluntary associations have historically had profound impact upon
individual and collective behaviour in both rural and urban Africa. Current interest in these
organisations is part of a broader search to identify institutions which might better link the
state and society together, to make the state more responsive to the needs of the governed,
and thereby enhance its legitimacy. They not only provide links between the state and societal
interests, but also perform an important mediating role whereby the macro-policy objectives of
the state and the particularistic interests of society's groups are adjusted to each other by
process of bargaining 288 . In this regard, expanding the sphere of 'civil society' increases the
likelihood of a more pluralistic and democratic political order because such intermediary
organisations have massively contributed to the process of economic development in Africa by
providing needed infrastructure, as well as an array of social welfare services which the state is
unwilling or unable to deliver, especially to small towns and rural areas. 289 A few well-known
examples worth cited here include the provision of primary and secondary schools, basic
health services, water, and cattle dips by Harambee Self-Help Groups in Kenya 290 ; the
provision of loans to small farmers by rural credit unions in Zimbabwe 291 ; and the provision of
women's associations in West Africa292.
3.3. Theoretical Points of Departure: Interpretations of African International Relations
287 See Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa ", World
politics, vol. 41, no. 3(1989), PP. 407-430.
288 See Joel D. Barkan and Frank Holmquist, "Peasant-State Relations and the Social Base of Self-Help
in Kenya", World Politics, vol. 41, no. 3(1989), pp. 359-380.
289 See Michael Bratton, op. cit., p. 417.
290 See Barkan and Holmquist, op. cit.; Philip M. Mbiti and Rasmus Rasmusson, Self-Reliance in
Kenya: The Case of Harainbee (Uppsala: SIIS, 1977); and Barbara P. Thomas, Politics, Participation
and Poverty: Development Through Self-Help in Kenya (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
291 See Michael Bratton, "Farmer Organizations and Food Production in Zimbabwe", in World
Development (Oxford), vol. 14, no. 3(1986), pp. 367-384.
292 See Joel D. Barkan, Michael L McNulty and M.A.O. Ayeni, "Hometown' Voluntary Associations,
Local Development, and the Emergence of Civil Society in Western Nigeria", The Journal of Modern
African Studies, vol. 29, no. 3(199 1), pp. 457-480.
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(a) Africa and the International System
Though most of Africa officially first entered the international scene in the second half of this
century, the era of slave trade had long integrated black Africa into the global division of
labour in the sixteenth century. As we mentioned earlier, the first and largest period of
African studies began around this time, with the establishment of trade relations between the
continent and the emerging, and European-based capitalist world economy of the Middle
Ages293 . These years of Afro-European relations, would, strictly speaking, count as the
beginning of Africa's international relations. However, until the latter part of the nineteenth
century, most of Africa was not legally incorporated into the global political systeim
According to Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa started to acquire new strategic
significance after the opening of the Suez Canal, that marked Egypt's importance to British
imperial policy294 . In other words, Africa's major appearance in the international scene took
place during the era of the European scramble that led to the subsequent establishment of
colonial domination in the continent. Though colonialism was terminated in the 1960s, its
legacy has remained a strong influence upon Africa's role in international politics. Post-
Independence African politics in general produced two major interpretations of colonialism.
First of all, colonialism has been treated as a phenomenon characterised by a huge infusion of
European ideas, technology and capital which, albeit in an authoritarian and arbitrary manner,
laid down the basis for African modernisation295.
Even Karl Marx, in the Communist manifesto of 1848 as well as in his latter writings on the
colonial process, believed that colonialism by its own contradictory logic (destroyer of pre-
capitalist systems and creator of new progressive ones) would lay down the basis for the
emancipation of colonial society 296 . The second argument -- largely based on global analysis
of the flow of capital -- interpreted colonialism as the highest and encompassing stage of the
293 See Roland Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, op. cit.; Hosea Jaffe, A History of
Africa, op. cit., particularly pages 43-64; Naomi Chazan et a!. op. cit., p. 377; and Basil Davidson,
Modern Africa, op. cit., p. 4.
294 See Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan, 1961).
295 See L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire: A Critical Appraisal of Western
Colonialis,n in Africa South of the Sahara (London, 1967).
296	 Marx's perception of colonialism as an emancipatory phenomenon, see Anthony Brewer, Marxist
Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 51-60.
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subjugation of Africa to the world capitalist system297 . It is such interpretations which first
dominated post-colonial African historiography of the 1960s. Thus most text books on
African history and the national history of African states were conceived in this optimistic
mould298 . The motives which took Europe to Africa, might or might have not been economic,
but during the late nineteenth century, European powers acted with the presumption, which
they themselves initiated and elaborated, that Africa did not really belong to Africans. It was
res nullius, a continent without owners, ready to be shared among those who equated might
with right. France and Great Britain were, of course, the continent's most intrepid colonisers,
while other European states such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain took smaller
portions of it. Therefore, Africas international relations at the very beginning was dominated
by such interpretations of debate and the ties it continued to maintain with its former colonial
governments.
To be sure, African countries first acquired their independence at the zenith of Cold War
politics. When they emerged in the 1960s, African countries appeared fragile and less
influential in world politics. However, the continent shortly became greatly affected by the
interests and ambitions of external powers. The two superpowers of the post-war era,
notably the former Soviet Union and the United States of America, gradually increased their
involvement in Africa, with China to a more modest scale. For the Soviet Union,
decolonisation paved way for forging friendly ties with the new states especially where strong
anti-imperialist movements emerged. While for the United States, African independence
posed the challenge of keeping the former European colonies inside the Western orbit of
influence. East-West rivalry on the African continent intensified considerably during the
Congo crisis of 1960299. This was one of the first major issues in inter-African relations that
drew external intervention for the first time. Thus, it created the dialectic between African
autonomy and external interventionism. While Africans have sought to enhance their freedom
of action, the great powers have often intervened in accordance with their own agendas. That
made it quite difficult for Africa to turn or exploit the situation for their maximum gains as it
happened, for example, in the Renaissance period where the "bipolar" rivalry between the
papacy and the empire precisely enabled the city-states to capture the opportunity of becoming
297 See one person who traces African dependence from the sixteenth century, Walter Rodney, How
Europe Underdeveloped Africa, op. cit.; and another contemporary is Samir Amin, see for example his
"Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin", op. cit., pp. 105-1 19.
298 See precisely Roland Oliver and J.D. Fage, op. cit.
299 See Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: a United Nations force in action (Washington, D.C.:
BrookingS Institution, 1965); and R. Dayal, Mission for Harnmarskjold: The Congo Crisis (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976).
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"independent" City-States. Thus the City-States were able to distance themselves from earlier
dependencies on the empire/papacy by seeking the support of the "other" side. Though it was
a delicate enterprise, these smaller entities were able to exploit the rivalry of the great powers
for their own independence.
In the case of Africa, the Cold War framework was different, because it involved among other
things, attention to regions outside Africa such as Asia or Latin America. In addition, Africa's
interests in autonomy and economic development have often been subordinated to this
globalist logic of great power rivalry. For example, United States policy was often that of
containment to prevent Soviet Union from making any gains in the continent. Though much
less effort was put in terms of developing or modernising affies, this Soviet-U.S competition
marked the emerging significance of Africa in international relations during the Cold war. It
was at this very moment in time that the international experience of Black peoples or 'Black
Diplomacy', to use Professor Mazrui's terminology, began to emerge30°.
Patterns of communication between Africa and the rest of the world began to establish. In
1963, at a conference in Addis Ababa, African leaders decided to form the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU), that would partly solve member states conflicts and maintain territorial
integrity of its members 301 . And in order to avoid entanglement in the ideological and military
issues which divided the West from the Communist world, the OAU member states decisively
joined the non-alignment movement 302 . This was yet another major antecedent in the
development of African international relations, where Third World collective diplomacy began
to emerge in which African states also started to participate energetically. The emergence of
organisations such as the non-alignment movement, the Group of 77, ASEAN, and the OAU
provided a framework for Third World active involvement in international affairs. So much
that from the 1960s onward, African leaders developed extensive relations with other
developing countries of Latin America and Asia. Notions such as 'Afro-Arab partnership',
300 See Au A. Mazrui, Africa 's International Relations, op. cit., p. 1.
30! See Yousif El-Ayouti and William Zartman (ed.), The OAU After Twenty Years (London: Praeger,
1984).
302 See Bojana Tadic and Ranko Petkovic (eds.), Non Align,nent in the Eighties: Jnternatio,zal Round
Table (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and economics, 1982); H. Kochler (ed.), The
Principles of Non-A lignnent: The Non-Aligned Countries in the Eighties (Third World Centre, 1982);
Uma Vasudev (ed.), Issues Before Non-A Iigwnent: Past and Future (New Delhi: Indian Council of
World Affairs, 1983); A.W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignnent in an Age of Alignments
(London: Zed, 1986); and Roy, Alison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignmnenr in the
Third World (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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'Afro-American links' 'Eurafrica' or 'Black Diplomacy' received considerable attention. Such
partnership enabled African states, which individually could wield little power in international
politics, to become particularly attracted to the strategy of acting collectively with other
developing states. This was a clear refusal to be tied to a military affiance with one of the
major two powers. Gradually, non-alignment developed into a broader concept of autonomy
and the right to experiment, a reaffirmation by small powers that they were entitled to an
independent say in world affairs. Though issues of trade and the use of world resources were
still substantially outside the non-alignment movement as such, the first major economic factor
to enter the movement was the issue of foreign aid303 . As a result of this, a doctrine of
balanced benefaction arose, where diversification of benefactors was preferred to a uni-
patronised dependent.
To this extent, Africa became an important strategic arena at the brink of Cold War politics.
At this very moment, non of the great powers was interested or cared about Africa's domestic
governance, because they were simply interested in the distribution of power and seeking
zones of influence on the continent. And when faced with domestic problems, African elites in
return turned to their external patrons for help and support. Early examples that merit
mention include the Congo crisis of 1960, Biafra, Ogaden and Angola. And from the mid-
1970s, the renewal of competitive turbulence was witnessed: the oil shock, the revolution in
Ethiopia that brought Haile Selassie's regime to an end, the emergence of Zimbabwe and the
final withdrawal of Portugal. In the 1980s, hostilities over Libya and unrest in South Africa
also raised tensions in both ends of the continent. It was only when the economic crisis of the
1980s befell the continent that Western pressure on African governments begun to gain the
momentum. At the same time arresting Africa's economic decline started to dominate most
analysts of African society as a precondition for reasserting African political economy. For
years, African economies were/are still tied to a global division of labour that is highly
constraining. For example, Africa still faces the issue of structural adjustment programmes
(SAPs) and the conditions exerted by the IMF and the World Bank304.
303 See Herbert Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964); John
Dickey Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1967); M.I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (London: Praeger, 1967); Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence,
and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard S. Eckaus (eds.),
Foreign Aid: Selected Readings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970); D. McNeil!, The Contradictions of
Foreign Aid (London: Croom Helm, 1981); and Au A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations, op.
cit., p. 6.
See The IMF, World Bank and Africa: Report of a Conference on the Impact of the IMF and
World Bank Policies on the People of Africa, held at City University, London, on 7th-Il th September
1987; also Dharam Ghai (ed.), The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment
(London: Zed Books, 1991); David Woodward, Debt, Adjustment, and Poverty in developing
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Because of the fact that most African economies were established by the former colonial
governments, at least one-third of the trade of most African countries remained with the
former metropole states. In many cases, particularly with the Francophone states, the
concentration was much higher305 . For example, France accounted for three quarters of the
external trade of Benin, Chad, Niger and Senegal at independence. More to that, most
countries had given preferential tariff treatment to imports from the metropole during the
colonial period. Similarly, most countries tied their domestic currency to the value of that of
the metropole such as the Franc or the Pound. Colonial powers had typically monopolised
foreign investment in their colonies. A similar concentration was found in aid receipts.
However, the project of complete decolonisation offered relative opportunity to African
governments to diversify their economic links and to reduce their economic dependence on the
former colonial power 306 . Though in 1975 ACP countries were offered free access to
European markets in the Lome Convention 307 , Great Britain and France continued to
monopolise trade with their former colonies. In any case, no other European state in history
maintained an African policy comparable to that of France. Because of its close ties with the
former colonies, France remained a very influential actor in African affairs and took the lead in
fashioning a close economic relationship between Africa and the entire then European
Economic Community (EEC). Culturally, economically, militarily, and thus politically, the
newly independent Francophone states have remained bound to the metropole, and successive
French leaders since de Gaulle until very recently have cultivated and even extended this
sphere of influence. France's strategy was to maintain maximum influence in its former
colonies in Africa via fmancial and technical aid combined with highly personalised relations
Countries (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Reginald Herbold Green and Mike Faber (ed.), The
Structural Adjustment of Structural Adjustmnent: Sub-Sahara,z Africa, 1980-1993 (Brighton, Sussex:
Institute of development Studies, 1994); and also Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Gerald K. Helleiner
(ed.), From Adjustment to Development in Africa: Conflict, Controversy, Convergence, Consensus?
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
305 See Naomi Chazan et al. op. cit., pp. 275-319.
306 See the struggle between Nkrumah and de Gaulle outlined by Au A. Mazrui, Africa's international
Relations, op. cit.,
307 There is a wide range of literature that outlines the European relations with the Developing World as
guided by the Lome Convention. However, for a general view of the Lome agreements, see F. Long
(ed.), The Political Economy of EEC Relations with African, Caribean and Pacflc States:
Contributions of the Lomne Convention on North-South Relations (London: Pergamon Press, 1980);
John Ravenhill, Collective Clientism: The Lome Convention and the North-South Relations (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and Marjorie Lister, The European Community and the
Developing World: The Role of the Lome Convention (Aldershot: Brookfield, 1988).
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with Francophone African leaders. For example, Presidents like Leopold Sedar Senghor and
Felix Houphouet Boigny had strong attachments to France308.
Despite its extensive involvement in colonial Africa, Great Britain has, on the other hand,
played a declining role in African Affairs since independence. While Paris has for a long time
maintained ties with almost all of Francophone Africa, London has often remained selective
maintaining partnership with only a few states of economic interest such as Kenya, Nigeria,
Ghana and Zambia, besides its central role in former Rhodesia and South Africa during the
conflict years and after. Indeed that could be explained by other factors given that Britain has
been embroiled in a series of crisis in its former colonial territories, including the civil war in
Nigeria and the massive expulsion of its Indian citizens from Uganda during Idi Amin's regime.
Occasionally, African issues have been central during Commonwealth meetings, Britain's
favoured instrument for the management of post-colonial relations309.
Al though the Commonwealth has often been fashioned as Britains primary forum for Third
World relations, British governments have frequently treated Africa as but one component of a
larger scheme. However, when generally viewed, Britain's major interest has been the
promotion of its own investment and trade in Africa. This has been explicit in its continued
defiance of calls to terminate ties with Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. In other
countries of continental Europe, West Germany captured a substantial share of the African
arms market and opened up dynamic cultural centres in many African countries in an effort to
cultivate interests and links. Italy, on the other hand expended its links with Libya, Ethiopia
and Somalia. Portugal fought the ties of independence until the mid-1970s before belatedly
joining the era of decolonisation. Belgium also maintained its partnership with Congo-
Leopoldville (now Republic of the Congo) and former Rwanda-Urundi (now republics of
308 See the literature on that, and Tamar Golan, 'A Certain Mystery: How Can France Do Everything
That It Does in Africa and - and Get Away with It?", African Affairs, 80(January 1981), pp. 3-11.
309 See D. Austin, West Africa and the Conimonwealth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957); Herbert
Victor Wiseman, The Cabinet in the Co,n,nonwealth: Post-War Development in Africa, the West
Indies, and South-East Asia (London: Stevens, 1958); Racism in Southern Africa: The Commonwealth
Stand. an account of the contribution of the Commonwealth to the battle against racismn in Southern
Africa (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987); Commonwealth Secretariat, Beyond Apartheid:
Human Resources for a New South Africa: Report of a Commonwealth Expert Group Prepared for
the Heads of Govern mnent Meeting at Harare (London: Commonwealth Secretariat in Association with
James Currey, 1991); and following publications by Stephen Chan, The Comnmnonwealth Observer
Group in Zimbabwe: a Personal Memoir (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1985); The Comnmnonwealth in World
Politics: A Study of International Action, 1965-1985 (London: Lester Crook, 1988); and Twelve Years
of Conunonwealth Diplomatic History: Commonwealth Sum,nit Meetings, 1979-1991 (Lewiston;
Lampeter: E. Mellen Press, 1991).
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Rwanda and Burundi). Besides Europe, USA and former Soviet countries, relations with
other regions of the world have also proliferated. For example, the newly industrialised
countries of south east Asia (the NICs) have also sought economic ties with Africa. Japan has
picked up relations with Africa through a number of development agencies it has successfully
established in most of the continent and in the area of trade. Canada, Australia and New
Zealand have also had links with most of Africa, mainly through Commonwealth meetings. In
one way or another, most of these countries are also now involved in helping the continent in
the current transition to democracy.
(b) The International Environment and the Liberation Struggles
in Eritrea and Ethiopia
Strategically, both Eritrea and Ethiopia are located on one of the world's busiest routes that
links Europe and the Indian sub-continent and the far east. The region attracted the attention
of major world powers that, unfortunately for one reason or another, sided with Emperor
Haile Selassie's regime in the early days of the conflict. The United States in particular had
acquired a very important communication facility in the region at Kagnew, near Asmara, and
as a result became closely engaged in buttressing Emperor Haile Selassie's position. In
reaction, Eritreas Arab neighbours led by Egypt and Syria were drawn into the conflict, and
the Emperor turned to his Israeli ally for expertise in combating the guerrillas. This foreign
involvement internationalised the conflict in Eritrea but mainly in favour of the regime(s) in
Addis Ababa. Moreover, after the collapse of the ancien regime, the Dergue, its successor
revolutionary government, continued the shrewd diplomacy deployed by his predecessor to
block efforts that may raise the conflict in international gatherings.
In the 1 970s, the Dergue intensified the dimension of international involvement in Eritrea
when they persuaded their Soviet allies to supply both armour and defence advisors to defeat
the Eritrean challenge. The Soviet involvement decisively reversed the Eritrean Fronts'
fortunes for a period of ten years of survival beginning from 1978 until the late 1980s when
the EPLF regained its strength to push ahead for the total liberation of the country. This
external involvement also affected badly the other ethnic-based liberation movements in
mainland Ethiopia3t0 . Certainly the involvement of the powerful individual countries on the
side of the Ethiopian regime, contained any further advances liberation movements would
make. This was then backed by the silence of both the UN and the OAU, who were not only
naive towards the liberation wars in Africa but shunned them as major causes of instability and
anti progress and development.
310 See chapter five for details of other Liberation Fronts in Ethiopia.
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The UN unwritten law or formality is that regional matters must first be addressed by regional
organisations, in which case the OAU, as Africa's regional body, would have been so
addressed. But the OAU too does not permit interference iii what was termed as "internal
affairs", where the conflict in Eritrea was seen as Ethiopia's internal matter 311 . However, both
the UN and the OAU were supporting liberation movements against colonialism in the 1 950s
and 1960s, and not movements that fought indigenous regimes. Moved by the desire to
remove white colonial rule, the General Assembly solemnly proclaimed in paragraph 2 of
article one of Resolution 1514 (IV):
'The necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all
its forms and manifestations', and further declared that 'all peoples have the
right to self-determination' and that immediately steps should be taken to
transfer all powers to the peoples of the territories not yet independent without
any conditions or reservations; and denied that inadequacy of preparation
should ever be a pretext for delaying the exercise of the right of self-
determination3'.
Similarly, most important in the OAU Charter is the principles of self-determination and non-
interference in the internal affairs of member-states, similar to that of the UN 313 . Since the
OAU charter upheld existing borders, the case of Eritrea was never debated in its foras on the
pretext of preserving the norm of non-intervention314 . Accordingly, the OAU member-states
turned a deaf ear to post-colonial liberation and secessionist movements such as those in
Biafra, Katanga, South Sudan, and of late in Ethiopia. In fact, article 3(2) of the OAU Charter
which forbids interference in the internal affairs of states has caused what others have termed a
"serious conflict management crisis", and a re-evaluation of the article has more often been
requested3'
311 See Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter; and for a concise analysis of it, see Makumi Mwagiru, "Who
Will Bell the Cat? ...", op. cit.
312 See General Assembly Resolution 1514(JV,), December 14th 1960.
For the aims of the OAU, see T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity",
A,nerica,z Journal of International Law, vol. 59, no. 2(April 1965), pp. 243-267:246-250.
314 See Bereket Habte Selassie, "The OAU and Regional Conflicts: Focus on the Eritrean War", Africa
Today, vol. 35, no. 3 14(1988), pp. 6 1-67.
For a thorough study of the effects of article 3(2) of the OAU Charter, see Makumi Mwagirus
Ph.D. thesis "The Internal Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation of 1985,
op. cit.; and in idern, "Who Will Bell the Cat? ...", op. cii.
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In other words, both organisations legalised support for the decolonisation of Third World
countries and not what were then widely perceived as domestic conflicts. Thus, the UN only
legitimised support against colonialism up to the extent of forming the UN's Decolonisation
Committee (UN-DC) 316 . In the same vein, regional organisations such as the OAU, ASEAN,
or the Arab League developed open diplomacy that only supported liberation from European-
white-colonialism. And as a result, the OAU Liberation Committee (OAU-LC) was formed to
carry out the task of supporting liberation movements against colonialism in Africa. Any other
liberation movements such as those which are the subject of this study were vilified and
vigorously opposed and shunned by the whole continent317 . Most OAU leaders who quickly
realised the problems they would face while in power began plotting means of how to contain
any crises that may arise.
316 See in particular Zoltan Szilagyi, The United Nations' Role in the Liquidation of Colonialism
(Budapest: Institute for World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1986), pp. 62-66.
317 For a thorough study of what were known in Africa as internal matters (South Sudan, Biafra,
Eritrea, or Katanga), see Alexis Heraclides, The Self-determination of Minorities in International
Politics, op. cit., pp. 58-128, 177-195.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
INDEPENDENCE THROUGH LIBERATION: ERITREAN SELF-VIEWS
Introduction
The dynamics and long development of the Eritrean struggle for independence began in the
first half of the twentieth century, between 1941 and 1951, when the first generation of
Eritrean nationalists started to battle the creeping European colonialism in the region318.
However, it has been also pointed out that these anti-colonial nationalists had failed to
construct a coalition capable of establishing a unified Eritrean nation-state to counter the then
looming Ethiopian dominance 319 . Like its other African counterparts, Eritrea is not made up
of a single nationality. It is a conglomerate of different communities which are themselves in
most cases akin by culture to their neighbours in Ethiopia, the Sudan and French Somaliland
(today's Djibouti) 320 . However, it has become common to say the long struggle is responsible
for the creation of what has been termed "an all-encompassing national identity" among
diverse communities of Eritrea. For years such diversity has been highly manipulated by
successive Ethiopian regimes to impose a single Ethiopian identity, that was meant to swallow
and contain Eritrea. To that effect, both the Imperial and Dergue regimes were able to contain
Eritrean nationalism and impose their hegemony mainly through coercion.
In response Eritreans did not only develop strong resistance against Ethiopian hegemony,
instead they grew a sense of solidarity and a shared identity amongst their nine ethnic
nationalities and the two major religions - Christianity and Islam. United in their quest for a
nation, Eritreans began to demand what Nuriddin Farah terms "A room of one's own. A
country of one's own. A century in which one was not a guest" 321 . According to most
historians, and in my own encounters with most Eritrean nationals, the struggle began with the
This has been well documented by G.K.N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1 941-1952
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960); well supplemented by Lloyd Ellingson, "The Emergence of
Political Parties in Eritrea, 1941-1950", The Journal of African History, vol. 18, no. 2(1977), pp. 263-
265; convincingly narrated by Ruth Jyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Do,nination,
Resistance, Nationalism 1941-1993 (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 61-8 1;
and for the different stages of the struggle, see EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic
Programme, op. cit., pp. 17-19, 27-30.
319 See in particular Ruth lyob, op. cit.
320 See particularly S.F. Nadel, Races and Tribes of Eritrea (Asmara: British Military Administration,
1944); G.K.N. Trevaskis, op. cit., p. 11; and Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 1.
32! See Nuriddin Farah, Sardines, 3rd ed,z. (Saint Paul, M.N.: Greyeolf Press, 1992), p. 4.
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dream of a country of one's own. Such a dream was not just a claim but a right that was
denied the Eritreans since the period of European colonialism. Worse still, that dream became
compromised when a "federal" arrangement was imposed between 19521962322.
Eritreans were three times denied their dream and aspiration to a "country of one's own". The
first attempt was in 1941 when the Italian colonial rule came to an end. Unfortunately, a
British caretaker administration was instituted to replace Italian rule until 1951. The second
chance was missed when in 1952 another demand for a country of one's own became
compromised under federal arrangements and reduced to a room of one's own within the
Ethiopian larger and more powerful structure. This arrangement was favoured mainly by the
Americans and the British who wanted to appease Ethiopian claims in the post-war period. It
is worth citing that at that time, the UN muscles were stifi strong and its resolution to federate
Eritrea under the Ethiopian Crown prevailed. Thus, Eritrean autonomy was eliminated and
Ethiopian hegemony became institutionalised. The third major chance was missed when in
1974 the Ethiopian Crown was overthrown and replaced by what later turned out to be a
Marxist dictatorship. The Ethiopian revolution had aroused particular hopes that the new
regime might bring a solution to the Eritrean question by recognising the Eritrean claim and
demand for self-determination. On the contrary, such hopes became shattered due to the
behaviour of what came to be widely known as the Dergue regime, and the struggle continued
unabated till the total liberation of the country in 1991 which was then followed by a
referendum two years later. Eritrea fmally formalised its sovereignty when it got its
independence on 24th May 1993, and became a de facto member of the international
community.
This chapter covers four main areas, two of which trace the genesis of the Eritrean struggle
for independence through liberation. While the first part discusses some major historical
antecedents to the Eritrean question, the second presents briefly the early days of the struggle
under various organisations up to the fmal days when a total unification was forged under a
nationalist banner, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The third part details
Eritrean self-views concerning the long history of the yearning for a country of one's own,
bringing in individual self-views and experiences about the struggle. Most of these views have
been expressed by Eritreans themselves in their own writings and in interviews. These self-
views are also complemented by official documentation in Eritrean archives, newspapers and
322 See Semere Haile, "Historical Background to the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict", in Lionel Cliffe and
Basil Davidson (ed.), The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace, pp. 11-
31:21-29; EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Programme, op. cit., pp. 30-32; and Ruth
Tyob, op. cit., pp. 82-97.
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magazines. To talk about Eritrean self-views means talking about their experiences,
perceptions and analysis of events that dominated the struggle from the 1950s to 1991. In this
case, the experiences also tell how Eritreans made the revolution and how the revolution made
them in turn. The fourth part of the chapter examines the role of the Eritrean elites during the
struggle and the subsequent involvement of the masses.
4.1. The Genesis of the Eritrean Struggle for Independence
(a) Historical Antecedents of the Eritrean Question
The literature on the Eritrean question is divided into two groups. On the one hand there is a
large amount of the literature written by Eritreans themselves and by scholars who are close to
and sympathetic to the struggle which emphasises the deliberate denial of independence to
Eritreans and regards Ethiopia as a colonial power323 . On the other hand, there is also an
enormous literature by Ethiopians and non-Ethiopian scholars sympathetic to the despair about
the break up of the 'Great' Ethiopia which gives a different version of the story and
emphasises that Eritrea has no history of its own and must remain part and parcel of
323 Such writings of supporters of Eritrean nationalism and identity include: Osman Saleh Sabbe, The
Histoiy of Eritrea. trans. Muhammad Fawaz Al Azein (Beirut: Dar A1-Mazirah, 1974); Bereket Habte
Selassie, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980); in idem, Eritrea
and the United Nations (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1989); Basil Davidson, Lionel Cliffe, and
Bereket Habte Selassie (eds.), Behind the War in Eritrea (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell House, 1980);
David Pool, Eritrea: Africa's Longest War (London, 1979); G. Dilebo, Historical Origins and
Development of the Eritrean Problem, 1882-1962. Current Bibliography on African Affairs, 7: 221-
244 (1974); Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1980); Semere Haile, The Long Struggle of Eritrea, op. cit.; Araya Tseggai, "Historical Analysis of
Infrastructural Development in Italian-Eritrea, 1885-1941", The Journal of Eritrean Studies
(Gambling, LA), vol. 1, no. 1(1986), part. 1, pp. 19-33; Jordan Gebre-Medhin, "European Colonial
Rule and the Transformation of Eritrean Rural Life", Horn of Africa (Summit, NJ), vol. 6, no.
2(1983), pp. 50-60; in idem, Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea: A Critique of Ethiopian Studies
(Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1989); Tekeste Negash, No Medicine for the Bite of a White
Snake: Notes on Nationalism and Resistance in Eritrea, 1890-1 940 (Uppsala: Reprocentralen HSC,
1986); Richard Caulk, "Black Snake, White Snake': Bahta Hagos and his Revolt against Italian
Overrule in Eritrea, 1894", in Donald Crummey (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa
(London: James Currey, 1986); Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, Eritrea: A Case of Self-Determination,
Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Eritreans for Peace and Democracy, 1990); Roy Pateman,
Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1990); in idem, "Liberte,
Egalite, Fraternite: Aspects of the Eritrean Revolution", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.
28, no. 3(September 1990), pp. 257-272; and Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics
(Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1991). And for examination of Italian motives and
achievements, see Yemane Mesghenna, Italian Colonialism??: A Case Study of Eritrea, 1869-1934
(Maryland, 1989).
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Ethiopia 24 . Either way, both arguments can be contested because the claim of sovereignty
over Eritrea by Ethiopia was as spurious as the claim that Eritrea had previously constituted a
distinct entity.
Etymologically, Eritrea originates from the name of the ancient Greek for the Red Sea Sinus
Aerithreus325 . However, during the ancient times, Eritrea was known by three distinct names:
Medri Geez, the land of the free, Medri Bahri, the land of the sea, and Mareb Me/lash, the
land beyond the river326 . In the eyes of most Eritreans and their sympathisers, these names
indicate the divergent histories and cultures of Eritrea and Ethiopia, an interpretation which is
highly rejected by the latter's centralists who have for years claimed that Abyssinian control
extended to the Red Sea throughout most of history327 . For example, in the middle of the
1980s, an article even sanctioned such claims that the entire Horn of Africa was under the
control of the Ethiopian Emperors from about the beginning of the Christian era until the
sixteenth century328 . Such claims, to most Eritreans, portray a version of the past which is not
324 Writings by supporters of Ethiopia's cultural and historic unity who reflect traditional concerns with
Semitic ties, royal chronicles, the imperial state, and the Abyssinian Great Tradition include: E. Sylvia
Pankhurst, Eritrea on the Eve: The Past and the Future of Italy's "First-Born" Colony, Ethiopia's
Ancient Sea Province (Essex: Lalibela House, 1952); E. Sylvia Pankhurst and Richard K.P. Pankhurst,
Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Last Phase of the Reunion Struggle, 1941-1952 (Essex: Lalibela House,
1953); Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London, 1976); Donald N. Levine,
Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974); Taddesse Tamrat, Church and the State in Ethiopia, 1270-152 7 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1972); Melaku Tegen, "Eritrea: Problems of the National Movement", Proceedings 4th
International Conference on tile Horn of Africa (New York, 1989); Haggai Erlich, The Struggle Over
Eritrea, 1962-1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Africa (Stanford: The Hoover Institution
Press, 1983); in idem, Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1986); Getachew Haile, "The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia", The Journal of
Modern African Studies, vol. 24, no. 3(September 1986), pp. 465-487; Christopher Clapham,
Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988); Paul Henze, Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime
(Santa Monica, 1985); Getachew Haile, "Eritrea, Part of My Ethiopia: auf W iedersehen!", Ethiopian
Review (February 1993), pp. 28-30; and Patrick Gilkes, "Even the Camels Know this Land is One",
Ethiopian Review (August 1993), p.9.
325 See Progress Report of the United Nations Com,nissioner During 1951, vol. Ill (Reprinted with a
preface by the ELF - The People's Liberation Forces, September 1977), p. VIII; and for Fred Halliday,
this indicated the uncertain status of the area during the contentious years of the war with Ethiopia, see
Fred Halliday, "The Fighting in Eritrea", New Left Review, 77(1969), p. 60. (emphasis added).
326 See Robert Machida, Eritrea: Tile Struggle for Independence (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press,
1987), p. 5; Semere Haile, op. cit., p. 12; and Roy Pateman, Eritrea: Even tile Stones are Burning, op.
cit., p. 29.
327 See in particular Sylvia K.P. Pankhurst, Ethiopia and Eritrea, op. cit., p. 13.
328 See Gatechew Haile, "The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia", op. cit., p. 465.
92
an objective historically factual documentation of the past, but rather constitutes an
imaginative reconstruction of the past in favour of the Ethiopian occupation of Eritrea329.
Whatever the case, it would be better to first establish the Eritrean claims by tracing rudiments
of their 'history'.
After the fourteenth century, Eritrea was virtually occupied by people of various origins: the
Nilotic, the Beja, and the Semites. Most records indicate the Niotic were the earliest
inhabitants of present day Eritrea. The Beja were first in Egypt c.2700 B.C., and then moved
into northern and northwestern Eritrea some time later. And the Semites came across the Red
Sea and only later established themselves in the highlands of Eritrea. It was these Semitic
immigrants who constructed a number of city-states in today's Eritrea similar to the Greek
polis, and built a kingdom centred in Aksum, then Headquarters of the Province of Tigray in
northern Ethiopia. Historical evidence regarding the existence of the Aksumite Kingdom are
drawn from the archaeological remainders of Eritrea and Ethiopia 330 . Most observers also
hold that the Aksumite kingdom corresponded very little with the modern state beyond the
limits of Tigray. This very observation is responsible for the argument that the Aksumite
civilisation was "more of an Eritrean history than of present day Ethiopia" because of the fact
that Aksum is more geographically proximate to the State of Eritrea than mainland Ethiopia331.
This again, to Eritrean nationalists and their sympathisers, clearly indicates the two countries
have always had separate historical tales of nationhood, though sharing a similar culture.
Following its establishment, Aksum acquired a very strong and prosperous commerce during
the third century A.D. And according to most historians, Aksum ranked among the great
powers of its contemporaries. This became evident in its well established contacts with other
great powers of the world such as Byzantium, Persia, India, and Ceylon (today's Sri Lanka).
It also had an open market that attracted traders from as far as Greece and Egypt332.
However, when in the fourth century Aksum became dominated by religion, its stability
329 See Frank Hearn, "Remembrance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present
and Anticipating the Future", Politics and Society, vol. 5, no. 2(1975), p. 201. (emphasis added).
330 See Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p.
19; and Robert I. Rotberg, A Political History of Tropical Africa (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1965), p. 30.
331 See Stephen Longrigg, A Short History of Eritrea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 13;
and Araya Tseggai, "The Case for Eritrean National Independence", Black Scholar, 7(June 1976), p.
20. (emphasis added).
332 For Aksum's commercial influence, see Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 7; and
G.K.N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, op. cit., p. 5.
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quickly started to crumble. It began embracing Christianity and started indulging in expansive
ventures to dominate most of the region as far north as Meroe in the Sudan and across the
Red Sea into Yemen 333 . To be sure, Aksum's power was based on the control of the Red Sea
trade route. However, at the close of the sixth century, Aksum had earned the wrath of other
foreign empires such as Persia which had to cut off Aksum's influence on Arabia. Because the
Persian Empire wanted to expand Islam, Aksum became affected and automatically delinked
from the rest of the world. By 710 A.D., Aksum had become totally undermined and its port
Adulis (now Zula), was destroyed334 . With such events, Aksum consequently lost its glory,
particularly the monopoly of trade. Thus, the Islamic expansion did encourage the Beja, who
first settled in Egypt, to take over the kingdom of Aksum. What followed throughout the
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, was the establishment of five independent kingdoms in
today's Eritrea and northeastern Sudan by the Beja335.
According to Margery Perham, there was a clear boundary between Abyssinia (today's
Ethiopia) and the five kingdoms of the Beja (parts of which are constituted in today's Eritrea).
And the rulers of Tigray and Abyssinia did recognise Medri Bahri as a vassal state, and in
Perham's words, Medri Bahri became "the vassal state of a vassal state" 336. Even though
Medri Bahri (Eritrea) was an independent entity, it had to stand against constant invasion by
the rulers of Tigray and Abyssinia who later succeeded to destroy Zula and Hirgigo, Eritrean
villages. Despite the fact that the local forces had successfully repulsed the Abyssinians at a
frontier on the Mereb River 337 , in 1540-41 an Abyssinian-Portuguese allied army thrust into
the territory but failed to sub-due Medri Bahri. Such resistance has become a tale of Eritrea's
enduring resilience from the ancient days to the contemporary victory in the 1990s. Taking
into consideration the foregoing narrative, one can say that Eritrea's struggle for survival as a
nation did not only begin with the fight against the Imperial and Dergue regimes in the
twentieth century. The earliest history of the region was dominated by constant upheaval
For the history of Christianity in Aksum and the domestic reasons that led to its subsequent decline,
see Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia 1270-152 7, op. cit.
See Semere Haile, op. cit., p. 12.
These kingdoms were Negash, Belgin, Bazin, Zarin, and Quaita'a. See Semere Haile, op. cit.; and
Spencer J. Trimingham, isla,n in Ethiopia (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 49-50.
336 See Margery Perham, op. cit., p. 437.
Mereb River still marks the modern frontiers between Eritrea and Ethiopia. See in particular Fred
Halliday, "The Fighting in Eritrea", op. cit., p. 60.
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between kingdoms and/or territories 338 . In other words, the land itself has been a subject of
contest for a long time. That is why in 1770, the Scots explorer, James Bruce, who had
adventured through Eritrea concluded in his findings that Eritrea and Ethiopia were not only
separate entities, but were also in constant conflict with each other 339 . Despite its successful
resistance against the constant regional invasions and upheavals, Eritrea was yet to undergo
foreign occupations over a period of five hundred years.
(b) The Impact of Early Foreign Occupations of Eritrea
Eritrean resilience was proven not just against the Imperial and Dergue regimes of present day
Ethiopia in the 1970s to 1991, but also against a number of great foreign powers such as the
Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, the Egyptians in the nineteenth century, and the
European colonialists in the twentieth century340. Having said that, this foreign occupation did
also contribute a lot in furthering Ethiopian claims over Eritrea as part of its territory in this
century. As we shall see, Ethiopia had actually fought most of these foreigners in their
attempts to also conquer Abyssinia. One of these foreign occupations was carried out by the
Ottoman Empire. After having successfully conquered the Arab countries, the Ottoman Turks
extended their conquest across the Red Sea in 1517. By 1557, they had formally occupied
Massawa and much of the coastal plain of Eritrea as far as Deba-ruba and built their
fortifications in 1558 there. They also expanded to western Eritrea as far as Keren and Sahel
and occupied those areas until the nineteenth century. At the same time, the Fung (also Funj)
Dynasty had also occupied the remaining parts of western Eritrea and Sennar in the Sudan.
However, both occupations came to their end in 1865, but only to be replaced by another
occupant in the same year, Egypt.
The Egyptian participation in the contest for land in the Horn of Africa was necessitated by the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In addition, the British were also concerned with their
position in Egypt and the sea routes to India, and thus encouraged the Egyptians to occupy the
338 A.M. Babu is right to point out that upheavals are not a new phenomenon to Africa, though the
contemporary ones in Eritrea and Ethiopia were qualitatively different from those elsewhere in the
continent. See A.M. Babu, "A Hopeful Dawn of Post-Colonial Initiatives", SAPEM (April 1996), pp.
14-17.
For details of Bruces adventures, see James Bruce, Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile,
Book V(Dublin: Porter, 1791).
° See Cohn Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: Hollywood Press, 1977);
G.N.K. Trevaskis, op. cit, Semere Haile, op. cit., pp. 14-20; and Ruth Tyob, op. cit.
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Red Sea port of Massawa, Keren (Bogos) town, and southcentral Eritrea 341 . As a result,
Egypt occupied the entire Ottoman territories and by 1872 the conquest of Massawa and
Keren were complete, and raised their flags throughout the former Ottoman areas of Eritrea.
But when in 1875 Egypt attempted to extend their rule into Abyssinia, it was pushed back by
the strong army of Emperor Yohannes IV, at Gundet in November the same year and at Gura
in March 1876 respectively. Both towns belong to Eritrea near the border with Ethiopia.
Because Yohannes had successfully driven back the Egyptian army out of Gundet and Gura,
he took control of the Eritrean highlands from 1876 to 1889. During the same period, the
Mandists were also intensively resisting the Egyptians in the Sudan, and thus, Egypt was
totally forced out of Eritrea.
The rise of the Sudanese Mandia against the Egyptians, together with the previous loses to the
Abyssinian monarchy augured direct British involvement in the crisis. The British opted to
mediate between Egypt and Emperor Yohannes to facilitate a smooth Egyptian withdrawal
from the Sudan, and at the same time conspiring with Abyssinian assistance against the Mandi.
In order to fulfil the British request over Egyptian evacuation, Yohannes sought the
occupation of Massawa and Keren as a quid pro quo. Thus, an agreement was signed to that
effect, the Hewit Treaty of 1884. The Emperor adhered to his side of the bargain and
facilitated a smooth evacuation of five Egyptian garrisons from Massawa and Keren in early
1885342.
However, instead of helping Emperor Yohannes in the taking over of Massawa, the British
encouraged the Italians to expand from the southern port of Assab to occupy Massawa, which
they had declared since 1882 and 1885 as colonies. According to Trevaskis, the British
preferred Italian influence in the Red Sea to counter the French encroachment from
Djibouti343 . These British-Italian manoeuvres are quite significant because they provide the
readers with another fashion of evidence that the Italians actually never took Eritrea from
Ethiopia, as the latter has always claimed in assertion of its legitimacy over the former. And
according to Margery Perham, it was from the collapsing Egyptian occupation that the Italians
took Massawa which the Egyptians themselves had taken from the Turks, and not from
Ethiopia344 . Thus, it could be discerned from the foregoing that Ethiopia's attempts to
" See Cohn Legum and Bill Lee, op. cit., p. 20; also Semere Haile, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
342 See Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967), 2:
422-23.
See G.K.N. Trevaskis, op. cit., p.8.
See Margery Perham, op. cit., p. 54.
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conquer Eritrea were short-lived, first by the advent of Italian colonialism in the Horn of
Africa. Second, the Ethiopians could not afford to sustain fighting two enemies: the Italians
on the one hand, and the increasing Mandist threat from the Sudan on the other. And third,
from the fourteenth to the end of the nineteenth centuries, multiple regional dynasties with no
strong central authority had proliferated in Ethiopia.
However, from 1889 a big rivalry emerged from the multiple dynasties and Yohannes had to
choose between fighting either the Mandists of the Sudan, or his new biggest rival, King
Menelik II of Shoa345 . In 1889, Yohannes chose to fight the Mandists where he met his death
and was subsequently succeeded by King Menelik II. It is Menelik, rather than Yohannes,
who is the sole architect of the modern empire-state of Ethiopia, one that stifi excluded
Eritrea. The argument that emanates from most Ethiopian centralists regarding the question
of Eritrea is that despite the successful defeat of the Italians at Adowa, King Menelik II had
not enough strength to be sure of another victory over Italians for Eritrea. Because of that,
Menelik decided to abandon the territory under Italian control and it was only early this
century that Ethiopia expanded its borders to include Eritrea. King Menelik II's sunender of
the territory has been liken by most Eritrean nationalists to the amputation of a hand which it
is impossible to reconnect. Therefore, Eritreans have all along accepted Italy as their sole
coloniser until it handed over the territory to the British Military Administration between
1941-1951, who in turn handed over Eritrea to the Emperor in 1952. But how Italy first got
possession of Eritrea, is a question we shall try to answer briefly by looking at the history of
Italy's involvement in the region.
(c) Eritrea Becomes an Italian Colony in 1896
When the Suez Canal opened in 1869, it accelerated what Gebre-Medhin calls the plunder by
capitalist Europe of the Red Sea coastlines of Africa346 . For many reasons, one is right to say
that Eritrean modern history began with Italian colonialism 347 . Because to many Eritreans, it is
345See Semere Haile, op. cit., p. 16.
346 See Jordan Gebre-Medhin, Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
For a brief history of colonial Eritrea under Italy, Britain, and Ethiopia, see Jordan Gebre-Medhin,
op. cit., pp. 56-69. And for a detailed study see Tekeste Negash, No Medicine for the Bite of a White
Snake, op. cit.; in idem, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, op. cit.; J. Baker, Eritrea, 1941 for the Fullest
Treatment of the Military Campaign (London: Faber, 1966); Richard Caulk, "Black Snake, White
Snake': Bahta Hagos and his Revolt against Italian Overrule in Eritrea, 1894", in Donald Crummey
(ed.), op. cit.; Harold Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States 1941-1974, op. cit., and
Stefano Poscia, Eritrea: Colonia Tradita (Rome: Edizioni Associate, 1989).
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the Italian rule that had reduced Eritreans to an oppressed, dominated, and colonised nation
for long348 . In the same year after the Suez Canal had opened, a group of Italian Missionaries
were sent to explore the Red Sea coast of the Horn of Africa, and in September they bought a
piece of land in the Eritrean Danakel province. According to most historians, the missionaries
had the support and blessing of both the Rubattino shipping company and the Italian
government349 . Although the Italian missionaries first camouflaged themselves as the sole
harbingers of the Gospel, they were destined to collect information about the area and its
inhabitants before returning to Italy in early 1872°. Following their return to Italy, the
Rubattino shipping company, well equipped with the information from the missionaries, was
then sent and authorised by the Italian government to purchase Assab (the present capital of
Danakel region) from the local Sultan as a fuelling station. But the motive behind this was to
facilitate a future occupation of Assab which was later accomplished when Italian forces took
possession of the port in 1879. Thus, Assab became colonised (colonia di Assab) and fell
under the authority of the King of Italy.
While this was taking place, the first people to protest against the Italian encroachment in the
region were the Egyptians and Turkish who both claimed sovereignty over Eritrea and not the
Ethiopians35 . In another development, though Ethiopia was not one of the first to protest
against Italian occupation of parts of Eritrea, it was one of the first to counter Italian
expansionist tendencies on the ground in the entire region. For example, when on February
5th 1885 Italian troops occupied Massawa, they pushed into the interior of Eritrea and were
met by the forces of Emperor Yohannes' General, Ras Alula, who was himself Governor of
Hamasien and Seraye (Eritrean Provinces). As was pointed out earlier, this region had fallen
under Yohannes' rule during the period of Egyptian evacuation. The first major setback for
any European power at the hands of an African army happened when the Italians were badly
defeated at the battle of Dogali in 1887.
348 According to G.K.N. Trevaskis, throughout the Italian regime the Eritrean remained content, docile
and obedient to his rulers. See his Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, op. cit., p. 29; and also Mebrat's
story recorded by Ai-nrjt Wilson, Women and the Eritrean Revolution: The Challenge Road (Trenton,
N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1991), pp. 9-32.
See John H. Spencer, Ethiopia At Bay (Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, Inc., 1984), p.
102-188; Robert Machida, op. cit., pp. 15-21; and Stefano Poscia, Eritrea: Colonia Tradita, op. cit.
350 See Semere Haile, op. cit., p. 16 (emphasis added).
351 See The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Italian Colonial Enpire, Information
Department Papers, no. 27 (London: The Broad Water Press, 1940), p. 9.
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Because of such a resounding defeat, the Italians reversed their channels of expansion and
resorted to diplomatic manoeuvres by exploiting the regional rivalry between Tigrayan and
Shoan monarchies. They did that by signing a friendship and commerce treaty with King
Menelik II of Shoa, in hope of using him against King Yohannes 352 . In this way, the Italians
supported Menelik's bid for the Abyssinian throne, and upon his accession he ratified relations
with them. In another development, Yohannes' conflict with the Mandists gave the Italians an
advantageous position which they efficiently seized without delay. From the middle of 1888,
the Italian forces moved into Keren and Asmara on 2nd June and 3rd August, respectively.
When at the same time Emperor Menelik II started feuding with his rival, General Baldissera's
forces also seized the opportunity and marched as far as the River Mereb, the traditional
frontier between Abyssinia and the modern state of Eritrea that was adopted in 1993 when
Eritrea achieved its formal independence.
Thus, Menelik II consolidated his position by signing the Treaty of Wichale (Ucciali) with Italy
on May 2, 1889, where he became recognised as de facto Emperor against any potential
challenger, particularly from Yohanness progenies in Tigray 353 . Some four months later, the
Treaty was ratified by Umberto I of Italy on 29th September 1 Thus, frontiers between
the newly acquired Italian colony of Eritrea and Abyssinia became clearly defined in Article III
of the Treaty355 . And it was after the Treaty that Italy declared its new territory in the Horn to
be a colony in East Africa on 1st January 1890. Following the Greek etymological derivation
of the term, the Italians named it Eritrea and that marked the establislmTient of a nation and
colony under Italian rule. As was mentioned earlier, the British intention to encourage Italy on
the one hand and discourage France on the other became manifest 356 . However, the Italian
colonial expansion did not proceed smoothly, because new problems arose between Menelik II
and his Italian counterparts over the provisions of the Treaty. The Amharic version of Article
17 of the Treaty was in a marked contradiction with the Italian text which stated that Italy
acquired a virtual protectorate over Abyssinia, and Menelik consented to "avail himself of the
352 Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1970), p. 55.
For the texts of all relevant treaties up to and including 1908, see Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa
by Treaty, op. cit., p. 454.
Ibid.
For details, see Clive Perry, Consolidated Treaty Series, vol 172, 1889-1890 (New York: Ocean
Publication, 1978), pp. 100-101.
356 See Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Tunes of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1884-1913 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1975), p. 82.
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Italian Government for any negotiations which he may enter into with other powers or
Governments" 357. According to Frank Hardie, when in 1889 the Italians pronounced or
proclaimed their legitimacy over Abyssinia as a protectorate, Britain recognised it while
France and Russia rejected it 358 , which showed a clear ambiguity of the treaty itself as
perceived by other rivals. Thus in 1890, with material aid and support from the French and
the Russians, Emperor Menelik II began to resist Italian claims over Abyssinia, and in
February 1893 denounced and abrogated the Treaty of Wichale in order to maintain the
independence of Abyssinia.
Despite Menelik's resistance, Italian forces continued to advance into Tigray, and on the 1st of
March 1896 they clashed at Adowa. Italian arrogance and intransigence was met with a
humiliating defeat at the famous battle of Adowa, whose one hundred years anniversary was
celebrated in 1996. Because of this, Abyssinia was able to earn itself respect from European
powers who were now ready to negotiate matters on the basis of equality and independence
with Abyssinia. The Treaty of Wichale became abrogated particularly when another peace
Treaty at Addis Ababa was signed on 26th October 1896, where Abyssinia's absolute
independence was proclaimed 359 . However, in return respect for the boundaries between the
Italian colony of Eritrea and Abyssinia was pledged, an event which most Ethiopian centralists
regard as a mistake. And in 1897, the boundaries between the Italian colonies of Eritrea and
Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia were negotiated and fixed, though slightly revised in 1908 in
Italy's favour.
Though on 2nd August 1928 Emperor Haile Selassie I had concluded a friendship Treaty with
Italy, Italy invaded Ethiopian territory on 3rd October 1935. By the Spring of 1936 the
mission was accomplished with the establishment of Africa Orientale Italiana, or what came
to be known as Italian East Africa constituted by Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia.
Emperor Haile Selassie fled his empire and was in exile till the allied forces led by Britain
successfully drove Italy out of Abyssinia, and Eritrea and Italian Somaliland were entrusted to
the British Military Administration in 1941.
(d) From the British Administration to the Termination of the Federation
See Royal Institute of International Affairs, Abyssinia and Italy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1935), P. 5; and EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Programme, op. cit., pp. 17-
18.
358 See his The Abyssinian Crisis (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1974), p. 12.
See Sir E. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 458.
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With the defeat of the Axis powers during the Second World War, Eritrea was handed over to
the British Military Administration from 1941-1952, who then assumed a formidable task of
governing it for eleven years 360 . During their administration, several attempts were made to
partition Eritrea with the aim of first, joining the western and northern parts of the territory to
the then British-held Sudan. The second idea was that the southern and eastern coastal
regions, including the ports of Massawa and Assab, were to be given to Emperor Haile
Selassie's Ethiopia. Had that plan materialised, it would have marked the total demise of
today's State of Eritrea. Fortunately for the Eritreans, British hopes of partitioning the
country had failed because Britain was already facing resistance from the Mandist nationalists
in the Sudan. Thereafter, the future of the former Italian colony became central in the UN
debates from the 1940s to the 1950s. Eritrean expectations were that the UN would find a
favourable solution to the Eritrean question, which for them could be solved only through
total independence. On the contrary, in 1952 the UN decided to hand over Eritrea to Ethiopia
under a highly contested federal arrangement, one that angered most Eritreans361.
Prior to that, decisions about the future and status of the strategically-located former Italian
colonies began in August 1945 at the Postdam (Berlin) Conference between Truman,
Churchill and Stalin. Because of their conflicting interests the powers decided to postpone
consideration until the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers
convened in London the following month. The debate was later continued in the Paris Peace
Conference between 29th July and 15th October 1946. It was decided that the final disposal of
the former Italian colonies be determined by agreement among the Big Four Powers within
one year, and the matter be submitted to the UN General Assembly for disposition362.
Unfortunately, the Four Powers failed to agree on the matter and the 15th September 1947
deadline date passed. Instead the Four Powers were able to approve a Peace Treaty with Italy
on February 10th 1947, which the latter ratified on 2nd August the same year 363 . The Treaty
was also later approved by other states which had declared war on the Axis Powers. Under
the terms of the Treaty, Italy denounced her rights and titles to her former colonies. As a
° See Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 31.
361 For details of the debates and the federal arrangements, see Bereket Habte Selassie, Eritrea and the
United Nations, op. cit., pp. 27-56; and Ruth lyob, op. cit., pp. 61-97.
362 For Article 23, see again Progress Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea During
1951, vol. III, op. cit., pp. XI-XIX.
363 See United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 49(1950), p. 139.
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result, their future status was now left in the hands of the Four Powers as provided by Article
23(111) of the Peace Treaty. In October 1947, a Four-Power Commission of Investigation was
formed and sent on a mission to visit the three former Italian colonies namely, Eritrea, Libya,
and Italian Somaliland, in order to furnish the Four Powers with adequate information
regarding the political situation in those territories. Though the commission submitted its
report in May 1948, the report lacked the basis on which the Big Four could agree.
Because of such stalemate in policies, the whole question was referred to the UN General
Assembly according to Article 23 of the Treaty and its annex XI(3) which called on the UN to
settle the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. Thus, the UN General
Assembly became entrusted with the task of making a final and binding recommendation on
the issue. At this stage, the Bevin-Sforza plan, named after the British and Italian foreign
ministers, became the background of the disagreement among the Four Powers regarding the
disposal of the former Italian colonies. Their formula stipulated the division of former Italian
colonies of Libya and Italian Somaliland as trusteeships of Great Britain, France and Italy.
Consequently, Libya was to be divided into three parts: (a) Cyrenaica for the British; (b) Fezan
for the French; and (c) Tripolitana for the Italians. In addition, Somaliland was also to remain
under Italian administration, while Eritrea was to be partitioned according to the long-time
wish of the British.
Despite bitter opposition from Eritrean nationalists, the first committee approved the Bevin-
Sforza proposal and recommended it to the UN General Assembly for a fmal approval.
Eritreans were fortunate that a combination of Asian, Arab, and Soviet votes blocked the
proposal364 . Thus, the fate of former Italian colonies was postponed until the Fourth Session
of the UN General Assembly resumed, whose resolution 287(111) of 18th May 1949 granted
Libya independence by February 1952, entrusted Somalia under a ten-year Italian trusteeship
before getting independence in 1960, and sent a second commission of enquiry to Eritrea.
The main tasks of the second commission of enquiry for Eritrea was: "... to ascertain more
fully the wishes and the best means of promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, to
examine the question of the disposal of Eritrea and to report to the General Assembly,
together with such proposals as it may deem appropriate for the solution of the problem of
Eritrea"365 . The commission was constituted of representatives from Guatemala, Pakistan,
See General Assembly Official Record: Third Session, Part II, Plenary Meetings, 5th April-i 8th
May, 1949, p. 596.
365 See General Assenbly Resolution 289-A(IV,) of 21st November 1949, p. 30.
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Burma, South Africa and Norway. The group visited Eritrea from 14th February to 6th April
1950. This period was subsequently regarded by Eritrean nationalists and their supporters as
far too short to allow any well-founded conclusions. Even though this was reported to the
Fifth Session of the General Assembly, the decision of the members of the commission was not
unanimous. Instead they divided into minority and majority plans. The minority plan favoured
a trusteeship for Eritrea after which independence could be granted (mainly Guatemala and
Pakistan), while the majority plan favoured the federation with Ethiopia (mainly Burma and
South Africa), with Norway proposing radically for a total union of Eritrea and Ethiopia.
The Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation for a federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia were fmally
adopted. Thus, the General Assembly Resolution 390-A(V) of 2nd December 1950 provided
for the Ethiopia-Eritrea Federation Plan and decided only for: "(1) Full autonomy for the
Eritrean Government in all domestic affairs with defmite limitations of the respective
jurisdictions of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian Governments, and (2) A democratic regime in
Eritrea with all its requisites and safeguards: respect for human rights and fundamental liberties
and government of the people by the people"366 . The Ethiopian Foreign Minister pledged
before the General Assembly his country's respect and honour of the terms of the federation
resolution. Precisely, the federal resolution provided for the division of powers and
responsibilities between the Federal Government and the Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia,
with the residual power remaining with the members of the federation. Thus, with such an
understanding, the UN Resolution 390-A(V) was given the benefit of the doubt by the
Eritreans367 . This is because it was vested in paragraph 5 of the UN Federal Resolution that
Eritrea must participate in the Federal organs: legislature, executive, and judiciary. In
addition, the Federal Constitution of Eritrea unequivocally stated that: "The citizens of Eritrea
shall participate in the Executive and Judiciary branches, and shall be represented in the
Legislative branch of the Federal Government"368.
However, when one examines closely the UN Resolution that federated Eritrea and Ethiopia,
the resolution did not specify the establishment, organisation and working of the federal
institutions, though it described and explained more fully the position and participation of the
eleven (11) Eritreans in the Federal Government, and defends the concept of a strict federalism
as the essential basis for the success of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Federation. Paragraph 5 of the
366 See G.A.O.R: Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, op. cit., p. 564.
367 See G.A.O.R: Seventh Session, Final Report of the United nations Commissioner in Eritrea,
Supplement NO. 15 (A/2188), 1952, pp. 7 & 47.
368 See para. 5 of the resolution in ibid.
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UN Resolution 390-A(V) and the Federal Act, and Article 7 of the Eritrean Constitution only
stated that: "An Imperial Federal Council must compose of five Eritreans and five Ethiopians
who would meet at least once a year to advise upon the common federal affairs, etc., of the
federation. The Council therefore acted as a liaison between the Eritrean government and
Emperor Haile Selassie"369 . To effect and implement the directives, the UN Commissioner in
Eritrea was mandated the authority to implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Federation under
paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of the Federal resolution. Be that as it were, the federal
arrangement had no built-in guarantee to protect Eritrean autonomy, which meant that in the
event of Ethiopian violation of the terms of the settlement, the UN would have the ultimate
responsibility to guarantee against any violation or to provide remedies for any violations.
Such was the view of the legal panel that drafted the fmal report370.
On the other hand, though the federal constitution had denied the Eritrean people their right to
determine their own destiny, it did recognise their national identity and that of Eritrea as a
territorial entity. It also provided for an autonomous Eritrean government and for the respect
of the institutions, religions, and languages of the Eritrean people. It further promised all
persons in Eritrea the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms through the
provisions of a Bill of Rights. Moreover, it did enshrine the democratic principle in Article 16
of the Eritrean constitution derived from Resolution 390-A(V), which was not to be amended
under any circumstances. In spite of all this, the federal arrangement proved simply a window-
dressing when instantly after the federation came into effect in September 1952, the Emperor's
government began to undermine the federation. Violations of the terms of the Federal Act
took place at all levels, draining the federal and democratic principles of their essence outlined
above, and reduced Eritrean autonomy quite drastically. Such violations of human and
democratic rights provoked Eritreans to send urgent petitions to the UN and to organise
unconventional protests and demonstrations but none were accorded any attention. The
gravest consequence of this was the immediate substitution of the official Eritrean languages
with the Ethiopian national language of Arnharic, both for purposes of official communication
and for instruction. This has to date left a whole generation of Eritreans educationally
handicapped. In addition, political parties and trade unions were banned, as were all meetings
of any kind organised by Eritreans.
Finally, in November 1962, the Emperor himself delivered the coup de grace, unilaterally
abrogating the federation, sending his troops of occupation and declaring Eritrea a simple
369 See Semere Haile, op. cit., p. 23.
370 See Final Report of the United Nations Commissioner to Eritrea, Ch. II, Para. 201, op. cit.
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fourteenth province of Ethiopia. According to most historians, Eritreans tried their best
through protests and by sending petitions to the UN, but all unfortunately fell on deaf ears371.
In the face of a flagrant violation of the federal arrangement which it worked hard to fashion,
the United States government and the entire world community remained silent. For most
Eritreans, this silence did in retrospect confirm the U.S government awareness of iHTritrean
people's favour of independence rather than federation, which the US simply undermined in
support of the Emperor's territorial claim over Eritrea. Emperor Haile Selassie was favoured
by the Americans because he had promised the latter, apart from mere loyalty, important naval
and air base and communication facilities in Eritrea. 372 It could be argued after the foregoing
review that the Eritrean peoples took up arms as a last resort after all pleas for a peaceful
settlement of their question did not yield favourable consequences.
4.2. The Take-Off of the Eritrean Struggle for Independence - Eritrean Fronts:
ELM, ELF, and EPLF
The Eritrean struggle for independence began just under a few years before the termination of
the federation. By the time Haile Selassie abrogated the federal constitution and annexed
Eritrea as a fourteenth province of his empire, a number of opposition leaders had already fled
into exile in neighbouring Sudan and Egypt in protest against the federal arrangement itself.
For example, Woldeab Woldemariam had found a safe escape to Egypt where he was
accorded a warm welcome and allowed to use the radio in Cairo for broadcasting as early as
1956 by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Woldemariam's daily broadcast became a strong
encouragement to other dissident nationalist forces, mainly students and workers, to get
organised inside Eritrea. Unlike Ethiopia, trade unions had been allowed to operate in Eritrea
and these provided the nucleus of a working-class leadership 373 . The unions became charged
with the role of addressing political grievances that were compounded by economic grievances
since the territory's economy began to slow down because of the departure of many Italian
investors and entrepreneurs. Eritrean patriots both inside and outside in the diaspora felt they
See for example Stefano Poscia, op. cit., p. 45; and EPLF, Political Report and National
Democratic Program/ne, op. cit., p. 20.
372 See Fred Halliday, "The Fighting in Eritrea", op. cit., p. 58.
According to John Markakis, the federation was an auspicious start, complete with a model
constitution, elections, a free press, and a budding trade-union movement; all in stark contrast to the
feudal regime across the border in Ethiopia. See his, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea", The
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 26, no. 1(1988), p. 53.
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were now left with one choice, to continue the struggle by arms, which marked Eritrea's
formal response to Ethiopia's long interference in their autonomy374.
From then, Eritreans started to mobilise themselves in a much more organised manner to fight
for their independence. Thus, new leaders emerged with new strategies and means of
resistance to salvage Eritrea's future as a distinct political entity, a people with a country of
their own. What this means is that party politics of the 1940s and 1950s was now overhauled
and its traditional power brokers became replaced by young exiles who focused more on the
task of reconciling the fragmented nationalism that had failed during the federation years. The
young exiles organised widespread acts of civil disobedience and constant political protests
that received popular support. The new leadership appealed for national reconciliation and
mobilised the masses through social gatherings, sports, where tea-houses became sole
mobilisation centers for youth, workers, and small traders. Cultural symbols were now used
to help iron out the schism between the Muslim and Christian populations. We will now briefly
outline the history of clandestine organisations that shaped and were shaped by the Eritrean
struggle.
(a) Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)
The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) was founded in November 1958. A number of
young Eritrean exiles and emigrant workers residing in Port Sudan were instrumental in its
formation375 . Though this group had no previous links with the Eritrean political parties of the
past, they were inspired by the tenets of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). The Sudanese
Communist Party was one of the best organised groups in black Africa at the time and since
these young exiles were in the strategic Red Sea town of Port Sudan, they adopted SCP's
structures of recruitment and mobilisation 376 . The ELM charter emphasised the salience of
Ethiopia's interference did not only drive the earlier advocates of independence to rebellion but, as
Trevaskis had predicted, alienated the former unionists also to the point where they gradually defected
to join the movement. See G.K.N. Trevaskis, op. cit., p. 130; John Markakis, op. cit., p. 54; and Araya
Tseggai, "The History of the Eritrean Struggle", in Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson (ed.), op. cit., pp.
75-76.
These revolutionaries included Mohammed Said Nawud, Saleh Ahmed Iyay, Yasin El Gade,
Mohammed El Hassan and Said Jabr. See John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of
Africa, op. cit., p. 106; in idem, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea", op. cit., p. 55; and Ruth Jyob,
OP. cit., p. 99.
376 See Tim Niblock, Class and Power in the Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 163-183. Discusses more about the impact
of the SCP in the rest of the continent.
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unity among Muslims and Christians because its leadership was conscious of the harmful
effects of religious divisions of the 1940s 377 . ELM recruited from the working class, traders,
social groups from which the leadership was derived and from teachers and students who
resented the Amharisation of schools378 . Thus, class divisions, politics of patronage, and
inter-elite alliances as practised by traditional leaders or parties in the 1940s and early 1950s
were phased out. Eritrea was, therefore, redefmed to mean a politically distinct, pluralist and
secular state. Independence, and the restoration of Eritrean constitutional rights were sought.
Initially, ELM did openly reject the consolidation of Ethiopianism and denounced elite
nationalism based on patronage politics and confessionalism. But since the anti-colonialist
elite politicians of the 1 940s had failed to construct a common platform for Eritrean
nationalism, ELM leadership had to develop new methods, networks, and institutions to
ensure the future survival of a secular, independent Eritrea379.
With such developments, ELM became widely known abroad by its Arabic name of harekat
al-tahrir Ertrya and internally by its Tigringya name Mahber Showate. In Tigringya Mahber
Showate means "group of seven", and implied that the ELM group was organised in secret
cells of seven members each, mainly in the urban centers. The organisation of clandestine cells
at the grass-root level was a clear manifestation of the new methods adopted by the ELM.
According to Poscia and lyob, "the cells consisted of a basic group of seven, each of whom
was entrusted with the task of recruiting six other members. Induction into the organisation
included an oath to support the aims outlined in the organisation's preamble, an undertaking to
denote 3 percent of earnings to the nationalist cause, and attendance at bi-weekly
meetings"380.
Operating with such methods, the ELM structure superseded that of party politicians and
traditional rulers in the 1940s and 1950s. As a result, it won the support of Eritreans of
different ages, faiths, and economic classes. This created, in a short time, what Markakis has
For ELM, the realisation of the Eritrean nation lied very much on the unity of the two religions, a
fact that later brought eminent success for the EPLF. Thus, the ELM statutes declared: "Muslim and
Christians are brothers and their unity makes Eritrea one [nation]". See Statutes of the Eritrean
Liberation Movement (Eritrea, 1982), in Arabic; and John Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in
Eritrea", op. cit., p. 55.
378 The term Amharisation is derived from the Ethiopian feudal language - Amharic. In 1962, after
abrogating the federal autonomy Haile Selassie abolished the official languages of Eritrea and imposed
Ainharic. See EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Program,ne, op. cit., p. 20.
See Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 100.
3SO See Stefano Poscia, pp. 69-70; and Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 100.
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termed an "amoeba-like" movement throughout Eritrea's urban centers 381 , and ELM became
the sole strong organisation with a national outlook, burying all previous divisions amongst
Eritrean nationals. There were two factors that sped up the revolution: (a) radio broadcasts
from Cairo intensified the recruitment of Eritreans; and (b) "Amharisation" increased
alienation in schools and the Ministry of Education. These factors became a major driving
force behind recruitment and the banning of all political parties brought about the politicisation
of social organisations such as sports teams 382 . In a sense, the organisation laid down a strong
foundation for a successful Eritrean people's national struggle. The period between 1952 and
1961 not only created favourable conditions for the formation of a single national struggle but
also trained what could be the core of a liberation movement.
Operating from Sudan, the ELM also advocated liberation by coup d'etat. Thus, they were
mainly influenced by the 1958 bloodless coup in the Sudan that brought the first military
regime of Ibrahim Abboud to power in the Sudan when the army took over from the
parliamentary government that had governed Sudan since independence in 1956383. However,
ELM's plot to overthrow the federal government and declare Eritrea's independence never
materialised. A number of factors led to its quick demise: (1) It developed links with people
like Ibrahim Sultan and Woldeab Woldemariam who were previously requested and asked to
support the proposed coup, but declined and instead accused the ELM's coup attempt of
radical nationalism and communist-inspired organisation; (2) It had no army on the ground
since its leaders operated only from exile; (3) Before the coup could be mounted, the Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF), a rival organisation, became established in 1960 under the alternate
leadership of Idris M. Adem and the ELF began to alienate the ELM drastically; (4) Woldeab
Woldemariam joined the ELF in 1962 after a failed unity meeting arranged by the post-
Abboud Sudanese government384 . Thus, (5) the ELF's declaration of armed struggle as the
381 According to John Markakis ELM's organisational skills gained popularity and it spread throughout
Eritrean towns and cities. See John Markakis, National and Class Conflict, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
382 Stefano Poscia writes about Adulis, the Eritrean team that travelled for a national match with a
Sudanese team, where members of the team were later recruited by ELM as internal mobilizers. For
example, a Tekie Yihdego later played a major role in recruiting the youth in Asmara. See Stefano
Poscia, op. cit., p. 70; and Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 101.
383 For the background to successive regimes in the Sudan since independence, see Mansour Khalid,
The Governnent They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution (London: Kegan
Paul International, 1990); and Peter Woodward, Sudan 1889-1989: The Unstable State (London:
Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1990).
384 In a conversation with Ato Ibrahim Totil, a pioneer of ELM, Woldemariam's move was decisive
because it changed the direction of the struggle and soon ELF was to assume a formidable role in the
struggle for independence. Ibrahim Totil comes from Barentu. He was also a member of the Sudanese
Communist Party (SCP) before joining the ELM in 1960 and he is now based in Eritrea's second city
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sole means of achieving Eritrean independence appealed to a larger audience of the Eritrean
populace. This was further strengthened with the fact that a large number of ELM cell
members defected and joined the ELF. (6) Skirmishes between the ELM and the ELF had
alerted the Ethiopian government to the threat of organised opposition. Thus, government
surveillance became more acute, making underground operations become more difficult to
carry out 385 . (7) In September 1961, the first shots were fired that were to mark the beginning
of armed resistance and the subsequent demise of the ELM 386. (8) In 1963 the ELF began to
procure arms for its intended goal-armed struggle. In 1964, the ELF leadership sent an
ultimatum to the ELM, pointing out that a liberation front already existed and told Mohammed
Nawud (ELM'S leader) to reunite with the ELF or face elimination, thus, in May 1965 the two
opposing groups clashed and the ELM sustained more casualties 387. (9) Finally, because of
such clash, the ELM could not deter Ethiopia's forcible integration of Eritrea into the empire,
and it was overtaken by a more militant organisation which promised to accomplish, by
guerrilla war, what the ELM had been unable to bring about by other means.
(b) Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
Historically, the ELF was conceived in September 1961, just a year before the formal
annexation of Eritrea. With the federation dead and political and press freedoms curtailed it
was inevitable that opposition to the Imperial Government should go underground. The
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) started to form in the last years of the Federation when it
became clear that Eritrea would lose its autonomy. Idris M. Adem became its first leader who
eventually declared its existence and formed a Provisional Executive Committee. Although
of Massawa (Eritrea's major port) at the Red Sea coast as Governor of Northern Red Sea Region
(formerly Semhar region).
385 For Markakis, several ELM members were arrested in 1961, and its cell structure was gradually
dismantled and phased out. See John Markakis, National and Class Conflict, op. cit., p. 108.
386 Hamid Idris Awate fired the first bullet, but what has been mooted about the incident is, neither the
ELM nor the ELF had anything to do with him. It has been confirmed in various writings that he fired
the first bullet at an isolated police post in Barka region. According to Hodges, Awate had an excellent
record of guerrilla fighting and he is reported to have driven back Ethiopian soldiers in 1948 and 1950.
see Donald C. Hodges and Robert Elias Abu Shanab (eds.), NLF, National Liberation Fronts,
1960/1970 (New York: William Marrow and Company Inc., 1972), p. 210; and for Markakis, Hamid
Idris Awate remains of symbolic significance as the herald of the Eritrean revolution, a veteran outlaw
who had gained notoriety in nomad tribal clashes in the western lowlands during the I 940s. See John
Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea", op. cit., pp. 55-56.
387 See Stefano Poscia, op. cit., p. 83; and John Markakis, "The Nationalist Struggle in Eritrea", op.
cit.,p. 109.
109
opposition to the Government was particularly exerted by peasants from the rural western
lowlands of Barka where the ELF had gained its first recruits and scored its initial success,
students and workers from the highlands and from urban centers in the Sudan and Egypt had
also began to join388 . The Muslims were markedly hostile to the Ethiopian regime because
they believed that they were about to be dominated by a Christian-oriented government, a
feeling that was to become responsible for the future fragmentation of the Front. From that
time, these Muslims dedicated the Front to the freedom of Eritrea by the force of arms. Much
of the action in the mid-sixties took place in western Eritrea because the guerrillas could
operate from safe bases inside the Sudan where they could easily withdraw if need arose. Like
other guerrilla insurgencies, the ELF tactics were to ambush small security units or attack
government installations such as police posts, highway depots, bridges, and roads. For
example, they from time to time engaged in spectacular ambushes on the railway which runs
from Asmara to link with the two important inland towns of Keren and Agordat.
In a matter of a few years the social composition of the fighting forces began to change.
Emancipated serfs from the lowlands constituted the military wing of the ELF. In 1962,
students, intellectuals, and workers from other sections of Eritrea also began to join the Front.
Because the ELF leadership was mainly in exile, there was a need to remove them from their
positions and replace them with fighters on the ground. This caused further struggle within
the field and democratic forces began to surface. For example, while one group of opponents
believed that the ELF could be reformed from within, others contemplated a creation of a new
Front with a revolutionary orientation as a precondition for any future success of the
revolution in Eritrea. The latter trend finally prevailed leading to the formation of the EPLF in
1970.
The Tigringya and Arabic names of the ELF-Tegadla Harnet Ertra and Jabhat Atahrir a!
Ertrya-Qiyada al Ama, were crucial names in the mobilisation of the masses. The ELF was
also welcome news to most Arab countries who perceived it as a potential stepping stone in
the expansion of Pan-Arab policy389 . It was the military and fmancial support from the Arab
countries that gave the Front immediate effect in its activities. For example, by the middle of
388 See Cohn Legum and James Firebrace, Eritrea and Tigray, Report No. 5 (London: Minority Rights
Group, 1983), p. 8.
389 Mordechai Abir has written that Syria in particular became the champion of the ELF, which it
claimed, was an Arab liberation movement fighting a reactionary pro-Israeli regime. He quotes a Syrian
Newspaper in 1964 which had published a map with Eritrea included in the Arab World. See
Mordechai Abir, "The Contentious Horn of Africa", Conflict Studies, no. 24 (June 1972), pp. 5-6; and
for John Markakis, the regimes in Syria and Iraq were strongly influenced by the Baathists, whose pan-
Arab vision seemed to include Eritrea. See his "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea", op. cit., p. 56.
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1964, Syria alone had sent its major assistance in the form of only kalashnikov assault rifles.
With such received help, ELF forces grew from a few hundred men armed with antiquated
weapons to about two thousand men with relatively modern weapons390. Although an
Eritrean anti-guerrilla commando was allegedly organised with help from Israeli experts 391 , the
new developments in the Front rendered the small imperial garrison in Eritrea unable to cope
with the situation on the ground. From that time, the imperial army remained inadequate in
trying to comb the vast and physically difficult terrain of western Eritrea. The ELF forces
continued to grow and they gradually gained control of most of the rural area of this terrain.
The ELF's emphasis on armed struggle as the only alternative to Ethiopian domination
continued to fmd resonance among the radical students and disillusioned civil servants and
workers. Former ELM members were also approached to join the ELF which in turn
portrayed itself as the logical extension of the ELMs urban-based resistance and began to
justify its brutal elimination of the ELM in 1965. In short, the ELM's achievements were
appropriated by the ELF, which posed itself as the sole liberation front dedicated to the
realisation of independence through the barrel of the gun. Though the creation of the ELF
was welcome news to Eritreans who had felt betrayed by the UN, the organisation lacked a
clear ideological line and a political programme that could have safeguarded the interests of
the oppressed majority of Eritreans. Worst of all, the ELF was allegedly led by a self-styled
leadership, residing abroad, whose main aim was, to the eyes of most Eritreans, to set-up a
neo-colonial state through armed struggle by making an independent Eritrea an Arab country.
Because of this, the ELF leadership was accused of having encouraged religious antagonism
and fanned backward differences and sentiments, of a regional and ethnic nature, so as to
assert its leadership. For that reason, the EPLF was to put all blame for any divisions amongst
leading Eritrean nationalists on the ELF's approach rather than on the ELM.
As a reaction to that, young recruits from both Christian and Muslim communities began
agitating for changes and reforms within the Front. Together with other reformers who had
come from training in Syria and China this group protested against the repressive measures the
self-styled leaders had taken against some sections of the Eritrean masses. From 1965 to
1969, the internal squabbles within the ELF had intensified and its leadership responded
ruthlessly, killing about five hundred of the fighters who had requested changes and reform,
and set-out to consolidate its power by continuous intimidation of the rest of the fighters.
° See Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopia and Somalia", Conflicts in the Horn of Africa (London:
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 10.
391 See Mordechai Abir, "The Contentious Horn of Africa", op. cit., p. 6; and EPLF, Political Report
and National Democratic Programme, op. cit., p. 22, also lamented the presence of these experts.
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This particular incident and the previous killing by the Muslim-dominated ELF of many other
Christian highianders and some dissident Muslims, led to the desertion of a number of
disaffected guerrillas to the Ethiopian Government392.
Thus, it became clear to the progressives within the ELF that changes from within were
impossible to achieve without risking elimination. The progressive elements demanded a more
democratically-run and ideologically-oriented movement. Between 1968 and 1969,
conferences were launched in an attempt to overhaul the ELF's command structure that was
divided into zones with autonomous leadership. In August 1969, a Conference of Adobha
was convened in an effort of trying to restore the unity of the divided rank and file of the
Eritrean guerrillas. The convening of the Adobha conference was crucial because the Imperial
Government had began to exploit the differences in the Front by launching a major military
offensive against the budding guerrilla movement in 1967. The poor showing of the guerrilla
army during the Ethiopian attack of 1967 frustrated many of the young, educated and
politically sophisticated cadres, and that led to a process of inquiry known as the Eslah
(reform) movement. All criticism was, therefore, directed against the zonal fragmentation of
the army, but soon came to focus on the ineffectiveness of the unrepresentative and absent
leaders393 . The government's onslaught devastated large areas of the country and drove the
first of thousands of Eritrean peasants into exile in neighbouring Sudan. Unfortunately, the
Adobha meeting failed in its efforts of trying to breach the gap and heal the wounds within the
Front. The power struggle within the ELF intensified and generated splinter groups of fighters
who decisively disengaged from the ELF in 1969. The groups, namely, the People's
Liberation Front (PLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front and the People's Liberation Front (ELF -
PLF), and the ELF-Ubel, all represented a mixture of Christians and Muslims from different
areas of the country. The fragmentation process was eventually overcome with the rise of the
EPLF, to which we will turn below.
According to most scholars of Eritrean Nationalism, the major weaknesses of ELF could be
summarised as follows: (1) The rectification movement was at first spontaneous, with no
clearly-defmed ideological, political andlor economic programme, and lacked a well-developed
military organisation. It had made no study of the Eritrean society or of the impact of
colonialism on the Eritrean people. For example, the question of defming "enemies and
friends" at the national and international levels was not posed, let alone answered. (2) The
392 See Araya Tseggai, "The History of the Eritrean Struggle", in Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson, op.
cit., p. 76.
See John Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea", op. cit., p. 60.
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ELF had Arab links that enabled Ethiopia to portray the ELF'S struggle as an Arab-inspired
conspiracy394 . In addition to that, since the Ba'athist parties in the Arab World had strong ties
with the Communist USSR, the ELF struggle became branded as a "Communist-Inspired"
destabilisation of Ethiopia 395 . As a result, the Eritrean struggle under the ELF became
categorised as both an Arab threat to the African regional order and a Communist threat to the
international order, making the Ethiopian regime gain sympathy from both the USA and Israel
and its military offensive against Eritrean rebels became legitimised even from abroad 396 . (3)
From the outset, the ELF political campaign took a religious bent. Its leadership divided
Eritrea into regions and divided the Liberation Army - command as well as rank and file -
along ethnic, regional and religious lines. (4) The Supreme Council, the highest body, was not
responsible to any authority and it began to engage in wanton divisiveness. This body was not
only based far from the field but also disunited. Each Supreme Council member attempted to
build his own power base exacerbating the divisions within the growing Eritrean Liberation
Army (ELA)397.
In short, most Eritrean nationalists hold that the ELF was not prepared to guide the rural
population into a revolution which would have social implications 398 . Therefore, the formation
of the EPLF became a historical necessity. Though faced with a liquidation threat from the
ELF, the EPLF proved later a capable organisation that would deliver Eritreans independence.
(c) The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
See in particular the Ethiopian Ministry of Information Press Department, Historical Truth About
Eritrea (Addis Ababa, July 1988).
See Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the
Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session; George Shepherd, The Tra,npled Grass: Tributary States
and Self-reliance in the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), pp. 68-
70, 80-83; Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea: 1962-1978 (Standford: The Hoover Institution
Press, 1982); in idem, "The Soviet Union and Ethiopia: The Misreading of 'politica Sciona' and
'Politica Tigrigna", in Dennis L. Bark (ed.), The Red Sea Orchestra: The Case of Africa, vol. II
(Standford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1988), pp. 130-133; and Paul Henze, "The Soviet Impact on
African Political Dynamics", in Denis L Bark, op. cit., pp. 40-43.
396 See Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 108. (emphasis added)
See EPLF Political Report and National Democratic Progra,n,ne, op. cit., pp. 32-40.
398See Jordan Gebre-Medhin, Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea, op. cit., pp. 172-174.
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The Adobha conference decided that the unity of the liberation army was imperative, if they
were to survive against the Ethiopian more superior force. At the conference, a number of
issues were undertaken: a thirty-eight-member body known as the Ki 'yada al 'Ama or General
Command (GC) was formed to replace the ineffectual Revolutionary Command (RC) based in
Cairo and its liaison office in Kassala (Eastern Sudan) and resolved that the first ELF congress
be held within a year. In a bid to maintain control of the Front, Osman Saleh Sabbe, a member
of the defunct Revolutionary and Supreme Commands abroad, reacted to the conference by
forming his own General Secretariat, the ELF-PLF Foreign Mission. What hindered a further
effective escalation of factional confrontation is the fact that Osman Sabbe was more of a
diplomat than a guerrilla leader and had little contacts with the field because his original
supporters had joined other progressives within the Front. Notwithstanding, Osman Sabbe
was influential in canvassing support for the Eritrean course among the Arabs and he always
derived his power and prestige from contacts abroad. In a tougher reaction, the new GC
rejected S abbe's move of forming a Secretariat and started arresting suspects loyal to him, and
his stronghold, the eastern lowlands were attacked ruthlessly and that marked the total
disintegration and weakening of the ELF, providing more room for the emergence and
consolidation of the EPLF.
However, the failure of the Adobha meeting in trying to breach the gap and heal the wounds
of the past left progressive fighters within the movement with no other option but to disengage
from the ELF in 1969 and formulate a new programme with a new leadership399 . Three new
groups were formed: (a) The People's Liberation Front (PLF); (b) The Eritrean Liberation
Front-People's Liberation Front (ELF-PLF); and (c) The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF-Ubel)
named after River Ubel in the lowlands. Although these groups were organised mainly by
zone five members led by Abraha Tewolde and Issaias Afeworki, they were constituted of a
mixture of both Christian and Muslim progressives like Ramadan Mohammed Nur and others
from diverse backgrounds and areas of the country. Renewed contacts were exerted by the
three groups and their leaders agreed to cooperate in a united front against the enemy until
confidence was fmally established. This was further strengthened by a "Tripartite Unity"
which fostered the subsequent creation of the PLF2, the result of merging the PLF and the
ELF-PLF.
In another conference that followed on 24th June 1970, Osman Saleh S abbe was repudiated in
a meeting at Suduh'EIa, Dankalia, where a nine-member political and military leadership was
elected. However, this continuous efforts to exclude Osman Sabbe from negotiations also
See Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 114; and Cohn Legum and James Firebrace, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
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proved counterproductive. It led into a further internal split within the newly forged union
with leaders of the ELF-Ubel group supporting Osman S abbe on the one hand, and on the
other some groups in the field Supported Issaias Afeworki and Ramadan Mohammed Nur (one
of Sabbe's former supporters)400 . In any case the cooperation between Ramadan Nur and
Issaias Afeworki was crucial in the future survival of the EPLF and the duo are highly
commended for their farsightedness in forging a unity between the Christians and Muslims in
Eritrea. Today, Eritreans of all walks of life widely believe Afeworki and Nur provided a solid
foundation for the establishment of the EPLF which liberated the country from colonial forces.
It has also been observed that the EPLF suffered no further splits because Issaias and
colleagues maintained what Markakis calls an "iron-discipline" within the rank and file of the
40!Front
On the other hand, the full emergence of the EPLF did not mean the end of other splinter
groups. Despite the discipline its leadership had maintained to avoid further splits within its
ranks, the EPLF was yet to face a greater challenge from the left-over of the ELF-GC in exile
and a few still in hiding inside the country. The ELF-GC worked harder to match the efforts
of the EPLF to counter internal dissent through increasing organisation. Therefore, the ELF -
GC called for a meeting and invited the three united groups (now under the EPLF). In their
unanimous response, the three groups demanded that the GC be eradicated as a precondition
to their participation. With their continuous intransigence, the ELF-GC went ahead and held
their congress at Ar, on the Sudanese border from October 14th to November 13th 1971402.
In this meeting, the ELF-GC condemned the three groups as reactionary forces and as a result,
declared annihilation missions against the newly founded EPLF.
In a counter attempt to diffuse the ELF-GC, a delegation from the EPLF was sent to Beirut in
a mission to request assistance from Sabbe's ELF-Foreign Mission (which had greater alliance
with the ELF-GC) 403 . Because Sabbe had hoped to win the confidence of the newly
400 According to John Markakis, this split led to serious repercussions. See his National and Class
Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cit., p. 126. It's also been quite puzzling that Ramadan Mohammed
Nur is out of government after the liberation of Eritrea. People I had conversation with in both Eritrea
and Ethiopia gave diverse views. Some think he became sidelined because he openly disagreed with
what he (Nur) saw as creeping dictatorship within the EPLF and therefore left in a protest, while others
believe he opted out of government at his own choice by resigning as a gesture for leaving room for the
young. The truth about this are still concealed, and as one commentator said, will one day come out
clearly when opposition politics emerges in post-liberation politics in Eritrea.
40! See John Markakis, op. cit., p. 136.
402 See Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 115.
403 Ibid., p. 116 (emphasis added).
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reorganised group in order to secure a place in the hierarchy, he was positive and a joint
committee was established to supervise the distribution of military supplies. Thus, a "pseudo-
alliance" was forged between Sabbe's Foreign Mission and the new group. This alliance was
again perceived as a threat by ELF's Revolutionary Command (the brainchild of the ELF-GC)
formed during the congress at Ar. At the same time, a programme of total reunification
between the three groups moved a step forward when another meeting was held at Geteb, on
the Sudanese border. After the meeting a committee was formed in October 1972 to
coordinate military and political activities and commissioned to draft the conditions for a
complete merger after six months. Therefore, confidence was built and a year after on
September 1973, the groups agreed there were no further fundamental differences and a total
merger was proclaimed with the creation of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF),
also known as Hizbawi Ginbar Harnet Ertra in Tigringa and Sha 'abia in Arabic.
However, the EPLF was not really immune from future internal challenges within its ranks.
For example, in 1973, a conflict surrounding the ideological correctness of its organisational
structure and its alliances with Sabbe's Foreign Mission (considered reactionary) led to the
emergence of an organised opposition within the EPLF leadership. The opposition came
mainly from former university students who espoused a militant Marxist ideology, named
Menkaa 'e404 . These were a group of inteffigentsia who accused the EPLF of being "petit
bourgeois" nationalists and demanded the creation of a "Proletarian Party". In addition to
that, another group who accused the EPLF leadership of etimic discrimination also surfaced
led by Solomon Woldemarian-i405 . Thus, the EPLF leadership labelled the Menkaa 'e group as
a combination of "ultra-leftists" and "ultra-rightists", while the Solomon group to them
reflected parochial grievances. Though the EPLF leadership tried to address the grievances of
their critics, the more uncompromising members were placed under arrest and later
guillotined406 . Poscia characterises the EPLF's decision to quell internal dissent by force as a
404 Menkaa 'e is a Tigringian term that carries a dual meaning: (a) refers to a bat, and (b) a slang for
"left-handed" person. See EPLF, Dictionary: English-Tigringa-Arabic (Rome: RICE, 1985), p. 48.
The equation of bats to the clandestine opposition is said to have indicated nocturnal activities such as
secret meetings held in secret or darkness. Its second meaning, is a slang term used to refer to "left-
handed" persons, which could be interpreted as an indication of leftist orientations. For more
information, see Ruth lyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
Their main complain was that they were not equally represented in the hierarchy. See Stefano
Poscia, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
'° See EPLF, The Destructive Move,nent of 1973 (Eritrea: EPLF, 1973), pp. 1-83.
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"dark chapter" in the Front's history and in his words, "... a situation that will remain
unrevised until some of its former members decide to speak about their experiences openly"407.
Despite all the difficulties the Front experienced, the creation of the EPLF fostered the
subsequent transformation of the struggle from the ELF's defiant nationalism to radical,
secular nationalism in the third decade of the struggle. Between 1961 and 1981, the endemic
fragmentation of Eritrean nationalism underwent continuous transformation, ultimately
coalescing under the radical mobilisation of the EPLF, which successfully transcended
parochial divisions and narrow agendas408 . This has been true because the history of the Front
has shown the EPLF evolved in the 1 970s, from mainly a small band of dissidents, to a radical
survivor and innovator in the 1980s. By emphasising secular nationalism and a youthful
membership, the EPLF's goals reflected those of the ELM.
As we mentioned earlier, the struggle for Eritrean nationhood was waged on two levels: First,
through military campaign against the successive Ethiopian regimes and their affies; and
second, through the construction of Pan-Eritrean political agenda. While the military
resistance through armed struggle against the Ethiopian hegemony led to a military stalemate
for some time, the political struggle to construct a nation out of the numerous ethnic and
religious groups was saluted with success409 . By the 1980s, the EPLF had successfully
mobilised the diverse ethnic and religious groups and classes (women included) into a single
nationalist force united around a single goal: liberation. Steps were taken to promote female
emancipation within the Front, not a small task given the weight of tradition, especially among
Muslims. Thus, women were urged to join the mass organisations in the liberated areas, and
recruitment picked up momentum, mainly among Christian females. And eventually, women
came to represent about 30% of the EPLF's strength410.
407 See Stefano Poscia, op. cit., p. 135.
408 See EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Programme, op. cit., pp. 32-76.
409 Interview with Ato Yemane Ghebreab, a leading member of the EPLF and now Political Secretary of
the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), Party Headquarters, Asmara, Eritrea, April 8th
1996.
410 Women became involved in all activities, including combats and lived on equal terms with, and
among, the men. See Doris Burges, "Women and War: Eritrea", Briefings in Review of African
Political Economy, nos. 45/46 (1989), pp.126-132; and the other person who details female
participation during the last fifteen to twenty years of the struggle for Eritrean independence, is Amrit
Wilson, Womnen and the Eritrean Revolution, op. cit.
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One major factor of the EPLF success in mobilisation was the identification of the Eritrean
question as an integral part of the African colonial experience 411 . The major reason why the
ELF had failed in trying to win both domestic and international support was because of its
close ties with the Arab and Islamic world, which suggested that a future Eritrean nation under
them would be incorporated into the membership of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism 412 . The
other factor that accrued to the EPLFs success is the idea of secular nationalism and the
emphasis on education and culture as prime vehicles for political mobilisation 413 . The EPLF
did have a clearer political agenda than its predecessors; an agenda that emphasized anti-
colonialism and opposition to American imperialism and Zionism. Leading EPLF members
emphasised that "the declared opposition to 'Israeli Zionism' can best be understood not as
evidence of Arab affiliation so much as a response to Israel's training of Ethiopian military
personnel, especially the notorious commandos 1O1414.
Ideologically, the EPLF was often described as a selective, pragmatic (even eclectic)
application of Marxist philosophy adapted to the particular context of Eritrea's nationalist
liberation struggle. And according to contemporaries, the EPLF documents, proclamations,
and training manuals for fighters of the 1970s reflected adaptation of radical Latin American
experiences drawn from the Tupamaros of Uruguay, Fidel Castro's Cuba, Vietnam, the
Bolshevik model of the USSR, and Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China 415 . The EPLF's
adaptation of Marxism developed as a response to the Ethio-American alliance which
supported Ethiopia's hegemonic claim against Eritrean nationalism. Though the EPLF's
organisational structures and policies continued to reflect a strong Marxist influence, their
For most Eritreans, their struggle was anti-colonial just like those fought by all of Africa during the
1950s through to the I 970s. See Bereket Habte Selassie, op. cit.; Semere Haile, op. cit.; Araya Tsegai,
op. cit.; and the EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Programme, op. cit.
412 See Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 123.
413See in particular the following EPLF documents: Hafeshawia Politicawi T'mherti NTegadelti
(General Political Education for Fighters) (Eritrea, 1975); and Hafeshawi Politicawi T'mherti: 1 Kifli,
Tiki,niti (General Political Education, Part I, October 1978).
See EPLF, General Political Education for Fighters, op. cit., p. 8.
415 The Chinese Ambassador to Eritrea and who had also previously served in Ethiopia during the last
days of Mengistu confirmed in an interview the long time friendship between China and the Front, that
has continued to strengthen diplomatic ties today. Interview with Ambassador Shi Yongjiu, 5th July
1996; see also Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 172, ch.8, endnote I.
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programmes and Congresses did not portray clear official declarations of a future Marxist
state416.
According to most EPLF officials, flexibility, discipline, pragmatism, and innovation were the
Front's key characteristics that cherished its success, and distinguished it by a marked
comparison from other Eritrean resistance groups that had preceded it. The EPLF's strength
is attributed to its capacity and readiness to learn from the lessons of history. For example, the
EPLF's first lesson was the politics of the late 1940s, when the Eritrean society was polarised
along religious and ethnic lines which in turn facilitated Ethiopian incursions into the political
fabric of the ex-colony. A second lesson was the ELM's swift demise in 1965, due to lack of
effective organisational structure and a disciplined army. A third lesson was the features and
characteristics of patronage politics and personalism exhibited in the organisational character
of ELF which led to its total disappearance in 1981. Thus, the EPLF had to organise and
discipline their fighting men and women lii order to avoid the mistakes of the past committed
by their predecessors.
As Ruth lyob observed, "the EPLF began an active political campaign of coalition-building
with Ethiopian groups which opposed the Dergue 's regime. By the 1980s, coordinated EPLF
activities and Ethiopian armed opposition groups began to engage the Ethiopian military on
various fronts. This drained Ethiopia's manpower and resources in the face of another cycle of
crippling famine and drought in the mid-1980s" 411 . The stalemate was fmaily broken in 1988
when their successful military and political campaigns picked up momentum with the battle of
Afabet and the subsequent fall of the Red Sea Port of Massawa in 1990. This marked the
political erosion of the Dergue regime which also coincided with the forged affiance between
416 In an interview with Ato Yemane Ghebreab (PFDJ), he denied the Front had ideological leanings
since at one time both powers supported Ethiopia against Eritrean nationalism. And this is backed by
the fact that none of the following EPLF documents record any evidence about the EPLF's ideological
leanings. For example, see Our Struggle and Its Goals (Eritrea, November 1971); Objectives of the
National Democratic Programme: First Organisational Congress, Eritrea, January 31st 1977;
Political Report and National Democratic Pro gramnnie, op. cit.; General Political Education, Part 1,
op. cit.; and Proclamnation on the Structure, Powers and Tasks of the Governmnent of Eritrea, Hadas
Ertra, no. 76(22nd May 1993). Though John Young claims certain facts about Marxist practices within
the EPLF and TPLF in his study of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front. See John Young, "Peasants
and Revolution in Ethiopia: Tigray, 1974-1989", Ph.D. Dissertation, Simon Fraser University,
Burnaby, British Columbia, September 1994; and in idem, "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples
Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism", The Journal of Modern African Studies,
vol. 34, no. 1(March 1996), pp. 105-120:107.
417 For lessons of the past, see Ruth lyob, op. cit., pp. 129-132; and EPLF, Political Report and
National Democratic Programme, op. cit., pp. 55-76.
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the EPLF and other opposition movements in Ethiopia. The successful re-unification of the
various Ethiopian opposition fronts under one umbrella organisation-the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), coincided with increasing superpower ambivalence
toward supporting Mengistu in his various offensives.
In addition to domestic opposition to the policies of the Dergue, the EPLF also began
initiating successive diplomatic offensives that reduced the Dergue credibility both regionally
and internationally; and the end of the Cold War also helped reduce, if not halt, Ethiopia's
external support418 . EPLF acquired legitimacy when it emphasised the Dergue's arbitrary
violation of human rights, the use of chemical weapons and cluster bombs, using famine as a
political weapon, and the violation of Eritrea's right to Self-Determination419 . Thus, the EPLF
began to envision legitimacy over Eritrea and started to transform itself from a guerrilla army
to a significant political as well as a military actor in the Horn of Africa.
4.3. Discourses on Liberation: Eritrean Self-Views
To be sure, all Eritreans share the same view that they are a distinct group of people who have
deserved independence since the days of European colonialism. Most speakers maintained
that Eritrea is a separate country from the Christian realm of the interior of the former
Ethiopian Empire. It is such a conviction that bound Eritreans together to stick to their guns
until the total liberation of the country in 1991 that was followed by a formal declaration of
418 See EPLF, Memorandun to the 42nd Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly
(New York: October 1987). Due to the policy of Perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev pulled out
support for Ethiopia. See Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the
World (London: Collins, 1987), p. 143; and James M. Makinda, Security in the Horn of Africa: an
analysis of post-cold war developments in regional security and emerging strategic issues in
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti (London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1992).
419 The famine highlighted the erosion of the post-imperial regime's legitimacy in the international arena.
For details on the impact of famine and drought in the 1980s, see James Firebrace and Stuart Holland,
Eritrea Never Kneel Down: Drought, Development and Liberation in Eritrea (Trenton, N.J.: The Red
Sea Press, 1985); Richard Pankhrust, The History of Famine and Epidemics in Ethiopia (Addis
Ababa: University of Addis Ababa Press, 1985); Mesfin Woldemariam, Rural Vulnerability to Famine
in Ethiopia, 1958-1977 (London: Intermediate Technology Publication, 1986); Kurt Jansson, Michael
Harris and Angela Penrose, The Ethiopian Famine (London: Zed Press, 1987); Robert D. Kaplan,
Surrender or Starve: The Wars Behind the Famine (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988; Dawit
Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea
Press, 1989); and Edmond J. Keller, "Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and
Eritrea", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 30, no. 4(1992), pp. 609-624.
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independence in 1993 after a successfully internationally supervised referendum 420. Scholars
have in the past pointed out that: "... from the time of the first European travellers onwards it
is known that the area 'beyond the Mereb river', i.e. between Ethiopia proper and the sea,
'was' separate from the Christian realm of the interior" 421 . Fred Halliday, in particular,
concurs that the entity 'Eritrea' as presently constituted did not evolve or subsist consistently
in the past but was a creation of Italian colonialism which occupied the area in the 1880s and
held it until 1941 when the British took over. Eritreans do confirm in similar comments that
the period of Italian colonialism contributed to the strength and firmness of their nationalism.
They further argue that the thirty years of war with Ethiopia did more good than harm in
cementing the different ethnic groups in Eritrea into one nation.
Our presentation of the self-understanding of Eritreans is divided into three sections. We will
first deal with the views of the "elite", then with the experiences of the fighters (both
demobilised fighters and soldiers still serving in the Eritrean forces), and fmally we wifi turn to
the attitudes of civilians who were at times caught between the firearms of both parties in the
war. For each of these groups, our exposition evolves around the four major issues: liberation,
democracy, self-determinationlsecession, and the transition from liberation to government.
(a) Self-views of the Elites
Those I have categorised as elites include key actors in both domestic and foreign policy
during the liberation struggle and its aftermath. Specifically, the self-views are those
expressed by leading figures in the EPLF which has now changed its name to the People's
Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), in the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea (CCE),
in Eritrea's diplomatic missions, in the Military, in the National Union of Eritrean Women
(NUEW), in the civil service and other public institutions. Common to all of these narratives
are the objectives of the nature of the struggle. Most of these elites were born in the 1940s
and the 1950s, and they all became of age at the time when Eritrean nationalism was under a
threat of being swallowed by the expansionist Ethiopian Empire. They all went to primary and
high schools in Asmara before joining either Addis Ababa University or winning scholarships
420 See the following informative articles on this, Okbazghi Yohannes, "Eritrea: A Country in
Transition", Review of African Political Economy, no. 57(1993), pp. 7-28; Berhane Woldegabriel,
"Eritrean Refugees in Sudan", Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, no. 67(March 1996), pp.
87-92); Dan Connell, "Eritrea: Starting from Scratch", Review of African Political Econom y, vol. 22,
no. 66(December 1995), pp. 587-592; Kjetil Tronvoll, "The Eritrean Referendum: Peasant Voices",
Eritrean Studies Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 23-67; and Tekie Fessehatzion, "The Eritrean
Referendum of 1993", Eritrean Sttdies Review, vol. 1, no. l(Spring 1996), pp. 167-175.
42! 
See in particular a piece of work by Fred Halliday, "The Eritrean Fighting", op. cit., pp. 57-67:60.
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abroad to Europe and the United States of America. Most of Eritrea's leading elites today
began their Political involvement first as "cell-groups" in towns, or student leaders both inside
and in the diaspora. According to Ato Yemane Ghebreab (PFDJ), there were a number of
issues that also had a strong influence on their generation, for example, the fight against class
struggle, the then floating idea of African Unity, and the era of nationalism and ideology. And
as Ato Beraky Gebre Selassie had complemented, "Such issues were reinforced more by
internal suppression where most of us had to experience imprisonment, mental torture, and
witness the indiscriminate burning of Eritrean villages by the notorious Ethiopian army"422.
In separate conversations, these elites all claim their motivation to become involved in the
liberation struggle began during their high school days in Asmara. At that time, the revolution
had an influencing effect because the Eritrean question became a common issue for discussion
in the streets and in everyday life. In addition, there were also manifestations of ethnic
nationalism, for example, Amhara versus either Tigrayan, Somali, Oromo or Eritrean. Thus,
on the Addis Ababa University campus, Eritrean students drew maps of Eritrea and painted
anti-government slogans on the walls of classrooms and/or toilets. Most of the interviewees
also confirm they were very much attracted by the ideology of the EPLF that had just formed
in 1970. Eritreans in the diaspora were active in forming strong associations that in turn
supported the EPLF. While abroad Eritreans had learned the politics of survival and, as a
result, developed the spirit of resilience that was instrumental in the formation and
strengthening of Eritrean associations in exile. These associations proved a crucial means for
assisting the EPLF, particularly fmancially. Towards the end of 1977, all active EPLF
members and supporters abroad were requested to come inside the field because the leadership
wanted to strengthen the various structures it had created during the first Congress, be it in the
fields of education, health, agriculture, information, administration, or Political mobilisation.
The positive response by most Eritreans outside to the call by their leaders in the field was
significant in the transformation of the organisation's modus operandi. This latter group
encompassed individuals from every field of expertise particularly those who had just
completed their doctoral and master programmes, and others like Ato Haile Menkerios, now
Eritrea's Ambassador to Ethiopia, could not wait but left their university studies half-way to
join the Front. This group constituted the bedrock of the movement because they contributed
meaningfully in the various areas of the struggle. It is the narratives of their own experiences
during the liberation struggle to which we now turn.
422 Ato Beraky Gebre Selassie did quit his studies for an LLB at Addis Ababa University in 1972 to
join the EPLF whereafter he became a leading member till the end of the struggle in 1991 and he is now
Minister of Information. This words are cited from an interview with him on 23rd July 1996, in the
Ministry of Information, Asmara, Eritrea.
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(i) Elite Discourse on Liberation: practical definitions and conceptions
When one asks an Eritrean, in particular a member of elite, to defme or give an account of
what liberation is in his/her own experience after the thirty years of the struggle against
Ethiopian regimes, one must as well get prepared to listen to a number of long but fascinating
stories. Their expressions and explanations constitute new narratives on liberation movements
in the post-colonial era. According to a number of Eritrean elites interviewed, liberation is a
loaded term, and when defined in the way books have done becomes a mere theoretical
concept totally detached from reality. Most of them plausibly argued that defmitions and
meanings people give to words normally vary depending on particular events, surrounding
circumstances and the historical time. Thus, the way Eritreans may express their experiences
and feelings today is obviously different from the way in which they would have expressed
them at the time of the war. For this reason, liberation may mean different things to different
people. For example, Ato Yemane Ghebreab thinks that an Eritrean who understands the
logic of a free society would view liberation as the total removal of a whole arsenal of socio-
economic, cultural and political restrictions 423 . Because such restrictions limit the area of
choices and opportunities that are available and open to a citizen in a society. Not much
contrarily, the ordinary Eritrean viewed liberation in a more direct and simple way: the
removal of the Ethiopian army and the independence of Eritrea. In other words, different
groups of Eritreans did experience the effect of the struggle differently depending on their
respective circumstances and time. Moreover, there were Eritreans who lived within the
oppressor's territory; there were those who found their way out to exile; and there were others
who remained in the liberated zones. However, no matter how Eritrean self-views on
liberation may vary from one person to the other, their narratives carry significant similarities.
The binding ethos was that all Eritreans whether in government territories, in exile, or in the
liberated areas, contributed in the fight against Ethiopian hegemony.
Talking to both elites and other Eritreans, one encounters convergence in the view that
liberation meant (and still is) freedom from Ethiopian occupation and oppression, the end of
Ethiopian dictatorship and the abuse of human rights, and more than anything else, freedom
from poverty, ethnic, religious or regional domination and fragmentation, freedom from the
social structures that have for years undermined the role of women and young people in
society. Although the demand that one must be left to determine his/her own destiny has not
423 
Interview with Ato Yemane Ghebreab, Political Secretary, People's Front for Democracy and
Justice (PFDJ), a Leading Member of the Government's Central Committee since 1987, and formerly a
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1994 when the PFDJ was formed.
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been unique to Eritrea alone, Eritrean elites have at times idealised their own experiences
during the struggle by overemphasising elements of self-independence or self-reliance, even
when it is widely known that their post-liberation struggle to survive and become self-
sufficient has been mainly hindered by the lack of resources 424 . Berhane Woldegabriel wrote,
"For a long time we've been trying to convince the world that Eritrea is rich in resources and
economically viable as an independent state. Now we must try to convince the world that we
are poor"425 . Despite such facts, the EPLF still displayed some arrogance in their first days in
office which made them to turn down international aid from donor agencies even when they
knew they were in need of external support. A foreign diplomat in Asmara interpreted that as
one negative effect of a long struggle because the EPLF still assumed it was possible to
survive with meagre resources after the war.
On the other hand, liberation in the experience of most Eritrean elites is not independence as
an end in itself. It is the freedom of a people to choose, to act, use their resources to better
their livelihood. It is not liberation in the narrowest sense where colonial masters were simply
replaced by African elites without any major restructuring of the social apparatus. The wider
African experience where decolonisation was marked only by raising of national flags and
emblems is what Eritrean liberation leaders have had a strong desire to avoid throughout the
struggle. According to Ato Menkerios:
Liberation is to be in control of one's own destiny, the life of one's own people,
develop one's own Political system without necessarily neglecting other people's better
examples, direct one's own programme in terms of both foreign and domestic policies,
trade, commerce and industry. To have a broader, flexible and pragmatic approach to
issues of nation-building, become self-reliant. This practical understanding of
liberation has continued and permeates our thinking and actions after independence426.
This has been strengthened more by the slogan of community participation that has endured
because all Eritreans feel they have a part to play in nation-building, reconstruction, and
rehabilitation in the same way they participated in the fight for freedom. In other words, an
424 John Markakis actually points out clearly that the EPLF and EPRDF did not have any alternative
but to adhere to the regular demand for democratisation, which Hobsbawm observed, "require the
adoption of all the institutional paraphernalia designed for the purposes of bourgeois societies". See the
Editorial by John Markakis, "The Horn of Africa", Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, no.
70(December 1996), pp. 469-474; and Eric Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 202.
425 See his article, "Demobilising Eritrea's Army", Review of African Political Economy, no.
53(November 1993), pp. 134-135.
426 Interview with Ambassador Haile Menkerios (Eritrean Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17th June
1996).
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element of civic virtue through common war experience has emerged. This culture was
developed during the liberation years as outlined in the Front's guidelines427.
The good relationship between independent Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia (FDRE) was the result of the EPLF's firm conviction that an oppressive regime
rather than the Ethiopian people was the arch enemy. Thus, one of the EPLF's pragmatic
policies during the war was not only to mobilise the opinion of the Ethiopian masses against
the government but to build a normal relationship with the powerful anti-government
organisations in other parts of Ethiopia such as the TPLF, MEISON, EPRP, EPDM, SLF,
and/or ALF. The EPLF pushed for a common ground in the views of all vanguard
organisations fighting for national liberation and for democracy 428 . The TPLF (and who later
brokered the affiance with other opposition to form EPRDF) too, believed there was no
democracy in Ethiopia without resolving the case of Eritrea and, as a result, did welcome the
programme of cooperation spearheaded by the EPLF429.
Furthermore, there was a belief that socialism was a workable ideology for liberation. This
view was mainly held by Eritreans who went to school in the United States of America (USA)
and not by those who got their education in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
(USSR)430 . However, later on in the long process, the EPLF learnt how to do things on their
own and through experience no particular "isms" were generally found applicable to the
Eritrean situation. The establishment of social justice, following pragmatic policies, and
learning the hard way through experience became the sole principle of the struggle. The
427 See the following EPLF documents: The Eritrean Armed Struggle for hidependence (N.P., 1976);
Objectives of the National Democratic Programme: First Organisarional Congress (Eritrea, January
1977); and Political Report and National Democratic Programnmne, op. cit., pp. 76-101, and 166-182.
428 For a detailed analysis of the relationship, see EPLF Political Report and National Democratic
Programme. op. cit., pp. 145-154, and for this quotation, see pp. 152-153.
429 Interview with Ato Haile Kiros Gessesse, former TPLF Representative in Washington, London and
Khartoum, and now MP and Head of EPRDF Foreign Relations, EPRDF Headquarters, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia (June 17th 1996).
430 In separate interviews with Ato Yemane Ghebreab (April 1996, PFDJ Headquarters, Asmara,
Eritrea) and Ambassador Haile Menkerios (17th June 1996, Eritrean Embassy, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia), both confirmed a large number of Eritreans who came from exile to join the EPLF in the
1970s got their education in the USA and the former USSR. But what is interesting is the fact that
those who came from the USA turned out to be strong proponents of Marxism or socialism in the
struggle and the opposite was true of those who came from the former USSR, who all became better
proponents of capitalism. Thia was mainly because of their own experiences of the contradictions of
ideology in those respective societies.
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Eritrean experience represents a situation where liberation becomes a continuing process in
which, philosophically, human potentialities are forever enlarged. Their struggle was a
perpetual search for a way of life where truth, justice, freedom and equality must triumph.
In precise terms, liberation both as a means and as a way of life, is to live in peace and
determining one's own fate, and in the words of Tesfayesus, "Living in a house without fear of
eviction, becoming the master of oneself, free of external threat, enjoyment of freedom
without causing or inflicting pain, fear or trouble on others" 43t . This is what most Eritreans
believe they were for a long time deliberately denied by the successive suppressive Ethiopian
regimes. They now argue that though their experience was full of pain and despair, the
struggle has been very rewarding because Eritreans can now determine their own destiny and
the innocent lives sacrificed in defeating the Ethiopian army in 1991 are now resting in peace.
And as an Eritrean minister expressed:
The painful experience has helped people develop patience, tolerance, and a
very clear outlook and pragmatic approach to issues. Eritreans have seen what
war is, we have learned from the destructiveness of it and we shall be very
careless to be lured into it by say any external aggressor. On the foundations of
a bitter war a strong nation has been constructed. Out of hard moments,
tolerance and political maturity have found greater resonance amongst the
Eritrean nationals. And after a bitter war, the vision of a nation has
materialised432.
Some Eritreans emphasise it is difficult to defme liberation the way various academics and
researchers would like it to be done. For Ato Ibrahim Totil, translating practice into words
especially from a feeling of a local combatant into a foreign language pervades meaning and
understanding. In other words, the act of liberation, that is the moment of combat with an
enemy say in the front-line, is very difficult to express in simple terms. And as he fmally
summed up, "Just as liberation was difficult to define during the actual combat, its logical
outcome has remained difficult to demystify" 433 . To the individual combatant, liberation
431 Dr. Tesfayesus Mehary served in various positions with the government and public institutions of
Ethiopia till the victory in 1991 that brought Eritrea's independence and he is now Vice President of
Asmara University. These are extracts from an interview with him on 2nd April 1996, Asmara, Eritrea.
432 Interview with Ato Beraky Gebre Selassie, op. cit.
Ato Ibrahim Totil is one of the few left pioneers of the Eritrean struggle for independence. He joined
the ELF in 1960 after becoming a member of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). He is a member of
EPLF Central Committee and now resident in Massawa as Governor of Northern Red Sea Province.
The interview with him was held in March 12th 1996 after a graduation ceremony at the Eritrean
Institute of Management (ElM), Embatkala, Eritrea.
126
means commitment to kill the enemy while at the same time gambling on one's own survival.
In other words, it is also a situation where killing and being killed is an ultimate possibility. In
Eritrea, while EPLF war victims were often locally canonised as martyrs, the enemy's dead
were often regarded as major villains. In a liberation war, there is no inquiry about
companions that have disappeared during combats and life is often continued with less grief
for the dead. In fact, some Eritreans explain there was more joy in death than survival
especially after loosing dear ones in battle. Instead martyrdom often made death rather than
life a pride. "But most important of all", Ato Ibrahim Totil posed, "some of us who 'were' not
formally highly educated gained a wealth of experience of how to administer even when
difficulties are there. The long struggle has graduated many responsible administrators,
rural/urban attorneys or judges, local technicians, field commanders, arid all kinds of expertise
and leadership necessary in the running of society". In this regard, the Eritrean experience has
proven liberation is an institution in itself.
(ii) Discourses on Democracy: understanding and visions of the elites
The Eritrean elites would like to see democracy in practical terms more than it is held as a
theory. Moreover, it has now been widely acknowledged that the liberation struggle in Eritrea
exerted tremendous influence on the liberalisation and the democratisation programme in
Ethiopia434 . The Eritrean case has shown that a full participation of a people in a struggle is
often followed by a full participation in the shaping of societal way of life. Eritreans were, in
the first place, instruments of their own conscious participation in social, political, and
economic issues during the liberation struggle. In my encounters with them, most Eritrean
elites view democracy as a process and attempts of trying to weigh multi-partyism as a
panacea is regarded as totally erroneous. According to Ambassador Haile Menkerios, the
level of economic development and social integration required for building what one may call a
stable democracy is still lacking in the African public and the effects of these often narrows
multi-partyism down to ethnicity and fuels further fragmentation. For him, the EPLF was (and
still is) a broad-based movement open to all the people, but democratic enough to allow
divergent views. He further expressed that though pluralism is generally good and necessary
as a check and balance, in practice it is not fully workable, even in the U.S. when both houses
of Congress are divided in an agenda it results in delay and, therefore, blocks progress and
implementation of projects (good or bad).
See in particular Assefaw Bariagaber, "Liberalisation and Democratisation in Ethiopia: Domestic
Consequences of the Conflict in Eritrea", Eritrean Studies Review, vol. 1, no. I (Spring 1996), pp. 69-
89.
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In this way, multi-partyism is more divisive and in Africa it divides the energy and effort of the
people needed for nation-building more than it strengthens. Thus, there is an overwhelming
view that any creation of parties in order to meet the demand for pluralistic governance is
unacceptable not only to the Eritrean elites but also to the public at large. Given the present
situation of nation-building and reconstruction, most Eritreans envision future splits within the
EPLF (PFDJ) as a healthy and fast move to multi-partyism because parties emerging from
such splits would still share the overall vision of prosperity and success. It is also widely
accepted that there has been internal democracy within the country's only party where
frequent discussions have occurred. And any differences that do arise within the party's
highest organ are often those of approach rather than principle. Thus, the major actors in the
party Headquarters believe the people do follow their debates because there has been
conscious participation in the liberated areas from the beginning of the mobilisation of the
countryside.
The most important legacy of the struggle is sacrifice and Eritrean elites view this as a crucial
element in the building of public institutions, especially a democratic constitution for the
nation. In a conversation with a minister, the long struggle has left a positive legacy of
commitment to nation-building and reconstruction even when the government does not have
enough resources to reciprocate such commitment. For example, Eritreans worked for four
years without salaries only receiving renumeration in kind, be it in the form of food, medical
services and/or clothes. Similarly, the national service is a workable programme and the
Eritrean youth welcomes the government's proclamation on national service. Today,
thousands of youths have been and others are still engaged in different voluntary activities for
the reconstruction of the nation. This has been seen as one measure of democratisation since
the Eritrean youth have not been forced but rather find it as a part of their contribution and
commitment to nation-building. "There is a developed kind of devotion over the years which
has to be nourished", the minister concluded435.
Thirty years under harsh circumstances is a long training in life and the system inculcates such
experience into the culture which has to be passed to the young and future generation. Above
all, liberation has also brought with it simple and less complicated methods of communication
with the general public. In order to avoid political marginalisation, for example, the
government has ensured the media operates in the diverse languages of its nine nationalities.
Radio Eritrea (RE) operates in five languages, two more languages in newspapers and another
two on Eritrean Television (ET). That this will have a greater effect in developing the high
Interview with Ato Beraky Gebre Selassie, op. cit.
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level of tolerance and integration Eritrea's different nationalities need cannot be disputed. Of
course the long struggle might have already fostered the unity and integration of the Eritrean
peoples, but historically inter-cultural migrations also existed in the country. The reason why
the EPLF is more highly credited is because it had encouraged the unity of the Eritrean
population and at the same time allowed diversity throughout the struggle. For Ato Beraky,
the EPLF was (and the PFDJ is still) interested to see diversity becoming an asset and not a
liability to the nation. Therefore, the EPLF is committed to minority rights being guaranteed
in Eritrea, and that the culture, language and/or religion of every Eritrean must be respected.
Foreign observers see this as a security guarantee throughout the future because ambitious
political elites who would like to appeal to their roots will not fmd resonance from their
respective cultural, ethnic, regional and/or religious groupings. And a parochial outlook of
political parties will be avoided. At the moment, Eritrea sees engagement in economic
development as a priority whose advance may lead to the formation of healthy political parties
with national rather than segmented outlook. Since its inception, the EPLF (now PFDJ) has
stated clearly the formation of political parties is a right in an independent Eritrea436.
According to some Eritrean academics, delay in the emergence of political parties cannot be
blamed on the present government because there has never been any experience of discontent
apart from that under Ethiopian regimes. It is simply difficult to imagine the rise of any
political party that would challenge the popularity of the EPLF (PFDJ) at the moment. It wifi
definitely take a few years as Tesfayesus and Naty concurred: "One would be foolish to
attempt a challenge against the EPLF (PFDJ) now because their victory is stifi being
celebrated and Eritreans are simply in a honeymoon of freedom. And anybody trying to
challenge the EPLF (PFDJ) now, even on constructive grounds, will be regarded as
treacherous and anti-progress"437 . So it wifi take quite a while for any strong opposition to
rival EPLF (PFDJ) on an equal footing, and that may be made possible with the return of the
young Eritreans who were born or carried with nappies to exile in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Ambassador Houdek believes the generation of exiles wifi pose a clear (and hopefully positive)
threat to future EPLF (PFDJ) followers because they wifi come with progressive views from
436 See EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Pro grainme, op. cit.; and EPLF, A National
Charter for E,-itrea: for a Democratic, Just and Prosperous Future, Approved by the Third Congress
(Nacfa, February 1994).
Dr. Tesfayesus Mehary is Vice President of Asmara University and Dr. Alexander Naty is Head of
Sociology in the same institution. They in a separate conversation (1996) concurred it is not the right
time to make any Political move to challenge EPLF (PFDJ) policies because the smoke of their bullets
that brought victory to Eritrea is still lingering close to the air and people could smell it every morning
of their wake.
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abroad to phase out the rather strict and stream-lined thinking acquired during the struggle438.
It is also widely observed that the legacy of fear and obedience to policies because of
command which was necessary for executing the war has inhibited the system that it will take
a while before challenging voices rise within the system itself
Today, most Eritrean elites believe the understanding of what democracy is has been very
much abused. For them, democracy and its formal attributes439 , particularly as outlined in
many scholarly works, has dominated the minds of people across the board in every society
with much less emphasis given to its practice. In its most recent wave across the world,
democracy has meant regular election exercises, that have in turn led to clashes not only
between the different Political parties, but between the different ethnic, religious, or regional
groupings that follow them. As a PFDJ official posed a question: "Can one say democracy is
in operation in Kenya, Zambia, Cameroon, and name them? Elections, Yes! But also ethnic
clashes, riots, more fragmentation and loss of vision of one nation one people!" In his words,
Ato Yemane further explained:
Democracy to us is and will not be measured only by termly elections or
casting the ballot or proliferation of Political parties with parochial agendas in
order to meet the demand for multi-partyism. We shall never view it that way
the fear is many parties may reverse and destroy our already well fused
differences. In most of Africa, political parties have often engaged in divisive
campaigns rather than in competing visions of national development and
progress440.
Most Eritrean elites all argue that democracy is not a day or an overnight phenomenon. It
emerges over time and must be grounded in the culture of the people concerned. So their
position is that they wifi not react unnecessarily according to the sound of drums beaten far
away. Ato Yemane Ghebreab constructively further represented the view of the PFDJ in the
following:
What the party is aspiring for is a system where people have control over their
lives. Democracy must mean active participation of the population not only in
the politics of the country (regular elections only) but in sharing the country's
resources and difficulties. Eritrea is a small country, it had to tap its limited
438 Mr. Robert G. Houdek, U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea echoed this words in a two-hour conversation in
his Office (Asmara, 10th July 1996).
See chapter two above for more theoretical understandings of democracy.
° This words were expressed in a long conversation with the author at the PFDJ Headquarters in
Asmara on April 8th 1996.
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resources to succeed. Though small, our country is diverse and all sections of
society must be engaged in national issues. All sections of society including
election losers (in the future) must have a share in the benefits of national
development. The party has a project of equal active participation of all
peoples of Eritrea in politics (yes! positive politics) and avoid marginalisation
that wrecked the country in the early days of the struggle. Here history has
become a useful instructor to the political leaders. The experience of the EPLF
is that it was able to tap the resources of its people to succeed. Active
engagement of all Eritreans in national issues, politics, and in life was the
central mechanism of the organisation. Eritrea wifi have one person one vote
but there wifi be no marginalisation of people because of election results. That
is important! The party is very keen in ensuring that all sections of the
population get something. The whole exercise of competition in elections is on
the level of efficient leadership that can carry out the programme of
liberalisation and democratisation hand in hand with national development in
quite an effective manner. So the competition will be based on who shows
better leadership ability and not between segments of society because this
creates marginalisation and therefore conflict may arise between and amongst
different nationalities in the country441.
The Chairman of the Eritrean Constitutional Commission (CCE), Bereket Habte Selassie,
believes that Eritrea needs "a system that will preserve and protect peoples rights (defmed in
terms of equal opportunity for aJl)" 442 According to him, history has taught Eritreans the
detriments of alienation and they now know accountability and transparency are efficacious for
a progressive political life. Therefore, the Eritrean constitution will provide for a multi-party
system but will also clarify the nature and circumstances under which political parties are
eligible for registration. In other words, national rather than parochial outlook will be one
underlying pre-condition in the formation of political parties in Eritrea.
Most elites think democracy (not particularly its modern conception) is not an alien element to
the Eritrean traditional polity. In Eritrea, what may be termed democracy was generally
coterminous to the Eritrean villages, the only difference is that the Baito debates often came to
a conclusion through consensus rather than parliamentary balloting. However, the Eritrean
Baito also allowed direct deliberations after prolonged debates and the EPLF claimed its
democratic programme had its foundations on this village-type democracy.
During the liberation struggle in Eritrea, representatives from all sectors of EPLF comprised
the supreme legislative body of the Front at a congress, from which a central committee and
an executive body was elected. Today, a 150-member National Assembly is composed of 75
Ibid.
442 Interviev with Prof. Bereket Habte Selassie, op. cit.
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members of the Central Council of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ),
formerly EPLF, and 75 members from regional assemblies443 . According to Eritrean elites, the
legislature as a representative of people is very important even in a war situation because it
provides a forum where people must participate in electing their leaders. Since its inception in
the 1970s, the EPLF had two major congresses that determined the composition of its
leadership. In 1977, the first Congress elected Ramadan Mohammed Nur as the EPLF
Secretary General and Issaias Afeworki (presently the country's President) was made
Assistant Secretary General respectively. A similar exercise was carried out ten years later in
1987 and the reverse took place where the assistant became the first and vice versa. In 1991,
the EPLF decided it had won the war but the Eritreans must be left to decide their own fate.
Therefore, in 1993 the international community was invited to preside over a referendum
where Eritreans decided Yes! for independence and the exercise was declared free and fair.
These litany of events are often today cited by Eritrean elites as clear indicators (if not acts) of
democracy. Because of this, the Eritrean leadership finds the current debates on
democratisation and its genus concept multi-partyism as of less importance compared to other
post-war programmes dealing with rehabilitation and reconstruction.
In a conversation, a foreign journalist summed up: "The concept of democracy in post-
liberation governments in Africa (particularly in Eritrea and Uganda) is centred around
'participation"444 . Both Museveni and Afeworki have argued more than once that Africa
must make a cautious turn in its democratisation agenda and instead put much emphasis on
"participation" rather than "multi-partysm". For these two post-liberation leaders, there is no
imperative in termly elections that do not generate development and progress but would
instead derange society. Their conviction is based on the fact that most African countries are
multi-ethnic and at times multi-religious, and putting much emphasis on multi-partyism has
often proved counterproductive since parties have tend to follow ethnic, religious or even
regional lines. They argue that there would be nothing wrong with a polarised debate that
would stop, say, in parliament such as those that terminate inside the Commons and/or
Congress in Britain and the United States. In mature democracies, defeat in elections and
thereafter in debates in the Commons or Congress is often acceptable to both individuals and
party members, and it has not often meant defeat in every respect of one's life. In most of
See international Symposium on the Making of the Eritrean Constitution: A Sumnary Report
(January 7th-I2th, 1995, Asmara, Eritrea), p. 5. This manual is also available in both Tigrigna and
Arabic languages.
Conversation with Andrea Sempleci, a Freelance Italian Journalist who had interviewed both
Presidents Yoweri Museveni (1992) and Issaias Afeworki (1996). The conversation took place on April
10th 1996, Asmara, Eritrea.
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Africa, defeat in elections, let alone failing to push a bifi through in parliament, means the
failure, not only of the individual who contests for a position, but of the whole household,
village, ethnic group, region and/or religion.
Because the individual is tied to his background, post-elections experiences have often been
followed by conflicts in most of Africa such as the constant clashes in Kenya's Rift Valley
Province after the 1992 multi-party elections; the political quagmires in post-apartheid South
Africa's Kwazulu Natal or the continuation of the civil war in Angola after the 1993 elections.
Though it is often common practise that post-election government programmes must reward
its voters, in Africa the programme is also often directed towards the punishment of political
opponents. As a result, post-election conflicts do not only occur between the government in
power and leaders of the opposition, but also between their followers. And such is the
experience countries like Eritrea and Uganda do not wish to encounter. In Uganda, Museveni
has already introduced what is widely known today as a "no-party" democracy. Museveni's
main argument is that democracy may become better exercised when individuals, who are not
affiliated with political parties, compete for seats in parliament rather than candidates
sponsored by political parties that are in turn based on parochial backgrounds. So that when
the individual fails to win, it is not the ethnic group, religion or region that has failed. And
likewise, if there are any following punishments for political opponents, these must be limited
to the individual who contested the polls.
(iii) Constructed Nationalism and Identity: Elite Discourses on
Secession/Self-Determination
The fight for secession and self-determination in Eritrea was triggered by the feeling of a
strong separate nationalism from Ethiopia. Thus, the yes 98.5 percent vote for national
independence and sovereignty in 1993 was the culmination of an important chapter in the
history of the people of Eritrea. For fifty years Eritreans had fought for, what appeared to
many as a dream, independence. Nonetheless, the conviction that the war would be won was
detectable because there was a common belief during the struggle in Eritrea that the EPLF
leadership had known and controlled the rules of the game. A PFDJ chief aptly summarised:
We knew and we read the principles of self-determination that no level of
relative strength of the other can subject a people to suppression forever. We
fought against enemies who had superior capacity, with meagre outside
support, relying on our people and own capacity, with heavy sacrifices,
tremendous effort, vigilance, political maturity and ingenuity. Our struggle was
not limited to combatting the enemy; we laid down the proper foundation for
an independent country.
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Though the idea of self-determination has been widely accepted since the appearance of the
democratic ideologies in the American and French Revolutions of the late eighteenth century,
for reasons unknown it was regarded incommensurate with the case of Eritrea. European
imperialists conquered much of Africa and Asia, and no contradiction was seen between the
liberation of Europe and Americas with the subjection of peoples in the rest of the world,
Eritrea included. From Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen points" to numerous UN and Human
Rights Conventions and Declarations, self-determination became the catch phrase of world
politics. However, the post-World War II African regional order did not allow Eritrea to
benefit from such examples. Self-determination in the post-colonial era, with its attendant
demands for Political participation, threatened the stability and order of the new fragile states
because new African heads of state were unable and at times unwilling to confront complex
problems of governance of multi-ethnic and segmented societies. Thus they opted to limit the
applicability of the right of self-determination to cases of Africans struggling against European
or white rule as happened in Portuguese colonies in Africa and Southern Rhodesia. And in
cases where the right of self-determination was invoked against acts of expansion by
neighbouring African states, the territorial integrity of sovereign states was upheld. For this
reason, it was not a coincident that the OAU Charter strongly upheld the new status quo and,
as a result, self-determination was relegated to nothing more than a rhetorical clause, and
Rupert Emerson was one of the first to criticise the double-standard when he wrote: "self-
determination has become the bright and shining sword of our day, freeing peoples from
bondage of empire. Yet the sword must be recognised as double-sided-sharp and cutting on
one of its blade but blunt and unserviceable on the other"5.
The fundamental historical and legal peculiarity of the Eritrean national liberation movement
were best defined in terms of contemporary international law. These are nowhere else
properly detailed than in Bereket's seminal work on Eritrea and the United Nations. For
Bereket, the Eritrean people possess the characteristics of a people according to international
law and their claim to self-determination is legally founded. Because of this, the Eritrean
people fought single-handedly for justice during the turbulent years overcoming the
humiliation from the big powers who deliberately and unjustly denied to acknowledge Eritrean
right to self-determination and contrarily continued to help Ethiopia. The evidence of the
Eritrean right to self-determination was clearly outlined in the December 2nd 1950 General
Assembly Resolution 390(V) that established a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This
case was referred to the UN General Assembly after the four big powers namely, the United
States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France had failed to resolve it. In short, the UN
See his "The Problem of Identity, Selfliood and Image in New Nations: The Situation in Africa",
Comparative Politics, vol. 1, no. 3(April 1969), p. 297.
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resolution recognised the existence of an "Eritrean people" which was not annihilated by the
federal link. Instead the resolution further clarified that Eritreas economic and political
association with Ethiopia must ensure "the respect and the safeguard of their institutions, of
their traditions, of their religions and of their languages as well as the maximum realisable
autonomy". The international lawyer Alain Fenet identified the problem as follows:
The resolution, which accepted the colonial boundaries as a historically constituted
entity, recognised that the Eritrean people have the right to self-government subject to
respect for the international status of the Ethiopian Empire. To that end the UN
ensured Eritrea was endowed with a constitution appropriate to a federated state
which provides for the creation and operation of autonomous institutions: Assembly,
Government, Administration. The international recognition of the Eritrean people
meant, therefore, that under the 1950 settlement, the UN made the Eritrean people
beneficiaries of certain rights without being a legal entity446.
To be sure, Eritrean nationalism has been strongly promoted by the inteffigentsia like Bereket
and other leading EPLF (PFDJ) cadres. Right from the inception of the struggle prominent
figures such as Woldeab Woldemariam, Ibrahim Sultan and Osman Saleh Sabbe had
maintained letter activities over four decades before the emergence of the present generation
despite the numerous assassination attempts from the Ethiopian Crown's representatives in
Asmara. All attempts by Ethiopian elites and their strong "Greater Ethiopia" nationalist
discourses could only best be encountered by their equals who were major proponents of
Eritrean nationalism. To strengthen their arguments against Eritrean nationalism, Ethiopian
elites often evoked the cultural, ethnic, religious, political, and regional differences in Eritrea.
They argued that Eritrea's ethnic diversity negates any claims for national identity 7 . To most
Eritrean elites, it was quite ridiculous for Ethiopians to argue that Eritrean inhabitants do not
constitute a single ethnic group to deserve independence because the line of argument equally
applies to Ethiopia itself. Eritrean elites do not deny the existence of differences, to the
contrary they do agree that ethnic, political, and religious divisions exist in all states, and they
Alain Fenet, "The Right of the Eritrean People to Self-Determination", in Lionel Cliffe and Basil
Davidson (ed.), The Long Struggle of Eritrea, op. cit., pp. 33-45:35.
° See in particular Mesfin Araya, "Reflections on Eritrean Nationalism", in Proceedings 1st
international Conference on the Horn of Africa (New York, 1986), pp. 11-17; in idem, "The Eritrean
Question: An Alternative Explanation", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 28, no. 1(March
1990), pp. 79-100; Getachew Haile, "The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia", op., cit., pp.
465-487; Andreas Eshete, "Beyond National Self-Determination: A Comment", in Proceedings 1st
Conference on the Horn of Africa (New York, 1986), pp. 23-28; Negussay Ayele, "On the
Determinants of Prospects for Peace and Development on the Horn of Africa: The Other Side of the
Coin", in Proceedings 3rd International Conference on the Horn of Africa (New York, 1988), pp.
112-120; Tesfatsion Medhanie, Eritrea: Dvna,nics of a National Question (Amsterdam, 1986); and
Dawit Wolde Giorgis, op. cit.
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will continue to play a role in Eritrea. The differences, Eritreans know, do not negate
nationalist consciousness. Thus, assertions that all differences are now resolved would
exaggerate what unity has achieved.
The EPLF did recognise nine ethnic groups in Eritrea based on linguistic differences. What
they did in order to counter arguments from Ethiopian nationalist elites, and to counsel any
divisive tendencies arising from within, was to portray the situation more appropriately as that
of territorial nationalism. According to Anthony Smith:
'Territorial' nationalisms start from an imposed political entity, and possess no
common and distinctive cultural identity to protect ... the projected identity is
really a total innovation. It is a politically fashioned and politically oriented
identity. It turns its back resolutely on the small-scale cultural identities of the
traditional social order for one which promises greater possibilities of group
development448.
Mesfin Araya too, admitted the Eritrean issue was one of state-building in a multi-etlmic
situation, however, went wrong by suggesting its process was to be achieved only within a
united Ethiopia, and that no separate Eritrean state was possible 449 . The EPLF ideologues
believe arguments of this nature were mainly driven by a certain value-judgement and political
allegiance to the system in Addis Ababa. Mesfm Araya, Getachew Haile, Andreas Eshete and
Negussay Ayele argued more often that maintaining Ethiopian nationalism was more important
than supporting what they termed a "subnational" Eritrean movement. Anthony Smith again
pointed out quite correctly on another work when he wrote, "More than tenninology is at
stake here, for the adoption of terms like 'subnational' (like that of tribe) indicates a political
or ideological preference, in this case for the preservation of the political status quo, based
on existing state boundaries ,,450 In short, even though critics of Eritrean independence often
referred to Eritrea's 'artificiality', the EPLF often acknowledged Eritrea 'had' no unified 'self
before colonialism, arguing that this is only typical of other African states. What they
emphasised over the years of the liberation struggle was to avoid as much as possible any
ideology of 'deep' historical unity and essential identity, and instead evoked strongly territorial
448 See Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York, 1983), pp. 217 and 219.
See Mesfin Arraya, "The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation", op. cit., pp. 79-100.
° See Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation imz the Third World (New York, 1983), p. 66.
136
origins of identity and acknowledged its relatively recent construction and development
through different stages451.
For years Eritreans have argued they were a colonised people who deserved the right to self-
determination, and that their claim was supported with legal and historical evidence. The
Ethiopians too did appeal to antiquity and authenticity to prove Eritrea's claims were
unfounded, and argued strongly the independent movement was an alien creation. The
controversy extended to foreign observers. Yet Donald Levine and John Spencer, who were
openly known for their usual strong opposition to the Eritrean fight for independence, did
concede in their remark that the majority of Eritreans supported independence452. Similarly,
Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux recognised Eritreans had the right to self-determination,
including establishment of an independent state, and went on to propose that concessions
would satisfy Ethiopian demands for access to ports. Though they had found the Eritrean case
justified in principle, Halliday and Molyneux were forced to undermine the case in practice
because they thought military victory against the Dergue was impossible at that time453 . Dawit
Wolde Giorgis, who had worked in the inner circles of the Dergue, claimed many Eritreans
were not for separation but demanded for self-determination within a united Ethiopia. Dawit
believed once a progressive and democratic government was established in Addis Ababa,
secessionist tendencies in Eritrea would have been squarely averted454. Others like Negussay
Ayele clearly berated "ballpoint mercenaries ... lumpen academics [and] lying 'historians'
abroad ... who made a case for Eritrean rights to independence" 455 . Mesfm attacked "foreign
commentators" who "cynically ... thoughtlessly preach the break-up of Ethiopia" 46. Andreas
Eshete castigated "foreigners' for promoting Eritrean nationalism" 457 . In short, Eritrean
" In an effort to argue their entitlement to self-determination, the EPLF clearly identified four different
stages as primary internal Political developments of the struggle for the construction of their identity.
See EPLF Political Report and National Democratic Programme, op. cit., pp. 27-46.
452 See Donald Levine, "Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa", in Co,n,nittee of Foreign Relations
(Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, 1976), p. 49.
" See Fred Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 192. The Dergue at one moment received military aid
from both side of the bipolarity.
"' A statement that could have as well proved right had the emperor maintained the federal constitution
respected Eritrea's autonomy. See Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, op. cit., p. 112. (emphasis added)
See Negussay Ayele, "On the Determinants of Prospects for Peace and Development on the Horn of
Africa: The Other Side of the Coin", op. cit., pp. 111-120.
456 See Mesfin Araya, "The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation", op. cit., pp. 79 and 100.
' See Andreas Eshete, "Beyond National Self-Determination: A Comment", op. cit., p. 25.
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nationalism was often characterised as artificial, as contagious, a foreign virus threatening the
Ethiopian body politic. For Eritrean elites, arguments that appealed to national or racial
authenticity and essence were often used not only to vilify Eritrean nationalism and to reject
the colonial argument, but also to dismiss inconvenient interpretations. Eritreans too
dismissed Ethiopian nationalist arguments as nothing but mere evocation of authenticity and
xenophobia. Be that as it were, the Eritrean case did receive positive resonance not only from
a good number of continental governments but also from renown African intellectuals like
Nzongola-Ntalaja who demonstrated very well against the labelling of the Erifrean movement
as "secessionist". For him, the use of the term was inappropriate because the Eritrean case
was less comparable say to Biafra and Katanga than to Western Sahara or Narnibia, former
colonial territories where self-determination was denied and which 'were' not termed
secessionists458.
While Ethiopian nationalism often invoked the past to legitimate the Greater Ethiopian
discourse by conflating ancient and contemporary empires, Eritrean nationalism does not
typically appeal to deeply-rooted historical identity, but begins its origins with Italian
colonialism and then emphasises the development, through several stages, of a new identity
based on con-n-non experience. Thus, colonialism did create the basis of a national identity that
recognises the existence of diverse backgrounds - cultural, ethnic, linguistic, regional or
religious. This crafted type of nationalism has been further stabilised by various factors. For
example, the songs of Eritrean artists describe the beauty and richness of Eritrea, and during
the war did condemn military repression by Ethiopia, and praise the EPLF fighters, and longed
for or affirmed the inevitability of national emancipation. The EPLF created new metaphors
that have successfully superseded earlier forms of ideological mobilisation. These are
developmental aspects and they are not simple timeless structures. Therefore, through a
liberation struggle a new society can be constructed or crafted and historical symbols and
authenticity can be deconstructed and phased out.
(iv) Transition from a Liberation Structure to a Government Structure
After thirty years of life in the jungle and wilderness, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF) liberated the entire country and fmally established a Provisional Government for
Eritrea (known widely for two years as the PGE) in May 1991. At this particular time, it was
not a major coincidence that the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
had also displaced the Dergue from power in Addis Ababa and also instituted a Transitional
458 See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The National Question and the Crisis of Instability in Africa", in
Emmanuel Hansen (ed.), Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development (London, 1987), pp. 56-86.
138
Government in Ethiopia (TGE). In a national conference held in Addis Ababa in July 1991 to
deliberate the future of Ethiopia, the EPRDF government endorsed the EPLF's decision to
settle the question of Eritrea in a referendum to be held after two years of the transition. In
April 1993, the PGE conducted an internationally supervised referendum whose outcomes
were declared "free and fair at every stage" by the head of the UN observer mission and was
also confirmed by other observer groups. In that referendum, 99.8 0/0 of the population
participated, and 98.5 0/0 of them voted Yes! for independence. Thus on the 24th May 1993,
Eritreans celebrated their independence officially. But that was not the end of the struggle.
Eritrea's EPLF had to reorganise and enlarge the government that must raise up the country
from the wreckage of war and, within four years, draft a constitution, prepare the development
of political pluralism, and the establishment of an elected government. It is widely acceptable
that transition from a liberation to a government structure is as tough as the struggle itself.
The EPLF leadership was confronted with the need of seeking diplomatic connections and
open the Eritrean society to the rest of the world as quick as possible in the early 1990s.
Thus, Asmara was opened to the international air traffic for an easier link with the world's
other cities and capitals.
According to Bereket, the difficulties were lessened because of the EPLF's organisational
character since its inception in the 1970s. The EPLF had running structures similar to that of
an established government in most liberated areas. The difficulties have also been lessened
because, unlike in the liberation years, other governments have come forward willing to give
assistance. In fact, support for the EPLF started to increase after the well publicised battle of
Afabet in 1988 where they emerged as victors. Diplomatic doors began to open for Eritrea in
the UN, Washington, or Brussels, and that brought numerous years of lobbying behind doors
and windows to an end. In order to proof to the rest of the world that Eritrea's case was
historically and legally founded, the EPLF leadership decided to hold a referendum because it
would make obvious the difference between the EPLF and other revolutionary movements or
military coup d'états who merely fight for power in the center. The EPLF elites believed
legitimacy would lead to legality and quick international recognition was the reward.
In addition to international recognition, Eritrea was also striving for reconstruction. It was not
easy because during the transition period, Eritrea had no money and it was not entitled to
international aid either. The situation put the new government of Eritrea to a major test.
After the liberation, the first two years were very difficult to the EPLF and it marked the
beginning of differences within the organisations hierarchy. However, some members within
the Front maintain the differences were that of a process rather than of principle, because an
intense healthy debate within the party was essential if a proper mechanism for national
rehabilitation and development was to be achieved. For example, there were people within the
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EPLF who had initially supported foreign aid and there were others who for reasons of trying
to uphold the spirit of self-reliance were resistant against foreign aid. The differences in
opinion and strategies did not mean, however, that the organisation's leadership was going to
polarise into factions. After long discussions, the view that foreign aid leads to submissiveness
and corruption was adopted. This position was later on acknowledged even by those who felt
that the pressure of poverty in the country was acute and refusing foreign aid was
irresponsible. However, President Issaias Afeworki was from the very beginning clear and
firm on the issue of foreign aid citing the experience of other African countries who had
embraced foreign aid in the past when he remarked, "These aid recipients have become
hostages of Western influence at times on misleading programmes". According to Yemane
Ghebreab, the government's position became clearer and donor countries' and International
Financial Institutions (IMF and \VB) now discuss matters with Eritrea without attaching any
strings. It could be argued that Eritrea is definitely one of the few countries that can now
receive foreign aid without conditionalities. Moreover, affluent countries today who would
like to see Eritrea succeed have now started backing the government policies on development.
Ambassador Robert Houdek did echo the difficulties the EPLF encountered after the liberation
of the country. For instance, when they took over, they had no money, no well-established
governmental institutions and, thus, they had to create ministries and other necessary
governmental departments. The EPLF liberation struggle was different from other African
liberation movements such as the TPLF (EPRDF) next door, or Cabrals' Guinea-Bissau, or
Zimbabwe's ZANU, or Namibia's SWAPO, because the latter inherited institutions that had
been there for long established by colonialists. Though they had brought with them certain
structures and institutions, such as for education, health, agriculture, or information, they
needed money and qualified personnel to strengthen their effectiveness. However, the EPLF
elites were clever because they moved swiftly to separate the government from the party by
forming the PFDJ. The disassociation is mainly to protect the party from any errors that may
be committed by the government even when it is known all members of the party are also the
ones who constitute the leadership of the government. For example, the PFDJ formed "Trans-
Horn", a transport agency, took all tracks and started to get involved in money-making
business. Through this, the PFDJ wants to appear as a party that is interested in tendering
services to the people. For Houdek, their target is to leave no room for would be opposition
to manoeuvre and become stronger than the PFDJ which is basically a monopoly and a
mainstream party.
On the other hand, the monopolisation of tracks and other properties also shows that the
EPLF (PFDJ) took over from a Marxist order that had nationalised everything. After taking
power during the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia, the Dergue took over and nationalised all
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properties including the land, for example, the university of Asmara and other high schools are
properties that belonged to the Catholic Missionaries. According to a Catholic cleric, the
Church in particular suffered the effects of the revolution more than any other institution in the
country. So there are fears now about the PFDJ taking the same line as the Dergue but such
fears have never been expressed openly. Though the government insists its policy is to benefit
every Eritrean, there is reported conflict between some individuals traders and the PFDJ over
markets. The PFDJ officials, however, do argue that since Eritrea is a free market economy
the party is there to influence markets and stimulate competition to which individual traders
must adjust. For most foreign diplomats, it is surprising that Eritrea takes the route of free
market economy quickly because, given the Marxist background of the revolution in the
country, there were fears they may be slow.
One major continuous issue is that of tension between fighters and exiles. While on the one
hand those who fought for years feel they should be rewarded, on the other those who never
fought in the field also feel they should enjoy the fruits of liberation because their grievances
provided the main reason for the fight. According to a government official, areas of tension
emerged mainly when it was discovered that some individuals who never fought had acquired
wealth or tried to make money at any cost even by seffing information about the EPLF to the
enemy during the war. And such an allegation was considered a crime by the EPLF
documents long before the end of the struggle. What the leadership did and has continued to
do is to emphasise the spirit of tolerance and forgiveness if harmony is to be achieved. This
was further clarified by Bereket when he commented, "I am not surprised, however, when
some civilian members complain because those who fought think they deserve more attention,
and therefore, should be given priority in the rehabilitation programme; but that is not
government policy". For the government, all Eritreans whether fighters, exiles, or found
within former occupied territories, are the same and will be treated equally.
Furthermore, the EPLF encountered another problem when it assumed the role of a
government in Asmara. In order to have a good beginning, the IME and the WB
recommended Eritrea must cut down the number of its civil servants. So who should be left in
or discontinued from the civil service became a contentious matter. What the government has
done is to consider or take efficiency as a criteria. According to a government official, those
civil servants whose efficiency was testified, either in the liberation struggle or found within
former occupied territories, remained in office. Thus, Eritrea dismissed ten thousand civil
servants at one go, and that in turn increased the problem of unemployment already faced by
demobilised soldiers, former guerrilla fighters, disbanded militiamen, and other youthful
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veterans of war459 . Unemployment also affects the educated minority who previously had a
ready source of employment in the state sector. There were also others who had committed
atrocities while cooperating with the enemy against the struggle of the Eritrean people. Even
if found efficient and qualified in their professions, these individuals had to be brought to
book, and many are undergoing trial in the court of justice.
The other problem is that the EPLF was a clandestine movement and it has not really
abandoned its secretive character. It remains difficult to know whether the post-liberation
government welcomes criticism from segments of society that were not in the field.
According to Ambassador Wolfgang Ringe, "There is a big problem with the present
government because information is hard to get, public relations policy is weak, for example,
problems over Hanish Islands and the border issue with Djibouti are really test cases for the
EPLF'460. In my own observation and analysis of what people think of the present
government, the military way of doing things during the war is still very strong, a legacy that
may continue to inhibit the current structures. Particularly what I have termed "cell-thinking"
which dominated the liberation years is still very fresh in the heads and minds of many Eritrean
fighters who hold key positions in the present government. As Houdek aptly pointed out "The
EPLF (PFDJ) have to break the habit and becone more open and accessible ".
For instance, there is still a gap between those who held arms for years and those who did not
because former fighters seem to associate more with those whom they have been together in
the field and, thus, making others seem isolated. In fact I never witnessed any, but there are
rumours that those who came from the diaspora with contributions up to millions of dollars,
are some of those who are now most frustrated. A good number of Eritrean exiles have made
money in the US, Europe (particularly in Italy and Germany), and the Saudi Arabian
Peninsula, and most of them now want to bring that money to invest it in business back home.
But because the EPLF inherited a lot of Dergue-type procedures, their control mechanism has
remained a hindrance to returning exiles. Some observers think the EPLF could be doing that
out of unconsciousness because of long-time practise, and that control mechanism may have
become a habit that phases out with time. In general, it is often difficult to shift from old to
new practices, and in the case of Eritrea, thirty years of war did cultivate a firm soldierly way
of doing things that may continue for some while.
See John Markakis' editorial, "The Horn of Africa", op. cit., p. 474.
'° His Excellency, Mr. Wolfgang Ringe is Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
State of Eritrea. He echoed this words in a conversation with the author in the German Embassy
(Asmara, Eritrea, July 4th 1996).
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(V) Other Major Social Issues: women, demobilisation,
repatriation and land reform
The GOE moved quickly to engage in the creation of a modern, technologically advanced and
internationally competitive economy where private enterprise becomes the driving economic
force. Thus, it adopted a broad-based growth strategy that encompasses aspects of
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development covering all sectors of the economy. The
major components of the government's strategy include:
Improve agricultural production and productivity through the development of
irrigated agriculture; and assist peasants, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to
enhance their productivity by providing new farming and grazing methods;
Develop capital-and knowledge-intensive, export-oriented industries and
services; Upgrade and technologically improve the informal sector; Develop the
tourism sector; Create an international financial centre; Develop and
systematise a public health care system; Provide a broad based education
system and improve access to it; Provide an effective social welfare safety net
system; Safeguard and upgrade the environment from undue pollution; and,
Decentralise and further democratise the political system461.
The centerpiece of this strategy is the establishment of an efficient, outward looking, private
sector-led market economy, with the government playing a pro-active role to stimulate private
461
economic activities -.
In keeping with these development objectives and strategies, the GOE has designed a macro-
policy framework to stimulate private investment and engender economic revival growth. The
main thrusts of the policy are the swift transition to a market economy, a liberal trade policy, a
central role for the private sector, and export-led growth. Within the context of the macro-
policy, the GOE has developed sectoral strategies and goals that provide the basis for
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. The sectoral strategies include participation of
women, demobjilsation of soldiers, land reform, repatriation of refugees, agriculture,
education, health, infrastructure, trade and industry, tourism, marine resources, energy, mining
and water resources. In the following we will briefly discuss some of them.
' See in particular Eritrea Rising from the Ashes (Asamara: Foreign Affairs Ministry, 1996)., p. 5.
462 
Proper details of this are well documented in government proclamations issued in 1994: The
Investment, Income Tax, the Customs Tariff Regulations and the Land Use Proclamations, available
from the respective departments and ministries.
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Women:
Like in other parts of the continent, women were excluded and discriminated against in the
socio-economic and political structures of traditional Eritrea. They did not have the right to
participate in matters that affect society and, as a result, did not have the right to vote or be
elected to the village council of elders (Baito), nor have their cases negotiated in the village
assembly that existed in traditional Eritrean way of life. It was assumed all along that women
issues could be presented by their male relatives to the village council. Traditional Eritrean
women had no access to land ownership since land inheritance also passed only to men heirs;
women were also prohibited from engaging in any means of production. This exclusive and
discriminative practice continued throughout the colonial administrations in Eritrea, and
women's active participation in the socio-economic and political realm was only brought to
light during the liberation struggle. This was made possible by the EPLF's progressive
policies that did not only see liberation in terms of decolonisation but also in terms of
transforming society. The Front advocated equality between men and women and worked
hard to eradicate religious and ethnic biases from societal structures. When the EPLF's first
congress took place in 1977, among other important agendas was the issue of women 463 . In
order to address the inequality that had persisted over the years, the EPLF had to undertake a
revision of harmful and discriminatory practices and laws against women, and enforced more
what it thought were 'just' laws.
Therefore, the EPLF's position towards women enhanced active participation of women in the
liberation struggle on equal grounds. Women contributed greatly to issues that have brought
changes to Eritrean society. Eritrean women engaged in harsh battles and underwent tortuous
adventures during the struggle on an equal basis with men 464. Women also worked in
administration, as health workers, teachers, platoon leaders, mechanics, drivers, and in other
non-traditional occupations. According to the EPLF (PFDJ) officials, women now serve in all
sectors of Eritrean society, and in 1995/96, 21% of the National Assembly members are
women, 13% executive ministers are women, and almost 50% women are involved as senior
officials of the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea (CCE). The GOB has allowed three
types of laws to operate in the country: Customary laws are practiced in the mainly Christian
463 The rights of women became incorporated into the Front's National Democratic Programme. For
details of this and other related agendas of the first congress, see EPLF, Objectives of tile National
Democratic Programme: First Organ isational Congress (Nacfa, Eritrea, 31St January 1977).
If there is any book recommended on women experiences in the Eritrean war of liberation, is that by
Amrit Wilson, op. cit. Amrit Wilson did talk to women, recorded their stories and travelled through the
war zones to gather the material in her most exciting work.
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highlands of Eritrea, while the Sheria (Islamic law) for Muslim communities, and finally the
Civil and Penal Codes of the state. Although the Civil and Penal Codes are the law of the
land, customary and the Sheria laws are prevalent in the majority of communities at the lowest
level in both rural and urban areas. The great fight is how to balance clauses that discriminate
against women in both the Sheria and Customary laws. At independence, the GOE
proclaimed that every person under the law has the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the
National Democratic Programme and Constitution of the EPLF, which prohibits any
discrimination based on race, colour, religion or gender. This is drawn from the objectives of
the EPLF's National Democratic Programmes, where article 1(e) stated that a People's
Democratic State of Eritrea will: "Assure all Eritrean nationals equality before the law without
distinction as to nationality, sex, affiliation, cultural level, occupation, position, wealth faith,
etc."465.
In a nutshell, the government had to change laws so that women can enter into marriage
contracts freely, and are afforded rights equal to those of men; bride price and dowry are
prohibited by law; and divorce can be initiated by both parties in the marriage (men and
women). After the liberation, the Land Proclamation now allows every citizen the right of
access to land for housing and farming upon the attainment of the age of eighteen, regardless
of gender. The Labour Law has also directed: "equal pay for equal work; protection of
pregnant women from working night shifts, overtime and in unsafe conditions; guarantee of
sixty days paid maternity leave in addition to two weeks annual and sick leave; and the
prohibition of child labour". Although women involvement in business is a recent
phenomenon, today many women have become leading entrepreneurs in the country's capital
and other towns.
Demobilisation of Soldiers:
As the Eritrean war of liberation came to its successful conclusion in 1991, the EPLF was
forced to re-think the military needs of a small country whose reconstruction priorities
supersede those of the military. The GOE decided to cut down the size of its army and most
of them were demobiised because the meagre resources of the country call for more focus on
rehabilitation and reconstruction, rather than enhancement of military capacities 466 . An Office
See EPLF, Political Report and National De,nocratic Programme, op. cit., p. 167; and also
National Charter for Eritrea: For a Democratic, Just and Prosperous Future, op. cit., p. 20.
466 According to John Markakis, Eritrea demobilised nearly 50,000 fighters of the EPLF shortly after
the end of the struggle. See his editorial, "The Horn of Africa", in Review of Africa,? Political
Economy, op. cit., pp. 469-474: 474. It must be noted that the dernobilised EPLF fighters remain a
standing force in case of war or should any military imperatives arise. This was confirmed to me by a
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for the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Fighters, called Mitias, was created under the
auspices of the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA). Mitias is a Tigrinya's
word meaning 'to help community members start a new life', and it originated from the village
system of community obligations whereby village members assist each other. In the Eritrean
traditional vifiage way of life, a newly married couple is entitled to the help of members of the
village in order to build a house or to acquire land for cultivation. This process has given the
GOE a task, not only of relieving the EPLF fighters of their duty and arms, but also requires a
process of reintegration into the public. For that reason, the government does not only give
them severance pay, but has to launch programmes of counselling and guidance, create other
employment opportunities for them, skill enhancement and vocational training. These again
require large sums of money for effective execution. Already the government has, within
Mitias, created a revolving fund and credit system for assisting ex-fighters in establishing
commercial and industrial business. And feasibility studies have been carried out on that to
determine further funding.
According to EPLF (PFDJ) officials, the demobilisation programme was not implemented in
one go. Of EPLF's 95,000 strong army 50% have been demobilised and reintegrated into
society. The first phase of demobiisation took place in the second half of 1993 where 26,000
soldiers-of which 4,500 were women-were demobilised. Most of these joined the liberation
struggle in 1990, that is, one year before the liberation struggle came to its end in 1991. They
were not, however, demobilised because they joined late but because they still stand the
chance of getting easily integrated into society since their experience has not isolated them
much from the rest of the population like others who have been in the struggle for thirty or
twenty years. Every demobilised soldier was given a sum of 1,000 to 5,000 birr (US$100 to
500 only) depending on their length of service; six months' ration of food, counselling; and
access to business assistance. Some of these individuals expressed their satisfaction and
argued that if there were any remaining problems they should be blamed on previous Ethiopian
rulers and not the EPLF. The second phase of demobilisation started in June 1995 where
about 22,000 soldiers, because of age, health, disability or other reasons, were not able to
remain in the regular army. In this phase, there were approximately 8,000 women fighters,
and most of these groups had been in the war for over twenty years, therefore, reintegration
became a problem because most of them could not easily readjust to society. They had to
return to their respective villages and families where they have to care for themselves and not
as it was during the war. Each of them was given 10,000 birr (US$ 1,000 only) and a ration
of food for a year. They also did benefit from a soft loan that enabled most of them to start
demobilised soldier, Mr. Angesom Efrem who now works as a waiter at Keren Hotel, Asmara, Eritrea
(21st January 1996).
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income generating activities, and to obtain free medical care. Given the economic difficulties
the EPLF had in its initial stages, these demobilised soldiers were not paid the prescribed
amount but it has been used as a collateral for bank loans taken by the fighter.
According to the EPLF (PFDJ) officials, the demobilisation process has led to the emergence
of two special groups that require particular attention. One group is that of fighters who got
disabled during the war, and there are about 2,500 of them undergoing treatment. The other
special group consists of women fighters who not only struggled along side by side with men
during the war of independence but also aimed at reforming the traditional patriarchal
practices that have relegated women to the periphery of society for so long. As far as
incapacitated fighters are concerned, the Eritrean War Disabled Fighters Association has taken
charge of their needs. This association was created particularly as a profit making
organisation catering to the needs of the disabled. The organisation now operates a number of
businesses, and provides counselling services, recreational facilities and skifi enhancement
programmes. Similarly, women fighters who numbered one third of the army, now require a
special attention. Many women war veterans have children and some are single mothers,
either because their husbands were lost in the war or because they have divorced. According
to Ambassador Haile Menkerios, it was much easier raising children in the field because of the
communal atmosphere of the struggle than today where people have returned to their
respective homes in towns and villages. Therefore, most of these women fmd it difficult to
readjust because returning to the vifiage means returning to traditional practices so some of
them have opted to fmd places in Asmara or other towns. One more problem for these
women is that their formal education is low, and their professional experience is poor. In
order to remedy their difficulties, the government has provided services such as day care
centres, and vocational or skill enhancement programmes for demobilised women. What also
helps government efforts is the fact that society has a high regard for ex-fighters because of
the sacrifices they have made to bring freedom for all Eritreans. And something that must not
be underrated is the fact that the GOE also enjoys international sympathy and some donor
countries in Europe and the united states have offered substantial assistance.
Repatriation of Refugees:
Eritrea's thirty years of war not only sent a good number of the country's population to
neighbouring states, but all over the world. The number of Eritreans in exile has been
estimated at roughly one million people. A significant number of Eritreans in the diaspora are
next door in Sudan where up to half a million refugees are housed. Because the effects of the
war were particularly severe and prolonged in the western lowlands of Eritrea, the area
became prone to an influx of refugees. While in Sudan, some of these refugees remained in
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settlements, and others found places in cities, towns or villages. The other half a million is
believed to be spread throughout the Western world, with a sizeable majority in Europe and
America. Many Eritreans who were born between the I 960s and 1 980s grew up in exile and,
therefore, know nothing about their own country. However, since 1991, about 100,000
Eritreans in the diaspora have returned back home spontaneously. As far as the repatriation of
refugees from the Western world is concerned, the GOE has less worries because there are
various programmes that have taken charge of facilitating the return and participating in
Eritrea's rehabilitation of refugees from Europe and America. The government's biggest
challenge, however, is repatriating refugees from neighbouring Sudan.
After the war, the EPLF (PFDJ) government presented a comprehensive project of US$262
million to donors for Refugee Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Settlement Areas in Eritrea
(PROFERI). This conservatively estimated amount is not only for repatriation but also for the
integration of refugees into the economy so that they can become self-sufficient and self-
reliant. Thus, the PROFERI project is meant to cover initial relief, food aid, water, health,
education, agriculture, environment, marine resources and fisheries, shelter, and roads. These
sectors are covered here because the areas where refugees return to do not have the basic
infrastructure to support them. The government has already made projections of areas where
refugees will be returning to. According to official records, 88% wifi be returning to the
lowland zones, 10% to the capital and the remaining others to the highland areas 467 . As
pointed out earlier, the lowlands were the most devastated by the war and the GOE wishes to
recreate their basic infrastructure in order to reintegrate the refugees. By the end of the
programme, the lowland (also Zone Four), will have their population doubled. The
government's intention is to make sure that the repatriation programme establishes a
continuum from relief to development, and to the sustainability of inputs in its implementation.
The coordination of the programme is entrusted to the Commission for Eritrean Refugee
Affairs (CERA).
The government divided the repatriation programme into three major phases. The first phase
began from July 1993 to January 1995 with an estimated amount of US$110,927,990; the
second phase between February 1995 to January 1996 with an estimated amount of
US$79,867,958; and the third phase running from January 1996 to January 1997 with an
estimated amount of US$71,406,331. The whole amount totals to US$262,202,279 only in
over a period of four years 468 . According to a government official, a special consideration was
See Eritrea: Rising from the Ashes, op. cit., p. 23.
468 The figures are well detailed in the 1995 report by the Foreign Ministry, op. cit., p. 23.
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also given to women in the plan because among the refugees to be repatriated, 37.5% of them
are female-headed households. In order for the programme to be executed on schedule, a
pledging conference was held in Geneva on 6th July 1993 for phase one. Of the amount
budgeted in the phase, only a third of the need was raised and, as a result, the government was
forced to look for other means, including the need of starting a pilot project on a much smaller
scale. Thus, instead for the first phase to have begun in 1993, the pilot project for PROFERI
started in November 1994 with an ambition of repatriating 4,500 families, approximately
25,000 individuals. By April 1995 (after six months), 4,574 families were repatriated back
from refuge in Sudan through the pilot programme. The evaluation of the pilot project,
however, did lead to the endorsement of a plan to begin phase one of repatriation under
PROFERI in November 1995. Phase One did lead to the resettlement of up to 25,000
families, that is about 100,000 people, in fifty sites throughout Eritrea over an eighteenth
month period.
(vi) Land Reform
In traditional Eritrean society, land ownership is extremely complex and foreign involvement
has for years created a lot of resentment on it. Eritrea's landscape is naturally categorised into
three different types. The land mass covers the highland plateau, the Western lowlands, and
the Red Sea coastal area. The highland plateau is the most densely populated area of Eritrea,
predominantly with Christian Tigrigna speakers469 . Since the lowlands area of Eritrea is
mainly desert, it is sparsely populated with the mainly Muslim nomadic pastoralists who speak
Tigre. In this region there are other ethnic groups such as the nomadic Rashaidas (also
Muslims) and the settled agriculturalists-the mainly "Animists" (or practising traditional
religion) Kunamas and the Naras, some of whom have in recent recent years converted to
Islam. The coastal areas of the Red Sea, also known as the Danakalia, are mainly inhabited by
the Afar and Saho people. These people are also pastoralists who are culturally more akin to
Somali and speak their local language and Arabic. In fact, it has been widely admitted that no
accurate population census of the different areas of Eritrea has been conducted since the war
began more than thirty years ago. Even the Ethiopian 1984 census, the first in the region, was
unable to penetrate the areas of Eritrea because of rebel activities there470.
' It has also been pointed out that the Majority of Eritreans live in the highland plateau with 25 per
cent of them in the Hamasien alone, one of the three highlands provinces. See John Markakis, National
and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cit., p. 120.
470 Eritrean population figures were always estimated until the referendum provided a close accurate
population of Eritrea in 1993. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Eritrean population
was estimated to be 2.5 million people. See Ethiopia, Erirrea, Somalia, Djibouri 1993/94 (London:
The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994), p. 37; for more details on the referendum, see Kjetil Tronvoll,
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Historically, the regional divisions of Eritrea have mirrored the differing modes of production
of the inhabitants. For example, pastoralism and agropastoralism are widely practised in the
Western lowlands region, while agriculture dominates the highland plateau areas, and
pastoralism in the Red Sea coastal areas. What has been seen in Eritrea over the recent years
is the rampant increase of sedentarised agriculture which has in turn led to changes in the
patterns of production. Sedentarised agriculture is moving into those areas that were
previously entirely pastoralist, such as the lowland and the coastal areas. Thus, it has been
estimated that 60 per cent Eritreans practise sedentarised agriculture, 35 per cent practise a
mix of cultivation and pastoralism and 5 per cent are engaged in pastoralist activities alone471.
Before the total liberation of the country, and before the GOE issued its land proclamations,
there were essentially four types of landholding in Eritrea, varying according to region and the
activities of the inhabitants. These were private ownership, family ownership, village
ownership, and dominiale or state land. Amongst the highianders of Eritrea, individual and
family ownerships were both common, widely known in their Tigrigna terms as tselini and
resti respectively. In the tsel,ni type of ownership, land is divided among male descendants
when a man dies, and in resti it passes back to the collective hereditary plot. This system
discriminated against women and the Makelai A/jet (innnigrants from Ethiopia to the
highlands areas of Eritrea who were mainly Tigrigna speaking Coptic Christians regarded as
outsiders)472 . In Eritrea's highlands, possessing hereditary land is regarded traditionally as
having something akin to a sacred right over land, and vests hereditary power, generally
known as restinya, on a person. This restinya element demonstrates the practice of feudal
ownership of land in the highlands of traditional Eritrean society. Thus, the restinya took
charge of all communal labour, the case of the Church and all other administrative and political
duties.
In the lowlands areas, there were many different social formations. The largest ethnic group in
the region are the Tigre speakers, organised in different clans who together form tribes. These
tribes practised a relationship of dominance and servitude. For example, the Beni-Amer
confederation of tribes, living mainly in the Barka region of the Western lowlands is divided
"The Eritrean Referendum: Peasant Voices", op. cit., pp. 23-67; and Tekie Fessehatzion, "The Eritrean
Referendum", op. cit., pp. 167-175.
471 See Economist Intelligence Unit, "Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti 1993/94", op. cit., p. 41.
472 See Amrit Wilson, op. cit., p. 112.
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into the Nabtab ("aristocrats") and the Hdreb ("serfs")473 . Similarly, the Habab tribes in the
Sahel area consist of the Asgede and Shumgele ("aristocrats"), who dominate the Tigre and
the Beja, and who were often looked upon as "serfs". In a nutshell, the life of a traditional
Eritrean inhabitant was already inhibited by grave social problems of inequalities among both
highianders and lowlanders. The coastal inhabitants too, lived their life similar to that of
pastoralists in the Sahel and the Western lowlands. This was the relative way of life
experienced in traditional Eritrea, just as others of the same pattern (if not similar) have
operated in other parts of traditional African society.
However, it was the invasion by colonial Europe that brought about changes in the land tenure
system in most of Africa. In Eritrea, land reform is a familiar practice, but in the past it was
highly criticised as ineffective. The first large scale land reform was formulated and
implemented by the Italian colonial administration in the highland areas of Eritrea. The Italian
land reform policy had two goals: one, to expropriate land from the indigenous inhabitants for
Italian settlers; and two, the Italians thought they would solve the conflicts already caused by
the intense pressure on land exacerbated by the continued use of the tselmi and the resti
system of inheritance. On the contrary, the Italian project of modernisation led to
appropriation of land for plantations that would meet the growing consumerism; more land
was used for construction of airports, roads and other sectors of the infrastructure necessary in
a modernising economy. This, however, backfired and led to a severe shortage of land for
subsistence farming in the highlands. In trying to minimise this problem, the Italians devised
the diesa system as a compromise while at the same time maintaining the restinya by putting
them in charge of land redistribution 474 . In the Western lowlands, the Italians introduced the
doininiale system in 1909, and gave much of it as concession to the Habab. The main reason
is that the Italians wanted to avoid a clash with the Habab who were already identified as an
immensely wealthy group in the lowlands475 . However, their wealth was not from self-
sufficient or integrated economy which the Italians were trying to promote, but they had
earned much of their wealth through trading livestock with Sudan and their butter with Arabia
via Massawa.
° The interpretation of the term serf as applied here does not match its usual meaning with respect to
relations of production. It is rather used loosely here. See also Amrit Wilson, op. cit., p. 201, footnote
32.
The diesa system is common among the Kunama lowland areas as part of the communal co-
operative system of agriculture going back to hundreds of years. See Amrit Wilson, op. cit., p. 112.
See W. Plowden, Travels in Abyssinia (London, 1868).
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Be that as it were, the Italian dominiale system had given the Habab most of Wadi Labca, the
area which spans the valley from the Red Sea to near Afabet. This area constitutes one of
Eritrea's relatively fertile land where the Habab aristocrats constructed a successful irrigation
system. Because the serfs' plots were not large enough to guarantee sufficient self-support,
they had to work on the aristocrats' farms to make their ends meet. Through this, the serfs
were renumerated either in form of cash or in the form of grain to subsidise serf families. And
as for those serfs who never owned any land, they exchanged their labour for a small piece of
land from the aristocrats. What was sad about the Italian land reform is that it encouraged the
aristocrats (or if you like the feudal lords) and gave them the right to acquire the larger
hectares of land in all parts of Eritrea476 . However, the power of the feudal lords and the
institution of serfdom came under severe criticism from the EPLF that had just established
itself as a strong organisation in the 1970s. The EPLF viewed both the restinya and the
doininiale systems as extremely unjust and they aimed at destroying the old land ownership
and built a new and equitable system instead. Thus, the EPLF's priority was to deconstruct
the foundations of such systems and substitute them with another fairer and just method of
land distribution477 . The crux of the matter is that the doininiale and the restinya systems
were not just because they favoured the stronger tribes at the expense of the less powerful. It
gave the largest and best plots to the stronger tribes, and in the distribution of tribal lands the
best and largest plots were taken by the feudal chiefs in the order of their hierarchical position
on the administrative leadership.
Therefore, the EPLF land reform policy was viewed by many disadvantaged Eritreans as a
panacea. The EPLF were (and are stifi) concerned about the shortage of food in the country,
and the GOE believes a rapid development of productive forces in agriculture would be the
most realistic remedy. The EPLF were convinced the agricultural sector not only provides
inputs for the industrial sector (both food and raw materials) and a market for industrial
producer goods (farm machinery etc.), but also a market for industrial consumer goods.
Although the EPLF (PFDJ) have all along denied following any ideologies, their concept and
understanding of balanced development was based on that of Maoist China especially during
the war. According to Mao's Revolution in China, developing the production of mass
consumer goods is linked to the goal of improving the overall standard of living of the
peasantry. This is what has made some students and scholars of peasant movements in
476 For a detailed analysis of the colonial land reform in Eritrea, see a highly recommended publication
in Italian by Irma Taddia, L 'Erirrea-Colonia: Paesaggi, Strutture, Uo,nini del C'olonia/ismo (Milan:
Franco Angeli, 1986).
See EPLF, Creating a Popular Economic, Political and Militar y Base (Unpublished EPLF
Document, Eritrea, 1982).
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Ethiopia to insist the EPLF was Maoist (if not Marxist) in character478 . When the EPLF
started to introduce its land reform programme in the liberated areas, people were initially
wary (and others are still wary today479), because of their past experiences with first, the
Italian, then the British and finally the Ethiopian administrations. According to an official in
the PFDJ, Eritrean peasants have the right to panic with any land reform proclamation till they
prove its fairness because they remember many different forms of land alienation and punitive
land redistribution imposed upon them in the past, often in the name of land reform. Ato
Yemane Ghebreab poignantly argued:
There are stifi people alive who remember the Italians for having imposed the
diesa and dominiale which left land redistribution in the hands of the rich
landowning families. They remember the British during whose rule a severe
hunger struck both the highlands and the lowlands which led to the rising of the
'serfs' in Barka and Sahel, only to be crushed by the authorities. The
Ethiopians, too are still fresh in people's minds for the handing over of fertile
lands to the Americans for military bases and installations, and to foreign
multinationals like Baratolo. So these experiences have led the Eritrean
peasantry to hate the very thought of land reform480.
The EPLF were confronted by old practices that requested ample understanding of the way
the Christian and Muslim leaders constantly reinforced the power structures in Eritrea. For
example, the Muslim leaders had sanctioned the believe that taking another person's land was
prohibited by the Quran and was likely to deprive one from entering into the best life in the
"other world".
Therefore, the EPLF quickly reversed their strategy because of the difficulty of dealing with
people whom they considered as having for years experienced and lived economically insecure,
culturally backward and generally illiterate. The EPLF had to admit that "cruel exploitation,
along with the subtle influences of the religious and spiritual world, had such an effect on the
mentality of the peasants that the technique to be applied in the process of political education
and dialogue with the masses was bound to be problematic, long, repetitive and demanding of
478 John Young in particular maintains there is no way the EPLF, TPLF or later the EPRDF will deny
their Marxist tendencies during the war. See his Thesis and works, op. cit.
" See in particular Sandra Fullerton Joireman, "The Minefield of Land Reform: Comments on the
Eritrean Land Proclamation", African Affairs, no. 95(1996), pp. 269-285, who believes the EPLF
(PFDJ) policy on land reform is inadequate because it neglects the two issues of pastoralists rights and
the role of investment. For her, these two lay mines of potential future crisis, both political and
environmental, in the Eritrean countryside. p. 285.
480 Interview, op. cit.
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great patience"481 . In order to counter this, the EPLF did carry out a number of measures
during the war. By the beginning of 1977, the EPLF had managed to politicise the core of the
Eritrean peasantry in the liberated areas and organised them into cells. This provided a base
for setting up the people's militia to counter the frequent armed incursions of the splinter
group, the ELF, and to tip the balance of power in favour of the majority of the people. Such
a step was felt to be necessary before touching the land issue. But what really moved the issue
of land to quick mass discussion was the victories of the EPLF in Afabet and other towns. It
became much easier to tip the balance of power in the area. The landlords had no Ethiopian
army or the ELF to turn to in case of disagreement. Thus, land began to be discussed at mass
meetings in an open manner. By 1978, when a few landlords organised a large demonstration
against reforms brought about by the Front, land had ceased to be a central issue in the minds
of the oppressed people who were already politicised to think of bigger issues, in particular
liberation from Ethiopian domination 482 . Thereafter, the EPLF's People's Assembly and the
Peasants' Association drew up plans for land redistribution. Like in any other peasant
revolution, the landlords in Eritrea lost their ownership when the EPLF emerged as a fully
fledged organisation in the liberated areas. Land was redistributed to tenants and middle and
poor peasants. By 1982, the EPLF was well established in the liberated areas and the process
of land reform took place in an atmosphere of confidence where the authority of landlords
could be challenged openly. Land redistribution was carried out according to the policy of
land reform formulated by the EPLF during the war.
By 1991, when the EPLF had taken control of the whole country, remnants of the many tenure
systems outlined above existed, as well as new systems developed by the armies of liberation.
According to the EPLF, this became a recipe for chaos after independence because when
soldiers returned to their respective villages in the countryside to claim land, it became clear
that a land reform or new land policy was of immediate importance. Thus, in March 1993,
shortly before the formal proclamation of independence, the Eritrean Land Commission (ELC)
was convened to draft a land policy for the country. After a considerable period of study,
several models of land allocation were devised, though most of them were rejected outright.
These were: privatisation, returning all land to the diessa system but changing the period of
allocation of land from five years to twenty years, maintenance of the diessa system and
several other variations on this options. According to Alem Seged Tesfaye, Head of the
Eritrean Land Commission, these choices were all rejected in favour of usufruct rights held on
an individual basis that would give a uniformity of tenure and allow for rental and share
481 
See EPLF, "Creating a Popular, Economic, Political and Military Base", op. cit.
482 
See Amrit Wilson, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
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contracts. The new land policy in Eritrea vests ownership rights on the government with
usufruct rights granted to individuals, but with the ultimate right of dispossession resting with
the state483 . Land will be allocated in two ways: primarily, to individual Eritrean citizens on a
lifetime usufruct basis and secondarily, all leftover land or expropriated land wifi go to the
government. Government land is both intended to serve as a mine and forest reserve as well
as to provide a supply of land for the government to allocate to investors. Investors receiving
government land do not have to be Eritrean citizens and acquire the land through the
permission of the Eritrean Investment Centre as articulated in the Investment Proclamation484.
Today, individual land holdings are allocated to both men and women on a lifetime usufruct
basis in Eritrea. These individual land holdings can be inherited, but any child inheriting land
from his/her parent must sacrifice any other land which he/she has been allocated by the
government. This mechanism is believed to encourage individuals to make long-term
investments in their land which will pass to their children eventually. Article 24 of the Land
Proclamation also directs that land can only be leased but not sold or granted as a gift.
Another special provision allows individuals to change their form of tenure from one of
lifetime usufruct to one of long-term lease in order to exploit the land in a different manner.
This particular provision is intended to introduce new ways of exploiting the land and
attracting the movement of capital into farming communities 485 . The Eritrean Land
Proclamation is under implementation now after an educational campaign in the countryside
and testing of the policy in four specific areas of the country. In a nutshell, the land reform
will have revolutionary consequences to sedentarised Eritrean farmers because farmers will no
longer be assured that the plot of land they farm will be changed every five years and there will
no longer be confusion as to actual legal rights to land. Instead, a stability of usufruct rights to
the same plot of land will be maintained, with the possibility of privatisation at some point in
the future.
In summary, the Eritrean Land Proclamation has started with two important facets, for the
people and economy of the post-war era. The new land policy is a security guarantee to
individual land holding. This should provide the foundation for the restructuring of the rural
agricultural sector in Eritrea. The other important facet of the new land policy is revolutionary
See Eritrean Land Proclamation Number 58/94, Chapter II, Article 3 (Gazette of Eritrean Laws,
Published by the GOE).
See the Investment Proclamation Number 59/94 (Gazette of Eritrean Laws, Published by the GOE).
485 See The Eritrean Land Commission, "The Land Proclamation of Eritrea: A Summamy", mimeo,
1995. Also the preamble to proclamation number 5 8/94 reiterates this.
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because it vests the legal right to hold land to both men and women. Thus, the land
proclamation assures equal rights to land ownership without restriction based on gender, race
or faith, and grants usufruct rights to Eritrean citizens above the age of 18486. For the first
time in the history of Eritrea, women are now allowed to possess their own land under a
lifetime lease. According to article 15(1) of the same proclamation, "Married couples, who
based on this proclamation are allowed to acquire agricultural land get their separate shares
from the land allocated for agricultural activities".
(b) Self-Views of Fighters: Narratives by Various Ex-Combatants
From its inception in the 1970s, the EPLF developed into a broad-based movement that did
not represent only a particular social class, ethnic group, religious sect, or a particular region
of Eritrea. Unlike other splinter groups (ELM, ELF-GC, and ELF-PLF, ELF-RC) in the
country, the EPLF as an organisation encompassed within its rank and file Eritreans of all
walks of life as it continuously strove to attract and recruit all citizens who were willing to
participate in the liberation struggle. Today, there are many people in Eritrea who often
introduce or describe themselves as fighters, an indication that a person was a participant in
the war. The term 'fighter' (also tegadelti) is stifi widely used to refer to those members of
EPLF who either participated fully in the actual combat or served in other non-combatant
roles during the thirty years of the war. The Eritrean combatants were mainly drawn from the
peasantry who constituted the strong army of the EPLF. After the end of the struggle, part of
the fighting army was demobilised and a sizeable number is stifi serving in the Eritrean Defence
Force, which president Issaias Afeworki prides as a capable army 487 . Most of the EPLF
servicemen and women did not have any formal education before joining the struggle because
the colonial system in Eritrea did not encourage it.
The self-views of the ordinary Eritrean fighters are based on their long time experiences of the
struggle and, as I mentioned earlier, the language and the words used to express the
experiences and feelings is quite different from that used by the elites because of the high level
of education and political sophistication of the latter. The fighters were often overtaken by
emotions which made most of them lose composure and effectiveness during interviews. For
486 See article 7 of the Land Proclamation 58/94, op. cit.
487 In an interview with a London-based Arabic daily, Al Hayat, President Issaias Afeworki reiterated
the importance of capability rather than size of the army when he was asked about the cross-border
disputes between Eritrea and Yemen on the one hand and with Sudan on the other. See the English
translation of that interview, "I'm not Boasting but Eritrea has a Capable Army", Eritrea Profile, vol.
3, no. 45(January 1997), p. 6.
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this reason, and unlike in the organisation of the self-views of the elites, the feelings and
experiences of the fighters I interviewed are discussed together in a much more condensed
fashion. Moreover the ordinary Eritrean fighter saw (and still sees) her/himself as a participant
and executioner and not the architect of policies and programmes. The bulk of the Eritrean
fighters compared themselves mainly to dancers rather than instrument players. As
Tesfamicael had metaphorically put it, "although we constituted an important section in the
struggle as fighters, the planners and commanders of the struggle were more crucial because,
like instrument players in a ceremony, the dance can only be successfully performed and
exceptionally entertaining when the rhythm of dancers co-ordinates well with the sound of
drums and tune of the song"488 . In a way, the fighters fought whole heartedly knowing that
post-war restructuring, and in particular the programme of rehabilitation and development
would as well be spearheaded by the leadership.
(i) Self-Views on Liberation: practical experiences of fighters
Arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate killing of people, and the continuous intimidation of the
younger generation in the country, are some of the most disturbing factors that made the bulk
of the Eritrean youth and middle-aged men and women abandon peaceful means of pursuing
their rights and take up arms against the Ethiopian regimes since 1952. By the time the armed
resistance had matured, with the EPLF coming closer around Asmara in the middle of the
l970s, especially in the nearby highland areas, most young Eritreans joined the Front in big
numbers. Some of these new recruits were trained as combatants, while others were sent as
internal informers, a kind of membership which the EPLF had encouraged throughout Eritrea
during the war. The main activities of the "cell groups" included supplying information and
food to the EPLF fighters.
Every Eritrean national, and every student whether in primary or high school, regarded the
Front, in the words of Hadas Mussie, as a "great university", where people learnt many
different professions. During the was, most ordinary fighters acquired diverse professions, for
example, many became bare-foot doctors, nurses, engineers, poets, dramatists, musicians, and
art designers. Alganesh Mekonnen from Orota did not hesitate telling that "The long struggle
taught me a lot of professions which I could not have learnt in a peaceful environment. Out of
a protracted struggle, a culture of 'tetswarnet, tsnat, tesfa, aklie, tewenefinet' (perseverance.
steadfastness, hope, patience and dedication) has developed".
488 Interview (Embatkala March 1996)
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For the ordinary Eritrean fighter, liberation meant freedom from what was widely perceived as
Ethiopian colonialism. Angesom Efrem, a young demobilised fighter, explained to me why he
had joined the Front:
"I joined the liberation struggle in order to die for my own country, Eritrea,
occupied by Ethiopia. There were many kinds of crimes committed by the
Ethiopian army on Eritreans. Mengistu's activities made the generation of the
time to join the movement. I had no political knowledge but what I saw was
enough to make me believe the EPLF had a strong reason to commit the
Eritrean lives for freedom. After all, Mengistu had already killed many
people"489.
The idea of liberation for Angesom Efrem, therefore, meant liberation from oppression by
Mengistu, from atrocities of Ethiopian soldiers, from crimes, killing and in one phrase,
liberation from colonialism. Berhane Asress cites the confiscation of land and the denial of
basic human needs such as food, shelter, clean water, the right to move and speak freely,
absence of freedom of culture, and the right to other social services such as the right to
education, health facilities, and market as major issues that sparked the rebeffion:
Before I joined the struggle, I had seen and experienced practically the
activities of the oppressors. I saw the Imperial regime and later the Dergue
government. So for half of my life I witnessed the miserable life of the Eritrean
people before the liberation. We had no political, economic and cultural
freedom. Ainharic was the language in schools and not Tigrigna or Arabic.
Ethiopians monopolised the trade and the sale of goods. Ethiopians were the
rulers and the army that occupied us. When I joined the field, I started to
breath the air of liberation. Because the EPLF was a democratic organisation,
it was leading the struggle in a democratic way of life. Every fighter as well as
the people under the EPLF jurisdiction enjoyed the protection and the liberty.
There was equal share of the meagre resources accessed by the Front, equal
participation in discussions and elections of office holders and free practise of
diverse Eritrean cultures. The EPLF is a unique organisation in the world.
Because it is the only organisation in the earth that acquired independence
solely through fighting and without help from African countries, America or
Russia. But we liberated the country on our own. AwetNeh'fash!490.
Fighter Teklemariam from Nefashit further added that before the total liberation of Eritrea,
every Eritrean was not free to move from one place to another without surveillance:
489 Angesom Efrem lives in Ras Alula Street, Asmara. He joined the EPLF after the capture of Afabet
in 1988. He expressed this in an interview with the author on January 21st 1996, Asmara, Eritrea.
° Awet Nehfash is a Tigrigna word for 'Victory to the Masses!'. Berhane Asress is a demobilised
soldier who narrated his story in a conversation with the author on 13th July 1996, Embatkala, Eritrea.
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"The right of association and gathering was lost, the right to speak, complain
and/or ask, the right to elect and to be elected, were all robbed off every
Eritrean citizen. The right to mourn or weep your dead, yes, was denied the
Eritrean by the Ethiopian army. Eritrean towns were all surrounded by the
Ethiopian troops. For those Eritreans in villages, to go out at night, say to piss
or defecate, would have exposed one to the bullet of the Ethiopian army".
Similarly Solomon Tesfahun, from Keren explained:
My experience of the revolution started as a teacher in government school. My
level of education is very low but because the Ethiopian government did not
care sending qualified teachers to Eritrea, I was forced to teach standards one
and two in primary. It was break time and I sat under a tree. An Ethiopian
soldier came and asked me why I was sitting under the tree. I told him I was
free and I had no class because it was also break time. He shouted in return
'this is the period of socialism get out from here and get to your class or else
...!' (probably you will be shot, he filled in the blank). I tried to make him
understand me but he was not interested. He warned me and the only thing I
could do was leave the tree at his will. Finally, I realised my life was not my
own but under someone else's control because he would in the next time
decide to do anything-arrest or shoot me without fear of anything. Thus, I
could not stay any longer to teach and I left and joined the EPLF leaving my
small job and family behind. Liberation for me means removal of the threat of
the Ethiopian army, living without fear, giving our children better education by
employing well-trained teachers, more schools, health centers, access roads and
better communication system, and yes, absence of torture, killing, burning
villages. After liberation, a nation has been born free of all these, and there is
no more bribery, corruption and mismanagement of government property. This
is the meaning of liberation49t.
In Eritrea, circumstances that would force one out of cities and villages to join the EPLF were
enormously diverse. For example, Teklie Gheresus was a member of a secret cell group that
operated in Eritrean towns occupied by the Ethiopian army before he fled to the field in 1978.
"When my friend was caught by the Dergue security in Keren, I escaped and joined the EPLF
to fight the enemy", he narrated. In Eritrea, once a member of a secret cell group was caught,
he/she was tortured to reveal other members, and that is one way how most people left to join
and become active combatants. Similarly, the general feeling that the war would soon come to
an end also encouraged many Eritreans to get recruited with the EPLF. However, this never
happened as many had hoped and Abraham Debessai confirmed:
Solomon Tesfahun is a demobilised soldier from Keren, and I interviewed him on 12th July 1996.
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When in 1978 the liberation struggle was at its resounding momentum, we
flocked to the field joining the EPLF with the hope that victory was already at
hand. However, shortly the EPLF was forced to evacuate the liberated areas in
an effort of what came to be widely known as a 'tactical withdrawal'. The
bitter truth was that Ethiopia's Red Star Campaign had overwhelmed the ifi-
equipped EPLF fighters. During the withdrawal, most fighters had no idea of
what was taking place. The struggle dragged on for thirteen years more and
nobody had known liberation would still fmd him/her alive.
The fact that many fighters had no knowledge of the withdrawal also reveals there were
moments when decisions could be carried out without considerable wider consultation as most
EPLF elites had always claimed. Misghina Debessai, a female fighter from Mandefera also
confirmed:
I joined the EPLF in 1976. I was trained for two months in the military center
and joined other combatants in the front-line. Soon the EPLF started attacking
and took control of the Eritrean countryside. Since that time, from 1977,
things had worked in our favour but with the intervention of the Soviets on the
Ethiopian side, bringing with them , modern military equipment and advisers,
everything was reversed and my expectations of a quick liberation were
subdued. Thus, the military balance changed in favour of the Dergue, and the
EPLF was forced to take what many now remember as a tactical withdrawal to
the Sahel (Awraja). Although the retreat was a real terrible and problematic
event that required full sacrifice and commitment, it also gave many of us the
motivation to carry on the struggle until freedom was achieved in 1991.
After the famous retreat, the EPLF quickly reorganised and launched the famous "Aighena"
attack in North-East S ahel in 1981, as a gesture of trying to regain its lost strength and raise
the morale of the army492 . Three consecutive big offensives were launched-the 6th, 7th, and
8th-which succeeded to paralyse and weaken the Dergue army in their daily activities. Thus,
constant engagement of the enemy picked up, and by 1988, the biggest army of Ethiopia was
destroyed by the reorganised EPLF army from the Sahel (Awraja). The hopes of liberation
were restored when the frontline of Nacfa was destroyed and the strategic town of Afabet was
also captured at the same time and the EPLF secured a huge armoury that included artifieries,
BM21 cannon and tanks. From that point the military balance had changed in favour of the
EPLF and in 1990 the country's second capital sea port of Massawa fell. A large number of
Eritrean youth, who marked the last phase of recruitment, joined the EPLF at this time.
492 The counter-attack from Awraja shifted the military balance in favour of the EPLF throughout the
l980s till the total liberation in 1991. See Lionel Cliffe, "Dramatic Shifts in the Military Balance in the
Horn: The 1984 Eritrean Offensive", Review of African Political Economy, no. 30(September 1984),
pp. 93-97; and Berhane Woldemichael, "Ethiopian Army in Disarray", Review of African Political
Economy, no. 44(1989), pp. 60-63.
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Given the strategic location of Massawa, and the massive equipment of the Dergue soldiers
defending it, it was difficult to imagine EPLF would secure victory over the government. The
EPLF radio kept every Eritrean informed and the hope that victory was now certain was
enhanced. For Hannah Ghebreberhan, a student at Asmara university, hearing the EPLF radio
alone was a moving event though for others it had remained a propaganda because everything
sounded unreal since the EPLF fighters have often been portrayed by the Dergue army as mere
shfras. As the liberation hours were being counted, anxiety increased, frustration and distrust
also intensified even amongst Eritrean nationals because people began to view things
differently. However, it did not take long because the following year the EPLF had captured
the whole country. On the 24th May 1991, the fighters marched into Asmara without firing a
single bullet, and they were received with excitement and exasperation. As Mama Tewedros,
an Asmaran elder, had put it, "I just found it hard to express my joy even now. It is the kind
of memory I hope will not fade out but live forever for generations. 'Awet Nehfash'!,
meaning victory to the masses".
The daily activities of the ordinary Eritrean fighter included combat with the enemy, digging
canals and tunnels for defence, teaching other comrades, preparing meals, fetching water,
guarding camps, playing games such as volleyball or football, and learning politics and other
social activities like dancing and singing war songs. The training of the EPLF fighters ranged
from two to six months depending on the role one was to play in the war. Like in any other
liberation struggle, roles of the EPLF fighters changed according to the prevailing
circumstances. Though most fighters expressed painful memories of the struggle, they also
told success stories of it, appreciating in particular the changes the war has brought in shaping
their way of lives. According to Tedras Kidane:
My experience of the liberation struggle started when I was eighteen years of
age when I joined the EPLF. First, I took military training for six months in
Solomona Camp. After fmishing the training, I joined the fighting army and
participated in the fight for liberation in different battles. That involvement has
given me the spirit of caring for my life and that of the neighbour. Patience,
honesty, optimism, resistance and resilience, vigilance and hard work are
characters that I have acquired over the years during the war, and they will
continue to guide my life and relations to the neighbour throughout my life493.
Interview with Tedras Kidane, a sergeant major in the Eritrean Defence Force (Dongolo , Eritrea,
18th April 1996). Eritrean Ministry of Defence is located in Dongolo over one hundred miles away
from Asmara.
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Most ex-combatants concur in their view that there was no difference in the social life of the
fighters whether one was a leader or not. The rank and file ate, drank, discussed, shared
logistical materials and died like other fallen heroes of the war. For Mengisteab, a life of
giving and receiving dominated throughout the struggle. From the lowest to the top in the
Secretariat, there was no difference of social status because the EPLF fighters lived together in
the sunny desert, rain, and starved when there was no food. Thus, braveness, patience,
dedication, perseverance and staunchness, were all mutually felt by the fighting men and
women in the EPLF. Everyone fought with great zeal and consciousness for freedom. It is
from such practices that the Eritrean has developed the idea of justice, equality, and dedication
to work during the post-liberation era.
According to Solomon Fesseha from Dongolo, the practical experiences from a liberation
struggle are so vast in scope and producing a precise account of them all at one moment is
quite difficult as he expressed:
However, if I am able to say anything with certainty, it is not because I am the
cleverest of all in remembering the past. But every comrade and every
countrymen and women or every participant in the struggle had more to give
than take from another. In every situation, I learned more from the altruistic
contributions of my fellow freedom fighters arid the commitment of Eritrean
people to Eritrea. The subtle love of humanity, the solid unity of citizens, the
willingness to offer oneself for the well-being of others, the desire for justice,
the resolute and unflinching fight against all sorts of oppression, were lessons
we all learnt from one another. I am very much grateful and feel equally
obliged to appreciate and thank the company of my comrades because I owe
them the whole person I am shaped to be today. Even the frustrations and
mistakes that punctuated the course of this experience proved a blessing in
disguise for they steeled me even more. It is quite noteworthy here, therefore,
that whatever is the peoples' must be returned to the people. And the Eritrean
struggle for liberation is a typification of this.
On the other hand, Tzighereda Elfu from Adi Keyi, recalled the misery and despairs of an
ordinary combatant saying,
The struggle was too difficult for the fighter because food, water, and even
clothes and shoes were never available in the Sahel, EPLF's strong base. For
example, a piece of bread was used as a meal and a bottle of water was shared
by almost ten fighters. We marched over thorny shrubs and forests, and over
desert and sharp rocks barefooted. The situation was equally the same with
leaders of the unit, women, old and young alike.
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Liberation means the state of peace, freedom from dictatorial rule, arbitrary imprisonment and
arrests, hunger, daily air raids and bombardments. Thus, Eritreans had all along yearned for
that day when they would have the right and access to everything humans are entitled to in
life, for example, food, shelter, education, medical facilities, freedom of movement, speech,
press and equal development and opportunity for all. A soldier in the outskirts of Asmara in
Hazhaz commented:
One major achievement over the liberation years, which no other country in the
world can match, is the fact that today our President has no bodyguards. His
office is opened to all who would like to express their grievances and views
without fear. Our President visits every Eritrean village in every year and
encounters challenges from village elders, something that has never been done
before by the colonial leaders to discuss issues. This is liberation which could
be seen with eyes and not heard or spoken only.
From early evening till midnight, Eritreans now flood their only high Street, Liberation
Avenue, taking what they often describe as a leisure walk and an expression of freedom.
(ii) Self-Views on Democracy and Democratisation
There is a widespread feeling amongst the EPLF ordinary fighters which confirms elite stories
that democracy and democratisation in Eritrea is not born of a desire to respond to current
international trends. For most Eritreans, the history of the struggle for freedom was also the
history of the struggle for democracy. On most occasions, both liberation and democracy
were defmed quite synonymously. As far as the Eritrean case is concerned, the ideas of
freedom, equality, justice, and public participation are more often than not associated with the
concepts "liberation" and "democracy". At the beginning of this century, the Eritrean masses
were the first to rebel against the feudal lords that had enjoyed an easy life in traditional
societies for a long time. Thus, most Eritreans have argued that the armed struggle in the
latter half of the century was only a continuation of that resistance against undemocratic forces
in society which mainly later on became reinforced by the behaviour of the feudal regime of
Haile Selassie and its military successor, the Dergue.
Many Eritreans believe that principles of democracy existed in their respective traditional
societies. Yet they also acknowledge that their traditional societies are not similar to those
based on a modern-liberalised economy. Ato Abraha Tesfahun commented, "The idea to
choose what one wants or needs, the idea to refuse or reject what one is not convinced of, has
always been Man's greatest gift from God in the culture of humanity. Of course different
societies evolved their own ways of doing things with certain limitations but without
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destroying the fundamentals of freedom, which in turn constitute major characteristics of
democracy". Woizero Nebiat complemented, "In rural Eritrean villages far from cities there
are different rules and regulations governing society. These rules and regulations are well
noted by members of the community. Every traditional Eritrean village had an assembly which
elected the leadership of the community from those elders considered wise, honest and brave.
The assembly debated, consulted and deliberated on matters that affected the life of society as
a whole".
The traditional system in Eritrea functioned under what is widely known as the Baito (some
kind of legislature or assembly). Through the Baito, the liberties of community members were
protected, and village leaders were entrusted the right to decide issues for the good of the
society. Thus, the EPLF followed the Baito system during the war and made it a forum for
discussion and differences were often resolved through it. The Baito is remembered in
Eritrean traditional societies for the long debates and discussions that had often taken hours
and at times many days before the right decisions are taken. One EPLF fighter criticised the
controversial nature of a traditional Eritrean whom he perceives as an orator and lover of
public debates and discussions at times for the sake of it. In a way, traditional African life was
more open than the modern one and an Eritrean elder believes the society has been
contaminated by the restrictive nature of colonial administration. Ato Woldemariam
contemplated the past in his words, "We did not have dictators in society. No rejected views
and ideas were forced upon our communities but we all reached the fmal decisions through
consensus and compromise".
However, there is a tacit agreement that the rudiments of democratic practices found in
traditional Eritrean society were also affected by other limitations particularly when it comes
to the issue of women and children. Though Michael Zekarias argued on the point that the
issue of women and children was not that of discrimination because traditional society
perceived them as a sole responsibility of man. It was not a deliberate subordination nor
discrimination but a traditional practise commonly conceived positively in the past. The
ordinary EPLF fighter acknowledges such traditional conceptions are a gross limitation that
provide a point of departure from traditional to modern government. The democracy that
operated in the rural areas was bound to be different from that practiced in the urban areas
where colonialism had sowed the seeds of modern economy. The EPLF took the lead in
incorporating traditional practices with the modern ones in the building of a new Eritrea. Thus,
the transformation of the old system did not mean the total condemnation and replacement of
the old traditions by the new modern ones. In other words, the foundations of modern
Eritrean democracy are based on those of the Baito.
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The Baito had the sole responsibility of creating laws that guided and regulated society. The
members of the Baito provided security for the community, knew how to cooperate with
neighbouring communities and made sure members of every community exercised their rights
without iinflicting pain on others. According to Berhane Asress from Embatkala, "The Baito
was charged with the responsibility of land distribution and cared about deforestation and
green pastures for animals. The Baito was the sole defender of traditional practices and
culture. It appointed Deyanus or Dagna (Judges or Judge) to interpret laws and tradition.
There is a lot of democracy here, although not absolute, it served as a base for running society
subject to law and order till the colonialists infiltrated us". Of course traditional Eritrean elders
did not have an orthodox way of defining democracy, but what they practice implies some
similarities. According to Zekarias Simeon:
Among the Tigrigna there are rules and regulations governing every village.
These rules and regulations are stated in a democratic way. Inhabitants of
every village convened meetings to discuss community issues and wise men are
often chosen to lead the village. In some villages, the division of labour is as
follows: there are metaro (land dividers), their main task is to divide land
equally among members of the village; there are gelafo (a committee that is
responsible for those who do not have the right to own land because of age, or
in the case of immigrants, etc.); there are wedati (advocates) a mobile
committee that takes care of contentious cases and issues; there are deyanus
(judges), who listened and deliberated on issues.
Traditional society had its own ways of enforcing laws and principles, as Solomon Tesfahun
from Adi Quala describes:
In traditional life, we did not have the police, courts and prisons, but there were
other means of enforcement-refusing to help communally in terms of
cultivation, refusing to rescue cattle from the raiders, refusing to quench fire in
case of burning accidents.
In most traditional African societies, it was common practise that the community neglected
and disregarded those who disobeyed communal regulations. Working for the welfare of the
community obliged every members to self-restraint and to avoid being led by personal greed
and ambition.
Yet the practiced democracy was not based on multi-party systems but on community,
deliberation, and consensus. Belai Habtegaber Bein from Dekemhare explains:
We did not have multi-parties, but our democratic way of life transcended that
of political party organisation. We worked together for the interest of the
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community. We respected believes that were not necessarily part of our
culture, e.g., Christianity and Islam. We sustained the unity and security of the
community. We shared both good and bad moments-in party celebrations, we
defended our communities together against the might of the enemy, and during
moments of sorrow we comforted one another. Collective responsibility was
the norm. That the absence of records of such activities makes them trivial is
not good enough reason to think our societies existed without any structured
democratic system.
Among the Kunama of Eritrea's lowlands region, participation was central in every aspect of
community life. Both young and old people got involved in activities of society according to
the relative capacity of every individual. Ranging from activities to do with tilling or
cultivating the land, building houses, to marriage were all performed communally494.
Generally speaking, High i-endaba (laws of the natives) functioned in traditional Eritrean
societies. Poor people who did not have oxen had their farms ploughed by other members of
society who saw it as their duty to do so. The able members of society cultivated, cleared off
weeds, and collected harvest together. Caring for the poor and disabled was done voluntarily
without any use of force or redress. Village elders discussed and deliberated (or passed
decisions on issues) that affected the lives of the vifiagers. Consensus rather than suffrage or
voting (balloting) was the common method of arriving at decisions. Since the duration of the
Baito foras was not fixed, quarrels and contradictions in society were settled through
prolonged discussions. Characteristics of traditional democracy included open discussion,
guaranteeing the rights of the disadvantaged, sharing responsibility, and sacrifice for the
communal good. For example, Eritreans communally owned land diesa and used rotational
systems which changed hands at a given period of time.
The EPLF adopted the Baito system which paved the way for the holding of frequent elections
in the liberated areas. The EPLF incorporated the modern system into the traditional way of
life in Eritrea by considering principles of religious freedom, women's equality and human
rights as important parts of the struggle. The elected committees and councils operating at the
village level throughout Eritrea today form the bases for the growth of a modern democracy
that transcends the limited traditional democratic practices. During the war, the EPLF
leadership emphasised building and expanding democracy from the bottom up. The Front is
convinced democracy cannot be imposed from above by the creation of formal national
structures without a base in society. A constitution and the framework for pluralism must
emerge from the needs and views of Eritreans to whom the Political system must be
accountable. Eritrea now has a free press, though one ex-fighter commented on the freedom
' Conversation with Goitom Oqbai from Barentu, Febraury 13th 1996, Asmara, Eritrea.
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of the press saying, "Self-censorship is our only problem. No one tells us to say this or that,
but we are all ex-fighters, and we do not have the habit of critical reporting"495.
Finally, in post-colonial Africa during the 1 960s through, economic and social conditions
became major barriers to the nurturing of participatory democracy. It is the lack of resources
coupled with mass illiteracy that paved the way toward bureaucratisation rather than
democratisation. Thus, the definition of the nation was tuned to a simple substitution of the
state for the people, bureaucracy for democracy and passive obedience for active citizenship.
In Eritrea, the post-liberation government has demonstrated such trend can be avoided by
building democracy from below rather than from above. The nationalist leadership has
reaffirmed its commitment to cultural diversity because national independence has been
achieved through a long drawn mass struggle. The wide feeling is that the nation will remain
an organising framework by emphasising the imperatives of obedience and loyalty to state
institutions. In other words, democratisation requires not merely the withdrawal of the state
to allow developments of spheres of social autonomy, but also a positive and active state
intervention of a particular kind, say a constitutionally secured framework of rights and
liberties, including the conventional rights of free speech, assembly, freedom of movement,
and universal suffrage will be crucial. The government intends to avoid democracy from
becoming a synonym for elite factional struggles by locating it in the self-activity of subaltern
groups, in both urban and rural areas. Social movements can in this respect act as conduits for
the expression and organisation of citizen's demands vis-a-vis the state and the wider society,
and protect their members from arbitrary administrative and political measures.
In Eritrea, mechanisms of popular-democratic empowerment are slowly emerging. This can
be seen in the efforts of trying to build democracy from the characteristic institutions such as
the families, schools, religious institutions, and work places which exhibit a uniform lack of
democracy at present. The post-liberation era is witnessing the emergence of differences in
the public sphere, and there is fear that the nationalist glue that bounded Eritreans together
may be weaken. For example, in April 1993 demonstrations in Asmara centred on the
questions of accountability and pay, and the Mai Haber incident where a protest by disabled
fighters culminated in the death of three veterans, signalled many of the rank and file members
of the Front are no longer willing to follow unquestioningly their leaders in the post-liberation
era, as they had once followed their unit commanders out of the trenches. Today, several
mass organisations, though still linked to the Front, have emerged. These include the National
Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW), the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers
Conversation with Kiflom Adgoi, Assistant Editor, Eritrea Profile, Ministry of Information
(Asniara, 18th July 1996).
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(NCEW), and the National Union of Eritrean Youth (NUEY), which have broadened the
scope of their activity in the post-liberation period. Other organisations such as those of the
union of journalists, teachers, lawyers, doctors and so forth, are still in the making. So far,
there is no real opposition coming out clearly in Eritrea.
(iii) Transition: post-liberation expectations and hopes for the future
In Eritrea, there was no "after the revolution", instead programmes had to be executed
simultaneously. Although the war had wrecked the country's economy and infrastructure,
while long periods of drought brought famine to the largely peasant populations, the feeling of
most Eritreans I had spoken to remains optimistic. Partly because the tenaciously fought
armed struggle also created a determinedly self-reliant nation which has accepted the discipline
of austerity and hard work necessitated by the fact that the Front took control of the country
with hardly any cash in the banks. And mainly because within the guerrilla army itself ranks
had been kept to a minimum and relations between the fighters and their commanders were for
the most part egalitarian and fraternal. Thus, preserving the democratic ideals which had fired
the nationalist struggle, and avoiding the authoritarianism of the traditional armies, will be an
imperative if the army is to retain its popular designation as a "liberation army". Moreover,
the mutinous demonstration by discontented rank-and-file members after the war in 1993 have
accelerated the process of transformation within the army. In 1996, the present Minister of
Defence, Sobhat Efrem, was promoted to the rank of General; eight former division
commanders became Major Generals; while twenty two were promoted to Brigadier Generals;
and another thirty four to the rank of Colonel496 . It is obvious that discontent is more likely
amongst the army than the civilian population because their lifestyle and expectations are
changing. As Markakis has pointed out quite correctly, "Gone are the gaunt faces, bushy
hairdos, camouflage jackets and scarfs. They have been replaced by neatly barbered men in
tieless suits and modestly dressed women"497 . Thus, recent restructuring in the rank and file of
the army is meant to contain any further mutinous demonstrations and to maintain the
discipline that was achieved during the thirty years of the struggle.
After the liberation, the GOE has been faced with an immense need to produce the results for
a population that has endured privations and sacrifices for over a quarter century. Eritreans
had suffered and they needed urgent change to effect a difference in their way of life. The
fighters found it difficult when most of them were asked to return to their respective villages
496 See Hadas Ertra, 10, Meaza 1996.
See John Markakis, "Eritrea 's National Charter", op. cit., p. 128.
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and work without salary. What could the government do with the disabled veterans, families
of fallen martyrs or the displaced people who had lost their properties? According to some
EPLF fighters, difficulties were expected and reactions to current dissatisfactions do not imply
the ordinary Eritrean fighter had high hopes life will change overnight. Nonetheless, an
improved way of life should have been the logical consequence of freedom from oppressive
successive Ethiopian regimes. For Angesom Efrem, people expected a lot of things, "The
expectation was liberation would put an end to the problems of housing, water supplies, health
facilities, electricity supply, education and other social issues that Eritreans have been faced
with for a long time. Precisely everyone wants to develop and get rich". On the other hand,
there is a wide consensus that gradual fulfilment of some of such expectations is taking place.
To be sure, economic difficulties are there but they are still mainly concealed by the
honeymoon celebrations of independence. Above all, the culture of tolerance and self-reliance
acquired during the war have had a strong influence on the larger population of the country.
According to Tekeste Ghebrezghi from Nacfa:
The slogan 'self-reliance' enabled the Front to survive all odds, without any
foreign support and economic aid; and without any external moral support, it
enhanced the victory of the revolution. Self-reliance has become our pride, a
culture that has now been incorporated into our society and socio-economic
formation. Today we are not victims of any foreign influence and we now
direct our own way of doing things. Our revolution has led to real dramatic
changes. The old traditions have not been replaced but filtered and inculcated
into new progressive ideas and models of running society.
And for Nasser Osman from Afabet:
After the liberation, everything has changed. Eritreans now have the basic
guarantee to life, freedom of movement, and arbitrary arrests and detention
without trial are now history. The life of the citizen is now valued. People
now have the right to elect and to be elected in public positions. People can
now elect their own representatives to the national assembly, and a wide
consultation has been carried out for constitutional establishment or
promulgation. The members of the national assembly are now able to listen to
their electors. The government is truly doing its best to make sure every
Eritrean citizen and region gets the services required. We now live a better life
that transcends affluent and destitute life, even a rich person who still lives in an
environment with constraints suffers more than the poor living in free Eritrea.
Peoples' expectations vary because some value liberation and describe it not in terms of
material realisation but in terms of freedom, justice, equality. In other words some people
dematerialised the nature of the struggle by not valuing it in terms of wealth and riches but
169
equated it with some kind of immaterial results, the idea of giving freedom of the mind a
priority. Others emphasise material expectations. People's optimism was made high mainly
by the belief that liberation and its genus concept independence would be followed by relative
material opportunities after the war. To this point, some Eritreans think their expectations
have been partially and quite considerably met since independence. The government is
engaged in activities that may provide the necessary services, even though everybody knows
the government had to scratch from down given that the country had no money and no
international support during the first two years before the referendum. Though the economic
outlook of Eritrea may be bleak, it is not entirely without hope since it was the best
industrialised area of Ethiopia thanks to the long period of Italian colonialism498.
In every liberation struggle, peoples' expectations are often high and even rise when success
has been achieved. In Eritrea, no one has made a systematic study to that effect, even the
government. However, from what I have gathered in my personal encounters with Eritreans
from various backgrounds, there is some sort of overall satisfaction with the government
performance since 1991 when the war first came to a halt. 'When in cities, it is difficult to see
enough signals of change because the GOE has put much emphasis in the countryside
influenced much by their policy of developing from bottom-up. Though a caution has aheady
been made by Mahmood Mamdani on Yoweri Musevenis tendency of trying to neglect urban
areas in favour of the countryside499 , the Eritrean government seems to follow the social
rationality in economics which emphasises that unless you develop the countryside, urban
immigration is unavoidable. Congestion of cities by rural immigrants who flock to cities
looking for jobs and better social services is the danger the Eritrean authorities are trying very
much to avert. Thus, the GOE has embarked on pragmatic efforts of building schools,
hospitals, roads, and better housing system in the rural areas, a project which it is highly
convinced will enable democracy and democratisation to become real.
(c) Self-Views of Civilians: Narratives of Non-Combatants
It appears that all Eritreans were politicised to understand the main reason why their human
and material resources were to be used in a war which, after all, it was difficult to imagine
would come to an end. Apart from the education and politicisation they got from their
See in particular Cohn Legum, The Horn of Africa Prospects for Political Transformation
(London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992), p. 7.
See Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialis,n (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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political elites, other practical incidents also served as concrete evidence to convince the
ordinary Eritrean that the Ethiopian soldier was an occupier and not indigenous as the
Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa wanted to portray him. Every time the Eritrean fighters
had a confrontation with the Ethiopian army, the regime in Addis Ababa often responded with
punitive measures on the civilian population. Thus, vifiages were being bombed or burnt to
ashes, and in some areas people were assembled at gunpoint and massacred or requested to
evacuate their villages immediately against their own will. Elsewhere in the country, helpless
peasant families were pursued for miles by Ethiopian soldiers in tanks and rocket-launchers.
So much so that all over the country the fleeing, the never-ending travelling and adventures,
the displacement, and the dislocation of peasants became the order of the day. Although
Eritreans in the cities suffered, those in the countryside were much worse off and they began
to pour into towns in the hope that it was safer there. In a short time, a vast conglomeration
of people with diverse histories, class and regional backgrounds converged in Eritrea's big
cities like Asmara, Keren, Massawa, Dekemare or Mandefera, thus building what one would
call a "lumpen proletariat".
Despite the fact that most of these lumpen groups were unemployable, there was a continuous
mob of fresh arrivals from the rural areas seeking jobs, and this resulted in massive
unemployment in the cities. The major outcome of such a situation was the rampant increase
of crime that affected Eritrea's city dwellers. These internal immigrants are refugees of
internal war who, unlike refugees from a drought or famine, come with pain and anger which
brews more bitterness and the determination to resist. Even though some of these people had
wished to return to their respective vifiages after the unpleasant experiences in cities, their
houses and localities had become mere memories except for a particular part of the land with
its surrounding hills and river and sky, but everything else was gone. So what else could the
suffering people do under such circumstances? Most of them reacted by joining the EPLF
freedom fighters, some fled as refugees into neighbouring countries and abroad, and others
opted to remain inside the occupied areas as informers.
One common story found amongst the Eritrean population, particularly those who endured the
war without fleeing outside the country, is that of massacres carried out by the notorious
Ethiopian army. The Ethiopian troops destroyed Eritrean villages in an effort to try to coerce
them into following the regime in Addis Ababa and stop listening to what was widely known
as the shfta (bandits) propaganda. For this reason, the Ethiopian troops used cluster bombs,
napalm and anti-personnel mines against the civilian population of Eritrea throughout the
l970s and 1980s. Though the event was traumatic in its disruption and displacement of
Eritreans, it also forced them to adjust to wartime conditions that has now made them bear
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and, perhaps, overcome post-liberation difficulties. One major effect of such traumatic
experience is that it has fundamentally changed the consciousness, and the view of the world
and the future of the Eritrean civil population. The economy and all its infrastructure were
destroyed immeasurably, the war has left hundreds of children without parents, and others
have remained traumatised and disabled, exposed to poverty as well as physical and mental
stress. Mahante and Gaddam expressed their experiences in a recorded conversation with
Amrit Wilson:
We are Billens. Our village is two hours walk from Keren. Under Haile
Selassie's regime the Ethiopians were massacring us; they made us gather in
Churches and Mosques and shot us. We had no peace to tifi our land, and
many of us had to flee to Sudan. Under the Mengistu regime many more of
our villagers have been kified. Because the vifiage is so near Keren everyone
even suspected of supporting the Front is arrested. After killing us, they say
they are doing us a favour. They ask us to sing and dance and ululate in
celebration. Since the Ethiopians have come we have no peace. They forced
us to leave our land, leave our vifiage. Our harvest, cattle and goats have all
been taken by the Amharas. Since our peace was disturbed we are always
thinking about change. Since we came on the side of the revolution seven
years ago, we learnt to be alert, to go out of our houses, to run away". In
tears, Gaddam uttered with sobs: "Now there are no Bifiens in the village. The
Amharas are there, the village is destroyed, and even the forest is gone ... when
we get our independence we'll be able to tackle all our problems. We are lucky
we are here in Fil Fil (a refugee camp). The EPLF looks after us but many are
sheltering under trees and stones with no food to eat and no plans for the
future500.
These and many other accounts tell of dislocation, loss and longing, and also a formidable
strength. Only personal histories and specific experiences differ, and with them the way
women and children, old men and young talk about their lives-their openness or reticence,
their imagery or incisive analysis, bringing home the richness of the Eritrean experience. For
example, Semhatu Bakheet comes from a very different background and according to Amrit
Wilson, "She is 54, a Tigre Protestant and EPLF cadre, a quiet woman of immense dignity
who lived in Ghabub, another vifiage near Keren". Sembatu narrated to Wilson the story of
the notorious Ona massacre and the simultaneous destruction of her village, and what these
atrocities did to her:
°° Amrit Wilson's research is one of the few efforts by a foreign researcher undertaken during the war
to record experiences of women both civilians and fighters. See her Women and the Eritrean
Revolution: The Challenge Road, op. cit., p. 67.
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I was brought up and married in Ghabub village. My father had a shop selling
essential commodities like sugar, coffee and oil. My mother was a housewife.
There were about ten other shops; the rest of the villagers were farmers and so
was my husband ... In 1970, the Ethiopians started shooting in the south. My
family and I fled towards Keren. When we reached Forto, the gate to Keren,
the people of the village of Masadare told us to gather in an Orthodox Church.
The Ethiopians then entered the Church and killed hundreds with guns and
bayonets; we ourselves narrowly escaped death. Then we saw that from Forto
the Ethiopians had started bombing Ona with heavy artillery and tanks. They
had forced people to gather in an Orthodox Church there and then they
bombed the Church. Seven hundred were massacred; Ona was destroyed
school students went there in defiance of the soldiers and buried the dead501.
The foregoing stories were responsible for the development and entrenchment of Eritrean
identity and nationalism amongst the ordinary civilians and peasants in cities and villages.
Every time the Ethiopian troops had killed and massacred innocent Eritreans, the reaction
would intensify with more agitation, increased organisation ensued and firm commitment to
continue the war for total liberation was also fuelled. Thus, one lady from the outskirts of
Asmara expressed in Tigrigna and translated by Edna Yohannes: "Eritrea is part of me, part of
my joy and tears, part of my pain and happiness, it is my future and the future of my children".
Throughout Eritrea, almost everyone I spoke to had experienced torture, imprisonment, loss
of someone in a family, has a disabled person in a family, or lost valuable property. According
to Abeba Ghebreher, now Secretary to the Dean of Arts and Social Sciences at the University
of Asmara, the Ethiopian troops were notorious because they would kill somebody's son and
throw his body outside the house and parents of victims were not allowed to mourn or weep
for their dead. The situation, however, worsened when the EPLF operated near the city
because that would license the Ethiopian army to attack the civil population in revenge for the
EPLF attacks. The Ethiopian army would declare a severe curfew where Eritreans were often
rounded up and massacred. Those Eritreans who risked going out during the curfew, were
killed and displayed in the street. According to Mebrat, a bar tender, any slight event could
spark off a massacre or indiscriminate killings. For example, a fight with an Ethiopian soldier,
or when an Eritrean woman rejected an Ethiopian soldier, intellectual arguments in university
or public institutions also led to killing.
On democracy and democratisation, there is a general feeling that cuts across the elites,
fighters and civilian population that Eritrea's priority now is to engage in reconstruction and
rehabilitation. Members of the civilian population I had spoken to believe the EPLF-led
government has their backing, especially when the Front which brought them total freedom in
o' For the whoJe story, see Amrit Wilson, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
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1991 is still fresh in their minds. Others like Jordan Gebre-Medhin have often argued that the
values of democracy are not strange to traditional Eritrean way of life. For example, he
records that Eritrean peasants often launched constant opposition to colonial rule particularly
that of the Ethiopian administration and feudalism in the past 502 . There is also a widespread
believe that the government is doing what it can to fulfill the expectations of the people. For
example, Ato Tewelde, an elder and business man in Asmara expressed that business men like
him are happy because of the free market economy the government has adopted allowing free
competition on markets. "There are no restrictions on foreign exchange, I can give you
American dollars, Italian Lira, Deutsche Mark, and other monies", he argued. There is a
proliferation of housing projects throughout the country, more schools and hospitals have
been built, clean water reaches most inhabitable parts of Eritrea now, remote areas of the
country are now accessible more than before.
During these years of transition, there is, however, some grumbling and rumbling among
Eritrean urban-dwellers and returning exiles over the slow pace of economic liberalisation.
One Eritrean returnee from the United States expressed dismay over government bureaucracy:
I have been struggling to open a hotel business, and nobody listens to me. I
want to acquire land in the city to build a big hotel in the city of Asmara
because I have the money, nobody welcomes it. I know the reason one ex-
fighter now working in a government department told me the priority has been
given to former fighters. This is ridiculous because I believe freedom and
independence is for all Eritreans whether inside or outside the country and we
should be treated the same way.
The other largest number of Eritreans whose aspirations and prospects are linked to the
economy is that of the youth. They form a sizeable population given the fact that an estimated
half of the population is under seventeen years of age. As Markakis had correctly put it,
"Uninvolved in the nationalist struggle, young Eritreans are also uninfluenced by its Spartan
mores"503 . That is why the EPLF-led government worked out a strategy of how to involve
them in rebuilding the country's economy right after liberation. They are now drawn into
various reconstruction tasks and they participated actively in the referendum campaign. In
May 1994, the Ministry of Defence launched a National Service Programme, involving six
months military training and one year work in reconstruction tasks, for males between the ages
of 18 and 40, including those grown ups who never participated in the struggle. This national
502 See Jordan Gebre-Medhin, "Nationalism, Peasant Politics and the Emergence of a Vanguard Front
in Eritrea", Review of African Political Economy, no. 30(September 1984), pp. 48-57:49.
503 See John Markakis, "Eritrea's National Charter", op. cit., pp. 126-129.
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conscription was, however, met with severe criticism and rejection from those who think they
are too old to be trained. However, women, students, government and private employees
were exempted for the time being. Every year, hundreds of young students will be sent for the
training programme which takes place in Sawa, in the Barka region.
4.4. The Role of the Elites and the Rise of Peasant Consciousness
For years, various arguments concerning popular movements have been advanced regarding
the role of the elites on the one hand and that of the peasants on the other. As to whether
peasants are often inspired from above by the elites or that the elites have often snatched
peasant movements, has drawn scholarly attention for years. Under what circumstances do
peasants decide to act politically? How do they get mobilised to act collectively? What is the
source of their resources? How do peasants overcome their disorganised character as a
group? These are a number of questions scholars in the area have long asked504 . However, the
underlying assumption that peasant movements in Africa have more often been inspired from
above is rooted in the literature on nationalism. For example, from the 1950s and afterwards
most scholars have viewed rural protest primarily through the prism of nationalist discourse.
Hodgkin, Ranger, Crawford Young, Mazrui and Tidy, have in the past defmed all significant
rural movements as nationalist, protonationalist, or linked to nationalism505.
According to this trend of thought, the educated nationalist leaders were able to construct a
suitable political language which both penetrated and resonated throughout nonliterate rural
communities, winning the hearts and minds of rural folk. Though they were right, these
authors all paid scant attention to the type of rural protests which took place in rural Africa
such as those in Eritrea and Ethiopia designed to safeguard critical household resources
against the greed of feudal lords. To be sure, the primary aim of the rebeffions by rural
peasants against their local landlords and colonial infiltration was not to capture the state but
to protect themselves from exploitation. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, the enlightened elites took
See in particular Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of the Mau Mau (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 1987); Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Africa: Endurance and Change South of the
Sahara (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and Sidney Tarrow, "National Politics and
Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States", Annual
Review of Sociology, vol. 14(1988), pp. 42 1-440.
505 See Thomas L. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York: New York University Press,
1957); Terrence 0. Ranger, "Connections Between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and the Modern
Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa", Journal of African History, vol. 9, no. 3(1968), pp.
437-454; Crawford M. Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonisation and Independence (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, op. cit.
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hold of the crises over land and turned it against the feudal system and later on against what
was widely perceived to be the most unfair regimes in Ethiopia.
According to the EPLF, military victory over Ethiopia was only certain if the majority of the
Eritrean people, that is, the peasantry, were highly politicised to develop a single purpose of
mind and direction which it was conscious of. Thus, the peasant question was made a priority
by the EPLF, how to mobiise them, how to politicise and organise a new national democratic
solidarity of the Eritrean masses. In short, the success of the Eritrean liberation came about in
a long run due primarily to the special attention paid on the question of peasants. Thus, it was
not surprising that the EPLF mouthpiece was to read more often "The Eritrean peasantry is
the backbone and force of our national democratic revolution" 506 . In order to succeed in their
mobilisation programme, the EPLF carried out a class analysis of the rural areas and
distinguished the needs and interests of the rural population. Given that the Front had no
outside or external support, the burden of shouldering the war for Eritrean independence was
totally based on the Eritrean people. In a short while, the Eritrean peasantry became
convinced of the EPLF policies and took the burden of the struggle as their sole responsibility.
Thus, the fighting army of the Front became entirely constituted by the middle and poor
peasants. Besides that, the Front organised militias in the countryside and built its cell groups
from the same class of the population. Apart from its contributory factor as a fighting force,
the unarmed Eritrean peasantry supported the front-line fighters with supplies such as food,
water, and other necessities. According to Ato Paul Highfield, during the years of the split a
correct handling of the peasantry by any splinter group was crucial for the survival of that
particular group507.
The EPLF success in their mobilisation programme was also due primarily to their strategy of
the national democratic programme. It must be noted that the EPLF has had three major
Congresses where it outlined clearly its National Democratic Programme (NDP) and only
changed it into a National Charter for Eritrea when the Front adopted the new name People 's
Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in its Third Congress in 1994508. In 1975, the
Front's first NDP was founded on the belief that "the Eritrean revolution has to be based on
506 See EPLF, Vanguard, 1987, p.23.
507 Ato Paul Highfield is English and works for the Ministry of Education in the curriculum
department. He joined the EPLF in the 1970s. (Conversation Asmara 1996).
508 For details of the three major documents, refer to the following EPLF documents: Objectives of the
National Democratic Pro gramnme, op. cit.; Political Report and National Democratic Programme, op
cit.; and A National Charter for Eritrea, op. cit
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the worker-peasant alliance". The alliance of the peasantry was crucial if the proletariat was
to be victorious over its enemies and, similarly, it was believed the peasantry could not win a
was without the leadership of the proletariat. And as Professor Bereket acknowledged in a
conversation:
You can only operate a revolution quite efficiently if there is some kind of
hierarchical order which establishes and allocates roles; and for such roles to
function efficiently they must be led. In this case, the elite factor cannot be
minimised. The only problem is that the elites must not mismanage their
power. Instead the elite power must be useful for influencing the masses. Thus
the elites are often there to facilitate the struggle by providing vital logistical
support, efficient leadership and a functioning structure.
In a way, the EPLF strategy was to organise the struggle in some kind of Marxist order where
the national democratic revolution becomes coterminous with the socialist one. The first stage
was transitional, where the alliance of all democratic forces, in particular the worker-peasant
affiance against feudalism, colonialism, and imperialism must be forged. This was then a pre-
condition for the success of the second stage, namely, the socialist revolution. Behind the first
stage are the peasantry, who lead a wretched life and constitute the majority, they are the main
force. However, this transitional stage of the democratic revolution demanded the guidance
and leadership of the workers. The first stage was dialectically related to and the foundation
for the success of the second stage where the socialist mode of production and socio-
economic relations take place. Hence, the adoption of a national democratic programme
based on the demise of two-stage revolution509.
At this point, part two of the EPLF programme dealing with agriculture directly concerned the
peasantry, where their effort was to:
Abolish feudal land relations and carry out an equitable distribution of land.
Strive to introduce co-operative farms by creating conditions of co-operation
and mutual assistance so as to develop a modern and advanced system of
agriculture and animal husbandry capable of increasing the income and
improving the lot of the peasantry. Promote an association that will organise,
politicise and arm the peasants with a clear revolutionary outlook so they can
fully participate in the anti-colonial and anti-feudal struggle, defend the gains of
See in particular a major literature that articulated EPLF's strategy of mobilisation by the Eritrean
scholar, Jordan Gebre-Medhin, "Eritrea: Background to Revolution", Monthly Review, vol. 28, no.
4(1976), pp. 52-61; "Nationalism, Peasant Politics & the Emergence of a Vanguard Front in Eritrea",
Review of African Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 48-5; and Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea: A
Critique of Ethiopian Studies, op. cit.
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the revolution, free themselves from the oppression and economic exploitation,
and manage their own affairs510.
In other words, the examination of peasant social structure in light of the history that preceded
it proved of importance. Thus, the outcome of historical studies demonstrated that the Front
considered land, labour, means of production, production relations, and superstructural
relations of greater salience in the process of building a popular movement. The EPLF took
an independently systematic study of each region, each section, and each village in relation to
the overall Eritrean situation. According to those involved in the project, no a priori
assumptions were made as to the revolutionary nature of a certain fraction of rural peasant
population. The then Chairman of the Department of Mass Administration summed the
method of peasant mobilisation in the following way:
Our organisation makes thorough preparations before it initiates the struggle.
We make detailed investigation of the political, economic and social life of the
village where the land reform is to be carried out. We study the relations and
contradictions between various tribes and nationalities, the strength of the
feudalists and other reactionaries, the influence of religious fanaticism and other
backward sentiments. We then analyse the level of organisation and
consciousness of the masses. Our experience shows that it is not correct to
assume a priori that in every particular case the poor and middle peasants will
take a resolute stand in favour of land reform, even though the people and
middle peasants may realise that the land reform is in effect their stand. If the
land reform does not succeed or is reversed, the poor and middle peasants fear
that the feudalists wifi expropriate their land or deprive them of the means of
gaining supplementary income. For this reason, the poor and middle peasants
might oppose the land reform to take a wavering stand. To ensure the success
of the land reform, we organise the poor, middle and rich peasants separately
and carry out sustained propaganda and agitation so as to raise the
consciousness and develop the self-confidence of the oppressed peasants. In
addition we organise a core of the most conscious peasants to terrorise the
feudalists and suppress them if necessary. If in addition a people's Assembly
dominated the poor and middle peasants is established, an extremely favourable
situation is created for successful land reform511.
In most parts of Eritrea, the interest of the peasantry often clashed with the interests of the
Ethiopian state bureaucracy. So when the EPLF liberated an area, it was not uncommon to
see peasants who had lived in the village for years without a portion of land. Because
510 See EPLF, National Democratic Programme, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
511 Sobhat Efrem has been promoted to the rank of General and he is currently the Minister of Defence.
This quotation is an extract from an interview he carried out with the Front's mouthpiece. See EPLF,
Vanguard, 3, 1-21-32 (1978).
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whenever peasants demanded that land be redistributed, the Ethiopian government cared less
about their complaints. Thus, the holding of the landlords and rich peasants had increased
while the number of poor and middle peasants had also increased. Rural class differentiation
favouring those who had land, the labour and the implements to exploit it, became acute
throughout the period of Haile Selassie's imperial reign512.
Fully aware of the common discontent amongst Eritrean peasant population, the EPLF quickly
adopted an effective strategy of mobilisation by infiltrating villages and agitate them first,
against the local hierarchy and enrol them in the membership of the Front. For example, in
1974 the EPLF dispatched its armed propaganda unit to villages near and around big towns.
In Azen vifiage, their role was to promote democratic political agitation, mobiise the peasant
masses, and initiate the necessary rural class struggle after a careful assessment of the
economic situation. Thus, conscious peasants were recruited from among the poor and middle
peasants and organised in underground cells, in preparation for building democratic mass
organisations. The peasant association of the EPLF in Azen was built in this manner. As soon
as the necessary mass homework was successfully done, an open democratic fight ensued.
The people of the village assembled and the question of village political power was openly
discussed for the first time. Now all the able-bodied villages participated in this open struggle
for the first time. The village assembly was freed of being under the control of the ruling
classes or being attended only by men. Thus, the assembly transformed into an arena of mass
class struggle with each individual in the village, regardless of religion or sex, having full rights
to participate. This is how the mass organ of the EPLF summed up the village situation in
Azen:
The question of political power was raised at mass political meetings ... In the
course of the discussions two diametrically opposed views were presented.
The overwhelniing majority of the peasants spearheaded by the cell members
voted for the popularly elected village assembly. The feudal lords and a section
of the rich peasants were for preserving the status quo, but their view was
totally unacceptable to the peasant masses and was repudiated and condemned
outright. Women who never participated in political meetings and had no
political rights before played a vigorous role in the historic event. It was a
turning point for Azen513.
512 Jordan Gebre-Medhin illustrates this case in the story of Azen, a village in Hamasien Province of
Asmara. See his "Nationalism, Peasant Politics & the Emergence of a Vanguard Front in Eritrea ",
op. cit., p. 55.
513 See AESNA (Association of Eritrean Students in North America), "EPLF Leading Peasants Masses'
and Eritrean Peasant Intensify Class Struggle", Eritrea in Struggle, vol. 2, nos. 2&3(1977), p. 5.
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After intense political and agitational work in Azen, under the EPLF guidance, a chain of
similar reactions proliferated elsewhere in the country. From thence, a united front action of
the peasantry in rural Eritrea was finally awaken and land came under the control of the
peasantry. However, the EPLF strategy did not go unchallenged, the Front had to experience
some opposition from the status quo circles. For example, the Church in particular reacted by
preaching about the unholy and anti-religious nature of the EPLF, but with less effects since
changes were evidently in favour of the majority of the population. The major effect of the
EPLF mobilisation offensive was the Final collapse of the magic of high culture in Eritrea's
liberated areas and the subsequent triumph of the peasantry.
Therefore, the correct handling of the land issue resulted in the active participation of the
peasants with clear political direction. Though the EPLF provided the necessary guidance to
the peasantry by introducing their NDP, the actual work of liberating the peasants from the
yoke of feudal idiocy, oppression and exploitation was done by the peasants themselves. This
proves that what peasants often need is prior intense politicisation and clear indication that the
programme of mobilisation would deliver them concrete goods in order for them to rise and
act against injustice and political suppression and oppression. On this point, Ambassador
Haile Menkerios was bold enough to say, "Elites of course start the conscientisation of the
ordinary people. But once mobilised, the peasants' involvement generates new power, this
takes years, in the case of Eritrea, thirty years. However, the long process pays because is in
itself a process of empowerment". By the end of 1977, more than 90% of the Eritrean
territory was under the control of anti-government establishments. Thus the EPLF's control of
areas like Azen was a display of peasant emancipation. Therefore, Eritrean nationalist
discourses have often emphasised that it was in the cauldron of war and revolution-which
involved massive social mobilisation across class, gender, religious and ethnic differences-that
the culturally and socially diverse population of Eritrea was forged into a single identity
forming a cohesive political nation.
In general, the EPLF had two major successful strategies of mobilisation: land reform and self-
reliance. We have already seen how the strategy of land reform played a crucial role not only
during the years of the liberation struggle itself, but has continued to do so in post-war
restructuring. In the same vein, the strategy of self-reliance was effective given that the Front
had no outside or external support. Self-reliance has as well permeated the Eritrean society so
much that the people know the country's survival and success remains on their shoulders. This
strategy was the consequence of the harsh environment, the narrow ravines and rugged terrain,
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though in military terms, the EPLF were proud to exclaim, "The mountains are our friends"514.
Throughout the struggle, EPLF maintained its transport system for delivering the necessary
equipment and even food for fighters and inhabitants of drought-stricken liberated areas. The
captured fleet of trucks were kept in good running condition by a network of garage staffed by
mechanics trained by the movement, capable not only of servicing and repairing but converting
military booties and destroyed trucks for transport and even for engineering of spare parts.
However, military effectiveness does not depend only on sound tactics and self-reliance or
land reform alone, but demanded efficient political mobilisation for the support of the broader
mass population. Thus, the provision of services such as health, education, famine relief
(whose creative activities has been documented by several other observers 515), was the crucial
proof that the EPLF was a viable organisation that can not only defeat the enemy but is
capable of also effectively running a government of a future independent Eritrea.
514 "The mountains are our friends" became EPLF's slogan. See Lionel Cliffe, "Dramatic Shifts in the
Military Balance in the Horn: The 1984 Eritrean Offensive", Review of African Political Economy, no.
30(September 1984), pp. 93-97.
515 See Roy Pateman, "Drought, Famine and Development", in Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson (ed.),
Eritrea: The Long Struggle for Independence and Constructive Peace, op. cit., pp. 163-186; and Mark
Duffield and John Predendergast, Without Troops and Tanks: Hu,nanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia
and Eritrea (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1994).
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DEMOCRATISATION THROUGH LIBERATION: ETHIOPIAN SELF-VIEWS
Introduction
Post-colonial liberation movements in the African continent at large do not in particular aim,
as some commentators have pointed out, "to take over the state structure established by their
predecessors and to use it, suitably adapted, as an agency for economic development, national
integration, and the consolidation of their own power" 516 . The EPRDF, EPLF (PFDJ),
NRM/A, SPLM/A and/or Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation
of Congo-Zaire, are all aiming at the total deconstruction of the state structure and its
apparatus and the replacement of these by new and often more democratic ones. It is now all
clear that liberation movements in Sub-S aharan Africa are led by revolutionary intellectuals
whose challenge against the dictatorship of the first generation of African leaders has received
popular response from the African masses. In fact, decolonisation left, if not encouraged,
corrupt state structures that have in turn provided the ground for dissent and political
fragmentation, and post-colonial liberation movements have struggled to restore and foster
national integration by introducing structures of accountability and transparency.
The liberation movement to democratise Ethiopia was started by the popular masses and
revolutionary intellectuals in the early 1 970s, and was unfortunately hijacked by the military
junta, later infamously known as the Dergue. The assumption of power by the Dergue in
Ethiopia led to the replacement of the monarchy with a military autocracy which shelved the
democratic agenda until its total overthrow in 1991. However, it is important to note that the
1974 Revolution in Ethiopia was preceded by decades of opposition, both covert and overt.
The attempted coup d'etat of 1960, for example, marked a watershed in the political
opposition in post-World War II Ethiopia. For years, opposition tended to be conspirational
and elitist, but after the 1960 coup, it became more open and mass-based. In fact, opposition
politics against the Emperor accelerated thereafter and assumed many facets. For example,
peasants rebelled against increasing demands on their produce. Nationalities rose in arms for
self-determination. Intellectuals struggled for their vision of a just and equitable order. Even
some members of the ruling class are reported to have favoured the removal of Haile Selassie I
believing that this might avert the total collapse of the socio-economic order 517 . In short, three
main groups became involved in the contest for the control of the state during and after the
516 
See for example, Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuily, op. cit., p. 14.
See Bahru Zewde, op. cit., p. 209.
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collapse of the monarchy: the military, the civilian opposition led mainly by the intelligentsia,
and fmally, the nationalist liberation movements that were either striving to detach their
regions from the Ethiopian state or fought for greater autonomy (Tigray, Gondar, Hararghe
and particularly Eritrean and Somali nationals)518.
As will be shown later on in the chapter, the fight for the establishment of popular democratic
foundations for the political future of Ethiopia and aspiration to acknowledge the rights of
national minorities for self-expression and autonomy have for the first time been brought to
public discourse by the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). To be
sure, not much has been written about the EPRDF except for those works that have simply
mentioned it in the course of writing about either ethnic liberation movements such as the
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Somali-irredentists
fronts, or mentioned it simply as a party that is presently in charge in Ethiopia 519 . On the other
hand, the Monarchy, the Ethiopian Empire, and the 1974 Revolution has been widely written
about 520 . The EPRDF is discussed here as a liberation movement that has truly brought total
518 See John Markakis and Nega Ayele, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea
Press, 1986), Introduction to American Edition; Shehim Kassim, "Ethiopia, Revolution and the
Question of Nationalism: The Case of the Afar", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.23, no.
2(1985), pp. 33 1-348; and Paul Baxter, "The Problem of the Oromo or the Problem for the Oromo", in
I.M. Lewis (ed.), Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa, op. cit., pp. 129-149.
519 John Young mentions EPRDF when writing about the TPLF, see his works: "Peasants and
Revolution In Ethiopia: The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, 1975-199]", op. cit.; "The Tigray and
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts", op. cit.; "Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia", op. cit.; Peter
Woodward mentions EPRDF only ten times or so, see his The Horn of Africa: State Politics and
International Relations (London: Tauris, 1996); Christopher Clapham does not allocate a significant
portion to EPRDF in his Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sarah Vaughan only examines the EPRDF's entry
into Addis Ababa and the July negotiations for the formation of the TGE, see her The Addis Ababa
Transitional Conference of July 1991, op. cit.; and Asafa Jalata, Oromia and Ethiopia: State
Formation and Ethnonatjonal Conflict, 1868-1992 (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1992). One only
source, though fragmented, but critical of the EPRDF is Ethiopian Review, a journal controlled mainly
byEthiopian dissidents in Los Angeles, especially the 1991-1993 series.
520 Notable among these works of scholarship include: Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, op. cit.;
Christopher Clapham, Continuity and Change in Revolutionamy Ethiopia, op. cit.; Edmond J. Keller,
Revolutionary Ethiopia, op. cit.; Rene Lefort, Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?, op. cit.; David and
Marina Ottoway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: African Publishing Company, 1978);
Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-1987: A Transformation From an
Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Mulati
Wubneh and Yohannis Abate, Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa (Boulder,
Col.: Wsetview Press, 1988); on the Monarchy and the Empire see Darrell Bates, The Abyssinian
Difficulty: The Emperor Theodorus and the Magdala Camnpaign 1867-68 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979); Donald Crummey, Priests and Politicians: Protestants and Catholic Missionaries in
Orthodox Ethiopia 1830-1868 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); R.H. Kofi Darkwah, Shewa,
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change in the political history of Ethiopia. For the first time, an Ethiopian Constitution has
allowed the right of self-determination to its different nationalities and indeed the right to
secession521 . Today, Ethiopia is neither ruled by descendants of the Agau Dynasty nor by a
military autocracy. Even though the EPRDF took over power through the barrel of the gun,
many including even representatives of Western democracies, believe Meles Zenawi (add
Museveni, Issaias, or Kagame) became soldiers by default 522 . Ethiopia's past of negus, ras,
tsahafe t'ezaz, dailach, bajerond or other royal titles have been totally destroyed by the
successful liberation alliance movement in 1991. Politics has now been upgraded and people
can elect their leaders through the ballot box523.
In order to fully comprehend the liberation struggle for democracy in Ethiopia, this chapter
wifi briefly trace the genesis of modern political life in Ethiopia back to its mythologies and
royal chronicles. While feudalism provided a fertile ground for the 1974 Revolution after
some three thousand years, the military autocracy which succeeded it, left forces of change
with no option other than the mobilisation of protracted mass-based movements. Though the
era of the Dergue delayed the transition from monarchical rule to democratic governance, the
rise of revolutionary intellectuals in the 1970s intensified armed resistance which later on
became fully fledged mass-based liberation movements in the late 1980s until the fmal victory
of a broader affiance in 1991. Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society and, somewhat in contrast to
Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813-1889 (london, 1975); Girma-Selassie Asfaw and Richard
Pankhurst, Tax Records and Inventories of Emperor Tewodros of Ethiopia (London: SOAS, 1979);
Harold G. Marcus, The Lfe and Times of Menelik II. Ethiopia 1844-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975); Sven Rubenson, King of Kings: Tewodros of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I
University Press, 1966); in idem, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London, 1976); and
Alesandro Triulzi, Salt, Gold and Legitimacy: Prelude to the History of a No-Man 's-Land, Bela
Shangul. Wallagga, Ethiopia, c. 1800-1898 (Naples, 1981).
521 See "The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia" (unofficial English
translation from the Amharic original), Addis Ababa, 8th December 1995, Pp. 18-19, where nation,
nationality or people are defined in the constitution as "a group of people who have or share a large
measure of a common culture, or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief (sic.) in a
common or related identities, and who predominantly inhabit an identifiable, contiguous territory", and
article 39 of the 1995 Constitution proclaims, "every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an
unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession". See also Constitutional
Commission, Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Basic Constitutional Concepts (Addis Ababa:
TGE, 1993); and EPRDF, On tile Question of Peace in Ethiopia (London: EPRDF, 1990).
522 Separate conversations with Mr. Robert Houdek, United States Ambassador, Mr. Claudio Bay-
Rossi, Italian Ambassador, and Mr. Wolfgang Ringe, German Ambassador, op. cit.
521 See in particular Kinfe Abraham, Ethiopia: From Bullets to the Ballot Box, op. cit., (emphasis
added).
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Eritrea, liberation movements there have more often been ethnically-based. Even though the
resentment against Amhara domination perpetrated by the rise of the Agau Dynasty is shared
across the majority of Ethiopian society, party politics during and after the 1974 Revolution
tended to follow ethnic or regional lines.
This chapter will also show that the social revolution in Ethiopia was started not by the
military but by university students, the intelligentsia and was supported by the masses in the
cities. When the people's revolution was hijacked by the army, remnants of it fled northward
fearing military intimidation and incrimination. It is these remnants who later on constituted
the membership of the various guerrilla insurgencies in Ethiopia. Most of them were from
Tigray who found their way to Eritrea and got trained by the EPLF to form the Tigray Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF). Theodros Dagne explained:
Reportedly, there were 37 students most of whom were active in the Ethiopian
student movement, but committed Tigrean nationalists as well. They were also
Marxists, with few exceptions. Most were in their early twenties and had gone
to the same elementary or high school, or University of Addis Ababa. Out of
the 37 founders of the movement, 11 were reportedly sent to the field to start
the armed struggle with five guns, some to Eritrea for military training, while
others remained in the cities to agitate. The current Defence Minister, Seye
Abraha, was one of the originals sent to Eritrea for military training524.
It was the TPLF who, in turn, became instrumental in the formation of an-all rebel affiance
from other parts of Ethiopia against the Dergue, leading to the birth of the ruling party, the
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989.
Just as the previous chapter on Eritrea, this chapter will first, in 5.1. and 5.2., present the
genesis of the liberation struggle in Ethiopia and then, in a second part, analyse how
Ethiopians look at their struggle for liberation and democracy, before we look again at the role
of elites in the struggle.
524 See Theodros Dagne, "EPRDF's Rise to Political Dominance", Ethiopian Review (December 1992),
pp. 17-20:17.
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5.1. The Genesis of the Liberation Struggle for Democracy in Ethiopia
(a) Historical Antecedents of the Struggle: Feudalism and Military Autocracy
Present-day Ethiopia's political problems are often traceable to centuries of monarchical rule
and more than a decade of military autocracy. Virtually all scholars of Ethiopia's history and
politics do concur that current political events in Ethiopia cannot be dealt with in isolation
from the past. The multiplicity of the Ethiopian people, their links to ancient history and
culture are reflected in Ethiopian traditions very much alive today. For years, Ethiopia's
political scene was dominated by the An-tharas on the basis of dynastic credentials, traditional
claims, demographic advantage, or the advantage of being endowed with resources. Although
such domination survived for millennia, at the second half of this century changes in the global
order began taking place. For example, the struggle between the communist and the capitalist
blocks had been on the upswing, particularly after 1948. Secondly, the era of decolonisation
in Africa could be said to have been ushered in with the independence of Ghana in 1957. And
in addition, Arab nationalism was on the rise, and the world's growing polarisation found
Ethiopia in the camp of the USA and Israel525.
Even though the membership of the nonalignment movement and later on the location of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa restored a certain veneer of neutrality to
the autocratic regime, it did not cleanse it enough for the regime to be viewed as sufficiently
neutral within the framework of world politics. Moreover the imperial regime continued its
heavy handed treatment of the new generation of Ethiopians with exposure to modern
education and some knowledge of world affairs. This use of brute force together with its
hollow propaganda was bound to boomerang on the imperial regime. In 1960, the emperor
experienced the first challenge to his very throne in the form of an abortive coup d'etat that
included "trusted elements of the Imperial Body Guard, the police, and the Security Branch, as
well as individuals" 526 . The press proclamation of the coup leaders read: "While the newly
formed independent African nations are making progress, Ethiopia is lagging behind, and this
fact is now realised. Ethiopia has always been lulled by vain promises. This realisation
See Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974: The Politics of
Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
526 See Robert Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (London: Pall Mall, 1965); and Bahru
Zewde, A Histoiy.of Modern Ethiopia, 1885-1974, op. cit., pp.
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resulted during the past two years in an active movement among farmers, merchants,
government officials, the armed forces, and the educated class .
Although Haile Selassie managed to suppress the coup d'etat, the event had planted the seeds
of dissent and revolution. For example, in 1961, a group that called itself "The National Front
Movement in Ethiopia" published a programme of revolutionary opposition to the monarchical
regime which read in its opening paragraph: "After centuries of independence and twenty
years [1941-1961] of a so-called modern government the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians
still live under medical [?] conditions of poverty, disease, ignorance and recurring famine".
The document further discussed issues such as "political tyranny", "the cult of personality",
"civil rights", "justice", "education", "foreign policy", and "feudalism and economic progress"
with regard to which it decided that the regime was a total failure. In the conclusion it stated:
The matter is that even with best intentions economic and social development is
of necessity impossible under the prevailing feudal agrarian structure, [sic.]
Institutional changes, including a radical change in the present system of
landholding and the self-appointed feudal autocracy, are fundamental
prerequisites of economics [sic.] and social development in Ethiopia. Nothing
less than this will release the energies of our people from the present dormant
and passive attitude, to a more dynamic and constructive attitude which should
form the only sound basis for economic and social development of our
country528.
This memorandum argued that no social transformation would take place without social and
political revolution. The consequence of this was the emergence of two major facets to
revolution: first the Eritrean nationalists (examined in the previous chapter) had already been
bracing themselves for a forceful seizure of independence; and the Ethiopian Student
Movement had emerged during the period between l96O1974529. By 1974, students and the
intelligentsia had succeeded in instigating public unrest which led to the overthrow of the
autocratic monarchy. The 1974 Revolution was meant to deconstruct the Amhara basis of
527 See R. Ronning Balsvik, Haile Selassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to
Revolution, 1952-1977 (East Lancing: African Studies Centre, Michigan State University, 1985), p.
94.
528 The full text of this statement came out in Ethiopia's Monthly Review that year and reprinted later
onin Challenge, No. 1(1968), pp. 26-32.
529 See Adhana Haile Adhana, "The Roots of Organised Internal Armed Conflicts in Ethiopia", in Terje
Tvedt (ed.), Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: Human and Ecological Consequences of Waifare
(Uppsala: Reprocentralen HSC, 1993); one person who details information on the student movement is
R. Ronning Balsvik, Haile Selassie 's Students, op. cit.; and on the Eritrean liberation struggle, see
chapter four abQve.
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power by proving that those less endowed with resources or the small nations also have
legitimate rights to participate in the country's political process, economic life and in the
burdensome task of rebuilding it. Even though this aim was not achieved, the 1974
Revolution marked the beginning of Ethiopia's seventeen years (besides the thirteen years
previously engaged with Eritrea from 1961) of organised armed resistance that culminated in
the overthrow of the Dergue in May 1991. Therefore, an autocratic monarchy succeeded by
an autocratic military regime laid the foundation upon which liberation movements for
democracy in Ethiopia were built. These two successive periods of autocratic rule deserve
separate examination.
(i) The Rise of Imperial Autocracy and Its Demise
As we have pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the aim of looking at the far past of
Ethiopia's political systems is not merely an exercise of historical revisionism, but rather that
of showing the foundation upon which the current system is built. The liberation struggle for
democracy in Ethiopia has its historical antecedents dating back to some three thousand years
ago. Conventionally, Ethiopian history begun with the visit to Solomon, King of Israel, by
Queen of Sheba, who allegedly came from Ethiopia in the tenth century B.C530. Thus, Babru
Zewde, himself an Ethiopian historian, writes:
The Kebra Nagast ('Glory of Kings'), written in the early fourteenth century,
which gave the 'received' account of the story of the Queen of Sheba and King
Solomon, not only linked the Ethiopian Kings to the House of Israel, but also
sealed the identification of the term Ethiopia with the country: since the
thirteenth century, when a dynasty that claimed to represent the restoration of
the Solomonic line came to rule the country, its rulers have styled themselves
'King of Kings of Ethiopia'531.
This reference affirms the truth of Ethiopia's three thousand years of history. For centuries,
Ethiopia was referred to by the name of 'Abyssinia' and acquired its present geographical
shape and multi-ethnicity only by expansionist conquest in the nineteenth century 532 . In fact, it
has for years been difficult to decide upon which date to begin from when writing about
history of Ethiopia can be traced as far back as three thousand years ago; it is even mentioned in
both the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible. See in particular the Books of Prophet
Jeremiah, Ch. 13:23; and the Acts of the Apostles, Ch. 8:27.
' See his A History of Modern Ethiopia 1885-1974, Op. cit., p. 1.
532 See Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974).
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Ethiopia's body politique. For the purpose of this thesis, 1855 is the date chosen from which
to trace the roots of revolutionary thought in Ethiopia.
The medieval Christian Ethiopian Empire had disintegrated into small feudal kingdoms. Before
1855, central authority was not effectively constituted in Ethiopia and the present geographic
boundaries were not established until 1908. The period of state growth and power
consolidation began in 1855 under four successive emperors, ending with the overthrow of
Emperor Haile Selassie I by a "creeping revolution" in l974. Thus, the man who is credited
as the main architect of Ethiopia's first effective unification and independence was Kasa
Haylu, crowned in 1855 as Emperor Tewodros II. He became the principle inaugurator of
Ethiopia's present history. According to Bahru Zewde, Kasa was a self-made man, who
became Tewodros by means of his own personal qualities: "his sense of mission, his military
skill and valour and his extraordinary intelligence" 534 . During and after the 1974 Revolution,
Mengistu Haile Mariam, the military autocrat, often invoked the qualities of Tewodros II for
modeffing himself to appeal to Ethiopians of his time for support, despite the fact that he also
claimed resentment of monarchical rule as a primary motive for the revolution.
Tewodros II has been described as the first monarch who introduced modernisation in present-
day Ethiopia535 . Even though Tewodros's concept of modernisation was vague because the
reforms he attempted to introduce lacked consistency and method, his reign laid a foundation
for what later on came to be known as modern Ethiopia under Menelik II. Tewodros had a
clear vision of constructing a powerful Ethiopian state and used Western technology which in
turn earned him recognition by Western powers. Tewodros successfully re-established a single
Ethiopian state with a vision which his successors sustained, and which ultimately made
Ethiopia survive as the sole independent indigenous African state in the middle of the
European scramble for Africa536 . However, Tewodros was an over ambitious emperor because
This period is remembered as that of construction and consolidation of the modern Ethiopian state.
See in particular Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia. From Empire to People's Republic, op.
cit.; Mordechai Abir, The Era of the Princes (London: Longmans, 1968); and John Harbeson, The
Ethiopian Transformation (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1988).
534 See Bahru Zewde, op. cit., pp. 27-80.
See Donald Crummey, "Tewodros as Reformer and Moderniser", Journal of African History, vol.
10, no. 3(1969).
536 See Sven Rubenson, King of Kings Tewodros of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I
University, 1966); Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: Fro,n Autocracy to Revolution (London: ROAPE, 1975), p.
2; and Haggai Eruich, Ethiopia and Eritrea During the Scramble for Africa: A Political Biograph y of
RasAlula 1875J897 (East Lansing, 1982).
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his programme of conquest even included the liberation of Jerusalem. Later on, the failure of
his vision backfired forcing him to commit suicide in the face of a British expeditionary force
sent to rescue imprisoned Europeans.
Tewodros II was succeeded by Yohannes IV of Tigray, who first had to defeat other rival
leaders in Ethiopia before ascending to the throne. It was Yohannes who successfully
defended Ethiopia (including Eritrea) against external invaders in 1875 and 1876, particularly
against the first Italian incursions from the coast and the Mandist from the Sudan where he
finally met his death in 1 Yohannes' reign is famous for having followed a substantially
different policy of unification. As opposed to his predecessor's confrontation with regional
powers, Yohannes IV was ready to devolve power to clients and subordinates who recognised
his claims as 'King of Kings' of all the regional chiefs. While Tewodros had restored the
image of "Greater Ethiopia", Menelik II, who succeeded the throne after Yohannes TV's
death, had the best claim of all the three great 19th century emperors to be considered as the
founder of the modern Ethiopian state538.
Menelik's claim to historical distinction was that he presided over the realisation of an idea
that had first been kindled in the fiery mind of Tewodros II. His reign witnessed a ferocious
process of conquest, annexation, incorporation and subjugation of peoples and territories - the
creation of a typical pre-capitalist empire-state. In the process, the entire socio-political and
economic foundations of modern Ethiopia were laid down. The socio-historical product of
this era of empire building is what Addis Hiwet has characterised as "military-feudal-
colonialism"539 . The borders of this expansionist empire were accepted by the colonial powers
after the 1896 battle of Adowa, where for the first time since Hannibal a native African army
had defeated a colonial army. For this reason, virtually the whole complex socio-political
structure of modern Ethiopia, say from 1900-1970s, was evolved directly out of and is based
upon it.
531 See G.N.K. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941-] 952, op. cit., pp. 7-8; and Araya
seggai, "The History of the Eritrean Struggle", in Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson (ed.), op. cit., pp.
68-71.
538 See Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik 111844-1913, op. cit.; John Markakis,
Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, op. cit.; Bahru Zewde, op. cit., dates his book from that
time; and Kjetil Tronvoll and Oyvind Aadland, The Process of Democratisation in Ethiopia - An
Expression of Popular Participation Political Resistance?, Human Rights Report No. 5 (Oslo:
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1995), pp. 22-23.
. See Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, op. cit., p. 3.
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Thus, without a clear grasp of this concept it is virtually impossible to understand any of the
fundamental elements of pre-and post-war Ethiopian socio-political realities. As mentioned
above, Menelik II had defeated the Italians at Adowa in 1896, the birth place of a future
president and prime minister of Ethiopia after the EPRDF successful liberation of the country
in l99l°. The only thorny issue left by the Menelik era was that of Eritrea because the
emperor had failed to repossess it from the Italians 541 . Since that failure, Eritreans often
referred to Italy's presence in their land as the de facto point in history that legitimised their
independence claim, an argument the EPRDF leaders later on conceded to and allowed Eritrea
to partition from Ethiopia. Despite that, there are many things Menelik II is also to date
praised for. For example, he moved the capital from Ankobar to the slopes of Entotto and
then to present day Addis Ababa, and linked it to the outside world by building Africa's
historical railway to Djibouti, in which the first Western educational and administrative
structures were created542 . After Menelik II, controlling Addis Ababa became a control of
national political power and that, for the first time in history, shifted the fight for power
amongst regional rulers to the city543 . In other words, the construction of Addis Ababa made
rival regional rulers less important who were then obliged to look to Addis Ababa for
recognition. In precise terms, it is widely acknowledged that the life style and system of
present-day Ethiopia begun during the reign of Menelik jj544
However, Menelik's last years created difficult moments in Ethiopia's early political history.
Following his protracted illness and up to his death in December 1913, the Emperor had
designated his grandson, Lej Iyyasu, a boy of twelve years of age, as his successor in the
a proper recording of the battle of Adowa, see G.F.H. Berkeley, The Gampaign of Adowa and
the Rise of Menelik (London, 1902). There is no written biography yet, but reliable sources confirm
that Meles Zenawi, Chairman of EPRDF, formerly President of the TGE and currently Prime Minister,
was born in Adowa, a town of the Province of Tigray. In fact the TPLF has been led by people from
Adowa since its formation. Its first Chairman, Sebhat Nega (1979-1989) is also from Adowa. See
Theodros Dagne, "EPRDF's Rise to Political Dominance", Ethiopian Review, op. cit., p. 18.
See B. Thompson, Ethiopia: The Country That Cut Off its Head (London: Robson Books, 1975).
542 See Bahru Zewde, op. cit., p. 69; and Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuily, op.
cit., p. 27.
'° See Charles W. McClellan, "Articulating Economic Modernisation and National Integration at the
Periphery: Addis Ababa and Sidamo's Provincial Centers", African Studies Review, vol. 33, no. l(April
1990), pp. 29-54.
See in particular the UNESCO General History of Africa, Volume VII, Africa Under Colonial
Domination 1880-1935, ed. Adu A. Boahen (London: James Currey, 1985); and Harold G. Marcus,
The Lifes and Times of Menelik II, op. cit.
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middle of 1908. But later in the same year, Menelik became paralysed and lost the power of
speech and was, therefore, forced to appoint Ras Tasamma (a former general) as an immediate
successor to the throne. Unfortunately, Ras Tasamma's Regency did not last for long because
he died shortly in 1911, and the Ethiopian Council of State was also forced to declare the
young designate, Lej Iyyasu, as old enough to act for himself with their guidance.
Unfortunately, Iyyasu's background suggested his father, Ras Mikael, ruler of Wollo, was
impetuous by nature. Iyyasu's family rule was concentrated only in Wollo earning him no
wider power base outside the province. Worse of all, his policies had alienated the nobles, the
Church dignitaries and the Allied delegations in Addis Ababa. For example, he had
encouraged close ties with the Muslim World and his foreign policies supported Germany,
Austria-Hungary and Turkey on the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. As a result, he
was deposed in September 1916 and kept in prison until his death in 1935. Menelik's
daughter, Zawditu, was thereupon crowned Empress, and Tafari, son of the deceased
Emperor's cousin Ras Makonnen, was made Regent and heir to the throne. That means
Empress Zawditu's coronation, on February 11th 1917, was followed by a regime of dual
authority in which power was shared between the Empress and the Regent, each with a palace,
a distinct group of followers and often conflicting policies. To be sure, the advent of Tafari as
Regent was an event of importance, in that he was a resolute leader desirous of resuming
Menelik's policies of promodernisation and of maintaining Ethiopia's independence. His
personal style enabled him to gradually extend his power during the regency over several
crucial areas of the public sector and, in 1928, he was crowned Negus (King), and assumed
complete control of the government. Thus, a brief description of Haile Selassie's rise to
power is important here because his reign marked the end of monarchical rule in Ethiopia.
(ii) Haile Selassie I's Reign: Farewell to Monarchical Rule in Ethiopia
First and foremost, Emperor Haile Selassie I was the last of the four major emperors of
Ethiopia who reigned between 1855-1974. His reign waved a farewell to monarchical rule in
Ethiopia. He was born in 1892 in Harar to Yeshi-emabet All and Ras Makonnen, he was
named Tafari Makonnen. In his biography, it is mentioned that Tafari Makonnen learned to
write and read both Ge 'ez (the liturgical language of the Church) and Amharic (the national
language of Ethiopia) from clerical tutors and became fluent in French through foreign tutors.
When his father died in 1906 Tafari joined the nobles at Menelik's court in 1907 where he also
attended the new Menelik II school in Addis Ababa. By 1916, Tafari had served consecutively
as Governor of Garamullata, Salale, Basso, Sidamo and Harar, even though such early
appointments were only titular and symbolic. However, his ascendency to the throne was not
an easy task. 'He had a number of challenges, but due to his shrewd character he managed to
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overcome them. On the death of Empress Zawditu in March 1930, Tafari Makonnen mounted
the imperial throne and was crowned Emperor Haile Selassie I on 2nd November 1930 until
his unprecedented debacle in l974.
However, it should be pointed out that between Menelik II and Haile Selassie I, an interlude of
power struggle took place in particular when Ras Abata Bwayalaw made a triumphant entry
into Addis Ababa in a bid to replace Ras Tasamma. In the city, he entered the palace in an
attempt to take over the armoury, this initiated another period of tension, as the chief of the
palace guards, Fitiwrari Gabra-Maryam, barred the way. According to Bahru Zewde, a
bloody clash was averted by the intervention of the abun and the echage; and Abate was
persuaded to retire to his Kambata fief446 . Bahru further summarised:
The political stalemate reached during this interlude was in the nature of a
compromise. In 1916, the monarch and the heir to the throne were,
respectively, the candidates of the Showan nobility and of the foreign legations,
the two forces which had united to overthrow Lej Iyyasu. Zwaditus sole
qualification for the throne was her birth, as the daughter of Menelik. Her
supreme attraction to the nobility was her political innocuousness. While
Tafari Makonnen's lineage as grandson of Negus Sahla-Selassie of Showa (r.
1813-1947) was almost as impressive, his pro-allies stand, emanating partly
from his French educational background, contributed as much, if not more, to
his claim to and assumption of such an exalted post547.
So the fight for power amongst the diverse groups of social backgrounds is a constant
phenomenon in Ethiopia's political history, and it has continued to date. Although Emperors
Tewodros II and Menelik II are renowned as architects of modern Ethiopia, nevertheless it
was Haile Selassie I, later on in his time crowned as the "Girinawi, Kidainawi, Haile Selassie,
Neguse Negest ze Ethiopia" (Greatest of the Great, the First amongst the First, Haile Selassie,
° See UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII, op. cit., p. 305; Haile Selassie I, Haywatayna
Yeitiopia Armaja, Vol. I (Addis Ababa: Berhannena Selam Printers, 1973), trans. by Edward
Ullendorff, Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie I: "My Life and Ethiopia's Progress", 1892-
1937 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, op. cit.,
p. 140; and Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia and Eritrea, second ed., op. cit., p. 160.
details about the lyasu Interlude, see Bahru Zewde, op. cit., pp. 120-128. He also confirmed this
to the author in an interview in Addis Ababa (1996).
547Though Bahru does not mention categorically as to whether Haile Selassie belongs to the ruling
imperial family or not. See Bahru Zewde, op. cit., p. 128-129; Christopher Clapham argues that
succession to the throne prior to 1855 was governed by descent or at least was restricted to a small
group of princes. But after 1855, it was governed almost solely by the control of force. See his
Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 28.
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the King of Kings of Ethiopia) 548 . During his reign (1930-1974, defacto from 1916-1974),
Emperor Haile Selassie I bridged Ethiopia's ancient past with the modern era, even though
significant events of his reign were expunged from the official record by the successive military
regime that shortly turned into an autocracy.
In his reign as emperor, Haile Selassie I did make some political changes, though
commentators have judged them as of less fundamental and structural significance. Some of
the changes he made included the centralisation of the administration, financial regulation,
army training, some public appointments according to individual ability rather than birth, the
elimination of the most conservative of the Ethiopian nobility and the formal promulgation of a
constitution in 1931. However, his education programme was comprehensively interrupted by
the Italian invasion of 1936-1941. In spite of increased political centralisation, social
separatism and cultural differences remained the dominant characteristics of Ethiopia and
serious hindrances to national integration 549 . The constitution that was promulgated in 1931
which provided for a bicameral parliament with a nominated Senate and a Chamber of
Deputies, was far from being radical and had little immediate impact on Ethiopia's political
culture. Instead, the constitution left the Emperor's absolutist powers intact and largely
retained the privileged position of the nobility. The parliament was given hardly any initiative
in legislation or policy-making, and convened and dissolved at wifi by the Emperor. Thus it
remained docile and complacent.
Furthermore, because of the historically dominant position of the emperor, political parties
were not allowed in Ethiopia. Even those that existed in Eritrea were abolished by the
emperor and little progress was made in resolving relations with the Eritrean independence
movement or the conflict with Somalia over the Ogaden. Although he is credited for having
achieved what his predecessors tried to achieve, his 1931 constitution set up the juridical
framework of emergent absolutism. As a result, the debate preceding its promulgation was
illustrative of the continuing struggle between centralism and regionalism. To date, Ethiopian
centralists still hold the emperor responsible for the total dismemberment of one of Ethiopia's
sea coast provinces, Eritrea. In a way, even though Haile Selassie finally succeeded in
realising the unitary state of which Tewodros had dreamt, soon he created new problems that
were to cause perpetual instability and even threatened national integration. For example, the
548 See Kjetil Tronvoll and Ayvind Aadland, The Process of Democratisation in Ethiopia - An
Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance?, op. cit., endnote 42, p. 63.
See Harold G. Marcus, Haile Selassie I: The Formative Years, op. cit.
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subsistence way of life of most of the inhabitants of the country scarcely changed. Not only
did efforts at land reform fail repeatedly, but he also consolidated the feudal system550.
After the challenge to his authority in the abortive coup of 1960 minor improvements were
offered, and the emperor promised to delegate more power to parliament, which discussed but
did little about the need to redistribute the big landholdings that supported the power of the
elite and the Church. In 1973, a combination of drought resulting in famine in Wollo province
and the evident corruption and inefficiency in the distribution of aid led to a crescendo of
criticism and unrest. The army in Eritrea mutinied in February and forced the mass resignation
of the cabinet. The emperor appointed the progressive Endalkachew Makonnen as prime
minister, and a committee was formed to draft a new constitution. This was not enough for
militant students, who periodically disrupted Addis Ababa. This kindled the "creeping
revolution" organised by junior army officers, which I discuss shortly below.
Though Haile Selassie's reign began in the early 1930s, it was aborted by the Italian invasion
and occupation between 1936-1941'. After 1941, the Emperor consolidated his rule again
with aid first from the United Kingdom, and then from the United States of America. We are
told that, by 1960, Ethiopia had the largest armed forces in SSA; with a four division army and
imperial bodyguard, a brigade of tanks, an air force flying jet fighters, and a small coastal
defence navy, amounting in all to some 45,000 men552 . Thus, Haile Selassie's power increased
and the political influence and military strength of regional governors became overshadowed.
Despite such strength of being in charge, the emperors' reign was to fail due to the feudal
system. Feudalism in Ethiopia is traceable to the early days when the Empire first emerged.
The history of the Ethiopian Empire began in the first half of the first millennium when
Semitic settlers from Arabia came and settled in the northern region of present-day Tigray. As
life went on the settlers mingled and intermarried with the indigenous Cushites and founded
° See in particular Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modern isarion in Ethiopia (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); Peter Schwab, Haile Selassie I: Ethiopia's Lion of Judah (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall Inc., 1979); and Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (London: Faber & Faber,
1969).
551 For more on Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia between 1936-1941, see Angelo Del Baco,
The Ethiopian War 1935-1 941 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969); Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia
Under Mussolini (London, 1985); George W. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War
(Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge University Press, 1967); and Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern
Ethiopia, op. cit., pp. 150-177.
552 See Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity, op. cit., p. 28.
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the historic Kingdom of Axum which later on dominated the Red Sea through trade and
conquest. Thereafter, Christianity was introduced into the kingdom in the fourth century,
marking the birth of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. It was then the Orthodox Church that
had also encouraged feudalism until this century, and even clashed with the leaders of the 1974
Revolution and has remained a critic of government policy on land reform 553 . Through the
feudal system, the influence of the monarchy and the Church increased tremendously to
dominate the political and economic life of the society554.
However, in 1137, the Axumite Kingdom was interrupted by the formation of the Agau
Dynasty by a group of Amahara from the Shoa region. This group referenced one particular
legend which associated the Agau Dynasty with a descent from Israel. As mentioned above,
the legend has it that during her visit to Israel, the Queen of Sheba (from Ethiopia) conceived
a son with King Solomon, named Menelik I. Thus, from the formation of the Agau Dynasty
until the deposition of the emperor in 1974, successive Ethiopian Emperors often used the
Solomonic line as a source of legitimacy for ascendency to the imperial throne 555 . One salient
factor of the Agau Dynasty is the proclamation of the Amhara region as the political centre of
the Empire by Menelik II, an event which gave rise to Amhara dominance and power in the
political, economic, social and religious affairs of Ethiopia. Amhara dominance became an
integral aspect of the flame of resentment upon which the boiling pot of ethnic, regional and
religious dissatisfaction in modern Ethiopia is heated. And the direct cause of contemporary
resentment in Ethiopia is the fact that Amhara culture has also been maintained as the standard
by which every ethnic and religious group would be expected to live, and this policy also
became reflected in the doctrines of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church556.
From 1813 to 1847, the Solomonic Dynasty engaged in a war of conquest with the nearby
southern, southeastern and southwestern territories and, in the process, it conquered the
Oromos and brought them under its rule. Successive Ethiopian Emperors enlarged the
territory, but as mentioned above, it was under Menelik II of Shoa (Agau Dynasty) that the
geographical boundaries of modern Ethiopia were constructed and maintained by the
See S. Pauseiwang, Peasants, Land and Society: A Social History of Land Reform in Ethiopia
(Munchen: Weitforum Verlag, Africa-Studien 110, 1983).
554 See Peter Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 4.
See Bahru Zewde, op. cit., p. 5.
556 Richard Caulk, "Religion and State in Nineteenth-Century Ethiopia", Journal of Ethiopian Studies,
vol 10, no. 1(1972).
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monarchy until its final debacle in 1974. The Agau Dynasty was able to survive for years until
1874 because of the feudal system.
First and foremost, the feudal system was instrumental in the success and maintenance of the
monarchy in Ethiopia. The feudal system is originally medieval in which ordinary citizens
acquired land from a lord, and in return worked and fought for him. In the same line, the
Agau Dynasty maintained its supremacy through a feudal system, without which it would not
have been able to dominate politically and economically for centuries. Writing about the
feudal system in Ethiopia, Bahru Zewde pointed out that "status, class and power were
shaped by it and the political order was based upon it" 557 . Under the feudal system, to own
land was literally to acquire political and economic power. Thus, from the reign of Emperor
Menelik II through to that of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Warlords and the Nobility alike were
granted land by the emperor, mainly as a reward of good behaviour and loyalty. For example,
Menelik II rewarded his Warlords with land from successful conquests, with such grants, the
services of the indigenous population were attached to the grant and they were required to tifi
the land for the soldier/settler, many were absentee landlords 558 . Similarly, the ruling class of
Haile Selassie's days were made up of individuals loyal to him. They were promoted to
positions of central and local administration and land was rewarded as a form of patronage559.
Until the 1974 Revolution, the bulk of the country's land was owned by the following groups:
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, government officials, and other large land owners. These
three privileged groups together exploited and suppressed the peasants, controlling their
everyday life. For example, tenant farmers (a system of farming which was much more
prevalent in the south than the north), had no legal, political nor economic rights. Through the
years, the feudal system became a legitimate part of the political structure of Ethiopia through
taxation and land tenure legislations560.
Throughout the imperial reign, the peasant was faced with numerous tax obligations which
included agricultural income tax (20 Birr before 1974) as well as indirect taxation in the form
of his labour time, for example, corvee labour and campaign labour whereby he was required
to assist in road building, reforestation and other special schemes. In the case of the tenant-
farmer, he was required to transfer about 50 percent of his produce to the landlord as tax. But
See Bahru Zewde, op. cit., p. 7.
558 Flarold G. Marcus, The History of Ethiopia, op. cit., pp. 11-47.
Bahru Zewde, op. cit., pp. 20 1-203.
° See S. Pauseiwang, Peasants, Land and Sociely: A History of Land Reform in Ethiopia, op. cit.
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on the other hand, the ruling classes were mostly exempted from taxation. For example, the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church was not required to pay taxes but the law allowed it to collect tax
from its tenants. The individual landowners, most of whom were government officials under
Haile Selassie, had similar privileges and on occasions when they were required to pay land
tax, the burden was often transferred to the tenant farmer. This kept the peasant on a
subsistence standard of living56'
(iii) The Rise of Military Autocracy in Ethiopia
The Ethiopian Revolution of February 1974, also Yekatit 1966 in the Ethiopian calendar, was
a turning point in the political history of Ethiopia 562 . The revolution did not only bring
centuries of monarchical rule to a halt, but also gave way to the rise of a no less autocratic
military regime that reigned with an iron fist until 1991. Resentment against the monarchy
began to accumulate after the failed 1960 coup detat and burst in the early 1 970s when the
famine situation in Wollo and Tigray claimed nearly a quarter of a million souls. Moreover
squatters from northern Ethiopia evidently engulfed Addis Ababa and Hamminas (singing
beggars) from Wollo attracted a large public attention in the capital city. The people in Addis
Ababa and elsewhere became aware of the hidden famine, in particular, when three university
professors who had visited Wollo brought back with them pictures and a report of the grim
conditions they had witnessed563 . University students were the first to react by donating a part
of their dining budget to the starving population and demanded that the government make the
famine public and seek international assistance.
Many Ethiopians came to regard the famine as a moral outrage and 'wrath of God' which
many felt came from God because of the emperor's wanton disregard of thousands of innocent
people who perished of hunger in Wollo and Tigray regions 564 . The rise of the Dergue was
561 For details of this analysis, see Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability to Famine in Ethiopia:
1958-1977 (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1986), Pp. 92-93.
562 There is a huge literature on the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 and any further attempt to detail the
events that led to its upshot is not needed here. However, recommended references for further reading
on the Revolution include: Ethiopian Government, Basic Docunents of the Ethiopian Revolution
(Addis Ababa, 1977); Fred Halliday and Maxine Mollyneux, op. cit.; Rene Lefort, op. cit.; Christopher
Clapham, op. cit.; Addis Hiwet, op. cit.; Edmond J. Keller, op. cit.; L. Collins, The Fall of Haile
Selassie's Empire (New York: Africana, 1976); and John Markakis and Nega Ayele, op. cit.
563See Addis Hiwet, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
Joint interviews with Netsanet Asafaw and Mebrat Bayene, Addis Ababa, July 1996; see also Kinfe
Abraham, op. cit., p. 68.
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premised on this because the military committee also exploited the famine as a propaganda
pioy. For example, they used the famine crisis to undermine the imperial myth by giving a
negative impression of the monarchy that "the father of the nation had failed to peiform his
most important duty, to save his children from death" 565 . Instead of protecting and defending
the emperor, the army took side with the opposition, largely consisted of a conglomeration of
the urban elite including students, academics, teachers, taxi-drivers, workers and, later, men in
uniform566 . The abrupt collapse of the Ethiopian monarchy has been described by some
revolutionary Ethiopians as "the inevitable impression that the Empire was like a house built of
sand"567 . Therefore, the famine was a cumulative effect of an archaic agrarian crisis which had
reached national proportions.
The famine triggered other major identifiable incidents in the continuum that culminated in
Haile Selassie's overthrow. Such incidents included: a mutiny by soldiers and NCOs in a small
garrison at Neghelle Borona of the Fourth Division in Southern Sidamo in January 1974
because of their discrimination for an access to pure water which the high ranking officers had
been enjoying. Even though the mutiny itself was simply over living conditions, the arrest by
the mutineers of the senior officers sent to investigate it gave the incident political overtures,
and indicated the powerlessness of the imperial regime in the face of military dissent. Other
dangerous mutinies ensued elsewhere in the country. Notable among these were: The Air
Force base at Debre Zeit near Addis Ababa who went on strike demanding higher wages; the
Second Division Infantry in Asmara also mutinied on 25 February 1974, with a list of several
demands. That was followed by the first break out of public demonstrations in the capital.
Similarly, teachers and students became alarmed by the implications of an education sector
review which proposed, among other things, an expansion of basic education in the
countryside, and a relative restriction of Secondary and University education in the towns, and
the commencement of tuition payment in public schools and the general de-emphasis of higher
education. This was vehemently opposed by teachers and students. On top of this, taxi
drivers went on strike against the government's refusal to let them raise fares in response to
the OPEC oil price rise - one of the few points at which upheavals in the international
economy impinged on a generally domestic political process.
565 SeeReneLefort, op. cit., p. 167.
In short, Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, op. cit., pp. 74-81, tabulated five main opposition
groups at the time: the provincial nobility; the non-Amhara nationalities; students; middle ranks of the
armed forces; urban population (employee) such as the Ethiopian Teachers Association and the trade
unions (e.g. Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions, CELU).
567 See Kinfe Abraham, op. cit., p.68.
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The Emperor sensed the growing dissent and rebelliousness that was emerging in the country
and was compelled to face the nation on television. His promises were branded as mere
outmoded lame excuses, and on the contrary, demonstrations continued unabated and the
Emperor was forced to demand the resignation of a cabinet that he himself created568 . The
then Prime Minster, seen as an imperial protege, was replaced by another, who was widely
viewed as a liberal aristocrat 569 . Ever since the unsuccessful 1960 coup detat to 1974, three
important political groups consolidated themselves. During this period, Ethiopia began to
develop a militant student movement whose strikes and demonstrations dominated the scene
of Ethiopian politics. Above all, they were the first group to come out clearly in support of
the 1960 coup. In fact, Ethiopian overseas students all became enthusiastic Marxists and their
love of the ideology made them become instrumental in the rise of the 1974 Revolution.
According to Clapham:
Students were drawn on the whole from the privileged sectors of urban society,
and could expect to be appointed to reasonably well-paid government posts on
graduation. Though they demonstrated in favour of 'Land to the Tifier', they
generally had little conception of conditions in the countryside. Yet for these
very reasons, their detestation of imperial government was all the more
significant, indicating its failure to attract the loyalty of those who would gain
from it and on whom it would directly rely570.
Secondly the armed forces became politicised and many of the junior officers began to share
students"disgust with the imperial government, apparently dedicated to little more than the
gross adulation of an aging puppet. The contempt among the junior officers extended to the
small groups of senior officers, some with aristocratic connections, who were admitted to the
charmed circles of the court and rewarded with land grants and other favours. As a result,
contacts between students and junior officers were closer than might be expected. In contrast
to most armies, where the officers are normally volunteers even though the other ranks may be
conscripted, Ethiopia had a partly conscripted officer corps. According to a senior army
568 This is one situation that led the Emperor to betray his own cabinet to save his skin. See
Ghewdewos Araia, op. cit., p. 76.
569 See Rene Lefort, op. cit., pp. 51-55; and Christopher Clapham, op. cit., p. 38.
570 See Christopher Clapham, op. cit., p. 34; Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, op. cit., p. 76,
footnote students' popular song of the period: "Faiz,za Metamara, Eiide Ho Chi Minh, Eizde Cue
Guevara", meaning "Patriot [i.e. one who fought the Italians did not flee like Haile Selassie] Go to the
Country like Ho Chi Minh, like Che Guevara"; and for more on students movement, see Ronning
Balsvjk, Haile Selassie's Students, op. cit.; and Legesse Lemma, "The Ethiopian Student Movement
1960-1974", North East African Studies, vol. 1, no. 2(1979).
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officer, during the period of the army's rapid expansion in the 1960s and early 1970s, the best
secondary school students were often compelled to join the army, and nourished a lasting
resentment against a government which sent them to serve in distant and dangerous zones of
Tigray, Gojjam, Wollo or Ogaden, where anti-government forces were active571 . Most
conscripted officers were unhappy because they did not want to serve in battleground areas,
while their contemporaries (particularly from the privileged families) enjoyed professional or
civil-service jobs in the city.
In addition, most of the conscripted army officers who first served in the capital before they
are sent to the frontline had frequently attended evening classes at the university, and were
therefore, affected by the prevailing climate of ideas; quite a number of these officers, indeed,
later held high office in the revolutionary regime 572 . In short, even though the Ethiopian
armed forces are historically renowned for serving a centralising tradition of government, they
found it tiring to continue serving with an anachronistic imperial regime. Thirdly, an
embryonic labour union began to form in the 1960s. This encompassed urban workers, petty
traders, the innumerable hangers-on in one kind of semi-employment or another, down to what
one may term the lumpenproletariat with which Addis Ababa was as well provided as any
other major African city. In Ethiopia, trade unions were recognised following the issuing of a
Labour Relations Decree in 1962, and by the early 1970s the Confederation of Ethiopian
Labour Unions (CELU) had a membership of about 55,000, heavily concentrated in Addis
Ababa and satellite towns along the line of rail to the coast573.
Although the right to strike was formally recognised, it was severely limited in practice, in
fact, in the case of Eritrea the formal right to strike was arbitrarily abrogated (see chapter on
Eritrea above). Thus, in 1974, the trade unions got involved in the upheavals, and the conflict
for control of them was often violent. However, the labour unions were less significant than
the local neighbourhood associations, known as idir, which were beyond the scope of
Interview with Col. Asaminew Bedane, Ministry of Defence, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Bedane was a
commander on the side of the Dergue and was captured by the TPLF as a prisoner of war. He was also
instrumental in the formation of the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement
(EDORM), both as its Chairman and Vice Chairman. As we shall see, EDORM became one important
ally of the TPLF in the formation of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
572 retired senior army officer confirmed that most of the 120 men Dergue members were high school
graduates who were conscripted by the imperial regime after the 1960 coup detat. Interview with Col.
Tesfaye, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, June 1996.
See in particular John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, op. cit., p. 176; and
David and Marina Ottoway, op. cit., chs. 2 & 3.
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government. The idir became instrumental in the mass involvement of urban dwellers in the
revolution. Therefore, the political spectrum in Ethiopia had, at one end, students and young
army officers, and the poorest of the poor at the other. These three groups together formed a
strong force behind the 1974 Revolution that deposed Africa's last absolute emperor. In this
case we see violence becoming inevitably a means for effecting change574.
Of all sections of the urban groups, students were the most critical on the imperial government
and they considered its policies and programmes responsible for the country's
underdevelopment. For them, the prevailing values espoused by the imperial regime of Haile
Selassie were a severe obstacle to modernisation and change. Unlike the working bureaucracy
that was obedient to the regime, students particularly deplored the underdevelopment of the
rural population and felt duty bound to seek change on their behalf. Donald Levine pointed
out quite clearly: "The bureaucracy was the other element in the modern Ethiopian
government, which was less alienated than either students or armed forces in the urban
structure. The bureaucracy was constituted by foreign-educated Ethiopians, who often
accepted the comforts of a government job, and the limitations on political action which this
implied"575 . As students, they had not yet been fully assimilated into the social system and
therefore had not yet acquired vested interest in the system.
Since the forces behind the revolution espoused Marxist doctrines, they demanded a reform of
the land holding system, with a major redistribution of land and an end to the feudal system
mentioned above. Thus when the famine of 1973 became exposed, mainly by university
professors in Addis Ababa, and the government's attempt to conceal it was realised, the
students staged major demonstrations in 1974576. Similarly, in addition to their demand for
pay increase and better living standards, the army officers also began to sympathise with the
regional conflicts which also occupied most of their time. Even though the Haile Selassie
government had discouraged the formation of labour unions, in 1962 they sprang up again
with the rise of plant unions. And as a result, the 1970s saw many workers on strike with the
support and encouragement of the student movement as economic conditions in the country
deteriorated.
" As in Johan Galtung, A Structural Theory of Revolution (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press,
1974), p. 22.
Donald N. Levine, Wax and Gold, op. cit., ch. 5.
576 See Addis Hiwet, op. cit., pp. 10-15; and Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of
Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), p. 152.
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On the other hand, taxi drivers campaigning for an increase in fares also went on strike, while
the military demanded further pay increases. At the same time, the main labour union, CELU,
had organised a four day strike that brought the country to a standstill. Finally, soldiers
mutinied and arrested senior officers and closed down the international airport, they were then
joined by personnel from Air Forces and other military units. In March 1974, junior officers
demanded the resignation of the Prime Minster. The crises moved from economic to political
dimensions. What was, however, unfortunate is the fact that the revolution erupted without a
clearly led opposition party. As a result, the officers organised a party in June the same year,
under the umbrella of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, the Dergue. From
thence onwards, the army hijacked the peoples revolution and began to chair it until its
leadership was consolidated in the person of Major Mengistu Haile Mariam.
(iv) The Consolidation of the Dergue and Its Demise: Farewell to Military
Dictatorship in Ethiopia
There is no precise date, but the Dergue ('Conmiittee'), as it became known, was formed
between June and July 1974. According to Harold Marcus:
On 27-28 June, the military representatives constituted themselves as the
Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces (in Amharic, derg, or
"committee"). During its meetings, a number of officers rose to speak, but
none was more eloquent than Maj. Mengistu Haile Mariam, of Harer's Third
Division, who became the Coordinating Committees chairperson. He brought
order to boisterous proceedings and gave shape to the derg's demands. He
told his colleagues that nothing was more important than the unity of the
military and the nation, and he may have introduced the stifi potent slogan
Etiopia Tikdem, or "Ethiopia above all'
The Dergue was an instant product of the several phases of the revolution. One particular
piece of work catalogues the "creeping revolution" into three major phases: where phase I
represented the people's uprising; phase lithe consolidation of the Dergue and the politics of
attrition; and phase III the consolidation of Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, or what has been
termed "a coup de grace within a coup d'etat and within a revolution" 578 . Another account
points out that: "Not until July did the self-styled Armed Forces Co-ordinating Committee
start broadcasting that they were the agents of revolution. It was still unclear who headed the
577 See Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 187.
578 
For details of. such dichotomies, see Ghelawdewos Araia, op. cit., pp. 75-99.
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group of 120 men, though General Aman Mikael Andom was its spokesman" 579 . Initially, the
120 men membership was partly elected and partly co-opted to represent the various branches
and units of the military establishment and, later, the police and territorial army580. The ranks
that constituted the membership of the Dergue ranged from plain soldier to major. The early
hours of the Dergue signalled a dictatorial trend when the committee rejected demands to
renew its membership through election, and instead filled the vacancies created by purging of
over one-half of its original members.
The Armed Forces Committee not only undertook an increasingly hard line favouring the
punishment of all those involved with imperial power either by birth, privilege or appointment,
it also took a hardline against what it termed Eritrean secessionists. Within a short time after
its formation, the Dergue had successfully decapitated the military hierarchy by decimating the
higher officer corps through execution, arrest and dismissal. This was followed by
nationalisation and expropriation of royal assets, eradication of Haile Selassie's name,
detection of those branded as "enemies of progress" (including wives and children), banning of
strikes and demonstrations, abolishment of Parliament, suspension of the Constitution, and
stringent censorship. On the 18th November 1974, it was announced that Major Mengistu
Haile Mariam was the Head of Executive Committee of the Provisional Military
Administration Council (PMAC), which later on became synonymous with the Dergue. Thus,
on the night of 23-24 November the same year, a series of arrests netted most of the high
officialdom of the ancien regime who got executed without trial; and similarly Aman Mikael
Andom and several of his aides died fighting indoor arrest. In order to garner international
support, in particular from the former Soviet Union and its allies, Mengistu declared Ethiopia
a socialist state on 13 December 1974. The following year, a formal revocation of the
monarchy was announced on 21 March 1975581.
However, that was not the end of it all. Besides the embroilment in class and ideological
conflicts within the party itself, the Dergue also began to encounter opposition from without
a See the Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia and Eritrea, op. cit., p. 268; and also Harold G. Marcus,
op. cit., p. 189.
580 See John Markakis, "The Military State and Ethiopia's Path to 'Socialism", Review of African
Political Economy, op. cit., p. 12.
581 See Cohn Legum, Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Selassie's E,npire (London: Collins, 1975); John
Spencer, "Haile Selassie: Triumph and Tragedy", Orbis, vol. 18 no. 4(Winter 1975); Patrick Gilkes,
op. cit.; and John Harbeson, The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State
(Boulder, Col.: \Vestview Press, 1988).
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the party582 . The first section of the Ethiopian society to express dissatisfaction was a group
of radical intellectuals who had espoused Marxism in the 1960s. These were constituted by a
core of two generations of university and secondary school students who had mounted a
consistent militant opposition to the imperial regime during the last decades of its collapse. As
a Maoist leftist group who claimed to represent the interests of the proletarians, they protested
against a Marxist revolution channelled through a military government and, as a result, refused
the leadership of the Dergue. These group of intellectuals managed to raise the consciousness
of the masses and guided the popular movement towards a social revolution. They defmed the
nature of the struggle as anti-feudal, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist 583 . These group
regarded the overthrow of the ancien regime as a prerequisite to fundamental change. Thus,
the military was bound to face problems because the civilian population followed suit and
protested that the revolution had not been mobilised for a military government to be installed.
The Dergue was accused of usurping a popular movement and a civilian government was
demanded.
Although the Dergue could hardly afford to ignore the hand that helped it to seize power, the
military officers reacted to the demands of the inteffigentsia by closing down the university and
colleges and Sent many students into the rural areas to educate the peasants on the objectives
of the revolution584 . This was a decision whose effects were bound to boomerang against the
regime itself. Instead the students seized that opportunity to indoctrinate and politicise the
peasants even more against the Dergue. While on the one hand the regime's reply to popular
demands seemed unaccomodative, they sought to make up for their ideological naivete and
lack of programme by adopting the radical orientation of the Marxist intellectuals and by
appropriating most of their programmatic suggestions as well. The temporary alignment
seemed natural enough, given what Markakis terms "the congruence of class between the
popular and the military movements" 585 . It was also an expedient one, for it was calculated to
win popular support and provide a legitimising ideology for the new regime 586 . The Dergue
582 See Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Bourgeois Dictatorship (N.P., 1976); John
Markakis and Nega Ayele, op. cit.; Marina Ottoway, "Democracy and New Democracy: The
Ideological Debate in the Ethiopian Revolution", African Studies Review, vol. 2 1(1978); and Gebru
Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
583 One particular work which details intellectual involvement is Randi Ronning Balsvik, op. cit.
See in particular John Markakis and Nega Ayele, op. cit.; and John Markakis, National Class
Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cit.
585 See John Markakis, "The Military State and Ethiopia's Path to 'Socialism", op. cit., p. 13.
586	 Marina Ottoway, op. cit.
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was admittedly under great pressure to establish its revolutionary credentials by dismantling
the socio-economic foundations of the old regime, and advancing its own radical motto: "The
Broad Masses of Ethiopia First" or Etiopia Tikdem became the revolutionary slogan587.
The Dergue also adopted a shrewd strategy that divided the intelligentsia and put them at war
one with another. Specific policy proposals of a few radicals were incorporated into the new
regime's political programmes and some of these radicals were silenced by rapid promotions in
the civil service and others even became active advisers to leading members of the regime. As
the community of the intelligentsia was successfully divided, the Dergue proceeded to
nationalise the means of production at the beginning of 1975 as a gesture of keeping in line
with its socialist outlook. Thus, it nationalised banks, fmancial and insurance institutions588.
The military regime further unveiled a radical proclamation concerning landownership. John
Markakis writes:
In March of the same year, a sweeping land reform decree was proclaimed,
which went further than most Ethiopians had anticipated. All agricultural land
was nationalised, possession was limited to a maximum of ten hectares, and the
sale or rent of land was prohibited. Thus both landlordism and tenancy were
eliminated at one stroke. Peasant associations were formed to implement the
provisions of the reform, which included the redistribution of available land into
equal shares within each association. All matters concerning land came under
the jurisdiction of the associations, thus, putting the notoriously venal
Ethiopian judiciary out of business in the rural areas. The associations were
also entrusted with the administration of local affairs and maintenance of law
and order, thereby greatly reducing the scope of action of the equally corrupt
police and provincial administration589.
In addition to that, urban land and extra housing were also nationalised, where ownership
became limited to only one housing unit per family. And as far as agricultural land is
concerned, no compensation was offered. Rents were substantially reduced for the cheaper
housing, thus, the lowest income group was the major beneficiary while the landlords became
the sole losers in the changes brought about by the revolution.
587 See Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 117; and Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 187.
588 See in particular Peter Schwab, op. cit., p. 26.
589 See John Markakis, op. cit., p. 13.
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These reforms were enthusiastically welcomed and especially the majority of Southern
peasants felt emancipated and eagerly participated in the peasant associations590 , which were
perceived as instruments of genuine local self-government. However, the also received
significant, and at times, violent opposition from former landlords in the South of the country
and Amharic farmers of the North who had owned land under the communal ownership
system whereby land was passed down from one generation to another; they considered the
reforms to have stripped them of land that was already theirs 591 . At the same time, conflict
between students and the Dergue continued over the mobilisation of the peasants. Since
political organisation was lacking before and during the revolution, the 'men in uniform'
became the vanguard of the revolution by historical necessity 592 . Therefore, the insistent call
of the radical left for a peoples' government was rejected as untimely, and its proponents were
dealt with increasing severity.
In order to secure the monopoly of power, the Dergue embarked in systematic dismantling of
the few existing organisations which it perceived as a possible threat that may develop into
staunch political opposition 593 . Therefore, the Dergue and the PMAC were eventually
combined under the complete control (de facto) of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Though the
existing organisations such as the EPRP continued a violent campaign against the Dergue,
they were answered with ruthless use of force. As we shall see below, the military officers
were able to wipe out the members of the radical left, the conscience of the revolution, out of
the post-imperial political scene in Ethiopia. This method of silencing its critics would become
a regular occurrence as the Dergue executed "enemies" of the revolution, including students
and members of the labour unions. Peter Schawb wrote: "Confronted by opposition in the
cities, within the Dergue, in Eritrea, in the Ogaden, in Tigray and from Somalia, Mengistu
590 These associations were widely known as Kebelles or Urban Dwellers Association. The Kebelles
were in each neighbourhood, making political and administrative decisions for its areas. See Harold G.
Marcus, op. cit., p. 193.
' See Dessalegn Rahmato, Agrarian Reform iii Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1984);
and John Harbeson, op. cit.
592 According to John Markakis, op. cit., p. 14.
This worry was baseless because even though organisations such as CELU, AETU, EPRP, and
MEISON would have become early platforms for political reform in Ethiopia, the foundations upon
which they were built were totally incoherent and disorganised. See in particular Christopher Clapham,
Transformation and Continuity, op. cit., Amare Tekle, "Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Politics",
in Marina Ottoway (ed.), The Political Econo,ny of Ethiopia (New York: Praeger, 1990).
207
decided that if he did not eliminate those he considered counter-revolutionary, they would
eliminate him and prevent socialism from being instituted in Ethiopia'594.
This coercive method did not only exacerbate the numerous ethnically-based liberation fronts,
but it also led to severe famine. To be sure, the ethnic conflicts per se did not cause the
famine, it was the Dergue strategy of containment that created conditions for the drought to
become a famine. For example, the government restricted free movement and prevented food
from reaching alleged-rebel-held areas. These deliberate strategies were the Dergue 's open
counter-insurgency methods. Such methods were bound to hit the innocent civilians because
the targeted rebels had no permanent military base. For instance in Tigray, it was very difficult
to target the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) because they operated using guerrilla
tactics of hit-and-run595 . In fact, the government's indiscriminate response to ethnic rebeffions
proved counter-productive. Instead of searching for a political solution to the grievances, the
Dergue declared most regions of northern Ethiopia war zone areas and began carrying out its
military strategy of a "counter-population warfare" 596 . The major consequence of this was the
emergence of ethnic-based liberation fronts and the seeds of widespread armed resistance were
sown.
(b) The Intensity of Armed Resistance in Ethiopia: The Rise of Ethnic-Based
Liberation Fronts
The rise of widespread effective guerrifia opposition against the Dergue became eminent
because of the military repressive measures of power consolidation. At one time the military's
prohibition against dissent and the capacity of the state to carry out its proscription in the
urban areas forced opposition leaders to move to the countryside and launch peasant based
insurrections. More than anything else, the military policies continued to alienate what became
the periphery - Eritreans, Tigrayans, Somalis, some regions occupied by the Oromos and a
Peter Schwab, op. cit., p. 42.
See John Young, Peasants and Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front,
1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
One particular incident is when most regions of Tigray were unofficially considered a war zone. See
Human Rights Violation in Ethiopia (London: Amnesty International, 1978); and Africa Watch, Evil
Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York & Washington, D.C.: Human Rights
Watch, 1991), p. 139.
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sizeable population of the Amhara in the north and northeast of the country 597 . As a result, the
ranks of ethnic-based opposition guerrillas swelled, and the political and military contexts of
the rebellions were defined.
The major ethnic-based liberation fronts in Ethiopia included the Tigray Peoples Liberation
Front (TPLF), the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF). These were then joined later on by other splinter groups such as the Ethiopian
Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM), the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation
(OPDO), the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were
irredentist organisations, the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement
(EDORM) formed mainly by captured Dergue officers, and those fronts representing the Beni-
shangul and the Gambella peoples. These fronts were all described by the status quo regime
as shiftas, meaning bandits or rebels598 . The activities of these ethnic-based liberation fronts in
Ethiopia together with those of the secessionists in Eritrea began to drain the regime's
resources and weaken it drastically.
Historically, a permanent grievance against Amhara connivance became the hallmark of Tigray
provincialism ever since Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1889) was dispossessed by Emperor
Menelik II of Shoa in l889. Because of the excesses of centralism which lent itself to the
slow southward thrust of the center of the empire (begun by emperor Menelik II and
consolidated by emperor Haile Selassie I), the people of Tigray began to resent the loss of
what they regarded as their hegemonic legitimacy to their arch rivals, the Amharas. According
to Kinfe Abraham:
The North-South conflict was kept under control because of Haile Selassie's
shrewd multi-pronged strategy of divide and control, intermarriage between his
family and the Tigrayan nobility, and the extension of traditional titles, land and
other privileges to prominent Tigrayans. However, this had not thily appeased
See Adhana Haile Adhana, "The Roots of Organised Internal Armed Conflicts in Ethiopia, 1960-
1990", in Terje Tvedt (ed.), op. cit., and John Young, "Peasants and Revolutions: A Theoretical
Review Based on Ethiopian Experience", Unpublished Paper, Addis Ababa University, 1996.
598 In ancient times the word had a political connotation applying to someone who rebelled against his
feudal lord, but more recently it has applied to any person doing robbery, usually in a rural area,
sometimes with a political purpose but mostly for personal profit. Haile Selassie I, for example, used
the term shifta to refer to Eritrean guerrillas; and the Dergue used it to refer to all those opposition
groups fighting the regime. See Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld (ed.), op. cit., p. 277; and Ruth
lyob, op. cit.
Yohannes IV became the only Tigrayan emperor of Abyssinia in modern times. See in particular
John Markakis, Nationa/ and C/ass Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cit., p. 248.
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the rebellious and disgruntled Tigrayan peoples. With the deposition of the
emperor those weak dynastic links which had helped maintain a semblance of
orderly allegiance were swept away in one stroke. The post-1974 regime
knowing that it did not have the dynastic credentials of the old one to which it
was ideologically opposed, did not do much to heal the wounds by replacing
the old structure with a democratic one600.
The major consequence of this North-South tension was to come to the open with the
formation of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1975. Although the story of the
Tigrayan resistance stems from the developments of the last quarter of the 19th century, it also
feeds on a mixture of legend and history which few contest regardless of their nationality. It
has its roots in the story of the Queen of Sheba outlined above, whose historic trip from the
northern kingdom to Jerusalem became the start of the Solomonic line of Kings. In fact, the
rise of Tigrayan nationalism never surprised experts in Ethiopian politics for the very simple
reason that the history of Ethiopia is characterised by the dominance of highland Christians.
So that the southward drift of the Ethiopian Empire (from Axum to Shoa), the loss of the
remaining vestiges of autonomy which was extended to the Tigray region by Haile Selassie I
and the failure of the Mengistu regime to understand the psychology of the Tigray people
including their hardiness and tenacity for waging war was bound to provoke resentment601.
Similarly, the economic underdevelopment of Tigray province was blamed on the Amhara
domination. For example, under the ancien regime there was little investment in the
Abyssinian provinces and none at all in Tigray 602 . Thus, the Tigray resistance is naturally the
outcome of the gradual decline of the region whose human and material potential was spent in
the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. On the cultural front, Tigray's distinct
language reinforced its self-consciousness. The imposition of Anharigna and the proscription
of Tigrigna in the l940s created serious difficulty and even greater resentment603 . The
Woyene rebellion was the first peasant uprising in Tigray long before the TPLF emerged in the
l970s604 . The other major problem Tigrayans resented is the fact that their region was
excluded from the mainstream of Ethiopias modernisation. Erlich Haggai wrote:
See Kinfe Abraham, op. cit., p. 154.
601 ibid., p. 159.
602 See John Markakis, op. cit., p. 251; and Cohn Legum and James Firebrace, Eritrea and Tigray, op.
cit., p. 17.
603 See John Markakis, op. cit., pp. 248-251; Cohn Legum and James Firebrace, op. cit., p. 17; and
many Tigrayans date the roots of their contemporary struggle back to the Woyene rebellion of 1949.
See Dawit Woldegiorgis, Red Tears, op. cit., p. 115; and John Young, Peasants and Revolution in
Ethiopia, op. cii.
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During modern times (starting with Emperor Tewodros), socio-political
changes were much slower in Tigre than in other regions in Ethiopia. Showa
underwent a centralisation of power under Menelik and extended this over vast
regions of Ethiopia. Wollo, the center of Oromo power till the days of
Tewodros, was later reduced politically to a mere buffer zone between north
and south. Eritrea was occupied by Europeans and experienced profound
changes in various fields. Both Gojjam and Begemdir had lost their local
leadership by the early 1930s. Ethiopia's southern regions had been annexed to
the empire by the turn of the previous century with inevitable repercussions for
their political, social and cultural institutions. Tigray, in contrast, was barely
affected. In the 1930s and early 1940s the power of the leading families
established centuries earlier stifi existed in this province. The political system
of the province, practically autonomous from Ethiopia's government, was
characterised by a complex set of rivalries and splits among the leading local
figures. In essence it differed only marginally from what had been the general
order in Ethiopia605.
Because of this ethnic discrimination, the urge to organise on the basis of nationality was
strong. For example, in 1972 the Tigray University Student's Union (TUSU) was formed and
the Tigray National Organisation (TNO) soon began active recruitment and mobilisation in
Tigray region. Thus, the students (most of whom were from western Tigray-Adowa and
Axum) who left Addis Ababa for Tigray after the dramatic events of the 1974 Revolution,
emerged in early 1975 as the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).
However, it should be pointed out that the Tigrayan resentment did not suddenly come to a
boiling point. The province's youth, as it was elsewhere in Ethiopia had hoped the 1974
Revolution was going to change the direction of the political activities in favour of the long
over trodden nationalities. That is why the 1974 event was greeted with optimism and the
euphoria of sudden change had awakened hopes of a new democratic order. Unfortunately,
that positive dream was shattered and a Provisional Military Government was formed instead.
Such a move reversed the direction of events and revolutionary intellectuals and university
students began to become more sceptical about the activities of the military. This loss of hope
was aggravated more by the Dergue's indiscriminate arrest of Tigrayan aristocracy and elite
together and its campaign of mass liquidation and arrest during and after the "Red Terror" in
Tigray, Addis Ababa and else where in Ethiopia 606 . Generally speaking, the TPLF was born
605 See his Ethiopia: A New Political History (London: The Pall MaIl, 1965), p. 133; and Kinfe
Abraham, op. cit., p. 163.
According to Kinfe Abraham, the total number of Tigrayan prisoners was larger than that of other
nationalities (about 70 percent), where it is argued that many non-Tigrigna speaking inmates were able
to learn Tigrigna in jail. See his Ethiopia: Fro,n Bullets to the Ballot Box, op. cit., p. 164.
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and nurtured in a climate of high hopes which were dashed to the ground by the unresponsive
activities of the Dergue.
Therefore, the Tigrayan main objective was to struggle for self-determination as the Front
explained it to the 37th Session of the United Nations General Assembly:
Even though the right to self-determination incorporates the right to secede,
the struggle of the Tigrayan people led by the TPLF does not take secession as
the only solution for the national domination under which it is forced to live.
Being part of a democratic multi-national Ethiopia based on equality, where
there are no oppressor and oppressed nations; where the right of every nation
without destination is constitutionally and in practice safeguarded; where
democracy and social justice prevail; and where fundamental human rights of
the peoples are not violated, is also acceptable to the people of Tigray607.
John Markakis too, pointed out that "Self-determination could result in anything from
autonomy, federation, confederation, up to and including independence" 608 . In another
statement, the TPLF outlined:
The TPLF is a peoples democratic front fighting for the national self-
determination of the Tigrayan people and waging a people's democratic
revolution. The TPLF is not fighting for secession. It is not against the
voluntary unity of the five million Tigrayans with other nations and nationalities
in the empire state.609
The fact that the TPLF supported the voluntary unity of the people of Ethiopia, so long as the
legitimate rights of those people are fully realised, made it difficult to describe the Front as
secessionist.
Moreover the environment for the consolidation of a strong front was favourable at the time
because the Dergue became intensively pre-occupied with the more serious problems posed by
the Somalis in the Ogaden and the Eritrean insurrection had acquired a successful momentum.
These two particular events disorganised the Dergue and therefore provided the fledging
TPLF with an important opportunity to establish itself. Thus, between 1975 and 1978, the
607 See TPLF, Submission to the 37th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Regarding the
Tigray People's Struggle for Self-Determination (London: TPLF Foreign Relations Bureau, 1982).
608 See his National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cot., p. 254.
609 See Cohn Legum and James Firebrace, op. cit., p. 18; also quoted from TPLF, Foreign Relations
Bureau, People's Voice, published sporadically from July 1981 (also widely referred to as "Tigray in
Struggle").
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TPLF was able to develop its political programme, make its first contacts with the peasants,
establish relations with the Eritrean revolutionary fronts, carry out its first model reforms, and
distinguish itself from other anti-Dergue movements in Ethiopia610 . Although this period also
witnessed the growing disenchantment of Tigray's peasants with the military regime,
informants have maintained that by 1978 the majority of the TPLF fighters were still drawn
from the province's petty-bourgeois, particularly teachers and students. As a group, the
Tigrayan petty-bourgeois shared with other ethnic and regional counterparts in Ethiopia an
opposition to the feudal regime. They also shared pan-Ethiopian ideology developed during
the Ethiopian student movement of the 1 960s and early 1 970s which fought successfully the
old regime and military dictatorship on a pan-Ethiopian basis. Ato Meles Zenawi, former
President of the TGE, currently Prime Minster of Ethiopia and Chairman of the EPRDF, and
his other Tigrayan contemporaries were leaders of that movement and their establishment of
the TPLF did not mark a retreat into ethnic parochialism, but instead proved to be an accurate
assessment of the revolutionary possibilities in the country at that time6".
By 1989, the TPLF took the government by extraordinary surprise when its troops sustained
the most humiliating defeat at the hands of the TPLF. The victories of 1989 not only resulted
in total control of Tigray but also delivered a stunning psychological blow to the morale of the
regime. Even the famine, which hit the region of Tigray in 1989 and 1990, did nothing to halt
its forward march. Instead the TPLF enabled the famine to widen its legitimacy as well as the
territory under its sway. In the aftermath of the total liberation of Tigray, the government had
gradually and painfully come to the realisation that the movement was a very serious force to
contend with. But it was too late, after getting hold of its home-base (Tigray), the TPLF
began the implementation of its overall strategy of emphasising a united opposition of
democratic fronts against the Dergue. In 1990 the TPLF merged with the EPDM with whom
it had cooperated since the early 1980s against the EPRP; the OPDO and EDORM to form the
EPRDF shortly before waging the famous Tewodros campaigns in Gondar, Walelign
campaign in Wollo and subsequent campaigns in Shoa in 1990 and 1991.
The other major ethnic-based liberation front was that waged by the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), whose roots are also grounded in the politics of the Ethiopian
Student Movement (ESM) of the l960s and early 1970s 612 . According to John Markakis, the
610 See TPLF, Revolt, First Year (1975?), no.7, p. 29, and no.8, p. 26; Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
(TPLF), Woyene, 21 February 1979; and John Young, "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation
Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism", op. cit., pp.
Interview with John Young, Addis Ababa, June 1996.
612 See Chris PrOuty and Eugene Rosenfeld (ed.), op. cit., pp. 115-117.
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EPRP infiltrated the Labour Unions, the Teacher's Association, and university bodies, and
"proclaimed itself a proletarian vanguard party on the basis of its class position" 613 . This was a
point of concern especially among the TPLF who perceived the primary contradiction
crippling Ethiopia as more of nationality than of class. The nature of the contradiction
widened the gap between the TPLF and the EPRP because of the latter's concern with class
rule and the former's pre-occupation with the question of nationalities. John Markakis further
commented:
Though it recognised the fact of national subjection, the EPRP saw it as a
derivative of class rule, and maintained that both class and national oppression
could be eliminated through the joint struggle of all nationalities against the
ruling classes. What mattered was not the nationality but the class nature of
the movement that waged the struggle. Citing Mao's dictum that in certain
historical situations the national contradiction can become the principal one, the
TPLF argued that although national subjection derives from class domination,
it is not necessarily resolved by class struggle. The Tigray nationalists
maintained that fear and suspicion between the Amhara and other nationals in
Ethiopia had reached a point where national sentiment submerged class
consciousness and made a joint struggle impossible. 'The correct solution to
the problem is national struggle which wifi have a class character against
Amhara chauvinism and American imperialism' (Woyeen, 1/2/76). The EPRP
asserted that national struggle is bourgeois concept and cannot be directed
against social oppression. Yes it can, retorted the TPLF, if it has a mass
popular base614.
The EPRP formed its military wing, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Army (EPRA). The
EPRA was to organise itself as a logistical unit to fight under the vanguard political leadership
of the EPRP. However, because of differences in ideology, the TPLF demanded to be
recognised as the only vanguard organisation operating in its home-ground, Tigray, and as a
result, requested the EPRP and its military wing to go elsewhere to struggle against the
Dergue. Under such circumstances, conflict erupted when the EPRP defended its right of
operating everywhere in Ethiopia615.
613 See his National and Class Conflict, op. cit., p. 242.
614 Ibid p. 254.
615 The bloody result of that conflict are well documented by John Markakis, op. cit., p. 25 and for
details on the EPRA and its activities, see Ghelawdewos Araia, op. cit., pp. 125-127.
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The EPRP was conceived in 1972 and declared its public existence in 1975 after the 1974
Revolution6t6 . The EPRP had operated underground as the 'Ethiopian People's Liberation
Organisation' (EPLO). Between 1972 and 1974, the EPRP leadership reorganised its
structure as a party drawing a good number of its leadership from Ethiopian Student
Movement (ESM) and the exiles. It was the exiles who made the necessary preparations to
enter into Ethiopia and initiated armed resistance in Tigray. Although the EPRP was an
outgrowth of the student movement, the bulk of its leadership were no longer students since
most of them had already joined the public service as civil servants in government ministries,
companies, trade unions, agricultural projects, and some were recruited as teachers in both
university and high schools throughout the country.
The EPRP ideological line followed the far left whose intention was to dismantle Ethiopias
ruling class. For this reason, the EPRP underground leaders supported the 1974 Revolution
which it thought would serve the interest of the larger masses. Thus, it began circulating its
two important organs: Democracia and Abyot. These were instrumental in its open
emergence in 1975. Even though the Dergue was stifi a staggering leadership, MEISON,
another contending party during the 1974 Revolution began getting worried of the EPRP and,
as a result, starting playing conspirational games against the EPRP by cooperating with the
Dergue6t7 . Because of such rivalry, the EPRP suddenly found itself sandwiched between the
Dergue on the one hand and METS ON on the other. The EPRP itself was also to blame for its
own downfall because it entangled itself in a series of actual suicidal battles that it
unnecessarily conducted.
Be that as it may, the EPRP exiles and other members in the country converged in the north,
Tigray Region, and assembled at Asimba (red mountain in the Saho language) in Awraja
Agame of Tigray to form an armed band which in effect became the nucleus of the EPRA618.
This nucleus of the EPRA, or the embryo of the revolutionary army composed only of 18 men
and was led by Berhane-Meskel Redda. They were trained in Algeria and the EPLF base area
in Eritrea. These men had to mingle with the people of Tigray, organise the latter and also
usher a hit and run guerrilla warfare in Asimba and its vicinity.
616 See Ghelawdewos Araia, op. cit., p. 115; and Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld (ed.), op. cit., pp.
115-117.
617 MEISON melted though some of its elements surfaced again at the end of the liberation struggle in
1991 as members of the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF). For more details on
MEISON, which I have deliberately left out in my analysis of the ethnic-based liberation fronts because
of similarities with the Dergue, see Ghelawdewos Araia, op. cit.
618 
For details about the EPRA and its activities, see also Ghelawdewos Araia, op. . cit., pp. 125-127.
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Despite the difficulties it encountered because of its unamicable relations with the TPLF, the
EPRP had various programmes of mobilisation against the Dergue. In a statement it released
against the Dergue, the EPRP wrote:
The revolution for which you bled, and made a life and death struggle is out
of your hold by the self-appointed caretakers. In this respect the revolution is
being misdirected to serve the interest of the ruling class ... not yours. On the
contrary, the very revolution you have set in motion is twisted to destroy you.
Therefore, before it becomes too late, you should reclaim your rights and
throughout this historical struggle you wage, the EPRP wifi stand at your side
until fmal victory619.
To be sure, the EPRP's party programme appealed to "the resolute workers and peasants, the
broad masses of the military forces, city dwellers, townsmen and villagers and patriotic
country people"620 . The content of the programme clearly showed that the EPRP was a
Marxist-Leninist party dedicated to the ideals of socialism. The party's programme clarified
that it aimed to "destroy the rule of feudalism and Imperialism, especially Imperialism led by
the U.S. and its representatives-bureaucratic bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie-and to
establish peoples democratic republic of the broad masses" 621 . As one of its primary
objectives, the EPRP mentioned the formation of a Provisional Peoples Government (PPG).
This became a rallying slogan during the first phase of the revolution, and as Ghelawdewos
wrote, "since the broad masses lacked an organised political leadership, it was appropriate,
correct and timely" 622 . Unfortunately, the Dergue manoeuvred to the leadership via the brutal
suppression of the masses.
The other important point, which was central to the EPRPs programme, was about political
democracy and the rights of the people and the nationalities. Thus, the EPRP aimed at
"establishing a broad democratic and progressive political system", and declared further that
its objective was: (1) to establish a national peoples congress, and (2) ensure the exercise of
democratic rights like freedom of speech and press, to safeguard freedom of political activities,
to separate church and state, to establish a genuine justice system. These will be achieved
when a national peoples congress is established which shall in turn, draft the constitution of the
6191bid., p. 87.
620 See The Ethiopian People's Revolutiona,y Party Pro gramine (August 1975).
621 ibid., p. 1.
622 
See Ghelawdewos Araia, 0/). cit., pp. 117-118.
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republic, promulgate laws, conduct elections for the peoples government, adopt economic
plans on national scale and ratifies international treaties and agreements 623 . These programmes
were wholly plagiarised by the military leaders who hijacked the peoples revolution and built
their National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) based on EPRP's plans624.
The EPRP's programme was "to safeguard the freedom of activity for all political parties,
organisations and individuals, 'irrespective of their ideological or political inclinations' as long
as their objective stands are anti-feudal, anti-bureaucratic bourgeoisie and anti-imperialist"625.
The EPRP also aimed at "establishing planned democratic national economy free from foreign
domination, and improve the material and spiritual well being of the broad masses". This past
includes ownership of land and development of rural agricultural land, urban land and housing,
industry and finance as well as commerce. According to this section, all rural land and extra
houses, formerly imperial owned industries and fmancial institutions such as banks and
insurance were to become public properties. Commerce was also to be regulated by the state.
By and large, this constitutes what the Dergue plagiarised and adopted in the construction of
their own programme.
Another important point in the EPRP programme was the issue of land ownership. The party
delineated three types of land ownership, namely, private individual, cooperative and state
ownerships. Thus, the party stated, "before embarking on settlement or resettlement schemes
the state shall consult and seek permission of the local people concerned" 626 . Most important
too, was the point that lay at the heart of Ethiopian politics, the issue of nationalities. The
EPRP wished to "declare and safeguard the unrestricted rights of nations to self-
determination". Because the pasty's goal was:
To give full rights to the peoples of the various Ethiopian nationalities to
determine their own destiny, and at the same time carry out a peaceful political
struggle for a voluntary union of the type they choose on the basis of equality
and feeling of brotherhood; to condemn and struggle against the militaristic
onslaught of the Eritrean people to solve the question; to ensure that the
Eritrean question is resolved peacefully and democratically; similarly to bring








about a peaceflul and democratic solution to the question of the Somali
nationality residing in Ethiopia627.
This is wha,t made both the EPLF and the TPLF to cooperate with the EPRP. The EPRP had
formally recognised the national independence of Eritrea and officially endorsed the self-
determination of nationalities in Ethiopia. On the other hand, the same policy was responsible
for the head coffision between the EPRP and MEISON because the latter was clearly reluctant
to address the Eritrean question. Even though the EPRP had recognised the question of
nationalities in theory, MEISON was clearly reluctant to address it, and instead waged the war
against nationalities by cooperating with the Dergue.
The EPRP focussed on the improvement of the working conditions and standard of living of
all working people, for example, the right to strike by the working class. The EPRP
programme aimed at the "establishment of a national democratic culture and educational
system and to run public health services catering to the masses". The EPRP wanted to abolish
all forms of reactionary, rigid, and 'imperialist-ridden' culture and education and install in
instead a progressive educational system that is attuned to the interests of the broad masses.
In other words, they aimed to merge theory and practice in schools to reflect the productive
engagement of the working class. The building of a peoples army and the equality of women
was also included in the party's programme. In short, the EPRP aspired to create a peoples
democratic republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), an aspiration the Dergue were quick to hijack after
liquidating the EPRP from its held territories. On the other hand, even though the EPRP's
policies were sound, the front did not succeed in its attempts to implement the programmes.
Instead it fell in collision with the TPLF, MEISON, and the OLF. The EPRP and the TPLF
had different strategic interests, outlooks, analysis of the Ethiopian revolution, and hence
different programmes 628 . The other important additional factor that contributed to the clash
was the fact that most of the EPRP's core leadership that had also played a vital role in the
EPRP were Tigrayans629.
Similarly, although both MEISON and the EPRP were, in essence, multi-national, MEISON
was largely an Amhara-Oromo organisation, with virtually no Tigrayans, an insignificant
627 1bid.,p. 14.
628 See Ghelawdewos Araia, op. cit., pp. 127-133; and an informant confirmed that the relationship
between the two fronts was confrontational mainly because the EPRP was dominantly Amhara while
the TPLF was similarly Tigrayan. Interview with Tafesa Olika, Department Head, Political Science
and International Relations (PSIR), Addis Ababa University, June 1996.
629 ibid., pp. 128-129.
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number of Gurages and other minority nationalities. In contrast, the EPRP was predominantly
Amhara and a minority of Tigrayans, Gurages, Oromos, Somalis, and even Eritreans. The
EPRP had also managed to recruit other minority nationalities - Kaffmo, Wolaita, Sidamo,
Dorze-Haizo, Saho, Afar, Falasha, and Shinasha. Thus, the EPRP was by far a more broad-
based revolutionary organisation than was MEISON. In fact one sidelined major problem in
the analysis of the differences between MEISON and the EPRP emerged out of attempts to
implement socialism in Ethiopia. They exhibited basic differences in their analysis of strategies
which were in part differences on the nature of the Revolution. The EPRP demanded the
formation of the PPG as an effort to try to fill the leadership vacuum during the revolution,
while MEISON supported the military. This was a major conflict because the Dergue 's Red
Terror' campaign that liquidated the EPRP and other opposition was backed by MEISON.
However, they all had similar programmes about the issue of nationalities 'self-determination
of nations'. MEISON, however, feared any attempts that may lead to the dismemberment of
Ethiopia via secession of nationalities. Thus, MEISON campaigned against Eritrea.
Despite all the conspirational games it played in favour of the military officers, MEISON
actually fell out with the Dergue and the latter began its onslaught against the former. After
successfully liquidating the EPRP and other opposition groups with the help of METS ON, and
after winning the war in Ogaden and Eritrea, the Dergue actually turned its sword against
MEISON. By the end of 1978 and 1979, MEISON and the EPRP were eliminated from the
political arena of post-imperial Ethiopia. They were pushed to the peripheries where they
continued to fight the Dergue but in a much weaker fashion. As for the relationship between
the EPRP and the OLF, I will turn to them later. Meantime, we examine the OLF as one
major ethnic-based liberation front along side the TPLF and the EPRP.
Of all the major contemporary resistance movements in Ethiopia, the Oromo is the oldest. It
started long before the 1974 Revolution and was also a reaction against the "Amhara
domination". For the OLF, the case of the Oromo was a colonial one dating back to the days
of the construction of the modern state of Ethiopia during Menelik in the latter half of the
eighteenth century630 . The foundations of the OLF are traceable to the early 1960s when the
Metcha-Tulema Self Help Association was formed in 1962. The objectives of the Metcha-
Tulema included the construction of schools and clinics, Churches and Mosques, and the
provision of legal assistance to members. Within three years after its inception, the
organisation had registered three million members and operated within eight regional
u See Peter Baxter, "Always on the Outside Looking in': A View of the 1969 Ethiopian Elections
from a Rural Constituency", Erhnos, vol. 1, no. 2(1980), pp. 41-59; Asafa Jalata, Oro,nia and
Ethiopia, op. cit.; and Kinfe Abraham, op. cit., p. 168.
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offices631 . By 1966, the pre-occupation of the Metcha-Tuleina with the issue of land
distribution had become a cause of some disquiet to the imperial regime632.
As the organisation became increasingly stronger, it began to go against government orders.
For example, it defied a government ban on a meeting in Arssi Region, and an exploded
grenade in an Addis Ababa Cinema was associated with the organisation. The major
consequence of such defiance was then paid heavily by the arrest of Tadesse Biru, and
execution of other Oromo leaders.
When in 1967 the imperial regime discovered the Metcha-Tulema, the organisation continued
to survive in other forms. For example, in 1969 an Oromo student paper, namely, 'Kana
Bekta?', meaning, 'did you know?', was established, and in October the same year, a militant
faction which had been trained under Sheikh Hussein Sura was imprisoned in Mogadishu,
attempting to return to Ethiopia to launch an armed struggle. From 1971 the militants were
able to maintain contact with two other clandestine study circles, 'Oromia' and 'Bakaicha
Ororno" which were established in Addis Ababa, and when in 1973 Hussein found his way to
Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian Peoples Liberation Front was formed. In July 1974, a few months
before the final fall of Haile Selassie, the movement's first organisational meeting adopted a
formal programme, and renamed itself the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
The OLF was established to fight for the independence of Oromia, which they claimed
comprised those regions inhabited by Oromo populations, who are in turn reckoned to
constitute more than half of the population of Ethiopia633 . These regions were integrated into
the rest of today's Ethiopia during the period of Menelik II. The Oromo nationalists have
regarded the Menelik adventure a colonial one, effected with the connivance of foreign
powers, notably Britain, France, and Italy, and the Oromo nationalists embraced the anti-
imperialist rhetoric of the Ethiopian student movement. In addition to such historical
justifications, the OLF leadership believed strongly that a colonial categorisation of the
struggle of the Oromo peoples was essential if the international legal principle of self-
determination was to be recognised as applicable. Although the TPLF disagreed with this
analysis, "it was not an issue to prevent cooperation against a common enemy between the
two organisations"634.
631 See Asafa Jalata, op. cit., ch. 8, passim.
632 SJOhn Markakis, op. cit., p. 260; and Asafa Jalata, op. cit.
633 See in particular Godaa Melba, Oronzia (Khartoum: The Nile Press, 1988).
614 Joint conversation with John Young and Marera, Addis Ababa, June 1996.
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To be sure, the OLF claim was not the same as that forwarded by the Eritrean nationalists, the
EPLF as we have encountered before. The Oromo claim had a second possibility. In other
words, if the mould of the Ethiopian state could be transformed to the extent that real self-
determination of nationalities could be achieved within its framework, "the OLF was prepared
to leave the door open to the possibility of coexistence" 635 . 'Whilst the relative weight which
this scenario carried out as a goal of the organisation fluctuated, it did nevertheless open the
door to cooperation with other nationally based organisations fighting the Dergue. The fight
for an Oromo independence cannot be proven given the well fast integration of the Oromos
amongst the peoples of other regions of Ethiopia. In fact, such problem was summarised
when Dawit Woldegiorgis wrote:
The objectives of the OLF are unclear at this point, but if secession is a goal,
the movement is doomed to failure. The Oromos are so integrated into the
Ethiopian soul that it is difficult to fmd an Amhara without some Oromo blood
in his veins. It is equally difficult draw a boundary between the Oromo lands
and the Amhara or Tigrayan lands. But if their objective is to achieve cultural
autonomy and democratic political representation, then their cause wifi
contribute enormously to the emergence of a strong Ethiopia united in
diversity636.
Nevertheless, the Oromos still feel cheated given that they are the most populous community
in Ethiopia but have remained in the peripheries of power. At the end of the day, the above
armed resistance organisations found a common ground, fighting against a common oppressor
government, the Dergue which they fmally overthrew in coalition of forces under the banner
of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991. With
whom the OLF joined to form a TGE and pulled out of the coalition within a period of three
months.
5.2. The Liberation Alliance: The Emergence of the Ethiopian Peoples
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
Conversation with Marera, Head of PSIR, Addis Ababa University.
636 See his Red Tears, op. cit., p. 117; this very words have also been quoted by Kinfe Abraham, op.
cit.,p. 170.
221
Building the EPRDF could be said to have began in the early 1980s. For instance, in 1981
cooperation between the TPLF and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM)
started on a successful footing. However, leading TPLF officials tell that the establishment of
the affiance was postponed for some years in the hope that it might be founded with more than
these two organisations (TPLF and EPDM). In an interview with Sarah Vaughan, Sebhat
Nega (TPLF Chairman 1979-1989) explained that immediate merger was not possible:
By the time the EPRDF was established the urgency of the formation of the Front was
considerable: at the Rome talks [which opened in November 1989] the Dergue claimed
that the TPLF, as a Tigrayan movement, had no right to discuss the situation of the
whole Ethiopia; at the same time we were expanding the movement outside Tigray into
the Amhara region. Diplomatically and politically the formal creation of the Front was
urgent637.
The EPRDF was officially established in 1989 as a coalition of four major political-ethnic
based groupings. These were the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), a core element
in the alliance, the Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM), the Oromo Peoples
Democratic Organisation (OPDO), and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary
Movement (EDORM). In large part, the EPRDF is the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
(TPLF), because about two-thirds of the EPRDF army are the TPLF and the same is true of
the political leadership of the alliance 638 . Very few, if any, expected that the TPLF would
emerge as a dominant force in Ethiopian politics knowing that it was formed by a handful of
ambitious university students from Tigray in 1975. The EPDM is a known junior partner of
the TPLF, formerly set in 1980 and largely Amhara. The EPDM is a splinter group of the
EPRP. The emergence of the EPDM has to date peripheralised the EPRP and MEISON in
Ethiopian politics because it has assumed the role of Amhara representation in the coalition.
The EPDM was formally founded in 1980 with the help of the TPLF enabling the latter to
penetrate Amhara region. As mentioned above, the EPDM has its origins in the EPRP, but
split in the late 1 970s after bitter infighting within the organisation. It was constituted mainly
by the so-called Belessa Group, whose members later received military training, arms and had
637 See Sarah Vaughan, The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991, op. cit., p. 5.
638 When it openly emerged in 1989, four out of the seven members of the EPRDF Central Committee
or Politburo were members of the TPLF. These were Meles Zenawi (Chairman), Abaye Tsehaye, Seye
(Salah) Abraha and Tewolde Wolde-Mariam, and the other three were Tamrat Layne (EPDM), Bereket
Helawi (EPDM), and Taye (Kuma) Demeksa (OPDO). See in particular Theodros Dagne, "EPRDF'S
Rise to Political Dominance ", op. cit., pp. 17-20; also John Young's Thesis, op. cit.; in idem,
"Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia", op. cit., p. 531; and Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld (eds.), op.
cit., p. 115.
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the permanent use of a large TPLF unit at their disposal in Gondar and Wollo. The crisis in
the EPRP began when a group within the front began calling for a congress to review policy
and change the leadership, were reportedly killed by those they challenged. In an interview
with Sarah Vaughan:
Bereket reports that a group of some 112 EPRP cadres then left Gojjam and
Gondar for Tigray, planning either to continue the struggle from there, if it
were possible to reach some accommodation with the TPLF, or, if not, to seek
safe passage through to Sudan. On arrival in the TPLF-held areas they were
given practical facilitation and, after a 5-month discussion, a core of 37 were
elected to form the EPDM and work alongside the TPLF who, whilst giving
them every support reportedly "never interfered in the internal matters of the
organisation". The first congress of the EPDM was convened on 20
November 1980639.
However, it is reported that the EPDM's first chairman left in protest at the growing influence
of the TPLF against the organisation's position on the question of Eritrea. Thus, in 1989,
Tamrat Layne, a close ally of Meles Zenawi, was elected Chairman of the EPDM as well as
the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Force (EMLF), which the former reportedly created. The
other members of the EPDM leadership include: Dawit Yohannes (currently Speaker of the
Shengo), Addisu Ebo, Tefera Waliva, Bereket Helawi (EPDM vice Chairman), and Haile
Wolde Senbet (Chairman of the Military Conmiittee). Despite the attacks it receives from its
critics because of its close relations with the TPLF, the EPDM seems to be one of the leading
organisations with substantial support in the Amhara regions of Gondar, Wollo, and
Gojjam640.
The third member of the alliance is the OPDO, whose ranks were formed chiefly out of
prisoners of war who agreed to fight against the Dergue without an aspiration for an Oromo
independent state. When a rift developed between the OLF and the TPLF, mainly over the
former's continuing support for an independent Oromia in the mid-i 980s, the latter founded
the OPDO as a rival to the OLF. The OPDO ranks were formed chiefly out of Oromo
prisoners of war held by the TPLF in Tigray, and Oromos who had at one time or another
joined the EPDM. As we mentioned earlier, the OLF has remained one of the most difficult
groups alongside the EPRP and MEISON, that the TPLF could convince to join the affiance.
Although on several occasions, with the mediation effort of the EPLF, the OLF temporarily
639 See Sarah Vaughan, op. cit., p. 6.
Interview with Yosef Tesfaye, Secretary to Dawit Johannes, Speaker of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia's Parliament, May 1996.
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joined the EPRDF, its key minister resigned within three months of service in the coalition.
The OLF and the EPLF were instead great allies and the latter is reported to have preferred
delivering the Oromo prisoners of war back to the OLF rather than releasing them through the
TPLF to reinforce the OPDO. Be that as it may, all Oromo prisoners of war were since then
congregated together to form the powerful rival to the OLF to date64t.
The fourth member of the EPRDF is the little known Ethiopian Democratic Officers
Revolutionary Movement (EDORM). It was formed out of the captured senior military
personnel particularly during the battle for the capture of Enda Selassie in February 1989642.
The other members of the alliance include the Beni-Shangul Peoples Liberation Movement
(BPLM) and the Gambella Peoples Liberation Movement (GPLM); the former was again a
TPLF creation while the latter a creation of the OLF. The strategy of building the affiance was
a real proof that the TPLF had grown beyond the parochialism of ethnic politics in Ethiopia.
Pointing to the fact that the EPRDF benefited heavily from the organisational talents and
tremendous capacity for discipline from the TPLF. The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the
TPLF is basically an intellectual legacy of the leaders' radical student days in the 1970s. Even
though the Marxist economic policies may have been dropped, Leninist organisation still plays
an important role in the EPRDF thinking and this is manifest in its organisation principles643.
On policies, the EPRDF had initially formulated a Leninist two-stage theory of the revolution.
The first stage was the national democratic revolution and the second stage was the socialist
revolution. For this reason, strategic alliance with various fronts was permitted in the first
stage but not in the second. In between the two stages was a transition period which had to be
managed so that the possibility of moving on to the second stage was not lost. This required
denying democratic rights to certain reactionary forces and putting the required structural
transformations of the country's political life in place so that "democratic forces" were
allowed to have their way. In this context, "democracy" does not allow a plurality of parties,
but rather a plurality of opinions within one overall objective. It is a pyramidal form of self-
government, with villages, districts and provinces each regulating their own affairs, and central
641 
People's Voice, 11(4), then claimed in the latter half of 1989 that "prisoners of war now number
more than 40,000", p. 21.
642 In an interview with Col. Asaminew Bedane, op. cit., former commander with the Dergite and
captured prisoner of war, he confirmed that most of them (POWs) found the liberation struggle for a
democratic Ethiopia where all nationalities will coexist equally a genuine cause and they never hesitated
forming their own front with the help of the TPLF.
See EPRDF, EPRDF's Pro gra,nme for a Smooth and Peaceful Transition of Power in Ethiopia
(London: EPRDF, 1990); and in idem, On the Question of Peace in Ethiopia (London: EPRDF, 1990).
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policy being dictated by the considered outcome of all these local deliberations. In its first
Congress in January 1991, the EPRDF resolutions 1 and 2 stressed the organisation of
"popular assemblies" rather than "occasions on which the masses 'elect' their oppressors every
so often", and denial of unrestricted democratic rights to "anti-popular and anti-democratic
forces" (specifically, those who held power under either the Dergue or the Emperor). Thus,
the affiance did not as well yield to organisations without a coherent political platform other
than national independence or liberation (specifically the "independence wing" of the OLF).
Resolution 3 of the EPRDF Congress granted nationalities the right to self-determination,
including secession, but only after a full and fair referendum.
Having dealt separately with Eritrea, the congress also stated that, under conditions of
democracy, secession would not "safeguard the interests of the people" - implicitly closing the
door to secession in the case of a democratic government. This pyramidal structure is
reflected both in the baito/gime gema system of Tigray and in the June 1992 regional
elections644 . However, the new members of the coalition have undeniably diluted the identity
of the core organisation by bringing in their own views on the future of a democratic Ethiopia
where all nationalities must be treated as equals. Therefore, some of the creations of the
earlier years have been quietly abandoned, and equally importantly, Meles Zenawi and his
immediate circles have displayed remarkable pragmatism645 . The process of the affiance
intensified and by early 1991, the political and organisational base for an Ethiopia-wide anti-
Dergue liberation movement had been forged. This paid off very quickly in military advances.
At the same time, Mengistu's zero hour was close 646 . He began reverting his policies by
seeking negotiation with both the EPRDF and the EPLF who were a short distance away from
victory. General Mengistu became more desperate because of his inability to obtain arms.
Paul Henze reported, "It is not surprising that Mengistu leaped at the opportunity to exchange
ambassadors and accept military aid from Israel in late 1989. Gorbachev had shown no
warmth toward him and, though Soviet arms kept arriving, it was apparent that the Soviet
relationship was cooling off. With all other expectations disappointed, Mengistu hoped that
Israeli arms and counter-insurgency skills might still enable his armies to defeat the EPLF and
See Local and Regional Elections in Ethiopia 21 June 1992, Human Rights Report No. 1 August
1992, Report of the Norwegian Observer Group, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Oslo.
645 Interview with Ambassador Robert Houdek, op. cit.
Kinfe Abraham, op. cit., Ch. One, rightly used the terminology "Mengistu's Zero Hour" in the
beginning of his first chapter to describe the Dergue 's changing position while increasingly surrounded
by his powerful adversaries, the EPLF and the EPRDF.
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the TPLF" 647 . The Israeli alliance which in 1989 seemed to offer hope for rescue, produced
no major diplomatic or military dividends, instead caused increasing complications over the
problem of the Ethiopian Jews. One major force that helped to prune Mengistu's branches
was the collapse of Communism in the former U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe. The Dergue was
confronted with international isolation which forced it to compromise with Israel, a nation it
had earlier condemned as a reactionary Zionist state and pawn of imperialism 648 . Mengistu
had hoped Israel would lobby on his behalf to change U.S. thinking and he also tried to lull
anxious and critical Western donors through the series of liberalisation measures undertaken
between 1988 and 1991. That did little to bring about a change of heart in the U.S. because
U.S. officials still viewed Mengistu grudgingly. According to Ambassador Robert Houdek,
"the bottom line was that the United States did not want to support a loser". Whatever
measures General Mengistu wanted to use in order to better the relationship between him and
the Western world came far too late and against a background of a series of military victories
by the EPRDF in the heartland of the country, the EPLF in Eritrea, and the OLF and other
movements elsewhere.
In all, the EPRDF continued its systematic advance southward against the Dergue armies that
occasionally put up stiff resistance. However, they more often crumbled under assault from
the less well-armed supplied insurgents, who had the advantage of high morale and the
support of the rural population of the areas they took over. One strategy the insurgent
movements adopted was not to occupy cities, because it was believed they preferred to be free
of the logistic and administrative responsibilities cities demand. In addition, they did not also
want to provoke the increasingly irritational and vindictive Mengistu who would not hesitate
from indiscriminate aerial attack and bombardment. Thus key towns such as Bahr Dar,
Dessie, and Gondar were left unattacked until rural areas around were secured. In order to
cut off Addis Ababa from the west, the EPRDF soldiers crossed the Blue Nile and advanced
into Wollega and Western Shoa. At the same time, other sister forces were advancing from
the eastern part, cutting off the city from its artery port of Asseb. The EPLF forces too were
beseeching Asseb from the north. Mengistu's major response to such a situation was to
shuffle his government, most of whose officials either fled away with him or were/are still
under house arrest in Addis Ababa. On May 21St 1991, he slipped out of the capital in a small
plane that was supposedly taking him to inspect military training camps in the south of the
country. Thereafter, informed sources tell the pilot found himself ordered to fly across the
647 
See Paul B. Henze, "Ethiopia in Transition: Downfall of the Derg and Establishment of New




border to Nairobi. From where he was flown to Harare where he has been granted asylum to
date, while some of his close aides are still either languishing in prison or are now undergoing
trial649.
Thus, many, whether in Addis Ababa or outside Ethiopia, felt things happened too quickly and
that everyone, including the EPRDF, was taken off guard by the unprecedented collapse of the
Mengistu regime. This version was of cause repeatedly denied by the EPRDF who maintained
that the end of the war was in fact delayed by the initiative of the London talks. In an
interview President Meles Zenawi explained:
Side by side with these discussions [with the Dergue], the war was going faster
than the political preparation, and there was a continual conflict between
speedily concluding the war and preparing the political basis for a new
arrangement. At times we bent in the direction of giving time for the political
work ... until fmally we felt that we couldn't continue to slow down. The war
had its own dynamics, its own logic ... And so we decide, some time
immediately after the EPRDF congress, some time in January [1991] - that the
war should end before the beginning of the rainy season, and planned our
operations accordingly. The EPLF had also come to the same conclusion from
their own angle, and we were co-ordinating with them650.
A few days after their entry into Addis Ababa, the EPRDF formed a transitional government
on June 1st 1991, with Ato Meles Zenawi as new Head of State of the TGE. The following
day, the new president's address was broadcasted on nationwide radio and TV, promising
Ethiopians a broadly based representative government involving all opposition groups and
prominent Ethiopians except those associated with the old regime651.
Although the taking over power in Addis Ababa seems to have caught the alliance by
surprise, documents of both the TPLF and the EPRDF provide evidence of earlier
preparations for a transitional government in Ethiopia a few years before the collapse of the
Dergue regime. For example, the March 1989 3rd Congress of the TPLF adopted an 8-point
It is no secret that Tesfaye Gebrekidan, a senior general, former chief of staff, and defence minister,
appointed by Mengistu to act as head of state, is still in the Italian Embassy in Addis Ababa surrounded
by Ethiopia's military security.
650 Reported by Sarah Vaughan, op. cit., p. 29.
651 President Meles Zenawi repeated the same pledge in an address to representatives of foreign
governments and international agencies in Addis Ababa, and in interviews with foreign and local
journalists. See Kinfe Abraham, op. cit., p. 4; and Alemayehu Gebre Mariam, "Appointment with
Destiny: The Dawn of Democracy in Ethiopia?", Ethiopian Review (August 1991), pp. 10-14.
t
227
"proposal for a peaceful solution to the situation in Ethiopia" 652 . The proposal included the
establishment of a provisional government "constituted from all political organisations" to be
established on the conditions of: a cease fire; freedom of political work for all parties; the
release of political prisoners; and the removal of the Dergue 's security apparatus and foreign
military forces. In addition, the provisional arrangement would respect the choice of the
Eritrean people regarding their fate, and would prepare a constitution: in accordance with this
last point a government would be selected to replace the provisional one.
As expected, the newly founded EPRDF adopted the proposal in October the same year
[1989], and produced a further elaborated programme in the following year [1990]653. The
latter programme actually detailed many things and alterations in it and provided a broader and
more precise agenda for the July 1991 Transitional Conference in Addis Ababa 654 . In order
for them to be adopted by the alliance's leadership, substantial changes were undertaken on the
TPLF programme. These included: the EPRDF's intention to remove the government by force
if it refused to accept and participate in this programme (Art. 1); the need for a referendum in
Eritrea (Art. 3b); the limitation of a provisional arrangement to a period of no more than two
years (Art. 4a); the need for the provisional government to effect economic reforms, help
victims of war, and rebuild the war-torn economy (Art. 4c); and the need for international
supervision of all elections (Art. 5e).
Finally, the EPRDF's proof of its commitment for democracy and public participation in
Ethiopia was explicit in the first document of the organisation - the Charter of the Provisional
Government655 . In summary, the charter encompassed four major sections which the TGE
was to implement within two years. Most important are sections 1 and 4 which discussed
among other things: declarations on "democratic rights", the right of every nationality on
"self-determination and self-government", the right to insure preservation of one's own
"culture, language and history", the right to participate in "national government", that the
TGE will observe all UN declarations on human rights. Freedom of speech, association and
652 See Tigray People's Liberation Front, Proposal of the TPLF for a Peaceful Solution to the
Problems of Ethiopia (London: TPLF, 1989); also published in People's Voice, 11(1/3)1989.
653 See EPRDF, A Democratic Alternative for Ethiopia (London: EPRDF, 1989); and EPRDF,
Programme for a Smnooth and Peaceful Transition of Power in Ethiopia (London: EPRDF, 1990).
6 For details of the Addis Ababa Conference, see Sarah Vaughan, op. cit.
655 There were four sections which the charter addressed: (I) Democratic rights; (II) Principles guiding
foreign policy; (III) Structure and Composition of the TGE; and (IV) Transitional programme. Refer to
appendix VI for the "Peaceful and Demnocratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia", Negarit Gazetta
(Addis Ababa, July 22nd 1991); and Sarah Vaughan, op. cit., pp. 72-76.
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conscience, the right to organise and establish political parties. In two years, the National
Council of persons and ministerial bodies will establish a constitutional commission which will
draft and present a draft constitution for consideration by the Council. Following debate in the
Council the draft document will be presented to the public for debate and comment. The fmal
draft will be presented to a popularly elected government for ratification.
Like other African countries, Ethiopia has had no tradition of political party organisation and
activity - legitimate or underground. Local personal connections provided the basis for
candidacy throughout the imperial reign. Even the opposition that emerged in the 1 960s
onwards had no party organising character. It has been noted that, "This absence of parties is
often ascribed by Ethiopians to cultural traits, and especially the pronounced lack of
interpersonal trust, and the difficulty of organising any cooperative institution in a
hierarchically structured society" 656 . Thus, even the political factions that emerged after the
1974 Revolution were mainly a creation or continuation of Ethiopian student unions abroad,
and not meant to organise the Ethiopian masses the way political parties elsewhere did. The
Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) was a product of academic exposure to ideological
imperatives of the time. This lack of political organisation enabled the military to hijack the
people's revolution, thus, delaying Ethiopia's path to democratic order. Even after the
Dergue had assumed the political leadership of post-imperial Ethiopia, the military coterie
never provided a ground for free political party organisation. Instead, it either used them
against one another or liquidated their leaders. Mengistu himself, admitted in a visit to
Moscow in 1978, that "the historical uniqueness of the Ethiopian revolution' consisted in the
fact that the army had assumed the vanguard role which was normally reserved for the
comi-nunist"657.
5.3. Discourses on Liberation and Democracy: Ethiopian Self-Views
Ethiopian self-views on the liberation struggle for democracy in their own country are slightly
different from those expressed by Eritreans in the previous chapter. Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic
society with over 80 major nationalities compared to Eritrea's 9 ethnic groups. Eritreans
portray themselves as one people and a wide range of evidence suggests the thirty years of war
has tightened the relationship that has in turn led to the optimism Eritreans hold about the
future stability of their country. The same cannot be said of Ethiopia where liberation
movements never overcame the impact of ethnic influence. As mentioned above, liberation
656 See Christopher Clapham, op. cit., p. 65.
657 Ibid.
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movements in Ethiopia were all ethnically-based, and post-liberation politics is still heavily
conducted under the auspices of ethnicity. However, this form of political organisation does
not imply Ethiopian self-views would reflect those of a people who strive to dismember their
regions in order to destroy mother Ethiopia. The liberation alliance attempts to resolve the
disintegration threat by putting the case of nationalities at the top of the agenda of post-
liberation restructuring. Many Ethiopians and foreign observers cited the preservation of the
unity of Ethiopia as one major achievement the liberation alliance must be praised for since
they took over power in Addis Ababa in 1991. According to the Charter of the TGE which
has now been incorporated into the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE)
Constitution, "every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to
self-determination, including the right to secession" 68 . It is clarified in the constitution that
the exercise of self-determination, including secession of every nation, nationality and people
of Ethiopia can take place when a two-thirds majority of the legislative council of any nation,
nationality or people approves it, after which a referendum is then organised by the federal
government within three years, and a majority of the vote in the referendum must support it to
be granted. In addition, informants also believe that the demand for secession by any
nationality will automatically be rendered redundant when democratic institutions are fully
promulgated and the implementation process is seen to be taking place. A major indicator of
the democratic process can only be seen when the people have the right to choose their leaders
and are given equal opportunity in economic, social and political development.
The long time yearning for democracy and democratic institutions, self-determination or the
right to form autonomous governments, and lack of equal opportunity for all nationalities is a
grievance shared across the majority of the Ethiopian society. So that in Ethiopia, the term
liberation often refers to the achievement of such principles, and not like in Eritrea where
liberation became synonymous with independence. Thus, such dichotomy should be kept in
mind when listening to Ethiopian self-views on their liberation struggle for democracy. Even
though Ethiopians talk of similar structural factors that gave rise to widespread dissent which
in turn led to the proliferation of liberation fronts, their experiences often reflect serious ethnic
consciousness. For example, an identification and systematic analysis of the ethnic-based
guerrilla formation is clearly explicit in their recruitment bases, orientation, size, and level of
organisation659.
658 For details of this, see Article 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, op. cit., pp. 18-19.,
659 Interview with Prof. J. 'Bayo Adekanye, Programme Leader, Ethnic and Nationalist Conflicts
Programme, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). I met Prof. 'Bayo in Addis Ababa
when we were both on our different research trips to Ethiopia in June 1996. His two-months research
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Every Ethiopian I spoke to justified taking up arms as the very last resort of a peaceful
struggle for change. Thus, liberation movements were/are all justified on the basis of such
explanation. Below, I have lumped Ethiopian self-views together under five major themes:
liberation, the question of nationalities, democracy, transition, and other social issues that
include-land reform, women, demobilisation, reintegration of soldiers and refugees.
(a) Ethiopian Self-Views on Liberation: practical definitions and conceptions
Contemporary Ethiopians who managed to survive the frustrations of both monarchical and
military autocracies have expressed their feelings on the current political change in the country
which they all consider was long overdue. Real political change should have taken place in the
late 1960s or early 1970s during the rise of clandestine political parties and protests led mainly
by the student movement. It is argued that some of the more impatient students who expected
instant change went and joined the Eritrean independence movement which at the time was the
only organised force opposed to the feudal regime. Narratives of Ethiopian experiences about
their own liberation struggle for democracy are normally referred to the activities of the
student movement, and the successes of the 1990s have their roots grounded on them.
Ethiopian intellectuals date the origins of present experiences with the student movement.
Dawit Wolde Giorgis, for example, presents the experience in a fascinating fashion where he
takes the story of 'Animal Farm' to ifiustrate the way the long struggle for democracy began in
Ethiopia. He quoted George Orwell's words:
Now, comrades, what is the nature of this life of ours? Let us face it: our lives
are miserable, labourious, and short. We are born, we are given just so much
food as wifi keep the breath in our bodies, and those of us who are capable of it
are forced to work to the last atom of our strength ... our life is misery and
slavery, that is the plain truth. But is this simply part of the order of nature? Is
it because this land of ours is so poor that it cannot afford a decent life to those
who dwell upon it? No, comrades, a thousand times no! The soil ... is fertile,
its climate is good, it is capable of affording food in abundance ... why then do
we continue in this miserable condition? ... all the evils of this life of ours spring
from the tyranny of human beings. Only get rid of man and the produce of our
labour would be our own. Almost overnight we would become rich and free.
What then must we do? Why, work night and day, body and soul, for the
trip was on "Disa,-ming Ethnic Guerrillas, Power-Sharing and Transition to Democracy in Africa",
with the particular cases of Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda.
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overthrow of the human race!! That is my message to you, comrades:
Rebellion!! (George Orwell, Animal Farm)660.
Although the irony at the end of the novel does not apply here, Orwell's work is indeed a
perfect illustration of how liberation movements for political change began in Ethiopia.
Ethiopians still resent the difficulties they endured for centuries and years under both the Haile
Selassie and Mengistu's rule. George Orwell's presentation of the speech, especially the style
and delivery in 'Animal Farm' is similar to those spoken and distributed in the form of
pamphlets by leading student revolutionaries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover the
characters in the novel - Snowball, Napoleon, Molly, Boxer - are also a perfect representation
of revolutionary personalities in the student movement. During the students movement,
leaflets full of ideals, the cry for freedom, removal of injustice, destruction of the old order,
and the desperate desire for political democracy, floated the streets of Ethiopian cities and
towns661.
Therefore, Ethiopian practical defmitions and conceptions of liberation normally refer to the
desperate strive to destroy the roots and foundations of autocracy. To many Ethiopians,
"deprivation by the ruling class of basic rights-political, economic, or social; exploitation and
suppression of nationalities and denial of their respective heritages-history, culture, or
language, led to the rise of ethnic-based guerrifia insurgencies in different parts of the
country". According to Richard Pankhurst, many nationalities and regions stifi resent the
domination by Amhara mainly from central Shoa and their language 662 . Whether Tigrayans,
Oromos, Somalis, Afars, the Gambella and Southern peoples, or even the larger Amhara
community from Gondar, Gojjam or Wollo, all talk of being dictated upon by the ruling few.
There are two major types of political oppression described by many Ethiopians in my
encounters. The first type of political oppression is what many term "cold oppression that
bites in bits and kills one via sleep like euthanasia". This type of political, social, economic or
cultural oppression was experienced mainly under the monarchy for centuries 663 . The second
type of political oppression is often characterised by brutality and terror. This was mainly
660 See Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, op. cit., p. 5. At the end of the novel, the irony is that things
never really changed for the better because the new rulers became worse dictators. See George Orwell,
Animal Farm, op. cit.
See Challenge, no. 1(1968), pp. 26-32, also quoted as footnote no. 17 above.
662 Interview with Professor Richard Pankhrust, formerly Director of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies,
Addis Ababa University (Addis Ababa June 1996).
Conversation with Tesfa Girmai, an elderly man, is now a dealer in buying and selling of foreign
currencies in Addis Ababa (Addis Ababa, 24th April 1996).
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under the military government that succeeded the monarchy. Mengistu is, in particular,
remembered for having liquidated not only the emperor and close allies, but for having
eliminated his own aides and close friends of the revolution. Mengistu nurtured ethnic
animosity, and worse launched the "Red Terror" campaign which caused massive destruction
countrywide. These are issues that recur in the minds of many Ethiopians like Ato Zemikael
from Tigray664.
The categorisation of citizens into classes, the Arnharisation of everything in the country-
culture, education, civil administration, even foreign policy, caused bitter resentment from
other nationalities in Ethiopia. For example, the wrong thing to do was when a Tigrayan, an
Oromo, a Somali, or a Gurage lawyer, teacher, or any official was forced to conduct business
in Amharic, the language of the ruling class, instead of using his/her own indigenous language
(the local language of the inhabitants of a province, district or town). Therefore, liberation is
conceived and defined as a total reversal of such order. Article 5 of the FDRE Constitution
states that: "All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition. Amharic shall be the
working language of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Each member of the
Federation shall determine its own working language". Similarly, Article 6 states that: "Any
woman or man either of whose parents is an Ethiopian citizen, shall be an Ethiopian
citizen"665 . Thess provisions are the applauded consequences of post-liberation restructuring.
According to Ato Haile Kiros Gessesse, liberation is emancipation from the yoke of
oppression where monarchical and military order that exploited the ordinary citizens are totally
extinguished. It is a situation where the people become judges of their own life, determinants
of their own destiny, participants in societal affairs, and become tolerant of the pros and cons
of life. This is also when a people can be seen to be operating in a democratic environment666.
Thus, a fundamental link between liberation and democracy emerges from such conceptions
and defmitions. "In which case, the idea of Tigrayan domination which is drummed mainly by
Amhara centralists in the 1 990s remains basically unfounded", he added. For Haile Kiros:
Conversation with Ato Zemikael, a former combatant who has been disabled by a Dergue bullet that
entered through his right knee during the war, and now works for the regional government as an
administrator in the Headquarters of the Regional Government of Tigray (Mekelle, Tigray, 4th June
1996).
5 See The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 2.
666 
Interview with Ato Haile Kiros Gessesse, EPRDF Member and Head of Foreign Relations, formerly
EPRDF Representative in Washington, London and Khartoum (Addis Ababa, 19th June 1996).
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The struggle began in Tigray and capable people evolved in the course of the
struggle who could now participate fully in the running of society. Such people
should naturally be assigned to play a major role in the restructuring process in
the country. But we have only two ministers in the cabinet-Prime and Foreign
Ministers. Three out of twenty Politburo members are from Tigray.
Ambassadors and other high-ranking officials are highly balanced in recognition
of the rights of every nationality in national affairs. Such balance is evident in
the fact that very experienced Tigrayan and other fighters from other
nationalities have been demobilised to balance the equation of nationalities667.
Therefore, liberation means there shall be no more problems in power sharing in the political
life of Ethiopia. From such expressions, it could be discerned that the EPRDF is interested in
the transformation of the Ethiopian society by enabling equal opportunity for all nationalities.
Others defined liberation as the total eradication of feudalism and its culture, the phasing out
of external influence on domestic affairs, and giving the people a larger say in societal matters.
In other words governments will have no external surrogates to seek help when questioned by
their own citizens over national issues. Liberation means the restoration and
institutionalisation of free press, freedom of association, freedom of movement, and the total
destroyal of royal titles, feudal privileges, and military influence on politics 668 . As pointed out
before, opposition politics in Ethiopia's past was more often conspirational and elitist, but
today liberation fronts have made it a mass-based activity. For this reason, liberation is
creating an environment where party politics, and different views can be tolerated. Today,
there are more political organisations than before, that are active against the ruling party, the
EPRDF. Newspapers, radio broadcasts, and public talking is now live in the streets of Addis
Ababa and other principal cities and towns of Ethiopia than during both the imperial and
military rule.
Similarly, military intimidation and incrimination which drove some elites and young
intellectuals away forcing them to organise, with the help of the peasants, effective guerrilla
insurgencies, have now been cleansed. According to Ato Chekol Kidane, "if the liberation
affiance do not make a major difference in policies of governance, respect for human rights,
equal opportunity for all nationalities, development etc., then liberation has no meaning
yet"669 . Aid for Netsanet Asfaw, the absence of principles of justice, the refusal of self-
ibid.
668 Interview with Woizero Netsanet Asfaw, MP for Endemariam, Tigray, and Director of Public
Relations in the Office of the Prime Minister (Addis Ababa, July 1996).
Interview with Ato Chekol Kidane, Advisor to the Regional Government of Tigray (4th June 1996,
Mekelle, Tigray).
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determination and equal development opportunity for all nationalities and regions, the
inequalities brought about by the unfair distribution of land, and lack of equality between
sexes, women, children, were the burning elements that led to the proliferation of various
guerrilla fronts in Ethiopia 670 . Dr. Ethiopia Beyene further expressed that liberation may mean
different things to different people depending on circumstances and time, but one element is
present in all situations, "the yearning for freedom from dictatorship". For her, liberation
includes the breath of peace, no more threat of torture, or open robbery, discrimination and
antagonism amongst and between ethnic groupings [interview EPRDF HIQs, Addis Ababa
July 1996]. It is the absence of terror, fear (sometimes of the unknown), greed, cure of
diseases, eradication of hunger and/or poverty. She also confirmed that the Haile Selassie
years marked the end of peaceful dictatorship, while Mengistu's reign epitomised terror and
the use of brute force to cow down any opposition. That is why forces of change (positive)
took up arms to fight for liberation where no one is capable of inflicting pain to the others any
longer67t.
Woizero Mebrat Beyene on the other hand narrated a story of how she and her friends were
recruited into a guerrilla group in Tigray. For her, their decision to join the liberation front
was a reaction to a situation which was widely felt unbearable. In her own words she
expressed:
I left university studies in the first year at Addis Ababa and joined the TPLF.
When the Dergue took over the control of power, it (Dergue) decided to send
all university students to villages in different parts of Ethiopia in order to
explain to the ordinary citizens the objectives of the 1974 Revolution. The
campaign was named Zeinecha whose main purpose was to disseminate the
philosophy of 'Ethiopian Socialism' through the medium of students, and to
systematically avoid the latter and minimise challenge at least at the center of
power. My colleagues and I were sent to Harar where we spent three months
of campaign. Generally, students response was not favourable to the
government. We in Harar did not carry the message of the Dergue, instead we
were accused of agitating the peasants against the military. As a result,
fourteen students were arrested from our group and so were many others from
groups in other parts of the country. Those who were not arrested were
relocated in different parts of Ethiopia. Fortunately enough, I was transferred
to Tigray my home region, for another three months campaign in Macho.
While in Tigray, we started hearing and getting information about the struggle
there. That is how most of us first got touch with the TPLF. My friends and I
670 Interview (14th June 1996, Addis Ababa).
671 
Interview with Woizero Mebrat Beyene, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Addis Ababa, 20th June
1996).
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started working as clandestine agents for the TPLF for about nine months.
Feeding them with information from towns was very important for their
success. For example, telling them in advance about convoy journey, the
number of commanding officers and troops, cars and so on. We actually
realised later on that we were a large cell group operating throughout Tigray
but without knowing one another for security reasons. The fear was that in
case one is caught, then others wifi be protected not to be revealed. At the
end, we did a good job for the TPLF countering Dergue propaganda very well.
Most of us converged in the field after fear of the possibility of being
exposed672.
In a way, the TPLF had the most effective means of recruitment and mobilisation. However,
other informants from different fronts also confirm that strategies were similar in some cases.
For example, all fronts operated secretively and had each their own cell groups in cities and
towns of the country. John Young explains how all fronts would "describe the route to take
to particular destination, the junction to turn or wait at, the person to meet, the colour of shirt,
trouser, shoes worn, and so on" 673 . Mebrat Beyene again confirmed that: "Recruits were at
times requested to climb buses without being sure of their destination. However, at some
point in the journey, someone in the same bus suddenly tells you to drop in the middle of no
where and within minutes or seconds, other persons would remove you from there without
delay". Although every liberation front had complicated directives of the journey to the
location of camps where training and organisation of fighters would take place, the actual
training programmes were similar including the time schedule just like training of the army
with all governments does not differ much. All operated using guerrilla tactics, except in the
case of the EPLF, liberation fronts in Ethiopia never behaved like a conventional army.
Whether guerrilla or conventional, liberation fronts are renowned for their craftiness674.
The tales of combat, loss of heroes, martyrs and spending of sleepless nights in terrains and
bunkers is a common experience expressed by many members of the different liberation fronts
both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Moreover, all the fronts in Ethiopia shared the same enemy with
their counterpart in Eritrea, even though their objectives were clearly different. Many ex-
fighters in Ethiopia converge in the view that liberation is synonymous with death on the one
hand, and capturing towns, cities, and victorious celebrations on the other. According to an
672Jbd
673 Conversation with Dr. John Young, PSIR (Addis Ababa, 15th June 1996).
674 John Garang, Leader of the SPLM/A named one of his operations in southern and eastern Sudan
"Operation Black Fox", where he argued that the nature of liberation is to be as crafty as a fox, but in
African folkiores, a black fox is even more craftier or cleverer. Interview, Erirrea Profile, April 1996.
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Oromo ex-fighter, it was normal to be prepared for death every time there was a combat with
the enemy. "The people who suffered the effect of loss more were the parents, wives, children
and other relatives" 675 . Similar feelings were echoed by fighters from other nationalities. They
all talk of acceptance of difficulties or tolerance, firm determination and commitment to
struggle for the liberation of the country from retrogressive policies of the past.
The concept of freedom was more understood by the fronts members and inhabitants of
captured territories than to those who were still in government held areas. Many simply
explained that in the liberated areas, the fighters controlled their own destinies, shared things
in common, tolerated difficulties together, and proved their solidarity with the masses under
control by sharing with them the meagre supplies: food, medicine, or clothes. This was a
phenomenon common amongst all the different fronts in Ethiopia. A Catholic Nun from
Nazareth (a hundred miles from Addis Ababa) summarised the feelings of peasants and
ordinary Ethiopians during the struggle when she expressed:
I worked in Nazareth where we take care of a number of responsibilities as
religious. Our role is to serve the people as God's commandments prescribe in
the Holy Scriptures. The Dergue considered the Church a waste of time
because of the communist ideology. Even when it (Dergue) pretended the
revolution was for the masses, nothing was done to prevent hunger, diseases,
and torture of the innocent continued. Where I worked, the people feared the
Dergue soldiers and instead found security in the liberated areas. The
government and its soldiers were associated with torture, terror, looting and
raping of civilians, intimidation and indiscriminate arrest of people and all kinds
of suffering. So when the liberators arrive in a place, the impression the people
got was that of security, co-operation, peace, and as a result, young men and
women deserted villages and towns to join the liberators. For me, liberation
means the opposite of everything bad the Dergue and its soldiers were doing.
We can now move from place to place without incrimination and fear, there is
freedom of expression, people can now elect their leaders such as the local
coundilors and/or legislators. Ethiopia is now liberated676.
As pointed out earlier, there is a clear-cut difference in the tone of the voices of civilians from
those of senior officers who fought and commanded the arms of their respective liberation
fronts. For example, many officers never cited events that annoyed the civilian population in
relations to their activities during the war. Whereas a number of civilians pointed out the
difficulties they encountered with either the TPLF, OLF, WSLF or the EPRP, ex-guerrilla
675 Interview with Tesfa Guma, an ex-Oromo Liberation Front member and now a civil servant in the
Ministry of Agriculture (Addis Ababa, 19th 1996).
676 
Interview with Sr. Abebech Getu (Nazareth, 18th June 1996).
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fighters always told the positive aspects of their encounters with the civil population. But it is
common knowledge that there were times when members of, say a Tigrayan front, EPRP or
OLF fronts fell in collision with civilians of different nationalities, where maltreatment and
torture of civilians was reported. Thus, the advantage of talking to the ordinary Ethiopian is
that his/her self-views are expressed in a much more blunt way than those expressed by a
Colonel or a Major in the former government or any of the fronts.
According to Col. Asaminew Bedane, liberation is to be free from oppression and suppression
of any kind; it is a situation when the use of force against the will and interest of others is
totally eradicated. In other African countries, liberation was synonymous with anti-colonial
forces, in Ethiopia, liberation is synonymous with anti-dictatorship, oppression by indigenous
non-white or non-European regimes. The attitude, actions, policies and directives of the old
regimes laid a foundation for the rise of ethnic-based liberation fronts in different parts of
Ethiopia. But what proved more significant and nationalistic, is the emergence of a broad
based organisation under the banner of the EPRDF in 1989. The organisation of the different
fronts into an alliance was aimed at shaping the direction of the fight, improvement of war
tactics, and transformation of ethnic-guerrillas into a national army. 'What was crucial is the
fact that the formation of the alliance created an environment for retraining and reorganisation
of the army to counter Dergue propaganda and indiscriminate offensives. The ultimate results
of the alliance were disastrous for Mengistu and the EPRDF operations were crowned with
victories and successes. The Colonel summarised:
In my own experience, one remarkable thing to remember is the attention given
prisoners of war (POWs) by the different fronts and later the alliance forces
EPRDF). I was a prisoner of war myself for years and it was law not to kill the
POWs. A number of options was given the POWs: (i) going abroad as a
refugee could be facilitated via Sudan and Kenya, or to the outside world, (ii)
returning back to towns if no special harm is expected from the government
side, (iii) living in the liberated areas and doing one's own business, and (iv)
Joining the struggle against the government. Most POWs chose to continue
fighting on the side of the fronts. However, later, we were even allowed to
form our own front, the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary
Movement (EDORM) where I became at different times Chairman and Deputy
Chairman677.
The Colonel further argued that it is wrong to think all army officers and soldiers working
with the Dergue were against the liberation struggle because most of them were known for
having been anti-establishment since the Haile Selassie years. He explained that it was difficult
677 Interview with Col. Asaminew Bedane, op. cit.
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to find one's way out especially when one was known for not being a staunch loyalist to the
system. Those with experience of Ethiopia's past politics say that the Dergue structures were
probably the most controlled and centralised, even more than during imperial period. The
Dergue planted informers in every corners and corridors of the army, the civil service, local
government, and other areas of public service. As a result, those who had a chance could not
hesitate joining their respective fronts since it became much clearer that a militant approach
was perhaps the only way to bring about changes in Ethiopia's political order.
In another interview with Col. Halefom Alemu, he expressed that liberation is the commitment
of one's life to struggle for the welfare of all in society, sacrifice for the benefit of many rather
than of the few. For him, it is the believe in democratic principles that drove many away to
take up arms and begin a long struggle for change. He argued that the influence of the student
movement in the late 1 960s and early 1 970s influenced the thinking of the younger generation,
especially students from overseas and abroad. Ethiopia was a closed society for years until
after WW II when scholarships began taking students to study in Western institutions, in
particular in the United States and Europe where democracy had long found public resonance.
Thus, Ethiopian students abroad and overseas tested the advantages of conducting business in
a free environment where freedom of choice governs. So that when most of these returned
home, they were highly suspected by the establishment, and young people, whether in the
army, civil service, higher institutions and universities, became a target of the military
inteffigence. Such suspicion led to the development of strong hatred between the
establishment and the intelligentsia who in anger decided to join clandestine organisations
against the status quo. Some guerrilla fronts had formed already such as the EPRP, but were
not able to attract larger following. Some fronts were scrutinising recruits but the TPLF was
more open and took members without reservation. Most people joined the fronts because of
intimidation, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and more because many understood the
advantages of a democratic society.
In his own words, Col. Halefom further argued:
In the front, we were indoctrinated with correct ideas of liberation which
included the desire for freedom, democracy, equal development opportunity for
all nationalities, and the desire for the reign of justice. The regime tried hard to
make officers in the army, the police, prisons, Wild Life and so on, to feel
different from their own people. Officers were not allowed to mix with
civilians, a total mess of military institutions and order. Such attitude was
severely resented by many people who became bitter against the Dergue
activities. The regime's aim was to create different classes between soldiers
and their respective communities. Even officers who were brought up in
peasant families were made to shoot the peasants. Yes, some officers acted on
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the orders of the regime, some of us defected in the face of it. For example, in
1990, one officer ordered the setting of villages on fire in Northern Shoa and
Wollo. Everything was done in support of the ruling class and not the citizens.
Because of such brain-washing by the regime, many officers were made to
believe they were part of the ruling class even when they know their parents
were in the ghettos of Ethiopian cities or remote villages678.
The Dergue tried to recreate the minds of many officers and ordinary soldiers, and what
helped the regime is the fact that the rank and file of the army was acting on the orders of their
commanders, who were mainly loyal to the Dergue. Those who realised the dangerous
manipulations by the regime quickly defected and joined to fight on the side of the various
fronts in Ethiopia.
Most informants tended to impress that the opposite of what the Dergue did was practised by
the various liberation fronts, in particular the TPLF and later on the EPRDF. The guerrilla
fighter had to be convinced in order to carry out the gun against the enemy during the
offensive. "The ordinary fighters did not respond simply to orders from commanders",
explained Ato Guma Buyo, an ex-OLF fighter. This is basically why the Dergue could not
defeat the fronts even when the latter were more poorly equipped than the former's massive
army. The Dergue were heavily armed and injected with Western technology, but all that did
not change the course of the war in their favour. In other words, fighting against a liberation
struggle is not fighting a poorly equipped army but fighting against a firm conviction, the
mind, the attitude developed, the resentment against harsh experiences of the past. The
relations between the ordinary fighter and commander was a major strength to the guerrillas in
Tigray and other parts in Ethiopia. "What is the mission? Why fight? What would be the
outcome? What would be the advantage? Who is the enemy? and so on", are major questions
that were well explained to the rank and file of the fighting forces for liberation. In addition,
"good planning and strategy, broad ideas, critical analysis of events and decisions, analysis of
the capacity, efficiency and moral of a unit or brigade before launching attacks were salient
guidelines during the struggle. Discussion before every offensive was mandatory to the
TPLF'679. In general, plans were set for discussion amongst different officers of the
unit/brigade for execution. In cases where differences arose during the process of discussion
and assessment of plans and strategies, they were often resolved amicably and in compromise.
678 Interview with Col. Halefom Alemu, Head of Chief of Staff Secretariat, Ministry of Defence,





Many members of the different liberation fronts in Ethiopia concur that there were no
leadership squabbles because individuals were all elected to positions according to the measure
of their performances and ability. Team work was hailed because everybody in the frontline
was aware the struggle could only be won when there was a unity of purpose. Major
decisions were often reached through secret voting and majority decision was often honoured.
Like every army, punishments and rewards were also there in every front in extreme cases.
Wearing uniform did not make fighting soldiers different from civilians given that the latter
also had a crucial role to play in the struggle. The guiding policy was that the purpose of
being a soldier is to protect and give society security, and sharing a common cause brings
people in society together. After all, the army is developed from the people, therefore it is for
the people. Even though members of the same family existed in the frontline, many fighters
expressed in their different experiences that the immediate neighbour was important or, as
Woizero Mebrat Beyene put it: "it is my comrade who can assist me and not my brother,
cousin, or uncle". The relationship among fighters was well established, which is very vital for
success. Every senior officer I encountered in the Ministry of Defence actually shared similar
views. In all, the view that peace of mind, family, and society as a whole is a perfect
explanation of a liberated society especially when it comes to comparing the Ethiopian past to
the present, is also upheld by many Ethiopians. Today, there is a widespread belief that if
something is inappropriate in society as a whole, or in some parts of it, there is the liberty to
discuss with the authorities concerned without fear. This never happened in the past where a
few were not only mismanaging society but even lacked the aspiration for better management.
National issues were handled like personal property by both Haile Selassie and Mengistu.
Thus, one former fighter expressed: "The EPRDF, even when inappropriately criticised, has
brought freedom to Ethiopia, it has changed it and put it in a direction that history alone wifi
be the best judge"680.
(a) Ethiopian Self-Views on Democracy:
Ethiopian discourses do link the issue of democracy to that of nationalities, because only in a
democracy can people control their own destinies, be they of a political, social, cultural or
economic nature. Many Ethiopians expressed the view that the liberation struggle for
democracy is a continuous process aimed at the establishment of a system where the majority
as well as minority rights will be upheld. Ethiopian self-views on democracy do not diverge
from those expressed by Eritreans in the previous chapter and/or by other African peoples in
the 1990s. In fact, many interviewees uphold the view that both the imperial and military
680 Woizero Hagosha expressed in her own way in a conversation at the EPRDF's Press Department
(Addis Ababa, 13th June 1996).
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dictatorships made democracy become an alien term in the country. For years, Ethiopia never
had a democratic constitution and as a result, has never experienced any election exercise.
Public participation in national matters is unheard of throughout the past political history of
the country. Many Ethiopians associate the beginning of a democratic discourse in the
country with the rise of the various ethnically-based liberation fronts.
According to Dr. Teshome H. Gabriel, "if Ethiopia is to be democratic, a new way of thinking
must prevail; democracy after all, is more than just elections; it's also an attitude - a way of
thinking that celebrates differences without being divisive. The search for the soul of Ethiopia
rests here. Democracy, like history, can only operate as a system of inclusion rather than as a
system of exclusion. Democracy, in other words, must allow a place for opposing voices and
contesting visions of the various peoples and interests in Ethiopia" 681 . According to a
Tigrayan fighter, the mobilising factor was that democracy can only be achieved when the
oppressive political system prevailing in Ethiopia was removed and replaced by a more
democratic one, based on the full equality and voluntary unity of all nations and nationalities in
Ethiopia682 . The democracy that would allow the recognition of the people's right to self-
determination or the right to secession was impossible under a monarchical or a military
autocracy. The success of the liberation struggle for democracy in Ethiopia has strengthened
the popular view that unless the nationality issues are resolved, there is no way out from those
vicious civil wars and economic crises that have wrecked the country in the past. In the
Ethiopian liberation struggle, democracy was the goal viewed by many as a means of resolving
the concrete issue of nationalities. In fact, one can say democracy in Ethiopia has been
reformulated to mean balance between nationalities. Representation of the different
nationalities in every aspect of national affairs has been implemented by the EPRDF, in the
armed forces, diplomatic service, university, civil service and so on.
For Woizero Netsanet Asfaw, democratic rights include the right to organise and form
associations that are not necessarily supportive of the government. Democracy means
freedom of the press, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and full public participation
in the affairs of the nation. Her views and those of others on democracy are actually well
stipulated in the FDRE Constitution which states:
681 Expressed in an international conference and published as "The Other Ethiopia", Ethiopian Review,
vol. 1,no. 8(August 1991), pp. 22-23:23.
682 
Interview with Ato Seeya Abraha, Director, Tigray Development Association (Mekelle, 2nd June
1996). Seeya Abraha is one of the pioneers of the TPLF, but now left government to work in a
parastatal.
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Everyone has the right to hold opinion without interference. Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression without interference. This right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
media of his or her choice. Freedom of the press and other media and freedom
of artistic creativity is guaranteed. Freedom of the press shall specifically
include the following elements: (a) Prohibition of any form of censorship, and
(b) Access to information of public interest. ... Every person has the right to
assemble and demonstrate together with others peaceably and unarmed, and to
petition683.
The FDRE Constitution draws a lot from the respective documents of the various liberation
fronts in the country. For example, the TPLF's proposals for peace in 1989 included
democracy as a principal goal of the front. The proposal outlined clearly that the TPLF's
intention was to overthrow the Dergue and institute a democracy and not to proclaim the
Province of Tigray an independent state (which was the goal of the Eritrean guerrifias), but
democracy within Ethiopia684.
According to Ato Haile Kiros, contemporary democracy equated with such positive results-
development, progress, technology, and above all peaceful management of national affairs, has
caused a contradiction to the traditional African old order. He argued that the association of
these elements with democracy tends to distance the latter from the African traditional way of
life, where traditional African democracy operated without being equated necessarily with
issues of modernisation. For example, sharing of things together, be it a problem or a fortune,
is a characteristic of village or community life in traditional African societies. In every
community, traditional leaders existed who often dedicated their roles for the service of the
people. In Tigray, for example, every person or family owned land, either through inheritance,
or acquired it in some legal way or bought it or battered it in lieu of some valuable property.
But the feudal system invaded society and robbed all the land by force, while the military
regime that succeeded it did not do much to alter the situation completely. The success of the
liberation struggle has restored peoples' rights to property and land ownership in particular.
Except for the Amharas and the Tigrayans whose traditional governments were run by
monarchs, the majority of Ethiopian nationalities had loose rather than fixed traditional
leadership. According to a number of interviewees from the Nilotic nationalities in Ethiopia,
both the ancien regime and the Dergue destroyed traditional democratic way of deliberating
3 See in particular articles 29 and 30 of the FDRE Constitution, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
See Interview with an TPLF Member of the Central Committee in the Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol.
I, no, 3(April 1989), p. 4.
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issues in society. In the past, public discussions were fashionable in non-Amharalnon-
Tigrayan communities and villages across Ethiopia. In fact, some Tigrayans even dispute the
likening of their way of life to that of the Amharas because many believe a similar system to
that practised in Eritrea described above was common in Tigray. The baito system resolved a
range of issues that mattered in the Tigrayan society. It is, however, agreed that consensus
rather than secret balloting was the principle channel of deciding affairs, including selection of
leaders. Such exercise was absent in those societies that had strict monarchical rule, in
particular among the Amharas. But the internal conquest by Amhara emperors transformed
the whole country into what many have termed "a modernisation of monarchical autocracy"685.
The reign of the emperors in Ethiopia has been for years blamed for having sowed the seeds of
anti-democratic culture in the country. Thus, the failure of the Haile Selassie regime to yield
to the popular demand for democratic change led to the eruption of the 1974 Revolution that
brought centuries of monarchical rule to an end. However, even though hopes for a
democratic Ethiopia were high during and after the 1974 Revolution, lack of democratic
culture and supporting institutions quickly gave way to a more despotic government.
On the other hand, the belief for democracy and democratic principles was building in the
countryside with the effective influence of guerrifia insurgencies. For example, it is reported
that there were no feuds over the contest for leadership during the liberation struggle. Leaders
were chosen through the secret ballot during congresses. For example, the TPLF had four
congresses during the liberation struggle. Informants tell of incidents when incumbent leaders
themselves resigned their positions at wifi to take charge of other desired responsibility. In
1989, for example, Sebhat Nega, the first TPLF Chairman, resigned in favour of another
assignment in the liberated areas, and his resignation actually paved the way for the emergence
of Meles Zenawi to the leadership 686 . Occasionally minor differences over the means of the
execution of programmes rather than principle arose but were often resolved amicably.
Today, pictures of leaders are not in public offices or business places as is the case in other
African countries. Foreign observers reckon the political situation in Ethiopia is perfectly
different from that under the Dergue. According to Kerstin Wilde, the freedom of the press,
recognition of nationalities, freedom of movement, reduced robbery and crime, are major
signals that Ethiopia is moving towards true liberation687 . In this case, liberation refers to the
process of possessing certain "rights" that protect individuals and groups from arbitrary acts
committed by the state or other third parties.
See in particular Harold Marcus, op. cit.
686 
John Young confirmed such story as an incident that puzzled everyone, but the truth is he genuinely
decided to do something else (Interview, Addis Ababa June 1996).
687 
Interview (Addis Ababa, 14th May 1996). Kerstin Wilde is Director of GTZ in Ethiopia.
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According to Colonel Asaminew Bedane, the revolutionary fronts, in particular the TPLF truly
represented a serious struggle for change, a change towards democracy. For him, the only
time he witnessed serious debating was after being captured by the TPLF. Otherwise,
discussions were not allowed under Mengistu who decided everything for execution whether
anyone liked it or not. It is the spirit that has been built and nurtured during the struggle that
has now been transplanted into a practical and workable project. He further argued that true
democracy has been instituted since 1992 when local and regional elections were held. In
1994, a Constitutional Assembly was elected that ratified the FDRE Constitution. In 1995,
Regional and Federal elections were held, and a federal government was democratically
elected, with a wide representation of all nationalities, an experience that has never happened
before. Opposition groups now operate in Ethiopia including those run by people who held
top positions in the previous regimes. "These people say things openly against the
government and because we have fought for democracy, we allow them to do so", remarked
an EPRDF official. Nobody could ever utter a single word against the Dergue or else you be
butchered alive. What is expected, one EPRDF official told me, to set a sound and good
example so that future governments that may emerge in some kind of opposition election
victory can treat others as they have been treated and can concede defeat in their turn. Multi-
party elections are no longer a problem in Ethiopia, but have become part and parcel of the
post-liberation order.
Ethiopian self-views on democracy maintain the line that their country has never tested
democracy for centuries of monarchical rule and many years of military dictatorship.
However, after one year of transition, Ethiopia held what was to be the first democratic
elections in the country's history. As part of the elections preparations, the TGE invited
foreign representatives to observe the process of the elections. As a result, the UN established
what became the Joint International Observer Group (JIOG), with a secretariat in Addis
Ababa whose purpose was to coordinate the work of the international observer teams during
the fmal period of the election. Although the findings did not match the high expectations of
many people mainly due to the imperfect conduct of the elections, a Norwegian Observer
Group (NOG) remarked that "the Ethiopian people has a strong desire and firm commitment
to develop a democratic political system, as these elections substantiated, the road to
democracy may become patchy and difficult"688.
688 See Human Rights Report No. 1, "Local and Regional Elections in Ethiopia 21 June 1992", op. cit.,
p.4.
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The 1992 elections, however, provided a ground for a Constitutional Assembly elections in
1994. The TGE again invited the international community, through the foreign embassies in
Ethiopia, to observe the 1994 elections, as had been done in 1992. The elected Constitutional
Assembly members had the crucial assignment to debate and ratify the draft constitution which
had undergone a countrywide consultation. Though regarded as less controversial, some
external observers expressed reservations. For example, a Norwegian team pointed out
certain anomalies in their report such as: "free and secret voting was not always guaranteed",
"voting stations did not have any booths for marking a ballot unseen, often people had to do
so under the eyes of an election officer, who in some cases even guided their fmger". It is also
reported that an election officer directed one voter who to vote for, and that in some election
locations there was only one candidate689 . A number of foreign diplomats were realistic to
remark that nobody should expect everything to be perfect from the very beginning given that
Ethiopia's political past had never tested a democratic exercise like in the 1990s690.
Moreover, long-term experiences with democratic procedures after decades of repressive
authoritarian rule and military dictatorship, coupled with the complexity of ethnic (national)
composition of the country, represent a serious challenge to the establishment of a stable
democratic system in Ethiopia.
Finally, the 1995 Regional and Federal Elections were intended to stand as the democratic
culmination of a four-year transitional period after the fall of the military dictatorship of
Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. According to most observers, the National Election Board
managed a tremendous logistical achievement in conducting the 1995 election, because no
polling station lacked necessary election material on voting day. Moreover in a country with
so underdeveloped an infrastructure as Ethiopia the preparations were a great
accomplishment, and a considerable improvement from the previous elections691 . Overall,
several interviewees expressed that if certain aspects of the election process deserve praise
others must be critically addressed if the democratic process is to improve in the future. In
addition, the present government has begun the trial of former Ethiopian government officials,
an exercise which many see as another gesture of the seriousness of the leadership in trying to
ensure the process of justice692.
689 See Siegfried Pausewang, The 1994 Election and Denocracy in Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 1.
° Separate interviews with Viatcheslav Reghus, Military Attache, Embassy of the Russian Federation
(Addis Ababa, May 1996); and Charlier, Counsullar, Embassy of the Belgian Kingdom (Addis Ababa,
May 1996).
691 Separate conversations with Viatcheslav Reghus, and Mr. Charlier, Counsul, op. cit.
692 Refer to the short report by Oyvind Aadland, Knut Rognlien and Odd Bolmdal, "Trial of the
Former Ethiopiaiz Government Officials Before the First Division of the Central High Court of the
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(a) Ethiopian Self-Views on the Question of Nationalities
For many, Ethiopia is a 'museum of peoples' or a 'prison house of nationalities'. It houses
over 80 linguistic groups with 200 dialects. The major nationalities include the Amhara,
Oromos, Tigrayans, Somalis, Gurages, Afars, and Agows. These are then joined by other
minority nationalities such as the Aderie, Annuak, Bella [Beni] Shangul, Falasha, Kaffa,
Kembata, Kimant, Kunama, Saho, or Shinasha 693 . The ethnically-based liberation fronts
fought a war of liberation in order that every nationality will be granted autonomy, equal
development opportunity, and cultural and linguistic freedom. The least common multiple for
a unitary state, many Ethiopians argue, is for the freedom of every nationality to be granted.
Teshome H. Gabriel had summarised the feeling of Ethiopian intellectuals when he wrote:
To be born into a particular nationality is an accident, to become an Ethiopian,
however, is a choice. This choice, which requires a sense of tolerance, wifi be
imperative for democracy to work and to flourish. A democratic Ethiopia
implies precisely this kind of attitude, in which the scars of history - painful as
they are - become the lessons of a history yet to be written. Only in this way,
can Ethiopia retain the richness of its diverse history and culture and the long
deferred promise of a democratic future694.
The whole crisis of nationalities began when the Amharas, since Menelik, started to dominate
the socio-economic and political life of Ethiopia. Menelik's southward expansion marginalised
the Oromos, who not only lost their sovereign kingdoms, but also their dignity and above all
their very means of subsistence when their lands were taken over by the Amharas. The
Tigrayans too, though akin to the Amharas, felt cheated by the monarch since the last of their
emperors, Yohannes IV was deposed from the throne. The Tigrayan long time resentment led
to the Woyene rebellion of 1943. The Somalis, unlike other Ethiopian groups, have for years
been regarded as an acute threat to the national unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia.
Thus, they were periperalised and very few even had the opportunity to join higher public
institutions including Addis Ababa University. Their existence was not felt in the bureaucracy
or in the army. Worse of all, the Somali people in Bale, Harar, and Ogaden were relegated to
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia", Report of the Observation of the "Dergue-Trial" in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1996).
693k, ee Ghelawdewos Araia, op cit., p. 152.
See his "The Other Ethiopia", Ethiopian Review, op. cit., p. 23.
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their nomadic and cattle breeding mode of living with very few of them engaged in
merchandalising and contraband activities.
The Gurages are the most industrious people of Ethiopia, but they were still despised by the
feudal system. Even though they were able to resist against Menelik's expansionist ambitions,
the Gurage are fairly absorbed by the Ambara culture. Like other nationalities in the country,
the Gurage were never given the opportunity to participate in government. However, they
managed to beat the system by engaging in commercial activities. For example, most of the
small to medium businesses in hotels, restaurants, Mercato stores, tea rooms and even shoe
shine throughout most of Ethiopia's big cities like Addis Ababa, Jiinma or Harar, are all under
their control. The Annuaks and Beni [Bella] Shangul were since time immemorial targets of
slave trade, for that reason they have never enjoyed any form of equality in Ethiopia, let alone
determining their own fate. Other nationalities like the Kemant, Woyto, Falasha, and Shinasha
are well known as the forgotten minorities of the "forgotten Ethiopians". The Afar, scattered
throughout the Horn of Africa, were for centuries made subjects to Ethiopian Emperors; while
the 1974 Revolution scrapped their semi-autonomy under Ali Mirah who fled to Saudi Arabia
and later on joined to found, with other aristocrats, the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU).
The Saho, the Kunama, the Agow and many other minority nationalities that now have a share
in national affairs were all marginalised in the past. Even among the Amharas, it was Shoan
Amharas who had the upper hand in Ethiopian politics throughout the reign of the emperors
up to its finale during Haile Selassie I.
While the Amharas from Gojjam were often perceived as prime challengers to those from
Shoa, those from Gondar and Wollo were as destitute as the rest of the oppressed nationalities
in Ethiopia. To be sure, it is the Amharas from Shoa who benefited heavily in terms of
material and psychological domination, the others from Gojjam, Gondar, and Wollo only
enjoyed physically because of the general use of the Amhara language, the Shamma as a
national dress, and Christian Orthodox being the official religion. These are elements that
made the Amharas in general feel more superior to other nationalities in Ethiopia. But in all,
Amhara or non-Amhara in Ethiopia were all subject to class exploitation, whose gravest result
was the emergence of liberation forces drawn from respective nationalities: OLF, TPLF,
WSLF, ALF, EPDM, EPRP, and the EPLF in Eritrea. The OLF wanted (and is still fighting
for) the creation of an Oromia nation, the WSLF wanted the self-determination of the Ogaden
and its merger with Somali Republic, the TPLF headed for the self-determination of Tigray,
the ALF's emergence was a manifestation of regionalism versus centralism, the EPDMs was a
fear of a total disintegration of "greater Ethiopia", and the EPLF were probably the most
clearly defined front with the objective of Eritrean independence.
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The popular view in Ethiopia maintains the line that the establishment of a democratic state is
unrealistic without giving nationalities the right to run their own regions. Thus, ever since the
war was won in 1991, Eritrea is now independent, regional autonomy has been granted to
different nationalities in Ethiopia, and democracy is undergoing systematic institutionalisation.
According to Desta Aregawi of Alemaya Agricultural Institute, "nobody, no government has
ever allowed this before in the history of Ethiopia" 695 . For him, the past experience of the
political history of Ethiopia, is a major testimony that the EPRDF will be remembered for
having founded a political system that may turn out to be a strong democracy. And according
to Dr. Engineer Hailu Ayele, Academic Vice President, Addis Ababa University, "there are
definite makers of history, the EPRDF has become one in Ethiopia" 696 . Bahru Zewde too,
believes democracy is not alien to traditional African societies, and argued that as an activity it
was practised but its application today requires the incorporation of modern-Western
conceptions. Traditional African democracy was seen in the way business was controlled by
the people rather than individuals in the community. There were what are popularly known as
Baitos in every village, a council of elected individuals to run the affairs of society697 . As
mentioned earlier in the case of traditional Eritrean societies, the Baitos in Ethiopia also acted
as parliamentary bodies. In every community, there were local administrators, village
attorneys or even errands that acted at times as mediators in cases of conflict. The people
resolved their own conflicts over land, cattle, or any kind of property in an open manner
through the raising of hands leading to a consensus. So it can also be said that every
nationality practised some kind of democracy which was destroyed systematically by the
feudal system and much later by the military regime.
Ethiopian self-views on the question of nationalities is often expressed in the demand for self-
determination or the quest for some kind of regional autonomy. Every nationality in Ethiopia,
except for members of the traditional ruling class, resents domination and all its attributes.
Widespread scepticism and fears of future ethnic domination have increased so much that
critics do regard the EPRDF project on nationalities as a sheer ploy determined to camouflage
Tigrayan domination. Others, however, think the EPRDF is more emphatic on assimilation
and integration of nationalities. Many observe the EPRDF aspiration to resolve the question
of nationalities is bound to falter because it looks at the concept of self-determination from the
695 Interview (Woldia, Wollo, 5th June 1996)
6 Interview (Addis Ababa, 25th April 1996).
697 Prof. Bahru Zewde is the writer of A Modern History of Ethiopia, op. cit., and he is currently the
Director of Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University. Interview (Addis Ababa, 14th May
1996).
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Western perspective a 'la Woodrow Wilson and socialist outlook a 'Ia Lenin. These, critics
argue, do correspond well to realities of a politics buttressed by ethnic rivalries in the
country698.
Be that as it may, Ethiopia is now decentralised and the other challenge is now how to create
and strengthen the process of multinational harmonisation. It can be said that dependable
harmony can only be achieved if and when the different nationalities become more altruistic
and work toward a formula of sharing both power and responsibility. For Demtaw Hailu, the
leaders of the different nations bear the burden of guiding the people in their national and
political constituencies. Unless this takes place, a process which will make the Ethiopians
direct actors in a forum where they can discuss their common future will remain a pipe dream.
Only then can the leaders who represent their people be accountable to them and to the rules
and logic of democratic practice. The new thinking post-liberation Ethiopia has pursued is the
formation of the council of representatives or parliament and a government which embraces
nearly all nationalities.
In summary, what most observers demand of every government in Ethiopia is that it must do
more in order to gain a wider popular anchorage. For example, every Ethiopian government
must not project a military image, and instead project itself as politically-pluralistic, multi-
national, and indeed multi-lingual. A representation of every nationality in the political and
military leadership is a bonus for national harmony. Post-liberation order must epitomise a
healthy human rights record, anti-corruption, and serious engagement in rural development
across the country without discrimination. Many share the view that the present regime must
generate some optimism via realistic promises and avoid lavish language and making pledges
that guarantee personal gains rather than public individual and public rights. It must stimulate
production and productivity, and fmally restore the sanctity of the family that has been
destroyed by widespread poverty. Then and only then can the country be said to have been
totally liberated from inequality, injustice, discrimination, exploitation, oppression and/or
dictatorship.
(c) Ethiopian Self-Views on the Transitional Period to Democratic Governance
Transition in Ethiopia was marked by the downfall of the Dergue in 1991, and the call for the
establishment of a new government in Addis Ababa by the forces of the liberation affiance, the
EPRDF. It was believed that a lasting solution to the political crisis in Ethiopia required the
698 
Interview with Prof. Endashaw Ayele, Head of Research Programme, Graduate School, Addis
Ababa University (Addis Ababa, 24th April 1996).
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creation of a broad-based government that would include all nationalities. It was also timely
that a conference which was organised early in 1991 in order to broker a peaceful settlement
between the liberation forces and the government, was turned into a forum for the discussion
about the formation of a transitional government in Ethiopia. Thus, the U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Herman Cohen, took the opportunity of the
conference to impress on all participants the U.S. expectation that future governments in
Ethiopia be democratic and committed to the protection of basic human rights.
The London Conference was followed by the Addis Ababa July transitional conference that
year which constructed comprehensive policies that guided the TGE 699 . When the liberation
affiance entered the center of the seat of power on 28th May 1991, it was well anticipated that
the EPRDF was bound to inherit the structures and bureaucracy of the old regimes, and as a
result, early precautions were to be undertaken during the July conference to prevent a return
to the old order. After entering Addis Ababa, the EPRDF leadership pledged to convene
within one month an all-inclusive conference of Ethiopian political groupings. The convening
of the conference was hailed widely as a fundamental break with an autocratic Ethiopian
political past. The conference deliberated on a number of important issues which included: the
basis upon which the TGE would be organised, a transitional period before democratic
elections take place, self-determination of nationalities and building confidence amongst
different fronts that were outside the alliance7°°.
According to the Foreign Minister, the idea of a transitional period after the defeat of the
Dergue was upheld by many liberation fronts in Ethiopia because every front knew it could
not alone form a government acceptable to all Ethiopians 701 . Furthermore, a gesture of
realpolitik was shown by the EPRDF in a statement that "it would have been ridiculous for
one organisation, operating in only a part of the country, to have formed a government".
Thus, the decision to form an "all-inclusive" Transitional Government was justified by
EPRDFs sources with myriads of ideological statements, fundamentally boiling down to the
assertion that reflected the intrinsically democratic nature of the organisation. For example,
TPLF's 1989 Congress outlined eight major points for the establishment of a Provisional
Government "constituted from all political organisations" 702 . The proposals were incorporated
6	 of this arrangements have been well documented by Sarah Vaughan, op. cit., 79 pages.
See appendix VI for the transitional charter.
°' Interview with Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopian Foreign Minister. See Sarah Vaughan,, op. cit., p. 30.
702 See TPLF, Proposals for a Peaceful Solution to the Situation in Ethiopia, op. cit.
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into the broader alliance's programme when it formed in 1989. The liberation alliance had
always been known for its advocacy of direct democracy and prolonged discussions of Gim-
Gema (a Tigrayan term for debate), based on mass gathering of the population at the
grassroots, but later it began to overlay its statements with the language that included ideals of
Western-type "liberal-democracy". The shift was meant to reflect the recognition of the form
of democratisation for which international pressure on Africa was mounting. It as well wanted
to demonstrate that Ethiopia was moving from the one-party system to that of multi-partysm.
Post-liberation restructuring in Ethiopia has been difficult but the commitment of the elites
across the country seems to water down any pessimism. One major difficulty was the lack of
agreement between the alliance and other fronts in the country. According to the OLF deputy
leader, the EPRDF had their own programme, the EPRP had theirs, and so on: each group
proclaimed its stand and announced "all you who agree march behind me" 703 . However, a
consensus was build before the July conference where all nationalities shared a similar feeling
as expressed by a representative of the Hadiya nationality:
We had a serious discussion with Seyoum Mesfm, in which he explained the
position and intentions of the EPRDF, and how they wanted to approach the
problem. After that the Executive Committee of the Hadiya National
Democratic Organisation (HNDO) met Tewolde Wolde Mikael at the State
Building. He had a handwritten draft of the charter from which he read out the
main chapter headlines. I was learning. It was a magnanimous and positive
gesture: the EPRDF was unchallenged but now they were caffing to a
conference others who had not contributed . We were cautiously impressed:
What are they up to? What is cooking? That was the first step. In the absence
of other information we decided to take things step by step704.
It is also reported that after protracted discussions on the principle of dividing the country
along nationality lines, the chairman of the conference confirmed suggestions that: "the
provision is that the regions will be drawn on the basis of nationalities, and that each will
administer itself, and use its own language. There are existing studies by the Institute of
Nationalities, which may be useful, but the issue is complex and will require time for
clarification"705 . The Eritrean question was clear because the EPLF had occupied it militarily
703 See Sarah Vaughan's interview with Lencho Letta, OLF Deputy President and Representative in The
Add is Ababa Transitional Conference of fitly 1991, op. cit., p. 35.
Interview with Dr. Petros Beyene, Biology Department, University of Addis Ababa, Council
Representative for the HNDO. See Sarah Vaughan, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
705 
Ato Meles Zenawi was the Chairman of the July Conference and these words are recorded in a video
tape of that conference, available in the EPRDF Head Quarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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and it did not require any decision for or against during the conference and the EPLF were
simply observers during the July conference.
Many top officials of the new regime also explained the limitations the inheritance of the old
structures has created in the transformation process, but all are optimistic time wifi phase out
the legacies of the old system. In the words of Colonel Asaminew Bedane:
People can tell the difference between the way the bureaucracy during both the
imperial era and that of the Dergue made things more difficult, because they
were well known for their slow process in tackling issues; a practice which has
been proven inadequate by the liberation fronts who often exemplified
efficiency in the liberated areas. This is the kind of system Ethiopians believe
would result to progress and peace in society. Administrative organs in the
liberated areas were effective and efficient. The people who visited the
liberated areas were able to confirm the type of administration desired for the
country. Thus, from 1989, there was a widespread longing for a speedy
takeover of the country. Ethiopians have seen the difference in economic
progress, increase housing, development, health services, the infrastructure and
so on and so forth706.
The present government in Ethiopia of course brought with it a lot of its own administrative
apparatus that operated in the liberated areas. It is all accepted that every liberation front
established some kind of effective administration to prove to the inhabitants of captured
territories that it was capable of providing an alternative government. Like the EPLF, the
ethnic based liberation fronts in Ethiopia had their own structures which enabled them to
manage the affairs in their respective areas with some kind of efficiency.
In a nutshell, the transitional period is still on and there are a lot of difficulties Ethiopia still
faces especially vis-a-vis the Oromo, nationally acknowledged as the largest ethnic group in
the country. The Oromo Liberation Front and many other parties that were initially in the
government withdrew after three months of a temporary coalition. The result of the OLF
withdrawal was, as expected, violence which has continued in many parts of the country that
are particularly under the opposition control. For example, serious fighting between the
EPRDF and the OLF broke out in mid-1992, where suspected OLF members and sympathisers
were put in rehabilitation camps. Although the confmement of about 19,000 OLF fighters
restored a degree of tranquillity, observers maintain the view that it can hardly facilitate
reconciliation between the OLF and the government 707 . In addition to the OLF, other political
706 Interview with Col. Asaminew Bedane, op, cit.
707 
See in particular Kerstin Wilde and Anteneh Belete, "Lessons Learned in Ethiopia", Paper presented
in a workshop entitled, Experiences with the De,nobihisation of and Reintegration of Ex-Conibatants
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parties such as the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), the All Amhara
People's Organisation (AAPO) and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) are also severely opposed
to the EPRDF government in Ethiopia, which many perceive as Tigrayan dominated. And
given the fact that democracy cannot please all, such kind of protests will continue to persist
until the democratisation process matures from that of a transitional system to a full
democracy with firm supporting institutions.
(d) Ethiopian Self-Views on other Social Issues
Other topical issues that concerned everybody in Ethiopia after the end of the liberation
struggle, and in particular during the transition period, include the issues of land,
demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers into society, the status of women and children,
repatriation of refugees particularly from neighbouring countries, the improvement of the
infrastructure - housing, medical services, schools, roads 708 . These are among other social
issues that have become major test cases for the new regime because impoverished Ethiopians
expect quick positive results of the liberation struggle. The country has been ruined by war
and the preceding governments spent the country's meagre resources on defence. Even worse
is the fact that the famine had also created apathy which has to be rehabilitated. And post-
liberation restructuring seems to have restored some hope for the improvement of life in the
Ethiopian society. The decentralisation of administration was also followed by the
decentralisation of resources. Every region now plans its own development budget and
presents it to the federal government for funding. In other words, the blame of
mismanagement has been removed from the federal authorities and lies now with the hands of
local authorities. It is competitive development rather than animosity between peoples of
different regions that has dominated post-liberation politics and national resources are shared
proportionately according to the size and population of each region.
Land has been a major issue of contest in Ethiopia's political history. It was the subject of
conquest during the reign of the country's first emperors, the architects of "Greater Ethiopia".
In traditional Ethiopia, land belongs to God, who passes it to the emperor, His anointed on
earth; the monarch in turn, grants it to deserving individuals as gult or rist709. The term gult
(Addis Ababa, 17th- 19th April 1996). This was also confirmed in an interview with Kerstin Wilde, op.
cit.
708 Separate interviews with Ato Alem Ghebre Wahid, EPRDF Branch (Axum, Tigray, 31st June
1996); Ato Abdurahum Ahmed, Administrator EFFORT (Mekelle, 3rd June 1996); and Ato
Tekelewoine, Director, Relief Society of Tigray (REST), (Mekelle, 4th June 1996).
7® See in particular, Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld (ed.), op. cit., pp. 201-203.
254
refers to land granted as fief, and was used as early as 1300s, during the time of Amde
Seyoum. Gult was held temporarily at the pleasure of the monarch, and its holder became the
judicial and administrative authority of these lands, entitled to collect taxes in kind or labour.
The rist on the other hand was more or less equivalent to private property or could be
inherited, sold, and subdivided. In addition to gult, specific lands held by the Crown were the
source of supplies to the court. The property holdings of individuals were expressed in terms
of which gult and which rists they held. So great were the variations - according to provinces
and their relatively autonomous lords - that the history of land tenure hi Ethiopia defies
summary.
For years, land was surrounded with incidents of confiscation and reallocation. For example,
Tewodros 11(1855-1868) reduced the power of the Church which was believed to control up
to one-third of all land, by confiscating much of its gult land, thus, incurring the wrathful
opposition of the religious establishment, a factor that led to his downfall. Successful
emperors had varying land tenure systems which included barring Muslims in Tigray and
Hamasien from land ownership unless they converted into Christianity, especially during
Yohannes IV's reign. During the reign of the emperors, measurement of land was the
necessary prelude to a tax on the amount of land held, though distinctions were maintained in
many areas according to the fertility of the land. Land reform was generally understood to
mean breaking up the large land holding held by the elite and the Church. Although Haile
Selassie I, in the face of mounting unrest, offered some ineffective palliatives, land reform
made little progress in his era. After the overthrow of Haile Selassie I in 1974, the Dergue
mounted radical changes that led to the confiscation of the property of the nobility 710 . The
changes resulted to mixed reactions among farmers and the Ethiopian poor were of course the
beneficiaries. Thus, during the Dergue early years of office in Ethiopia, their land-reform
experiment was regarded one among the most successful in Africa, at least from the peasants'
viewpoint. In order to bring disputes on land into a halt, post-liberation restructuring has
made land a subject of national concern. Land has become an integral part of the democratic
process, justice, human right, equality, and development. Every Ethiopian national and citizen
has the right to land ownership without discrimination. Land is now distributed equally for the
purposes of development, farming, private business and entrepreneurship. The government
has democratised land distribution by facilitating the programme of land distribution in
advising or litigating any difficulties that may arise.
710 See Land Proclamations issued between March 1975 and September 1977, which outlined Dergue
policy of "land to the tiller", where every family was allocated ten hectares of land for farming.
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Since 1991, the government has engaged in the immediate rehabilitation of the war ravaged
regions and the revitalisation of the Ethiopian economy at large. War and famine affected
areas have been given priority by the government in the improvement of basic services such as
education, public health, water, telephone, electricity and light utilities, and transportation
services. Specialists were dispatched to gather empirical evidence in those areas labelled as
war and famine ravaged in the country, and their findings facilitated government plans in terms
of budget and financial arrangements. The regional governments take the responsibility for the
implementation of federal decisions and programmes. However, the government appoints a
committee to monitor the implementation of its directives in order to make sure devolution of
power does not falter in the hands of irresponsible individuals.
As state patronage in education and health services has proved inadequate, post-liberation
restructuring will include the encouragement of private clinics and health centers, private
schools and training institutions. The government encourages community participation in the
construction of clinics, health centers, schools, and road building. Efforts are being exerted to
enable these institutions become self-financing rather than depend on government finances.
For example, there should be an integration of adult education with community development
skill development projects leading to improved farming, soil conservation, hygiene and
sanitation practices. The government has also encouraged the participation of foreign and
indigenous NGOs in the provision of social services and setting up of economic and
entrepreneurial ventures which might boost a process of self-sufficiency. In addition,
education should not be undertaken as a job provider, but rather as a catalyst of change and a
provider of essential skills for self-sufficiency in agriculture and for self-employment in
business or in various skills co-operatives.
Post-liberation government policy encourages self-reliance where regional administrations are
accorded the necessary facilities needed for the exploitation of the rich agricultural plains and
basins, the production of staple crops, heat resistant cereals and crop varieties, horticultural
schemes-including fruit trees, animal farms and animal breed improvement via crossing of
breeds and raising improved breeds, poultry farms via the establishment of hatcheries which
can supply farmers with baby chicks of better breed, and fish farming on an experimental basis
in artificial ponds. Environmental rehabilitation is also seen as a survival strategy for the
whole country andlor regions. One system that guarantees environmental rehabilitation is
through the practice of sustainable agriculture. This combines the conservation of soil, forests
and habitat via an integrated approach of rural development. When travelling throughout
Ethiopia, one witnesses the gully building, hillside terracing, agroforestry projects and
environmental protection to conserve the existing reserves. Small scale projects have also
been undertaken in valleys and rivers which have potential for the development of irrigation.
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This is done by the use of water, building concrete dams, earth dams and the drilling of wells.
Most important is the conservation of water by the construction of earth dams for the storage
of water for human and animal consumption. This is a common approach both in Ethiopia and
Eritrea and even some parts of eastern Sudan and the northeastern province of Kenya. This is
normally done by piling and compacting earth with very little concrete.
Ethiopia also has a potential for developing an export-oriented agriculture. For example, it is
a major producer of Gum arabica, cotton, sisal, sesame, fruits of all types, oil seeds, has the
largest livestock in Africa where meat canning can be processed for export, and semi-
processed and processed hides and skins. Secondly, the viability of the exploitation of several
minerals which are available in Ethiopia on a commercial scale such as gold, marble, iron,
copper and tin, limestone, sulphur, and/or salt, has also received attention. In addition,
Ethiopia's tourist industry is impressive, it includes tour operations focusing on the traditional
historic sites of Lalibella, Axum, relaxation locations like Lake Tana in Bahr Dar, the Lakes
region in the south, wild life, and other new sites in the country, including battle grounds and
grave sites. The government's task is to ensure equality of women by sharing developmental
roles through the allocation of important offices to women candidates. The University of
Addis Ababa has increased its intake of women in all faculties to ensure women's participation
in public affairs. Children too, are a major concern to the government today because they are
the future of the country. Improved health facilities have been increased since the end of the
war and schools have been given major attention. These are areas that no previous regime in
the political history of Ethiopia has had interest on.
The other major social issues are those of demobilised soldiers and repatriated refugees. "We
shall build an invincible force! Everything to the war front", was one of the famous slogans
used to mobiise all kinds of material and human resources 7 . In its efforts to suppress
opposition forces the Mengistu regime recruited an estimated number of 1.2 million soldiers
with about half a million mobilised at the time of defeat712 . The reasons for the attraction of
recruits into the army had nothing to do with the commitment to defend the incumbent
government. Many informants pointed out that a number of issues including poverty and lack
of alternative income sources that pushed the majority of people to join the army of the status
quo regime. In addition to the massive army of the Dergue, the different fronts also owned its
army in thousands, such that when the liberation struggle came to an end in 1991, the TGE
Interview with two unnamed members of an NGO that dealt in cooperation with the Commission for
the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (Addis Ababa, 13th
June 1996).
712	 Kirsten Wilde and Anteneh Belete, op. cit.
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was forced to cut down the size of its army and, as a result, it had to demobiise both the army
of the liberation struggle and of the Dergue. In a positive response, the TGE established the
Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Members of the Former Army and Disabled War
Veterans on June 11th 1991. This commission was charged with the registration, disarmament
and demobilisation of the target group and later on spearheaded the reintegration efforts.
Apart from hundreds of thousands of soldiers who were initially assembled in camps for
registration, others made their own way back to their home areas, often taking their weapons
with them. A considerable number of others flew across the borders to neighbouring countries
fearing vengeance. The number of ex-combatants in need of reintegration assistance increased
when the OLF withdrew from the TGE and started armed resistance against the EPRDF in
mid-1992, some thousands of OLF-fighters were captured and kept in camps. No defmite
time frame was initially set to accomplish the reintegration task. Four to five years were
envisaged but by the time I was in Ethiopia in 1996 fmancial shortage had forced some
reintegration offices in the regions to close. The TGE had appealed for fmancial assistance
from the international Donor community to achieve the objective of the Commission.
Between June 1991 and August 1992 about 70 million US$ were mobilised for the emergency
programme. The UNHCR and ICRC financed the larger share of the budget. The Federal
Republic of Germany was the first foreign Donor government to establish a programme aimed
at supporting efforts to reintegrate former soldiers 713 . Thereafter, the British and Swedish
Development Agencies also made contributions towards the assistance of the programme.
According to the World Bank estimates, a total of US$ 170 million for demobiisation and
reinsertion was followed by various actors' spending of about US$ 130 million on
reintegration between 1992 and early 1995. Until now, the programme of reintegration is at
its closing stage. Jobs were created to cut down unemployment problems. Many groups
voice a lot of dissatisfaction with the whole process, especially from the side of the former
army of the overthrown government and the OLF. However, the problems seem to be well
contained by the government.
Many other projects have also been dedicated to the repatriation and reintegration of refugees.
These are handled mainly by both indigenous and foreign NGOs. For example, in Tigray
region with the largest number of refugees, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) has done a lot
in the resettlement of refugees 714 . Other regions too do have their respective programmes for
the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. Similarly, a number of legislations have been
Interview with Kirsten Wilde, Director GTZ, op. cit.
714 Interview with Tekelewoine Assefa, Director, op. cit.
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passed to guarantee the rights and equal participation of women in national affairs, and the
rights and place of children too. The liberation struggle, many comment, has brought total
change in all aspects of the Ethiopian society.
5.4 The Role of the Elites and the Rise of Peasant Consciousness
The primary aim of the rebellions by rural peasants against local landlords and colonial
infiltration in the African continent was not to capture the state but to defy constant material
exploitation and political suppression. But as to who inspires peasant movements is a question
that we have tried to address above in the examination of the Eritrean case. Are peasant
movements rural grown or they are urban but transported to the rural areas? As in the case of
the Eritrean rebellion, enlightened elites took hold of the crises over land and other political
grievances and turned them against what was widely perceived to be the most unfair regimes
in Ethiopia. Thus, the leadership of all ethnic-built guerrilla groups in Ethiopia valued the role
of peasants in the success of the liberation struggle. In order that peasants could be mobilised
for the overthrow of a system that had encouraged exploitation, discrimination, and political
suppression, the elites played a major role in their conscientisation.
Therefore, massive peasant response to rebellion against the political system in Ethiopia took
place after the last of the country's monarch was overthrown by a military cabal in 1974.
Unwilling to share power with civilians or acknowledge the right of Ethiopia's nations to self-
determine themselves, the new government was challenged on many fronts. In these chaotic
conditions a small group of university students went to the countryside of the northern
province of Tigray in 1975 and launched a national liberation struggle under the banner of the
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). This front, together with the Eritrean Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF) were then instrumental in the encouragement of other ethnic-based
liberation fronts in Ethiopia, including EPDM, OPDO, and EDORM. The TPLF, with the
help of the EPLF, started building an affiance with the OLF, which had began armed resistance
much earlier than other organisations in mainland Ethiopia.
Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea was the home ground for guerrifia activities since the 1960s and
early 1970s. Since the Eritrean case was more a fight for independence, other ethnic-based
liberation fronts in Ethiopia sought their case to be more of self-determination of the diverse
nationalities and the democratisation of the country's political system. The TPLF in particular
became the primary organiser of the new agenda for Ethiopia. They organised themselves first
in the northern province of Tigray which possess only 7% of Ethiopia's population, then
moved to help others in the country to strengthen their rebellions. According to a recent
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study, the Oromos constitute 40% of the population, followed by the Amhara with 30%, and a
further 20% speak Amharigna as a second language. Only 12-15% of the population speaks
Tigrigna715 . The northern region is a poor area without an industrial or valuable exports, and
its overwhelming population of peasants had the highest percentage of land holders in imperial
Ethiopia716 . The case of Tigray as a home ground of rebeffions in Ethiopia contradicts the
thesis of some of the most influential theories of revolution which argue that peasants are
often moved to revolt because of economic changes and disruption to relationship with
patrons caused by commercial agriculture. Although such theories do recognise that
intellectuals lead revolutions, they largely confine their research to the peasant economy and
discount the part played by conditions in towns or by other political factors. The case of
peasant rebellion in Ethiopia confirms that peasants rebel not because they are opposed to
markets, nor do they object to the break up of the feudal economy and destruction of patron-
client relations. In spite of their poverty, most peasants did not initially join the struggle of the
urban-based intellectuals. Contrary to the emphasis on economic factors by theories of
revolution717 , an examination of peasant rebellion in Ethiopia found that peasant commitment
to revolution was also stimulated by political factors, including government policies,
nationalism, and leadership of the revolutionary party718.
It was, as Barrington Moore had argued, the actions of the few upper class that hi large
measure both provoked peasant rebellions and defmed their outcome 719 . The argument is
perfectly represented in the case of Ethiopia's peasant rebeffions. Although political dissent
was restricted during the imperial reign, the feudal system did not have the capacity to
715 It should, however, be noted that these statistics were derived before Eritrea's independence which
removed a substantial proportion of Ethiopia's Tigrigna-speakers. See T. Ofcansky and L. Berry (eds.),
Ethiopia. A Country Study (Lanham, Maryland: Bernan Press, 1993), p. XVT.
7I6	 Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, Report on Land Tenure Survey of Tigre Province
(Addis Ababa, 1969), p. 54.
717 See Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); John
Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Towards Political Change in the Third World
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); and James Scott, The Moral Economy of the
Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1976); and J. Walton, Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopinent
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 15.
718 Students and other intellectuals who fled out of the cities and major towns were instrumental in the
mobilisation of peasants to rally behind the liberation struggle for democracy and the self-determination
of nationalities. Refer in Particular to John Young's works, op. cit.
719 See his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Denocracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 457.
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eliminate it entirely. Thus, in post World War II era a more strong and open opposition to the
old regime began to surface in the towns. Again the successor regime's prohibition against
political activities and the state to carry out its proscription in the urban areas forced
opposition leaders to move to the countryside and launch peasant-based guerrifia insurgencies.
The Dergue used political mobilisation, bureaucratic measures, terror, and the ideological
appeals of socialism and nationalism to establish its rule and attack the largely student based
opposition which pressed for democratic civilian rule. The military government's use of
violence against its political opponents alienated many Ethiopians, and as a result, helped build
the ranks of the opposition and defined the political and military context of the rebeffion.
Thus, although peasant discontent had its roots in growing crisis of the rural economy that
developed prior to the collapse of the old regime, it took the form of armed opposition in
response to the policies of the Dergue and the means it used to implement them.
The other mobilising factors were the result of the military government's activities. Although
the Dergue announced radical agrarian reforms, these were treated with suspicion by peasants
who feared that the elimination of their traditional system of land tenure would allow the
government to gain control over land. Land reform was not welcome in all parts of Ethiopia
after the 1974 Revolution. For example, while land reform was welcome by the indigenous
population in southern Ethiopia who saw it as a means of repossessing land lost to outside
interlopers, in Tigray and Eritrea landlordism was limited because there were virtually no non-
indigenous land holders, and in the highlands there were few large concentrations of land.
Many people believe the Dergue 's land reforms might still have served as a valuable means to
gain peasant support had it not been for the authoritarian means by which they were
implemented. Because of the political threat the Dergue faced its land reforms were hurriedly
carried out and thus became the source of many grievances.
Therefore, widespread dissatisfaction with the policies of the new regime drove many people
away in protest to join the various fronts. Domination of its peasant associations by
government allies also caused bitterness and undermined peasant support. Peasant
dissatisfaction increased further when the Dergue began forcibly procuring agricultural
surpluses at less than market prices and restricting the employment of seasonal farm labour
which many peasants depended upon for survival. The introduction of state and co-operative
farms, forced resettlement, and vifiagisation caused further anger. As the rural insurrection
spread, the Dergue introduced compulsory conscription, conveys, ever higher levels of
taxation to finance the war, and resorted increasingly to terror attacks on civilians and
religious leaders.
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Moreover, the petty-bourgeoisie's resentment at political marginalisation, peasant concern
over declining living standards, and their joint fear that the Dergue hegemony in the state
represented a new form of domination by a non-indigenous ethnic elite, gave rise to an equal
forceful nationalism which became the central focus of the liberation struggle for democracy
and self-determination of nationalities.
Therefore, effective mobilising factors included: the rise of land problems, national question,
constant famine and drought, the issues of women and children rights. Thus peasants were
mobilised to understand the political, social, economic and cultural objectives of the struggle
on such basis. And as Haile Kiros had put it, "What the ordinary people need is effective
leadership in terms of organisation. Otherwise, the effects of deprivation, exploitation,
suppression, and alienation were equally felt". According to Haile Kiros, two important
characteristics defined the liberation struggle for peasants. (1) The fight for justice in society.
Fight internal exploiters, the feudal regime-Ras Men gesha. The ruling classes had very strong
firm affies behind them. Haile Selassie had American and Western backing throughout.
Mengistu at one time had the backing of both poles. Thus, the fight was also against external
enemies. (2) The other point was of extending the struggle to other Ethiopians. Not all
Amharas are enemies, but a sizeable group that have assumed the role and right of a ruling
class are Arnharas. These are the few who resisted the extension of the struggle but peasants
were quick to understand the whole logic of the struggle. Thus, a lot of Amharas joined the
TPLF, disregarding the antagonism exerted by METS ON and the EPRP (dominant Amhara
fronts).
Many recruits from universities in the United States joined the various liberation fronts in
Ethiopia. There was a strong Ethiopian Student Union in North America in the early 1970s.
Unfortunately, Amhara chauvinism threatened to wreck the union by infiltrating it with EPRP
programmes. As a result, the question of nationalities was always pushed to the periphery
because it was seen as an encouragement of Eritrean, Tigrayan, or Oromo nationalism and
struggle to secede. In the end, students in the diaspora became convinced that the democratic
right and the right of nationalities to self-determine themselves was only achievable through
armed struggle with the various fronts in Ethiopia. Many regarded the struggle as
predominantly peasant in organisation because most of Ethiopian students abroad had a
peasant background. Thus, the leadership encompassed peasants, students, working class and
some defected soldiers.
According to Tekelewoine Assefa, the struggle was a socialist revolution in which the peasant
became an appendix and the proletarian a major actor, while the enemy was a bourgeoisie.
There was a deep belief amongst the intelligentsia not to undermine the peasants. For them,
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peasants are not lifeless, or just a bunch of illiterate, feeble dormant group in society, but they
often justified their needs, and perceived the essence of the project(s). In the various fronts,
there was no discrimination of any kind on the basis of education, class or status. In fact, an
ex-fighter expressed the importance of informal knowledge which many had acquired through
long-term experience during the struggle. The success of the struggle also owes a lot to the
harmonisation of roles of the masses who were accorded high regard by the elites. "Creativity,
the gift of God, is not learnt from the classroom, but one is naturally born with it", echoed one
ex-fighter from Wollo. So farmers are clever enough to discover and articulate their needs
and interest, the total deprivation of which may lead to revolt. Farmers are not interested in
theory, but they want practical consequences, so that regimes that do not respond to their
needs often risk rebellion by the masses.
Peasants were mobilised and organised in order to effect total change. Mobilisation was based
on the fact that young officers, intellectuals, young students left their jobs and lowered
themselves down to struggle with the peasants for better change in society. The elites
indoctrinated the masses with policies for change, and their response was to contribute in the
liberation struggle. The effective message of mobilisation was "fight to change the miserable
life of the peasant, because there was lack of infrastructure for the peasants: hospitals, schools,
water supplies, electricity and all kinds of services a modern people and society requires"720.
720 
Interview with Ato Yosef Tesfaye, op. cit.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA - A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP
This thesis endeavoured to study the impact of post-colonial liberation movements on the on-
going democratic political changes in Sub-Saharan African countries. It was argued in the first
chapter that studies on liberation movements are scarce and those that are available often
concentrated on liberation movements that brought about the total decolonisation of Africa
and Asia in the 1950s through until their culmination with the independence of Lusophone
Africa and former Rhodesia in the 1970s and 1980 respectively. This study points out the
differences between the liberation struggles for decolonisation and the post-colonial ones. The
former were mainly directed towards the removal of white-minority-regimes in the continent,
while the latter are mainly against indigenous, non-white-minority-authoritarian regimes.
Unlike the liberation struggles for freedom from European colonialism, post-colonial liberation
movements have not been widely studied and contemporary scholars have hardly given time to
empirical research in order to establish facts about them. Thus, this thesis has been one of the
few attempts to bring post-colonial liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa to the
attention of scholars, both in the Third World and in the West.
Throughout the thesis, four major themes - liberation, democratisation, self-determination
and transition from a liberation structure to a government structure have been discussed. The
study reiterates that the three themes in particular: liberation, democracy and self-
determination, functioned symbiotically throughout the struggles. This thesis also draws
examples from post-colonial liberation restructuring to contradict the pessimism surrounding
publications on the current democratisation process in the continent. For example, one such
pessimistic view contends that "the prospects for continued democracy in Africa remain
extremely uncertain"721 . This has often been the position of scholars who borrow Western-
type democracy wholesale and try to apply it to the African situation; and in defence of the
failures of their own assumptions, they in turn argue that "social conditions are not [more]
conducive for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region of the world"
(including even the Middle East ones where the social conditions are better but with
democracy still in the threshold) 722 . On the contrary, this thesis takes the stand that
721 See Christopher Clapham, "Deinocratisation in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects", Paper Presented
at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops (Leiden, 2nd-8th April, 1993); Thomas Callaghy, "Africa:
Back to the Future?", Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 4(1994), pp. 135-145; and Marina Ottaway,
"African Democratisation and the Leninist Option", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35,
no. 1(1997), pp. 1-15.
722 See in particular Tatu Vanhanen, Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries (London:
Routledge, 1997), pp. 127-141 (emphasis added).
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democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to date began mainly because the continent
was already ripe for change, and external factors only added to indigenous efforts. It was also
pointed out that the struggle for democratic restructuring began a few years after the
decolonisation of the continent but the only problem was that world attention neglected them
for long.
The cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia selected for study in this thesis are only two among other
post-colonial liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. Those which are not studied here
include the struggles in Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, or the Congo (formerly Zaire). These were
struggles against what were widely perceived as authoritarian indigenous-non-white-minority
regimes, different from those, say fought in Angola or Mozambique which were a creation of
ideological allies who perceived the MPLA and FRELIMO as being communists/Marxists.
Post-colonial liberation struggles had a tough time trying to get their message across to the
international community, and were mainly hampered by the now defunct geopolitical divide.
Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War has never really provided a favourable climate
for their success, post-colonial liberation struggles can no longer last for years as recent cases
in Rwanda and the Congo have shown. Moreover, the significance of an international donor
community that began to exert pressure for 'better governance' cannot be denied. Such
pressure forced other African countries whose peoples have not taken up arms to succumb to
pluralistic elections. Better examples being Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Benin or
Togo723 , even when they are arguably stifi more on a slow transition, than what is going on in
Eritrea, Ethiopia, or Uganda.
To be sure, since the early 1990s the continent has witnessed the proliferation of political
democracy, and countries that have undergone change through liberation struggles such as
those which are the subject of this thesis have become models of social transformation in the
continent. Having spearheaded the struggle for liberation, the EPLF and NRM in Eritrea and
Uganda, for example, are now engaged in the construction of a democracy that may suit the
African situation. What they are searching for is a democracy defmed in terms of
'participation', which I purport to discuss in some detail later in this concluding chapter.
Eritrea, in particular, is retrieving a strong and rich democratic tradition that built its roots up
from the village (baito adi), district (baito woreda), and province (baito awraja) levels724 . On
723 See Samuel Decalo; Julius E. Nyangor'o; Peter Anyang' Nyong'o; and Catherine Anglin, op. cit.
724 Democratisation in Eritrea is structured in three different levels: bairos adi (village level); baito
woreda (district level); and baito awraja (province level). Refer to Eritrean self-views on democracy in
chapter four; and see also Olusegun Abassanjo, "Reclaiming Africa's Democratic Roots", Choices:
The Human Development Magazine, vol. 2, no. 1(1993), pp. 18-21; and A. Abedeji, "An Alternative
for Africa", Journal of Politics, vol. 5, no. 4(1994), pp. 119-132.
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a similar, though slightly different development, after seventeen years of liberation struggle
various rebel forces, representing different regional and ethnic groupings, finally entered Addis
Ababa after Mengistu Haile Mariam had fled the country and formed a government of national
unity that began preparations for democratic change for the first time in Ethiopia. The cases
of Eritrea and Ethiopia have been selected particularly because they are clearly linked and stifi
allow the reader to look at two different narratives on liberation. As was pointed out earlier,
Eritrean self-views centred around self-determination and independence while Ethiopians
referred more to democratic principles and devolution of power. These are two different
narratives on liberation qua self-determination on the one hand and liberation qua democracy
on the other, however, in one concrete historical setting.
As we saw in chapters one and two and in the empirical studies, the theories of liberation and
democracy contain explanations that were also raised by Eritreans and Ethiopian as causes of
their respective liberation struggles. For example, the ideals of justice, freedom, equality, or
material deprivation are all located within the parameters of revolutionary thinking. It was
also pointed out that recent scholarship on African liberation theorists identifies more Frantz
Fanon and Amilcar Cabral as founding fathers of African liberationist discourse. However, an
examination of anti-colonial discourse also requires greater attention to mid-and late
twentieth century liberation theorists and statesmen in Africa725 . For this reason, Marxist
discourses on African liberation have been discussed in chapter two, mainly because of the
influence Marxism exerted on African political theorists like Cabral and Fanon and statesmen
like Nkrumah, Toure, Nyerere, Kaunda, Neto or Machel. This thesis adds a new list of second
African generation leaders, some of whom were not necessarily influenced by Marxist ideals.
These are Eritrea's Issaias Afeworki, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni,
Rwanda's Paul Kagame, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Laurent Kabila. This
group, if successful in their respective projects of continental restructuring, may provide a new
brand of leadership for Africa with a clear vision for the future.
In chapter three, it is argued that in addition to the problems generated due to the authoritarian
nature of the first generation of African leaders, the origins of the entire African state-system
has also been found an issue. Unlike the way other state-systems developed (for example
most European), the African state had significant time constraints, its boundaries were
hurriedly constructed and have today become major causes of interstate and even more
intrastate conflicts. Ethnic-interest conflicts erupted over the control of state power and all its
apparatus.
725 
See in particular Immanuel Wallerstein and Aquino Dc Braganca, op. cit.
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Even though there was enormous variation in traditional African politics, ranging from
societies governed by hierarchical structures through to those characterised by dispersed
authority and consensus-building, colonialism distorted the process of state-making in the
continent by modernising traditional sources of authority. For example, it encouraged families
and clans of chiefs and rain-makers (royal traditional families) who normally controlled villages
and ethnic groups to assume the control of the state. These to some extent reflected
underlying socio-economic factors, such as resource endowment and population densities,
although the precise political arrangements emerged from complex societal processes.
According to Gluckman, a rich body of constitutional practices existed in pre-colonial Africa,
defmed in particular by reciprocity, accountability and a form of political legitimacy by which
rulers could be challenged if they transcended established cultural and political norms 726. In
precise terms, not only did colonialism in some cases supplant traditional political institutions
in Africa, it also distorted the process of autochthonous government. Instead pre-colonial rule
was tamed to become a basis for imperial hegemony, in which existing political leaders
collaborated with the colonial authorities in return for preservation of their power and
status727.
In Africa, the use of the concepts of 'nation' and 'state' do not follow their original use in
European politics. In most of Europe, state boundaries often coincided with national ones but
during the formative years of the African state-system, the idea that states should coincide
with nations was not applied. Thus, the search for a coherent theory of the state has remained
difficult to establish in Sub-Saharan Africa728 . In fact, the whole exercise of the scramble for
Africa and its partition has rendered colonialism to be cited more often as one major reason for
the ills of contemporary Africa. It was also pointed out that Africa emerged in the era of
ideology, when it was not clear as to whether capitalism or communism was good or bad.
World polarisation left liberation struggles hardly supported since the struggles were regarded
an internal matter. However, today the general consensus is that democracy is the best way.
726 See M. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). See also
F.A. Kunz, "Liberalisation in Africa - Some Preliminary Reflections", African Affairs, vol. 90, no.
350(April 1990), pp. 223-235.
727 See J. Londsdale, "States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey", African
Studies Review, vol. 24, nos. 2-3(198 1), p. 139; and R. Hodder-Williams, An Introductio,z to the
Politics of Tropical Africa (London: Unwin Hyman, 1984).
728 See Adrian Leftwich, op. cit., pp. 63-70.
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In chapter four, the genesis of the Eritrean struggle for liberation was presented in detail. In
order to articulate the dynamics of Eritrean nationalist discourse, a historical background to
the conflict deserves attention. Major antecedents of Eritrean struggle have been traced back
to early years of foreign occupation and colonial involvement in the region some four hundred
years ago. Typification of early foreign occupation included those by the Ottoman Turks and
the Egyptians in the 16th and 18th centuries respectively. However, European colonialism
was the latest, where Italy and Great Britain became the sole architects of modern Eritrean
nationalism because they introduced political concessions, spread education and print culture,
and a war economy that led to the widespread expansion of the urban population.
Specifically, such phenomena exposed and created the social and political conditions for the
growth of the first generation of Eritrean nationalists. These groups of activists seized the
global discourse on self-determination as an entitlement that they could put more claims on.
The case was discussed in the UN General Assembly where res. 390(V) was passed, but
unfortunately federating Eritrea and Ethiopia instead. What in particular mobilised the
Eritrean activists to take up arms is the abrogation of the federal act and the total annexation
of Eritrea ten years after in the face of a divided international community. Thus, the actual
armed resistance began a bitter war against Ethiopia accusing it of imperial tendencies.
Unfortunately, the budding movement could not survive the legacy of early divisions that
befell early Eritrean nationalists of the l940s and 1950s. A series of inter-factional feuds
ensued in the 1960s right after the struggle had picked up momentum and culminated only in
the 1970s with the emergence of a stronger front, the EPLF. It was the EPLF who provided
the passage into a clandestine and subterranean world of guerrifia warfare which relocated the
centre of gravity of nationalist agitation away from the civic and associational dynamics of the
public sphere to the increasingly tightly organised and disciplined structures of a liberation
front. With the conviction that the development of national self-awareness had to be actively
systematically pursued, the nationalist movements used varied strategies of mobilisation to
fashion local solidarities into a society-wide, counter-imperial project. Thus, the front
educated ranks and file members into a more ambitious sense of their own political capacities.
It was in this way that the EPLF may have transcended the conventional distinction between
the inteffigentsia and ordinary people. Seeing from what the Eritreans themselves have
expressed in chapter four, the EPLF nurtured collectivist and co-operative ideals of solidarity
and promoted a non-competitive ethos of participation that opposed an individualistic cult of
achievement. It can therefore be argued that the EPLF understood quite correctly that the
struggle for liberation required the creative involvement and engagement of rural Eritrea, and
thus, had to take peasant issues seriously to enable the growth of a broad alliance with the
masses.
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Therefore, the political and cultural project found practical embodiment primarily within the
EPLF and, even today in Eritrea, an extraordinary degree of collective self-reliance and
resilience is evident. To be sure, it is the imperatives of order and discipline that provided the
ground upon which the success of a liberation struggle became realised. Thus, as the
beginning of the war in the 1960s marked the closure of political activity in Eritrea, its end in
1991 has once again retrieved the field of political contestation back to the arena of a budding
public sphere. The sort of renascent public sphere understood not in terms of a post-
structuralist ideal-type of a source of rational deliberation, but as a zone of contestation
between the emerging public groupings 729 . This is likely to intensify and may form one of the
central axes along which post-liberation politics in Eritrea wifi be conducted. Meanwhile, it is
difficult to predict its fmal outcomes, but there are indications that its evolving shapes will be
the result of the interaction between the formal process of institutionalisation, informed as it is,
by the PFDJ's own political culture and the dynamics of autonomous social groups and
movements within the wider public arena730.
Similarly, four major areas have been thoroughly dealt with in chapter five about the liberation
struggle for democracy in Ethiopia. Part one of the chapter traced the genesis of the struggle
back to centuries of monarchical rule and seventeen years of military dictatorship. The modern
Ethiopian state was founded on a feudal monarchical system stretching some three thousand
years back. In its political evolution Ethiopia has experienced both transformation and
disintegration. It was Emperor Menelik II who succeeded in consolidating modern Ethiopia
into a unified Empire State in the late nineteenth century. Haile Selassie I, who ruled Ethiopia
from 1930-1974, continued the modernisation of the Empire's institutions begun by Menelik
II. For example, he produced a written constitution, creating a Parliament and Senate, even
though his powers had remained absolute. It was Haile Selassie who transformed a
'traditional autocracy' into a 'military autocracy', by building a strong standing army. So that
the military cabal that later deposed him was, in itself, a product of the professionalised army
of Haile Selassie which was supposedly trained to protect the ruling monarchy but for reasons
explained in the foregoing chapters turned against it.
Haile Selassie I was involved in the international negotiations over Eritrea which he later
annexed in 1962 after abrogating the federal arrangements set up by a UN resolution in 1952.
729 See Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1989); and GeofEley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the
Nineteenth Century", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1992).
730 See EPLF, A National Charter for Eritrea, op. cit.
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Thus, he sparked the rise of the Eritrean struggle for liberation which turned out to become
the first major challenge to the restored Emperor. Furthermore, internal upheavals ensued
triggered mainly by the foiled coup d'etat in 1960. Later on the disastrous famine which killed
an estimated 200,000 people in Wollo and Tigray provinces worsened things for an already
ailing Emperor Haile Selassie. In February 1974, widespread protests culminated in several
months of strikes, demonstrations against the government and the military junta, the Dergue,
assumed power on the 12th December 1974. Unfortunately, detentions and arbitrary arrests
followed by summary executions characterised the new regime. The military cabal declared
Ethiopia a socialist state and measures to achieve a socialist order were enacted drastically.
Despite its failures, the 1974 revolution brought a radical change by altering the Ethiopian
social fabric that had endured from 1855 to 1974. For the first time, the means of access to
high office changed. But the Dergue did not do any better to achieve a phenomenal change
that would have made it the first architect of social change in modern Ethiopia's political
history. On the contrary, the military rulers turned against their own people by terrorising
them, suppressing their political views, and continued the discrimination against the diverse
ethnic nationalities and regions of the country. In a way, a revolution that began with high
hopes of transforming the country ended up as an infamously military dictatorship. Thus,
university students, intellectuals and the working class, who were the revolution's first
instigators in 1974, were thereafter forced to ally with the masses and wage unprecedented
guerrilla insurgencies throughout the country in order to salvage the increasingly deteriorating
state and society. This is how the ethnic-based liberation fronts discussed in chapter five
emerged in the late 1970s until a group of them managed to come together in 1991 to form a
rebel-alliance, the EPRDF, which has now thrown national issues out to public discussion for
the first time.
Therefore, the two chapters on Eritrea and Ethiopia provide room for an assessment of
competing explanations of liberation and democracy in the light of empirical fmdings. The
different narratives by Eritreans and Ethiopians about liberation and democracy, and their
feelings about post-liberation restructuring are summarily compared. The questions both
countries asked themselves in 1991 are: After overcoming all the difficulties of decades of
struggle what type of life do we now deserve?; What is the best possible political system for
us?; What type of government should we build?; What do liberation and democracy mean to
the Eritrean and Ethiopian of all walks of life?; And this thesis adds another question: what is
the possibility of the applicability of the experiences and concepts drawn from Eritrea and
Ethiopia to the wider African continental political reordering? In other words, Eritreans and
Ethiopians have tried to answer the philosopher's question of "what does it mean to lead a
good life?"
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6.1. Analysis and Comparison of the Previous Two Chapters
The Eritrean and Ethiopian cases provide two different narratives on liberation within,
however, one concrete historical setting. While the Eritrean self-views were preoccupied with
the desire for self-determination or independence, Ethiopians referred more to devolution of
power arrived at via a democratic constitution. While the Eritreans styled themselves more as
"nationalists", the TPLF and other ethnic-based liberation fronts in Ethiopia fought for a
loosely structured state that can accommodate the diverse nature of their society. Like in
other African countries, Ethiopia favours devolution of power as a means of addressing the
delicate multiplicity of the state.
Unlike Eritreans who were inspired by a vision of a state of their own, Ethiopians were united
by the common perception of material deprivation and social discrimination, sustained and
compounded by political oppression. For example, Tigray (TPLF), Somalis (ALF & WSLF),
Oromos (OLF & OPDO), Amharas from Gonder and Gojjam (ANDM, EPRP, EPDM &
MEISON). This perception nurtured the proliferation of ethnic-based liberation fronts in an
attempt to salvage the bad conditions of life perpetrated by a history of monarchical rule and
military dictatorship. In fact, material deprivation, evident in an uneven development and
social structures, has become a necessary explanation for the emergence of liberation
movements in the post-colonial African political order. For example, it was the excesses of
corruption and marginalisation in Uganda under Obote (twice) and Idi Amin, in former Zaire
under Mobutu, in Ethiopia under both Haile Selassie and Mengistu, or in Sudan under the
ruling northern families, that provided a fertile ground for the growth of liberation struggles in
those countries.
Moreover, an enforced process of national integration, promoted by the state which embodies
the culture of the group that dominates it, more often leads to social and cultural
discrimination. For example, Amharas (in particular from North Shoa) in Ethiopia, again the
ruling northern families (the UMMA and the DUP) in the Sudan, the Hutu in Rwanda and/or
the Baganda in Uganda. This leads to political emasculation of groups in the state. Political
oppression and suppression in most of Africa emerges out of such situations and is often
meant to stifle the opposition and their activities. Thus, the Eritrean struggle for liberation
incorporated the nine different Eritrean ethnic groups, the two major religions (Christianity
and Islam), and/or the different social classes to avoid similar instances in a post-liberation
order. Thus, the common perception of victirnisation in and by a state controlled by others
(Ethiopians, particularly the Amharas), transcended and submerged the mutual differences and
contradictions of pre-liberation Eritrea. The liberation struggle meant the ending of the
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Amhara domination and the realisation of a state of one's own, a home in which one would
not be treated as a guest731.
Unlike Ethiopians who viewed liberation more as a means for democratising state structures,
Eritreans viewed liberation as a way of life, a road to self-determination and independence. A
theatre through which they could design structures suited for running their own society.
Liberation for the Eritrean becomes a civic virtue through a common war experience. The
actual struggle is not viewed as a way toward liberation, but as 'liberation or emancipation'
itself, even at the individual level. In Eritrea, the individual is defmed in the context of the
community so that individual rights also become defmed in terms of duty and responsibility for
the community as a whole. Liberation is how individuals relate to each other, and in the case
of Eritrea, is an agent of cohesion rather than division. Liberation becomes a civic virtue -
civic virtue as sacrifice, resilience, self-reliance, hard work, tolerance, perseverance and/or
happiness. Civic virtue and diversity - where harmony is forged between ethnic, linguistic,
religious or social classes in a polity. Thus liberation is defmed as a uniting and harmonising
element.
In Eritrea, the struggle itself was a liberating element. It led to the formation of a common
spirit (sameness) and the construction of a new identity through a unified cause. For
Eritreans, a constitutional order alone which is not embedded in the life of a people is not
enough. Thus, the notion of liberty which nurtures the Eritrean struggle entails "positive"
aspects. At stake here is not just the freedom from oppression, interference, poverty etc., but
also a positive vision of communal life.
A liberated people are a favourable climate for the growth of democracy. Thus, democracy
when preceded by a common life of struggle permeates society. Democracy falls under
liberation or, said differently, liberation overrides democracy. Democracy evolves during a
liberation struggle, and as a result, it becomes existential. Virtuous democracy is built on the
baito and gun gemna. The Eritrean experience supersedes those of other African countries that
have not made progress after multi-party elections. The democracy born out of a long
struggle is existential because it is not influenced by a desire to respond to external
international trends. Democracy in Eritrea is not viewed as a dogma or a concept upheld only
by elites and imposed from up-down! Thus, liberation is viewed as post-ideology and a self-
disciplining factor, but democracy as post-pedagogy, experienced and lived by the people
thsough a protracted common struggle, democracy where individual rights are never




This type of democracy transcends that of political party
organisation.
On the other hand, liberation in the Ethiopian experience is not viewed as a way of life, but
rather as a means for solving a concrete political problem. As was pointed out earlier, the
question of nationalities, fuelled more by lack of "better governance" for over three thousand
years of monarchical rule and military dictatorship, was one major war aim in Ethiopia. It was
pointed out in chapter five that democracy was not tested during both the imperial and military
regimes in Ethiopia. This is however no explanation as to why Ethiopia has no democratic
tradition. Imperial and military autocracies concealed traditional values of democracy to
enhance their personal and family rule. This was further perpetrated by scholars who often
praised the multiplicity of modern Ethiopia even when it is clear the country was kept unified
by the iron hands of monarchical and military rule 732 . That order has been deconstructed by
severe armed insurgencies, mainly led by revolutionary intellectuals and backed by the working
class and peasants in the countryside. The compass of political activity has been redirected to
include the views of the wider public in Ethiopia for the first time. The various ethnic
regionally-based liberation fronts all pushed for the creation of a political order that respects
and upholds the rights of all Ethiopians. Again, 'rights' in Ethiopia are defmed more in the
context of ethnicity rather than the individual. However, since Ethiopia is extremely ethnically
heterogeneous, the legalistic approach is the answer to the question of nationalities via self-
determination. Thus, the struggle in Ethiopia had a clear target, rescuing the threatened unity
of a disintegrating state.
Today, Ethiopia is a new country in the making. After thirty years of resistance war within, a
new model of state government is under implementation. Ethiopia has changed from a
People's Democratic Republic (PDRE) framed on Marxist/Socialist models to a Federal
Democratic Republic (FDRE), with ten ethnically defmed regions, with a democratic
constitution compatible with Western democratic standards. Although the changes are seen
from a continental context as a bold attempt at African political restructuring in the 1990s,
others view them sceptically fearing the repercussions the EPRDF constitution will have on
the traditional 'Ethiopian entity' when ethnic division is legally sanctioned. While other
African states, including Ethiopia's former province of Eritrea, have been neutralising ethnicity
in politics, and have banned political parties formed along ethnic, religious or regional lines.
Ethiopia has now encouraged devolution of power along the opposite direction. Unlike
Eritrea whose constitution wishes to bar and legalise the means to forbid and if necessary
732 
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suppress ethnic, religious or regional feelings, Ethiopia chose the opposite path. In a way,
Ethiopia is fulfilling one of its major conceptions of democracy as an exercise in self-
determination. And indeed, no government could win political support from the Ethiopian
public without solving the nationality question raised earlier in chapter five. It is along this line
of reality that the EPRDF was compelled to offer "self-determination up to and including
secession" to satisfy the demand of Ethiopian nationalities. This historically is in fulfilment of
the agenda of the student movement in the 1960s which was later on adopted by every
liberation front in the country.
Although the EPRDF believes the establishment of the ten new ethnically-defmed regions in
Ethiopia are a solution, and defming all political aspects on an ethnic basis, to quell ethnic
problems and help in the reconstruction of a peaceful Ethiopian society, critics maintain such
attempts will endanger the unity of the country instead. They argue that "to take the
destructive sting out of ethnicity in Ethiopian politics and society, it would appear vital to
follow a line which can facilitate a more equitable distribution of material and social goods
among the population. A crucial point here wifi be a fair new land policy, giving the control of
land back to the peasants themselves"733 . It is further argued that:
To avoid state disintegration of the Ethiopian entity along ethnic lines, it is even more
important that ethnic identity should not become the only valid rallying point in
national politics. One must rather encourage a political environment which can
encompass both an Ethiopian and an ethnic identity operating parallel to each other,
together with various other identities. Only by such a strategy may a multi-cultural
society like Ethiopia nourish a system which allows different ethnic groups to live in
peaceful coexistence734.
Although the ideals of freedom, equality or justice also featured in the various documents and
declarations of the many liberation fronts in Ethiopia, democracy was viewed as a least
common denominator for uniting the present state together. Many fears particularly increased
after the independence of Eritrea that other regions may also want to partition. Therefore, a
democratic constitution that allows the right of self-determination and up to secession of the
different ethnic groups in Ethiopia was widely perceived as a necessary and fmal answer735.
Democracy is viewed by the many fronts as the last instrument for the conservation and
preservation of a multi-ethnic society already on the brink of collapse and disintegration. In
See Human Rights Report 1995, Oslo, p. 2.
Ibid.
See The Constitution of the FDRE, op. cit.
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this case democracy becomes a requirement of political correctness, a mechanism for resolving
conflicts and/or grievances of the different ethnic groups in the country. Thus, the EPRDF
believes a democratic constitution that recognises the right to self-determination of
nationalities is a better formula for resolving the chronic equation. However, in this way it is
also believed, coexistence, trust, and mutual respect of difference may become strengthened in
the long run. In other words, the major political problem in Ethiopia is identifiable as concrete
and democratic laws are the concrete answer. In this case democracy can be legalistic,
negative, and/or defensive because it is expressed in laws, as a dogma rather than as a way of
life, and a written document or constitution.
However different, both conceptions of liberation and democracy in Eritrea and Ethiopia are
complementary in nature. First of all, liberation is a common factor where democracy and
self-determination in both cases are realisable through it. The referendum for independence in
Eritrea was an expression of self-determination in practice. Sirnihrly, the various local,
regional and national elections held in Ethiopia are democracy expressed in practice. The two
liberation struggles targeted a common enemy, and shared strategies and political plans
together. Thus, the various narratives discussed in chapters four and five typify how the three
major themes - liberation, democracy and self-determination or independence functioned to
reinforce each other symbiotically during and after the struggle.
In all, it must also be noted that to establish an electoral system in a politically, socially, and
economically underdeveloped African country like Ethiopia or Eritrea remains a tremendous
task. The political environment in Ethiopia, for example, is filled with distrust and allegations
from various political actors. This in turn produced a polarised setting which has led to
election boycotts on various occasions. Moreover, political restructuring in both Eritrea and
Ethiopia must take into consideration the historical relationship between the ordinary citizens
of those countries and the rule of the previous regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie I and
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. It must be remembered that both leaders employed state
coercion to control and dominate their citizens, thus, prohibiting their divergent political
views. The legacy of the past is responsible for creating the prevailing political apathy among
the Ethiopian public. Unlike Eritreans who fmally overcame their divisions and followed one
solid liberation front during their struggle, the Ethiopians were organised ethnically and/or
regionally, and as a result, did not develop a united nationalist ethos. Thus, the
democratisation process in Ethiopia, unlike in Eritrea, is most likely to face some difficulties
because the majority of Ethiopians would not dare to openly challenge the government parties
and structures fearing similar repercussions experienced during the previous regimes. This
kind of behaviour again produces disinterest and apathy towards a political process as one way
of showing political discontent.
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6.2. On the Possibility of an African Discourse on Liberation and Democracy
The unrelenting struggles for liberation by the African peoples in the post-colonial era have
created great optimism in the current democratisation throughout the continent. This
optimism has been backed more by the recent events in the Great Lakes region and the final
recognition of the cause of the liberation struggle in the Sudan under IGAD's Declaration of
Principles (DOP) agenda by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), in particular, by the
traditional ruling families of the Mandi's UMMA party and the Mirghani' s DUP for the first
time. Other events elsewhere in the continent also deserve to be cited including the recent
elections in Liberia that have finally legitimised the presidency of Charles Taylor after almost a
decade of conflict. All these point to a significant turn in Africa's political direction and the
end of the century may find the continent on a better footing than ever before. Africa may
enter the new millennium totally transformed both politically and socially. Political stability
may hold in post-colonial liberation countries like Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and/or
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even the Republic of South Africa whose transition
into a non-racial democracy attracted greater pessimism early this decade has remained stable.
These examples may break the pessimistic mould about the current political transformation in
the African continent.
Moreover, in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the seeds of a liberation struggle have began bearing fruits.
Apart from the social improvements governments there are exerting, democratic political
restructuring is taking root. While in Eritrea liberation was the foundation of a new life, in
Ethiopia it was the solid ground upon which democracy and the self-determination of
nationalities was founded. In many cases of post-colonial liberation struggles, democracy is
viewed more in terms of 'participation'. The demerits of multi-partyism are more hazardous
in Africa than other parts of the world because political parties have tended to follow ethnic,
religious, or regional lines. In these cases multi-partyism has also reduced democracy to a
mere exercise of termly elections without any reciprocation to the voters in terms of services
from the "democratically-elected" government. Instead post-election experiences have shown
that the opposition and their followers, be they ethnic, religious or regional, have more often
been excluded from the services of an elected government. In other words those perceived as
supporters of the opposition are subjected to the consequences of a total loser in a game, say
of sport. In this way, many would loose their jobs, business, or properties.
The major consequences of the whole process is that not only does it fuel hatred and
protracted enmity between the ruling party and the opposition, but also between their
followers. Thus, post-liberation restructuring in Eritrea, Ethiopia or Uganda takes such
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experiences into account when talking about change in their respective societies. Instead of
emphasising party politics, they now purport to construct political systems that must not
polarise their populace but keep them in harmony. Most of Africa is ethnically, religiously,
and regionally heterogeneous, and such fragmentation has rendered multi-partyism counter-
productive since political parties have tend to form along those lines. Political party
organisation has led to some bitter debates and polarisation in parliament such as those that
terminated in the Commons or Congress in Britain or the United States. One major difference
is that in the Western World, defeat in elections and thereafter in debates in the Commons or
Congress are often acceptable to both individuals and party members, and it has not often
meant defeat in every aspect of one's life.
In Africa, real politics suggests defeat in elections or failing to push a bifi through in
parliament means the failure not only of the individual persons or parties, but of the whole
household, village, ethnic group, and religion or region. In other words, multi-party politics
has generated some of the most severe conflicts in African societies such as the constant ethnic
clashes in Kenya' s Rift Valley and Coast Provinces and the political quagmires in South
Africa's Kwazulu Natal. Such examples have often been cited to back the Eritrean and
Ugandan argument that the embracing of an externally imposed political system is counter-
productive, and both countries are not at ease to see their peoples returning back to severe
conflicts after years of struggle. Thus, Issaias Afeworki and Yoweri Museveni have more
often emphasised the view that it is possible to practise democratic governance without
necessarily adapting systems that are incompatible with the African way of life. In other
words, multi-partyism is not viewed as the only way of proving a system is democratic or not.
Democracy in both Eritrea and Uganda is therefore defmed in terms of 'participation', which is
discussed shortly below.
It must be noted that post-colonial liberation movements in Africa do not investigate whether
rules of democracy are familiar and cherished, but rather whether the process of it is conducive
to inspire confidence. Moreover, leaders of post-colonial liberation struggles are informed
that certain fundamental principles exist which are universal in regard to democratic models of
governance. For example, open and equal opportunity to participate in politics for all,
freedom of speech and organisationlassembly, advocating a pluralistic society are all principles
that are requested for a system to be labelled democratic. Democracy depends on a minimum
of confidence in the goodwill of others, and in everybody being able to represent her or his
ideas in a peaceful dialogue with an equal chance of being heard. Thus, whether a state is
independent in its local historical or cultural contexts, these standards must be respected for it
to qualify as a democratic society.
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In traditional African societies of Eritrea and Ethiopia, there is a considerable tradition of
democracy. Traditionally, people resolved local problems and affairs without resorting to
violence because it is understood in every African traditional society that discussion rather
than violence leads to better solutions. For example, the experience of the Amhara rist
system, the gada of the Oromo, or the ottuba of the Sidamo, and corresponding procedures in
other Ethiopian societies, have all one thing in common: established set of rules by which
issues are discussed and solved by collective decisions. Like in other traditional African
societies, the rules are such that everybody feels represented and everybody is made co-
responsible for the well-being of all.
Similarly, conflicts in traditional African societies are negotiated by a group of elders who
usually follow a general African tradition of giving every involved party a chance to voice their
views and interests, and discussing as long as necessary to reach a solution with which all parts
involved become satisfied. This way of resolving conflict was distorted by the long period of
colonial domination. To be sure, African traditional legal practice is committed not so much
to localising and apportioning guilt and to administering punishment but to re-integrating a
deviant into the collective life of society. So that an external imposture of political practice,
say as attempted by the Dergue on Marxist/Socialist models, do not simply work. However,
the difference in cultural practise does not imply African countries must develop their own
form of democratic rule based on their own traditions and principles. Moreover, we have
pointed out earlier the existence of certain fundamental principles which are universal in regard
to democratic governance.
It must also be noted that African democratic traditions are often confined to the community,
thus, may lack protection for minorities/individuals and outsiders. Today, no democracy
excludes respect for human rights which apply to everyone irrespective of age, gender, race,
status, religion, political or regional affiliation, and/or other dividing criteria. These
democratic values are at best rudimentary. Thus, what post-colonial liberation movements
have worked for throughout the struggle is to transform traditional democracy from local
communities to the level of the state. In which case democracy becomes a uniting and
harmonising factor at a national level be it on political, social and economic grounds.
Democracy becomes a measure by which equitable distribution of resources is tested, and in
the case of Ethiopia in a federal structure. Post-colonial liberation restructuring seeks to
incorporate into discourse external procedures in the democratisation process where the
values and virtues of democracy are drawn from the experience of autochthonous life of
collective decision making. In traditional African societies, the principle that rights derive
from responsibility and participation in decision making is closely linked to a collective
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responsibility for the well-being of all. So that local economic issues and interests often
become subjected to a collective decision making process.
It is on this basis that post-liberation restructuring in the 1990s drew significant international
attention in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda or recently the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. This is mainly because the world would like to see whether the transition from
liberation structures to governmental ones will be successful. Moreover, change had occurred
in these countries at a time when what Huntington terms the "democratic wave" has swept the
whole world, leading for the first time to "free and fair" elections in many countries of the
world716 . Since the dawn of this decade, the discourse on democracy and "good governance"
has seized hold of the political imagination not only of African elites and citizen activists, but
also of the ordinary peoples.
The main argument post-liberation restructuring highlight is the importance of participation
rather than multi-partyism. Participation of every people of all walks of life in the affairs of the
state. Participation, when explained in the Eritrean or Ugandan model does not entail the
competition of ethnic, religious, or regional groupings. These groups must function in
harmony rather than in opposition because opposition in traditional African culture leads to
political elimination. In Eritrea, Ethiopia, or Uganda, ethnicity and religion have in the past
led to severe conflicts. For example, it was pointed out in chapter four that the 1940s and
1950s in Eritrea were dominated by the activities of divided nationalist elites. Such divisions
later recurred in the late 1960s to the mid-1970s before the EPLF emerged to heal the wounds
of the past divisions. Even in Ethiopia where political party organisation was unheard of until
the demise of the monarchy, the Dergue was controlled by the Amharas mainly from North
Shoa on religious credentials and dynastic claims. In Uganda too, severe ethnic divisions have
often characterised party formations such as DP being predominantly Baganda and UPC in the
North mainly the Acholis and Langi. Divisions between the Anglican and Catholic Churches
have also in the past led to the assassination of Church leaders in Uganda. These examples
pose a threat to the smooth political restructuring along the lines of multi-partyism in every
African country.
It was pointed out earlier that one major conceptions of democracy is that it is an exercise in
self-determination. That means there should be a democratic process that informs and equips
people to make the right choices. In the cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the media, in all its
forms-including print, radio, television-should serve this purpose. According to Bereket
76 
See Sainuel Huiitington, The Third Wave, op. cit.
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Habte Selassie, this is when a constitutional arrangement in relations to the media as a guiding
tool becomes important 717 . It is often the case that for the democratic responsibility of the
media to be robust and independent, freedom of the press is absolutely important. Yemane
Ghebreab, a high-ranking official in the PFDJ, argued quite convincingly in an attempt to
explain the controversy surrounding African countries on whether 'one-party', 'multi-party' or
'no-party' democracy is applicable or not. For him, most African leaders and their
governments should make sure that people's participation does not end only in the casting of
the termly ballot but that people must also participate in receiving equal services from the
elected regime718 . It is not the four or five years of termly elections that are important, but
such elections must be followed with the necessary services of health, education, clean water,
better roads, food, and everything that any government can provide its citizens irrespective of
the political parties, ethnic, religious or regional groupings they belong. Moreover
participation entails the freedom of the people to choose, say or do everything free citizens
wish to do without inflicting discomfort to others in a polity. Therefore, this is an indication
that there is no refusal of party politics in Eritrea and Ethiopia provided that political
groupings are not created along ethnic, religious or regional lines.
In most of Africa where post-colonial liberation struggles have taken place, there is a
widespread realisation that having opposition alone is not enough, especially opposition
politics that does not generate progress and benefits but would instead derange society. In
Eritrea and Uganda, for example, what makes a government democratic is the dominance of a
democratic behaviour in the life of the individual, family, institutions like schools, Churches,
factories or elsewhere in a polity. It is the duty of every member of society to see to it that
democratic principles are upheld. It is often the case that the citizens of a democracy must be
informed about societal affairs and functions in particular those which affect life in a polity.
The citizens of a democracy must be avid and must continuously seek after the facts about
what matters in society. The primary duties of a democracy are said to be at work when
citizens express themselves freely and make their views known, and to speak up when they
need to be heard. The citizens of a democracy must participate responsibly in societal affairs
and cease from thinking that societal affairs belong to political leaders alone. The Eritrean and
Ethiopian experience has proved that democratic behaviour is learned behaviour and citizens
must be willing to learn and each generation will follow the same route739 . According to the
Interview, op. cit., and see also International Symposium on the Making of the Eritrean
Constitution: A Su,n,narv Report, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
71 Interview, op. cit.
719 lb 1(1.
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EPRDF' s Ato Haile Kiros Gessesse, a citizen of a democracy must act on the basis of
considered judgement and utilise all channels of legal and rightful participation in affairs that
concern him/her740.
Since independence one-party systems or military dictatorships dominated the political life of
the African continent. This culture of one-partyism and militarism has just began disappearing
in a number of countries .where liberation movements occurred. There are many reasons why
liberation movements will become a major means of rooting out dictatorial governments in the
continent. For one, in Eritrea the EPLF brought with them values and virtues of
representative government, a fresh ground for public contestation, tolerance of difference of
views and diversity of belief. In Ethiopia, a wide variety of social values and forces have
emerged for the first time since the modern empire state was born some three thousand years
back. A robust and independent media can be witnessed today in Ethiopia. Post-liberation
politics and social restructuring has shown how quickly the benefits of democracy could be
reaped. Democracy is the opposite of absolutism which says there is one way, and only one
way, of meeting human need and that it is fixed and fmal. In Ethiopia, there is a growing
belief that differences could best be resolved democratically and new designs acceptable to all
can be created. In other words, a healthy competition of ideas and a firm foundation of belief
is emerging when ideas stand the rest and security of people who ask challenging questions, in
particular, gun geina and baito are a challenging ground of discussion in traditional Ethiopia.
From practical historical experiences, democracy is dynamic and developmental. Democracy
is in a sense always a "process of becoming" as each generation broadens its concepts and
deepens motivations. Democracy stresses the rule of diversity rather than the rule of
uniformity, democracy is creative and accepts the fact that it is the business of all of us to
work on the "unfinished business" of the democratic community. Democracy calls for
participation on the part of the many. It cherishes freedom of speech and expression. It
believes deeply in free inquiry and the utilisation of the scientific method. It is based upon
responsible citizenship. In a democracy, there are no perfect functioning ideas instead all ideas
function partially741 . Thus, a democratic agreement does not necessarily imply uniformity but
arises out of the thrilling experience of prolonged discussions (gun geina and baito) and
conferences. Participation in public debates and affairs is a self-fulfilling experience. A
democratic group is equally a responsible one because it is accountable to the public.
° Interview, op. cit.
See Abraham Adhanom, "Primary Duties of the Citizen in a Democracy", Eritrea Profile, vol. 3,
no. 19(20th July 1996), p. 5.
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Commensurate ability to share in public activities. The best productive methods are a guiding
principle since a democratic society is always in a state of flux and change. Thus it modifies
itself according to the changes that take place. A democratic society makes constructive use
of conflict, opposition, or criticism. It does not shrink from such behaviour but considers each
example or situation as a further means of strengthening its own fabric. Post-liberation
restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa requires a lot of commitment one that has been shown in
Eritrea, Ethiopia or Uganda. In these countries, each government gathers the facts, studies,
analyses, makes its decision as a result of discussion, and then acts on the basis of such
fmdings. Post-colonial liberation movements have germinated a thoughtful, vigorous, active
group basically dedicated to the improvement of society.
6.3. "Quo Vadis?": Reflections on the Future of Africa in the Changing World
To be sure, life in the world is not static. When Africa first got her political independence in
the second half of this century, it must be recalled that Marxism-Leninism was presented as a
panacea to developing countries' problems during the post-independence era. However, with
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of the governments of what used to be the
Eastern block, democracy and the market economy are now presented as the solution for
eradicating poverty and political problems in developing countries like Eritrea, Ethiopia or
Uganda. Further, with the dismal performance, and in many instances total failure, of one-
party systems in Africa, multi-partyism is also presented as an integral component of the new
solution. Thus, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the United States Aid for International
Development (USAID), the European Union (EU), and many other members of the
development community, have all used their influences to speed up democratic change in
donor recipient countries.
Post-liberation countries have, however, expressed caution in considering the new phenomena.
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and add now former Zaire, are more cautious than other African
countries like Kenya, Zambia, Malawi or Cameroon, who are viewed as having succumbed to
political pluralism due to external pressures only. I argue that countries that have experienced
the liberation struggle in the post-colonial era provide Africa with an optimistic future because
they tend to give new content and meaning to democracy within the countries' own unique
political history and conditions. This has been reinforced more in Eritrea through independent
and innovative thinking, and self-reliance nurtured during the many years of the struggle.
Expressing their commitment to the building of a democratic political system, the EPLF wrote:
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We Eritreans, for the first time in our history, are starting to build our own state. This
is a great opportunity which we have gained after a long struggle. It is natural that we
now desire to build the best political system and government we can, as many people
would. History has recorded that the human race has desired to build the ideal political
system, and that its best philosophers have studied and written about such political
systems. Although it is impossible to achieve the ideal political system, it is vital to
strive to establish the best political system742.
In Eritrea, the strong desire to build a stable political system is grounded on their respect of
law and order, lived through a long struggle. In Ethiopia, a strong desire for democracy as an
exercise in self-determination is derived from the long yearning to solve the burning issue of
nationalities. As Africa is undergoing political liberalisation, the Eritrean and Ethiopian efforts
of trying to craft political systems that may safeguard unity and peace, human rights and
freedom of expression and association should serve as major exemplary features.
The other most striking aspect of the current discourse on Africa's future is the deep growing
awareness on the part of the people that their involvement in the making of their own
governments through the ballot box is salient. Since Africa got her independence almost four
decades ago, the experience of its peoples has been that of disappointment, frustration and
disillusion. The only hope now is that the future must not remain equally difficult 743 . The new
thinking provided by the new generation of African leaders who emerged after years of
struggle is that the continent must re-evaluate its place in the global political arena. For
example, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni scathingly referred to the OAU recently as a "trade
union of criminals"744 . This is a renegade statement that exemplifies the challenge new leaders
pose to the rest of the continent. The re-evaluation project is in particular important for (1)
the thirty years of independence have been utterly lost decades 745 , and (2) the international
system has undergone a drastic metamorphoses, where the end of the Cold War has meant the
triumph of Western democracy and economic liberalism746 . Similarly, scholars of African
politics (both Africans and Africanists), have been forced to shift their approaches from the old
paradigms to more pragmatic ones. The old levels of analysis such as developmentalism or
modernisation, Marxism-Leninism, non-alignment or even integration as shown in the failures
742 See A National Charter for Eritrea, OP. cit., pp. 19-20.
See Ralph I. Onwuka and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Africa in the World, op. cit., p. xiii.
See "Will Kabilla Live up to Mandela's Expectations?", Southern Africa Report, vol. 15, no. 23
(June 1997), pp. 3-4.
See Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), 30 Years of Independence, op. cit.
See Francis Fukuyama, The End of Histo,y and Last Man, op. cit.
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of the OAU, or the now revitalised East African Community in the 1970s, have all proved
inappropriate. New and innovative suggestions include: self-reliance and self-sufficiency,
devaluation and privatisation, devolution of power, development and encouragement of civil
associations.
The development of an African civil society is in particular crucial to the development and
strengthening of participatory democracy. This argument remains, however, mooted because
it is not agreed whether democracy provides a better growth civil society or vice versa. That
debate aside, civil society is people's capacity for self-development. It enables people to
participate fully in the political life of their countries. External intervention on behalf of
democratic principles can be at best ineffective and at worse dangerous unless they are
anchored in and supported by the indigenous population. But civil society cannot be created
or shaped by a constitution alone. What the constitution can do is to provide the necessary
conditions for the emergence and development of civil associations. This has been deep
rooted in the history of the Eritrean struggle for independence and the Ethiopian struggle for
democratic restructuring. Direct and participatory democracy has been nurtured through the
establishment of people's assemblies up from the village, district and provincial levels. It is
evident that this direct popular participation via the baito and girn gema, more than anything
else, accounted for the success of the liberation struggles in Eritrea and Ethiopia. It is on this
basis of participatory experience that the PFDJ envisions a development process based on true
democracy and social justice for Eritrea747.
Therefore, the 1990s and beyond will be different and analysis of African politics and
international relations seem to be predictably becoming more exciting than in the immediate
post-independence years. For example, most countries have shifted from parastatals to
privatisation, from stagnation to expansion, from one-party to multi-party democracies, from
militarism to more civilised government. The new post-liberation countries of Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo wifi lead the way for
pragmatism because their leaders have proved they can assimilate new global dynamics and
respond in imaginative ways to contemporary problems and likely projections. There is now a
more positive perception that the content of seeming continuities, such as bipolarity and
EurAfrica, have changed to multi-polarity and to new South-South connections or dialogue,
notably with the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). If African politics and international
relations becomes transformed, the changes will be counted as one major contribution from
the revolutionary thinking of post-colonial liberation leaders.
See EPLF, A National Charter for Eritrea, op. cit.
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6.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is true that although upheavals are not a new phenomenon to Africa, those in Eritrea and
Ethiopia were qualitatively different from those elsewhere in the continent. What took place
in Eritrea and Ethiopia were revolutionary upheavals-deliberate, disciplined and organised748.
Most of our empirical findings confirm the peculiarity of the revolutions, which have in turn
formed a new brand of discourses on liberation and democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
emergent discourses are entirely those of a post-colonial nature because they are completely
different from the previous African liberation struggles that were mainly directed against
colonialism and white settlerism. Since these latter liberation struggles were perceived as
being waged mainly against the external enemy, they enjoyed the total support of the African
people and continental governments as a whole. For example, they were supported and
funded by, among others, the OAU Liberation Committee (OAU-LC). The UN's
Decolonisation Committee (UN-DC) also gave them the green light to fight for their
independence, sanctioned mainly by Woodraw Wilson's conception of self-determination in
after the First World War..
On the other hand, the situation has not been the same with the post-colonial liberation
movements. The newly independent countries of Africa took hold of the reinterpretation of
the concept of self-determination to mean instability because it threatened the unity of the state
and society. Thus, far from being supported by Africa, the revolutions in Eritrea and Ethiopia
were vilified and vigorously opposed and shunned virtually by the whole continent. For
example, the Eritreans were mostly condemned as "separatists" and not infrequently named
the "enemies of Africa". Their only "crime" was that they were fighting against internal
oppressive regimes, if not against the corruption of neo-colonialism. The EPLF, EPRDF, and
NRA (though not included as a case study here) in Uganda have won their wars against all
odds - against the powerful and well-established indigenous armies and in an unfavourable
international diplomatic climate. For example, Emperor Haile Selassie's diplomacy and
shrewd manipulation of Eritrean rivalries during the 1 940s succeeded in gaining him imperial
control over Eritrea which he finally annexed in the face of the UN and Western powers. The
military regime that succeeded Haile Selassie, the Dergue, not only continued the imperial
748 See EPLF, Political Report and National Democratic Pro gramnme; this has been reflected in the
Eritrean National Anthem, see Hadas Ertra, no. 76 (May 22, 1993), p. 8; Ruth lyob, op. cit., p. 136;
and A.M. Babu, "A Hopeful Dawn of Post-Colonial Initiatives", SAPEM, op. cit., pp. 14-17.
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tradition of combining clever diplomacy with military campaigns but justified its methods by
new ideological symbols (Ethiopian Socialism and Marxism-Leninism)749.
Moreover the OAU, being the servant of the regimes under attack, dutifully condemned these
movements with all its diplomatic ferocity 750 . Thus, the liberation struggles in Eritrea and
Ethiopia enjoyed neither external support nor sympathy. They virtually fought alone,
depending entirely on the justness of their cause and on their own ability, ingenuity and sound
leadership. The total collective experience of these two cases is enormous. The Eritreans
struggled for thirty years while the Ethiopians took seventeen years. This leaves us with a
total of almost half a century of collective struggle. In a marked contradistinction with the
decolonisation struggles that had preceded them, the post-colonial liberation movements were
fought, organised, supplied and administered within their own countries - in liberated areas -
gaining a wealth of experience in the process. After decolonisation, most African countries
adopted a one-party system of rule, a tradition that continued until at the close of the 1980s
and the beginning of the 1990s. But post-colonial liberation struggles in the continent have
brought with them a culture of democratic practise and are now introducing democratic
institutions and civic government.
In a nutshell, what lessons have these new emergent governments learnt and brought with
them from the bush and what contributions can be drawn from their experiences for the rest of
the continent? It is possible to catalogue the contributions they have come up with, as a
penultimate project for future research, in the following:
(1) They have learnt and mastered the rudiments of self-government, of administration, of
building essential institutions and the skills of self-reliance, and the virtues of sacrifice
and tolerance. In this case the EPLF/PFDJ has received external support in form of aid
with less conditions attached.
(2) Through experience, they have developed the ability to identify reliable leadership under
severe and stressful conditions, for example, surviving the severe splits along ethnic,
religious or regional lines during the early days of the struggle.
(3) They have developed the mature skills of give-and-take negotiating for survival whether
See Ruth lyob, pp. 3, 29-58.
750 With the institutionalisation of the African state system and the subsequent establishment of the
OAU, unity was enshrined as the primary purpose in the organisation's Charter (art. II of the Charter
speaks of the promotion of unity and solidarity of African states); see Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basis
Docu,nents on African Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 3 Article III (2) affirms the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, see Makumi Mwagiru, op. cit., and other
references therein; and C.O.C. Amate, Inside the OA U, op. cit.
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on the battlefield or at a round-table. In other words, they have mastered the intricate art
of flexibility, of being firm when firmness is required, and of compromise and
reconciliation when no strongly held principles are at stake.
(4) Tough and rough experience has also enabled them to develop the ability to constantly
distinguish and make a choice between primary and secondary contradictions, and to act
on them according to the needs of the required objectives. Said differently, they have
developed that rare capacity to be able to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable.
(5) Last but not least, they have learnt that stability and success are only possible through
cohesive leadership that would in turn foster national unity for the realisation of progress
and development.
This rare wealth of experience is now seen in action demonstrated by leaders of revolutionary
governments in Africa. Eritrea's Issaias Afeworki, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, and Uganda's
Yoweri Museveni are definitely the most outstanding examples of leaders who went through
the rigid experience of fighting wars that had no regional and international support. They now
provide the new type of leadership in Africa. These leaders were civilians who took up arms
to fight the dictatorial civil and military regimes, and they have won. They are now working
hard to lay foundation for a type of democracy in Africa. What they are purporting to
construct is a type of democracy that sounds "deviant". It is deviant because their articulation
of democracy seems contradictory to the orthodox meaning and application of it. Moreover
the new approach takes certain fundamental principles which are universal. These leaders
have come to know and trust one another only after the victory of their respective struggles,
but not during the struggle. After having fought and won their wars separately without any
common strategy (though TPLF/EPRDF and EPLF had renewed relationships from time to
time)751 , they now seem to share views on the type of democracy that might be acceptable to
Africa. In fact, they have also now developed a solid identity of purpose, the purpose of
regional stability and prosperity seen in the strengthening of Inter-Governmental Agency for
Development (IGAD), constituted mainly by Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and
Djibouti. The pragmatism of their economic co-operation policies reflect the realisation that
Nkrumah's "seek ye first the political kingdom" in the 1960s later had nothing added unto it!
751 See John Young, "The TPLF and EPLF Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism", op. cit.
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4ppendix I:
Lists of Interviewees in Eritrea
While in Eritrea from January to July 1996, the researcher interviewed the following:
A. High Ranking Officials
(1) His Excellency Ato Beraky Gebre Selassie, a leading member of EPLF and now Minister of Infromation in
the PFDJ Government, Asamara, Eritrea.
(2) His Excellency Prof. Bereket Habte Selassie, a Diplomat and leading member of EPLF and now Chairman,
Constitutional Commission of Eritrea (CCE), PFDJ Government, Asmara, Eritrea.
(3) His Excellency, Ambassador Haile Menkerios, a leading member of EPLF and now Ambassador of the
State of Eritrea to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(4) Ato Ibrahim Tottil, one of the oldest member of the liberation struggle and now Governor, North Red Sea
Province, Massawa, Eritrea.
(5) Ato Yemane Ghehreab, a leading member of EPLF, former Head of EPLF's Infromation Department and
now Head of Political Affairs, People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), a substitute to EPLF, Asmara,
Eritrea.
(6) Ato Alem Araya, former EPLF and now a senior official of the Ministry of Mining and Industry, Asmara,
Eritrea.
(7) Ato Paul Highileld, a British who had served in the liberated areas during the struggle and now in the
Planning Section of the Ministry of Education, Asmara, Eritrea.
(8) Dr. Tesfa-Yesus Mehary, former Assistant Professor and also had served as Head of Division Statistical
Office, Ministry of Planning in Ethiopia and now Vice President, Asmara University, Asmara, Eritrea.
(9) Ato Afewerki Abraha, former EPLF, served as Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the
State of Eritrea, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and now Hon. Counsul, Eritrean Consulate to the UK and Northern
Ireland.
(10) Kiflezghi Zekarias, former teacher, had refugee in Sudan and now works as a trainer with the National
Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW), Asmara, Eritrea.
(11) Mrs. Dahab Suleiman, former EPLF and now Head of Research and Documentation Department, NUEW,
Asmara, Eritrea.
(12) Mrs. Hadas Mussie, former EPLF and Head of Personnel Office, NUEW, Asmara, Eritrea.
B. Others
(13) Mrs. Abeba G/her, civilian and now Secretary to the Dean of the College of Arts and Language Studies,
Asmara University, Asmara, Eritrea.
(14) Ato Angesom Efrem, former EPLF and now works at Keren Hotel, Asmara, Eritrea.
(15) Former EPLF and now Director, Teachers Training Institute ('FF1), Asmara, Eritrea.
(16) Misghina Dehcssai, former EPLF and now a civil servant unfergoing training at the Eritrean Institute of
Management (ElM), Embatkala, Eritrea.
(17) Tirhas Fesshaye, ElM, Emhatkala, Eritrea.
(18) Berhe Andemariam, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrca.
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(19) Freweini Tekie, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(20) G. Mebrat, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(21) Alganesh Mekonnen, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(22) Berhe Mesfun, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(23) Tseggai Tekiehaimanot, former EPLF and now Head of the Staff, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation,
Public	 Administration Department, 1-lammasien Province, Asmara, Eritrea.
(24) Tzighereda Elfu, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(25) Solomon Fesseha, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(26) Nasser Osman, Civil Servant who never joint the EPLF.
(27) Johannes Haily, Department of Agriculture, Vertinary Section.
(28) Abraham Debesai,former EPLF.
(29) Henoc G.flimwet, Student, Asmara University, Asmara, Eritrea.
(30) Tedros Abraham, Student, Asmara University, Asmara, Eritrea.
(31) Alazar Abu, Trainee, ElM, and former EPLF.
(32) Zewenghiel Serium, Department of Maritime Transport, Massawa, Eritrea.
(33) Dawit Slum, former EPLF.
(34) Tekeste Ghebrezghi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(35) Solomon Kifleyesus, former EPLF.
(36) Tekie Gheresus, former EPLF.
(37) Yehdcgo T. Michael, former EPLF.
(38) Russom Sereke, former EPLF.
(39) Tekle Abraha, fromer EPLF.
(40) Hailemicael Mathewos, former EPLF.
(41) Yemani Tsegai, former EPLF.
(42) Berhane Zemicael, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(43) Goitom Oghai, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(44) Andeberhari Weldehans, Ministry of Defence, Dongolo, Eritrea.
(45) Abeba Gebre Christos, former EPLF.
(46) Belai Habtegaber Bein, former EPLF.
(47) Senait Tesfay, former EPLF.
(48) Zekarias Simeon, former EPLF.
(49) Solomon Tesfahun, Education Office, Anseba, Keren, Eritrea.
(50) Nerayo Taddesse, former EPLF.
(51) TfMariam W/Slassie, former EPLF.
(52) Ghirrnai Teklealfa, ElM, Embatkala.
(53) Berhane Asress, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(54) Berhane Habte, former EPLF.
(55) Yebio Ogubaselassie, former EPLF.
(56) Michael Zecarias, ElM, Embatkala, Eritrea.
(57) Fesehagherghis Ocubazghi, Post Office Department, Asseb, Eritrea.
(58) Alazar Ghirmai, Ground Force, Ministry of Defence.
(59) Hassan Mohammed, Agordat, Barka, Eritrea.
(60) Yosief Tewelde, Mendefera, Seraye, Eritrea.
(61) Yacob Andemesrel, former EPLF.
(62) Tekeste Tzegai, Taxi Driver, Asmara, Eritrea.
(63) Bereket Fitwi, former EPLF and now works in the Project Development Department, Ministry of
Education, The State of Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea.
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Appendix II:
List of Interviewees in Ethiopia
While in Ethiopia between most of April and July 1996, the researcher interviewed the following:
(1) Col. Halefom Alemu, former TPLFIEPRDF and now Chief of Secretariat, Ministry of National Defence,
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(2) Col. Asaminew Bedanie, former Dergue Deputy Commander in Tigray 1987-88, former Chairman
Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) 1988-90 and Vice Chairman of the same
organization 199 1-93, former member of the Council of Representatives and now Department Head Foreign
and Military Relations, Ministry of National Defence, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
(3) Ato Haile Kiros Gessesse, former TPLF Representative in Washington, London and Khartoum, and now
EPRDF member and Head of Foreign Relations, EPRDF Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(4) W/ Netsannet Asfaw, former Journalist with Deutsche Welle, former Head of Information in the Office of
the President during the Transitional Government, and now EPRDF MP for Endamariam, Axum, Tigray and
Director, Office of the Prime Minister, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(5) W/ Mebrat Beyene, former TPLFJEPRDF and now Head of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(6) Ato Teklewoini Assefa, former TPLF and Co-founder of REST and now Executive Director, Relief Society
of Tigray (REST), Mekelle, Tigray, Ethiopia.
(7) Ato Chekol Kidane, former TPLF and now member of EPRDF and Adviser to the Regional Government of
Tigray, Mekelle, Tigray, Ethiopia.
(8) Ato Zemichael G.Medhin, former TPLF and now senior official of the Regional Government of Tigray.
(9) Ato Alem G/Wahid, former TPLF and now Head EPRDF Branch Axum, Tigray, The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia.
(10) Prof. Bahru Zewde, Director Institute of Ethiopian Studies, University of Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa, The
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
(11) Ato Haile Ghirmai, former TPLF and now Businessman, Addis Ahaba, Ethiopia.
(12) Ato Yosef Tesfaye, Secretary to Dawit Yohanes, Speaker of the House of Representatives, former member
of the Constitution Drafting Commission, former Executive Committee member of Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and Caolition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(13) Cot. Tesfaye Asemanew, former Col. of Police, Imperial Regime and retired during the Dergue Regime,
and now Hotel Businessman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(14) A good number of people in Ethiopia did not want their names written anywhere. This includes students
and teachers at Addis Ababa University, and others encountered at social places.
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Appendix III:
List of Foreign Observers Interviewed in both Eritrea and Ethiopia
While in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, the researcher interviewed the following Foreign Observers:
(1) His Excellency Ambassador Robert G. Houdek, Ambassador of the United States of America to the State of
Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea. Formerly in Nairobi, U.S Embassy as the NO. 2 (1980-84); in Uganda as U.S
Ambassador (1985-86); and as U.S Ambassador to Ethiopia till the overthrow of Mengistu in 1991,
(2) His Excellency Ambassador Wolfgang Ringe, Ambassador of Germany to the State of Eritrea, Asmara
Eritrea. Formerly a German Diplomat to Niger, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa.
(3) His Excellency Ambassador Claudio Bay-Rossi, Italian Ambassador to the State of Eritrea, Asmara,
Eritrea. Formerly Italian Envoy to Somalia and Canada.
(4) His Excellency Ambassador Hussein El Hoghby, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the State of
Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea.
(5) His Excellency Dr. Martin Ngwenya, UNDP ResRep and UN Cordinator in the State of Eritrea. Formerly
UN ResRep in Souther African Countries.
(6) His Excellency Ambassador Shi Yongjiu, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the State of
Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea. Formerly Envoy to Ethiopia till the overthrow of Mengistu in 1991.
(7) Ms. Sally Crook, Representative VSO, Asmara, Eritrea.
(8) Viatcheslav L. Regush, Attache, Embassy of the Russian Federation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Also
monitored the Eritrean referendum in 1993.
(9) Jean-Paul Charlier, First Secretary, Belgian Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Also monitored the Eritrean
referendum in 1993.
(10) Kerstin Wilde, LUSO CONSULT Ltd., Hamburg Germany, Economist and Programme Officer GTZ,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
(11) Andrea Semplici, Journalist, Via di Mucciana 6, 50026 S. Casciano in Val di Pesa - Firenze, Italy. Did
similar interviews with both President Museveni of Uganda (1992) and President Issaias Aferwerki of Eritrean
(April 1996) on democratization.
(12) Prof. Richard Pankhurst, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. professor of
Anthropology and an authority on Ethiopian Studies.
(13) Dr. John Young, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, former
Journalist with the Sudan Times, and his Ph.D (September 1994) was on TPLF.




A National Charter for Eritrea
For a Democratic, Just and Prosperous Future
Approved by the Third Congress of the Eritrean people's Liberation Front (EPLF)
Nacfa, February 1994
EPLF (PFDJ) Transitional Constitution and Third Congress Resolutions
(A) Transitional Constitution
Introduction
-Whereas, during the transitional period, between now and the next Congress, the Front must be organized and
conduct its activities in accordance with the Charter; and
-Whereas, during this transitional period, it requires a leadership and an organization to lead its programs;
-Now, Therefore, Be IT Resolved, that the Front shall operate under the following transitional constitution, which is
based on the principles of the Charter, until the next Congress.
çj Name
-The People's Front for Democracy and Justice.
Chapç Membership
1.Any Eritrean who believes in the national unity of Eritrean people, and rejects all factional religious, regional and
ethnic-based divisiveness; accepting the National Charter, is ready to contribute to the development, justice and
prosperity for the people of Eritrea, and has attained the age of 18, is eligible for membership.
2. An individual who was against the independence of the people of Eritrean and collaborated with colonialism is
not eligible for membership.
3. Applications for membership are completed and considered individually.
4. A member has the right to voluntarily withdraw his/her membership.
Chapter 3 Membership Responsibilities
A member of the Front has the following responsibilities:
1.To properly understand the National Charter, and earnestly strive to uphold and implement its contents and spirit.
2. On the basis of the Charter, to conduct political activities among people, and to uphold and strengthen the unity of
the people of Eritrea.
3. To uphold and enhance the unity of the Front based on the National Charter.
4. To be loyal to the principles and laws of the Front, and carry out its decisions and programs.
5. To practice constructive criticism and self-criticism.
6. To establish close relationships with the people and forward views expressed by the people to the appropriate
bodies.
7. To participate in practical programs and activities of the Front.
8. To strive to enhance his/her own political and cultural consciousness.
9. To be a trusted and honest servant of the people and country and to be committed to truth, justice and work.
10.To respect the confidential matters of the Front.
11.To pay dues on time.
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Any member who does not fulfil his/her obligations shall be subject to disciplinary action, ranging from warning to
dismissal.
Chapter 4 Membership Rights
A member of the Front has the following rights:
1.To participate and freely express views during meetings, seminars, conferences and in publications of the Front.
2. To receive continuous information on the Front's policies, programs and their results.
3. To present constructive criticism on policies, programs and their implementation, to leaders or to ordinary
members.
4. To hold dilièrent views, provided they are within the Front's general goals and principles.
5. Based on the constitution, to elect, and run for office, for leadership positions at all levels.
çpter 5 Central Council
A. The Central Council shall be the body with highest authority during the transitional period until the next
Congress of the Front.
I. The Central Council shall be elected by the Third Congress of the EPLF.
2. The Central Council shall be composed of 75 members.
3. Two-Thirds (2/3) of the members of the Central Council shall constitute a quorum.
4. Decisions of the Central Council shall require a majority vote. In the event of a tie, the Chair shall have the
deciding vote.
5. Regular meetings of the Central Council shall be held every six months as determined by the Executive Council.
6. Special meetings can be called by the Executive Council when it deems necessary, or upon request by two-thirds
(2/3) of the members of the Central Council.
B. The authority and responsibilities of the Central Council are as follows:
1.On the basis of the National Charter, to draw up plans by which the Front can be organized and expanded.
2. To organize the Congress of the Front.
3. To elect the Chair of the Central Council and the Executive Council from among its members.
4. To elect an Executive Council from among its members.
5. To review and approve reports of the Executive Council.
6. To legally discipline any members of the Central Council or the Executive Council who violates the principles
and laws of the Front.
7. To have the authority to change the Executive Council as a whole or some members.
8. To perform other duties as may be assigned by the Congress.
Chapter 6 Executive Council
A. The Executive Council is the body with the highest authority during the period between regular meetings of the
Central Council.
1.The Executive Council shall be composed of eighteen (18) members and a Chair, elected from among members
of the Central Council.
2. Two-Thirds (213) of the members of the Executive Council shall constitute a quorum.
3. Decisions of the Executive Council shall require a majority vote. In the event of a tie, the Chair shall have the
deciding vote.
4. Regular meetings of the Executive Council shall be held every month as determined by the Chair.
5. Special meetings can be called either by the Chair or by two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the Executive
Council.
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B. Authority and responsibilities of the Executive Council are as follows:
1.To call meetings of the Central Council.
2. On the basis of the Charter and Central Council programs, to organize and lead the Front.
3. To plan programs of political activities and assess their implementation among the people.
4. To promote the National Charter's acceptance by government and society at large.
Chapter 7 Chair
1.The Chair calls for and conducts meetings of the Central Council and the Executive Councils.
2. The Chair is the most senior official of the Front.
Chapter 8 Central Office
I. The People's Front for Democracy and Justice shall have a permanent national central office which co-ordinates
the administration of its activities.
2. During the transitional period, branch offices can be opened as needed.
Chapter 9 Departments
The Front shall have the following departments:
1. Political Affairs
2. Organizational Affairs
3. Research and Documentation
4. Economy
Chapter 10 Organizational Structure
1.The People's Front for Democracy and Justice shall have an organizational structure at national, provincial,
sub-provincial and village levels.
2. During this transitional period, organizational guidelines for the Front shall be determined by the Central Council.
Chapter 11 Publication, Emblem, Slogan
1.The People's Front for Democracy and Justice shall have a magazine called Hedri.
2. The former emblem of the EPLF shall be the emblem for the People's Front for Democracy and Justice.
3. "Victory to the Masses" shall be the slogan of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice.
(B) THIRD CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS
I. Revitilizing the Front and its Political Work
Recognizing the immediate and long term importance of organizing a broad based Front in accordance with the
National Charter,
Cognizant of the need for the effective organization of the Front as a dynamo of national construction, a guarantor of
peace, stability, unity and development and a driving force for democratic progress,
Noting the decisive role that political work has played during our liberation struggle,
Aware that political work remains the major task of our Front,
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Conscious that the National Charter, as an expression of our political experience and vision, must be disseminated,
popularized and enriched in the crucible of real life,
The Congress resolves that:
1.The Central Council draw up and start implementing programs necessary to revitilize the Front,
2. Political work be conducted constantly and efficiently throughout the country both in the urban and rural areas,
including in the remotest corners,
3. The letter and spirit of the National Charter be widely disseminated and known.
II. Reinforcing the Unity of the Eritrean People
Recognizing that the national unity of the Eritrean people has been forged and consolidated in the course of half a
century of national struggle, and especially during the three decades of armed struggle,
Cognizant of the decisive role that the EPLF has played in promoting and strengthening the unity of the Eritrean
people,
Aware of the existence of elements and groups who try to use religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity as instruments
of political machination,
Mindful that all sectarian and divisive machinations are categorically abhorent in free Eritrea,
The Congress:
1.Resolves that the Front play an appropriate role in the political, economic, social and cultural tasks of
nation-building as the unity of the Eritrean people will be consolidated further in this process,
2. Emphatically condemns those who attempt to use religion, ethnicity and the language question as an instrument
of sectarian political interests.
ifi. Establishment of a Constitutional Government
Aware that the establishment of a constitutional government in Eritrea is our fundamental goal,
Cognizant that the national constitution should be drafted and adopted through broad popular participation,
Conscious of our endeavors to base the Eritrean national constitution on the fundamental principles of the Charter-
patriotism democracy, secularism, and social justice,
Realizing that the establishment of a constitutional system, the development of constitutional institutions and culture
is a long and basic process that goes beyond the adoption of a constitution,
Taking note of the preparations underway to establish a commission to draft the national constitution with broad
popular participation,
The Congress resolves that:
1.The Front play an active role in the drafting and adoption of the constitution, and the dissemination and
internalization of constitutional knowledge and culture among the people,
2. The Front exert all efforts to firmly put in place and strengthen the pillars of a constitutional system in Eritrea.
IV. Law on Political Parties and the Press
Aware that a democratic political culture in general and experience of political parties in particular are undeveloped
in Eritrea,
Conscious that Eritrea is a new state which has just begun to build its own national government where the process of
national building is yet unlinished,
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Realizing that the primary and fundamental tasks of the moment is laying down the foundations of the national and
the building of the economy,
Convinced that a pluralist political system that respects the basic rights of expression and association should be
established in Eritrea,
Upholding that nationalism and secularism should be the basis of all political activity,
Conscious that the basis of political association should not be sectarian,
Mindful that political afliliations hinged on the negative experiences of our armed struggle should not be tolerated as
they are contrary and detrimental to the beginning of a new political chapter and the development of a healthy and
democratic political culture,
Aware that there should be no foreign interference, in whatever form, in our national politics,
Noting that the cultivation of a free and responsible press is vital to the development of democracy,
The Congress resolves that:
1. The Front play a catalytic and constructive role in the development of a healthy democratic culture as well as
a free and responsible press,
2. The Front actively participates in the drafting and adoption as well as application of the law on political parties
and a press code.
V. Building Institutions of a National Government
Mindful that the people of Eritrea are, for the first time in their history, building their own government,
Aware that the building of a strong and effective rational government is a vital instrument for nation-building and
reconstruction as well as for the attainment of stability and development,
Conscious that a strong national government cannot prevail without adequate and effective institutions and that
institutional capacity-building requires resourceful, effort and time,
Assessing the generally successful efforts as well as the problems and constraints encountered after Liberation in the
establishment and effective operation of the courts, assemblies at different levels, and executive departments and
institutions,
Cognizant of the immense tasks awaiting us for building adequate and effective institutions in enhancing our
performance,
The Congress:
I. Commends the successful efforts undertaken and results achieved in building institutions of national government
by overcoming various problems during the past three years,
2. Underlines the need to prepare for greater effort, conscious that building a government is a complex and long
process,
3. Pledges that the Front will contribute its share in the development of a strong national government that guarantees
nation-building, stability and progress.
VI. Reconstruction of Eritrea
Assessing the efforts exerted and the results achieved since Liberation to rehabilitate and revitilize the Eritrean
economy devastated by the long war and natural calamities,
Aware that transition is inherently difficult and jump-starting the economy even harder,
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Conscious that economic recovery is a complex and long process,
Aware that the measures necessary for economic recovery entail temporary hardships for the population,
Cognizant that the decisive fuctor is the work we undertake on the basis of self-reliance and the development of our
internal capabilities even if foreign assistance and investment play an essential role in the revitilization of our
economy,
Realizing that we should bear with our temporary hardships and focus our energies on lasting solutions, since
economic recovery and take off will necessarily take time,
Appraising the encouraging work undertaken after Liberation to expand educational, health and other services and
implement development programs in the rural and urban areas,
The Congress:
. Urges every Eritrean to work with dedication for the construction of the country by overcoming temporary
obstacles and difficulties with the same spirit of self-reliance and confident struggle displayed in achieving the
victory considered impossible by many,
2. Allirms that the development programs implemented so far are substantive and encouraging, taking all things into
account,
3. Resolves that our Front play active a catalytic role in ensuring the success of reconstruction programs.
VIII. State Administrative Divisions
Recalling that successive colonial powers had instituted different administrative set-ups to serve their interests in
Eritrea,
Recalling that these administrative set-ups served, among other things, the colonial policy of divide and rule,
Realizing that the administrative set-ups introduced by the colonial powers should, as all dysfunctional colonial
legacies, be supplanted by a new national administrative system,
Recalling that an administrative system serving our liberation strategy was operational during the armed struggle,
Convinced that a new national administrative system capable of serving nation-building, development programs,
efficient and effective governance and promoting decentralized administration should be establishment in free Eritrea
today,
The Congress:
1. Recommends that the existing administrative set-up inherited from colonialism be dismantled and replaced by a
new national administrative system to serve nation-building and development programs and promote decentralized
administration.
VIII. Land Issue
Aware that the prevailing land tenure system and associated laws and traditions are archaic, imposed by colonialism,
incompatible with the nation's demands of the moment, and self-contradictory.
Aware that the work of reconstruction and development is being obstructed and land disputes aggravated on account
of these laws and traditions,
Convinced that if a conducive environment for the socio-economic development of Eritrean society is to be created
and our country to secure a competitive position in the rapidly advancing world, the land tenure system must be freed
from the archaic and dysfunctional laws and tradition, and be:
• conducive to agricultural and industrial development,
• capable of providing initiative and incentives both to users and producers,
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• conducive to the promotion of private investment and initiative,
• preventive of animosity, contention and dispute,
• uniform and equally applicable throughout the country,
The Congress urges that the existing land tenure system which is obstructive of development be dismantled and
replaced by a land tenure system that:
1.Affirms the sole right of the state of land ownership,
2. Vests the state with supreme authority in the formulation and implementation of policy regarding the use and
distribution of land,
3. Bestows usufructory land rights on the people without any discrimination as to gender, religion, or ethnicity,
4. Allows the granting of land to a person or body for direct and effective use for residential or development
purpose,
5. Introduces a mode of land distribution that abolishes the prevailing land tenure system rooted in family, village,
tribal and similar parochial divisions of land, and replaces it by a uniform system based on individual use and
subject to verification by registry while recognizing that villages constitute the basis for the identity of citizens,
6. Makes it incumbent on the Government to provide due compensation for land taken from users for purposes of
reconstruction and development. Moreover, it urges the Government to issue this in the form of z proclamation
and to give utmost priority to its implementation.
IX. Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Combatants and Families of Martyrs
Assessing the efforts and measures undertaken to date to rehabilitate members of the army, the media and families of
martyrs,
Aware that their total rehabilitation is linked to the capacity of the national economy and that it requires time,
The Congress:
1.Commends the measures undertaken so far with the limited available resources to assist and rehabilitate members
of the army, the militia and families of martyrs,
2. Reiterates the imperatives to work with patience and vigor in the programs of rehabilitation and recovery of the
national economy convinced that the total rehabilitation of the members of the army, the militia and the families
of the martyrs is of crucial importance and, in the final analysis, the responsibility and mission of the people, the
Front and the Government.
X. Role of the EPLF Popular Organizations
Recalling the substantive contribution of our mass organizations in the liberated and enemy occupied areas and the
diaspora to our liberation struggle,
Cognizant that there are many who suffered in their private livelihood on account of their participation in the national
struggle,
The Congress:
1.Commends the role of the mass organizations in the victory of our struggle and urges them to play an enhances
role in the new phase,
2. Affirms that priority must be accorded in economic opportunities to all those whose livelihood has deteriorated
on account of this participation.
Xl. Enhancing the Social Position of Women
Recalling the heroic role that Eritrcan women played in the liberation struggle,
Cognizant of the changes brought about in the political and social Status of women through the revolution,
Aware that backward, oppressive and chauvinistic ideas and sentiments are still strong in our society,
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Realizing the existence of won-out ideas and attitudes that attempt to reverse the gains achieved during the revolution,
Noting that the building of a modern state is impossible without the broad participation of women and the solidarity
of men and women in equality,
The Congress:
1.Reaffirms its categorical rejection of all ideas and practices that oppress women and detract from,
2. Resolves to preserve, advance and expand the gains achieved in the revolution and to combat all attempts to
reverse or undermine them,
3. Resolves to draw up and implement programs to enable women to consolidate their political and social status,
guarantee their economic freedom by enhancing their role in production, and broaden their access to education
and training so that they may become self-sufficient and maximize their contribution,
4. Resolves to struggle to ascertain the right to women's equality in the family as well as in the ownership of land
and other property,
5. Resolves to extend unreserved support to strengthen the movement of Eritrean women.
Xli. Youth Affairs
Aware that the future of our society is linked to the state of our youth,
Recalling the decisive role of youth in our armed struggle and its victory,
Cognizant that in order to preserve and advance the gains of our liberation struggle and enable our country to
modernize equitably, it is essential that our youth be imbued with the heritage of the revolution, i.e. self-reliance, hard
work, and love of country and people, and carry forward the banner of our martyrs,
Realizing the crucial importance of the transmission of the heritage of our national struggle to posterity as nation
building is the work of generations,
The Congress:
1.Resolves that the Front take systematic measures, as well as encourage individual initiative, to effect the proper
documentation of the history of the armed struggle so as to teach and transmit this history and experience to our
youth and imbue them with values developed in the revolution,
2. Resolves to draw up and implement concrete measures to enable our youth to be productive and critical thinkers,
hard working and creative, and imbued with love of country and people as well as of truth and justice,
3. Affirms that the National Service Program is of great importance in the upbringing of youth and for gaining
experience.
Xliii. Repatriation and Reintegration of Eritrean Refugees
Aware that repatriation and reintegration of Eritrean refugees and the betterment of their livelihood is their basic
right,
Recalling that the EPLF has, during the struggle, established a Commission of Refugees and endeavored to repatriate
and reintegrate them with the expansion of the liberated areas,
Recognizing the effort of the Eritrean Government to repatriate and reintegrate Eritrean refugees, particularly those in
the Sudan who constitute the majority,
The Congress:
I. Supports the implementation of the program already drawn up to repatriate and reintegrate refugees with our
limited sources in the absence of adequate international assistance,
2. Calls on the international community to assist in the program of repatriation and reintegration of Eritrean
refugees.
XIV. Establishment of the National Assembly
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Recalling the decision of the seventh meting of the EPLF Central Committee regarding the Proclamation on the
Government of Eritrea and the establishment of the National Assembly,
Realizing that the Congress has to elect the representatives of the EPLF in the National Assembly,
Noting the need for changes in the composition of the National Assembly,
The Congress:
I. Affirms that the decisions of the seventh meeting of the Central Committee regarding the Proclamation on the
Government of Eritrea and the establishment of the National Assembly were appropriate and timely,
2. Resolves that the National Assembly be constituted of the 75 representatives of the People's Front for Democracy
and Justice (PFDJ), and an equal number of representatives elected by the population,
3. Resolves that the 75 representatives of the PFDJ shall be the members of the Central Council elected by the
Congress,
4. Resolves that the present members of the National Assembly coming from the provincial assemblies continue
provisionally until the establishment of the new administrative system and the subsequent election of the
representatives by the population.
XV. Regional and International Cooperation
Noting that Eritrea is fostering warm relations of cooperation with its neighbors, the region and the world at large
based on peace and non-alignment,
Aware that it is developing constructive relations with its neighbors aimed at securing the peace and stability of our
region and the promotion of all around cooperation,
Cognizant of the effort it is exerting to cnsolidate regional bodies,
Aware of the good relations and cooperation that are developing with the countries of the Middle East,
Cognizant of the efforts being exerted to establish and expand relations with African countries,
The Congress:
1. Urges that the effort already begun to expand and develop our relations and cooperation with our neighbors, the
countries of the region and the world at large on the basis of our policy of peace and non alignment be maintained
and intensified,





Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia
Negarit Gazetta
July 22nd 1991
EPRDF's Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia
WHEREAS the overthrow of the military dictatorship that has ruled Ethiopia for seventeen years presents a
historical moment, providing the Peoples of Ethiopia with the opportunity to rebuild the country and restructure the
state democratically;
WHEREAS the military dictatorship was, in essence, a continuation of the previous regimes and its demise marks
the end of an era of subjugation and oppression thus starting a new chapter in Ethiopia's history in which freedom,
equal rights and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles of political, economic and
social life and thereby contributing to the welfare of the Ethiopian Peoples and rescuing them from centuries of
subjugation and backwardness;
WHEREAS peace and stability, as essential conditions of development, require the end of all hostilities, the healing
of wounds caused by conflicts and the establishment and maintenance of good neighbourliness and co-operation;
WHEREAS for the fulfilment of the aforementioned conditions and for the reign of a just peace, the proclamation of
a democratic order is a categorical imperative, and;
WHEREAS to this end, all institutions of repression installed by the previous regimes shall be dismantled, regional
prejudices redressed and the rights and interests of the deprived citizens safeguarded by democratic government
elected by and accountable to the people;
WHEREAS from The Peace Loving and Democratic forces present in the Ethiopian society and having Varied
Views, having met in a Conference convened from July 1-5 in Addis Ababa have discussed and approved the charter
laying down the rules governing the Transitional Government as well as setting down the principles for the




Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, adopted and proclaimed by the General
Assembly by resolution 217 A(ffl) of December. 1948, individual human rights shall be respected fully, and without
any limitation whatsoever. Particularly every individual shall have:
(a) The freedom of conscience, expression, association and peaceable assembly;
(b) The right to engage in unrestricted political activity and to organise political parties, provided the exercise of such
right does not infringe upon the rights of others.
Article Two
The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed. To this end, each nation, nationality
and people is guaranteed the right to:
(a) Preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and develop its language;
(b) Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on
the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation;
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(c) Exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned nation/nationality and people is
convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated.
PART TWO
PRINCIPLES GUIDING FOREIGN POLICY
The Transitional Government will conduct its foreign relations on the basis of the principles of respect for the
sovereignty and equality of states and non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as the
promotion of mutual interests. Accordingly:
Article Three
The policy of destibilization and conflict-promotion hitherto actively pursued by the previous regime with respect to
the country's neighbours shall cease forthwith the issuance of this Charter.
Article Four
It shall abide by all mutual agreements that respect the sovereignty of Ethiopia and are not contrary to the interests of
the People.
Article Five
Local governments shall have the right to establish direct contact with relief organisations with respect to relief work.
PART THREE
STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
Article Six
There shall be established a Transitional Government consisting of a Council of Representatives and a Council of
Ministers.
Article Seven
The Council of Representatives shall be composed of representatives of national liberation movements, other political
organisations and prominent individuals to make-up a total of no more than 87 members.
Article Eight
The Transitional Government shall exercise all legal and political responsibility for the governance of Ethiopia until it
hands over power to a government popularly elected on the basis of a new Constitution.
Article Nine
The Council of Representatives shall exercise legislative functions as follows and oversee the work of the Council of
Ministers:
(a) draw-up its rules of procedure
(b) election of its Chairperson, who shall also be the Head of State, and a Vice-Chairperson and Secretary; the Head
of States shall appoint the Prime Minister whose appointment shall be approved by the Council of Representatives.
The Head of State, the Prime Minister, the Vice-Chairperson and Secretary of the Council of Representatives shall be
from different nations/nationalities;
(c) approve the Prime Minister's nomination of members of the Council of Ministers, draw-up on consideration of
ascertaining a broad national representation, technical competence and unswerving adherence to the Charter;
(d) initiation and promulgation of proclamations and decrees pursuant to the Charter;
(e) adoption of national budget;
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(1) provide for the administration of justice on the basis of the Charter; the Courts shall, in their work, be free from
any governmental interference with respect to items provided for in Part One, Article One of the Charter;
(g) establish the Constitutional Commission;
(h) ratil' international agreements;
(i) create committees for defence and security policy during the transitional period;
(j) provide the mechanism to ascertain the fair and impartial application of the mass media;
(k) issue just labour law that protects the rights and interests of the workers.
PART FOUR
TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMME




The Council of Representatives shall constitute the Constitutional Commission to draw-up a draft Constitution.
The Constitutional Commission shall submit to the Council of Representatives the draft constitution.
Article Eleven
Upon adoption of the draft constitution by the Council of Representatives, the Constitution shall be presented to the
people for discussion.
The final draft shall be presented for adoption to the Constituent Assembly to be elected pursuant to the final draft of
the Constitution.
Article Twelve
Elections to a National Assembly shall be held on the basis of the provisions of the new Constitution.
The Transitional Government shall hand-over the power to the parties that gain a majority in the National Assembly.
The said national elections shall be held no later than two years after the establishment of the Transitional
Government. Provided however, that the period can be extended by the Council of Representatives for no more than
six months.
Article Thirteen
There shall be a law establishing local and regional councils for local administrative purposes defined on the basis of
nationality. Elections for such local and regional councils shall held within three months of the establishment of the
Transitional Government, wherever local conditions allow.
B. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
The Transitional Government is unequivocally determined to ensure the delivery of relief assistance to areas ravaged
by war and drought. In connection with this:
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Article Fourteen
It shall gi'.e priorit) to the rehabilitation of those areas that have been severely affected by the war, prisoners of war,
e-prisoners of war as well as those sections of the population that have been forcibly uprooted by the previous
regimes policy villagisation and resettlement shall be done in accordance with their desire.
Article Fifteen
It shall take immediate steps to reconstruct or repair the infrastructure that has been destroyed or damaged by the war.
Article Sixteen
It shall eive special consideration to hitherto neglected and forgotten areas.
Article Seventeen
It shall make special efforts to dispel ethnic mistrust and eradicate the ethnic hatred that have been fostered by the
pre1ous regimes.
PART FIVE
LEGALITY OF THE ChARTER
Article Eighteen
This Charter shall sene as the supreme law of the land for the duration of the transitional period. Any law or
decision that is contrar) to the Charter shall be null and oid.
Article Nineteen
The Amharic and the English tevts of this Charter hae equal authenticity. Where disparity occurs between the two
languages the Council of RepresenLaties shall decide.
Article Twentx
The Charter chall be e1fecti e upon publication in the Negarit Gazetta.
Addis Ababa this 22nd day of July 1991
MELES ZENAWI
CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE
